Social representations of mental illness: A study of British and French mental health professionals. by Morant, Nicola Jill
SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS OF MENTAL ILLNESS 
A STUDY OF BRITISH AND FRENCH 
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS
Nicola Jill Morant
Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of 
The University of London for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy.
Department of Social Psychology 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
December 1996
UMI Number: U61542B
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U615423
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Scl(3i+(,i+
ABSTRACT
Based on the theory of social representations, the thesis explores how mental health 
professionals understand mental illness. The principle data source for this investigation 
is semi-structured interviews conducted with sixty mental health professionals in Britain 
and France, two countries currently moving towards community-based care for the 
mentally ill. Systematic qualitative analysis of these interviews (using QSR-NUDIST) 
is both grounded in the data and guided by previous research findings, theoretical 
considerations, and other data sources (policy documents and observations). Research 
explores how the nature, causes and treatment of mental ill health are represented by 
professionals, and provides an empirical test of the concept of ’professional social 
representations’. These are conceived as professional practitioners’ representations of the 
object of their work, which consist of five inter-related elements: practice, theory, 
professional identities, organisational factors and lay representations. Analysis highlights 
how, despite their ’expert’ status, mental health professionals adopt an agnostic stance 
and their representations are fraught with uncertainty, questioning and debate. Mental 
illness is understood as a polymorphous category, broadly divided into ’neuroses’ and 
’psychoses’ and understood in essentially social terms. Thus, various forms of 
difference, distress and disruption are central themes. Professional practice is 
conceptualised as a social rather than medical endeavour, which involves eclectic 
interventions in many aspects of clients’ daily lives. The dominant role in France of 
psychodynamic theories and practices is the only major difference between professionals 
in France and Britain. With contemporary shifts towards community-based care, 
practitioners experience added uncertainties and difficulties in renegotiating professional 
working relationships. The findings suggest that professional social representations serve 
important compromise functions, helping the practitioner community to reconcile the 
tensions and conflicting agendas of mental health work, and reflecting the unique role of 
professionals in the development and circulation of social knowledge. This research 
extends the scope of application and the conceptualisation of the theory of social 
representations.
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INTRODUCTION
’Mentally ill’, ’mad’, ’psychologically disturbed’, ’insane’, ’crazy’, ’nut-case’, ’cuckoo’. 
Whatever terms we use, in modem western society forms of mental distress rank amongst 
the most feared and misunderstood aspects of human existence, shrouded in mystery, 
intrigue, taboo, and enormous social stigma, and continuously attracting the attention of 
writers, artists, media producers, academics and politicians. The Office of Population, 
Census and Surveys (1994) estimates that one in seven people in Britain experience some 
kind of mental distress during their lifetime, alerting us to the fact that this is no marginal 
issue, but one of vast psycho-social relevance, with implications in our daily lives, in 
politics, in education and in the law.
This, then, is the starting point of this research. It is a vast arena within which any 
serious study must be selective. As a piece of social psychological research, this thesis 
is concerned to investigate the social meaning of ’mental illness’. This is not a new issue 
- volumes of literature already exist on how mental illness is construed socially, as the 
chapters which follow will attest. But this thesis offers a novel approach and focus in 
concentrating on how professionals who provide services for the mentally ill in two 
European countries - France and Britain - understand and react to mental illness.
1 Initial Comments on the Focus of the Thesis
Studying Mental Health Professionals
’there is a need to develop a truly sociological perspective on (mental) diseases and (mental) 
illness which takes into account the fact that such phenomena belong as much to social and 
cultural contexts as they do to persons. And that is why it is only through the study of the 
ways in which such things as psychiatric services are organised and the ways in which 
psychiatric issues are presented and re-presented through diverse forms of professional 
practice that we can arrive at a sound understanding of what psychiatric disorders are.’
(Prior, 1993, p 197)
There are many possible routes of access into societal understandings of mental distress. 
Analyses of the media, the daily lives of people with mental illness diagnoses, policy 
decisions and documentation, and numerous other social artifacts would all allow the 
social scientist to mine rich hermeneutic seams in this area. Motivated by a desire to
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capture the very tangible social practices and daily interactions which constitute much of 
the reality of mental illness in contemporary society, this thesis focuses on the practice- 
based understandings of mental health professionals. It aims to avoid a solely abstract 
and generalised level of analysis, which risks reducing to a dry intellectual argument, and 
to remain very much grounded in daily social reality. The ’real world’ of mental illness 
is socially constructed in the psychiatric out-patients clinic, the hospital ward, the day 
centre, the case conference. It is here that the fate of thousands of distressed people is 
decided by professionals whose work is to care for and treat the mentally ill in the ways 
they deem most appropriate, whether this is medication, psychotherapy or group 
activities. A study of the social representations of mental illness held by these 
professionals, of which these daily practices are a part, relates directly to the real 
experiences of people whose contact with mental health services defines them socially as 
mentally ill.
Mental health professionals play a uniquely powerful role in the changing construction 
of societal belief systems about mental distress. They occupy a distinctive position at the 
interface between expert and lay knowledge, belief systems whose basic assumptions and 
agendas may not necessarily correspond. It is through professionals’ daily practice that 
clinical research and government policies are implemented, and become integrated into 
social reality and societal belief systems. This thesis starts from the assumption that the 
ways we organize care and treatment for those suffering from mental health problems 
both reflects and constitutes how these problems are socially represented. Thus by 
studying what mental health professionals believe and practice in relation to ’mental 
illness’, we may gain insights into broader societal understandings of mental distress, as 
well as into social knowledge in a particular social group which warrants study in its own 
right.
During the early 1990s, as community care policies were debated and implemented in 
Britain, mental illness became an increasingly controversial social and political topic. In 
the space of only a few years policies have been introduced which attempt to reverse the 
historically established western European practice of marginalisation and segregation of 
those deemed mentally ill, and which constitute radical challenges to mental health 
professionals’ established working practices. Change stirs collective memories and 
highlights the arbitrary status of collectively constructed representations whose existence
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as a part of social reality has previously gone unchallenged1. In its desire to make sense 
of these new integrative policies and their implications, society is now engaged in 
vigorous discussion about the nature of mental illness and our reactions to it. This debate 
is played out in the media, in daily conversations, in medico-legal decision making, in 
mental health case conferences and so on. Following a prolonged history of being 
silenced and negated, mental illness has moved to the forefront of contemporary social 
debate. This makes the current time an opportune moment to capture a snap-shot of these 
renegotiation processes as they emerge and develop through the rapidly changing 
practices of mental health professionals. Through the active translation of policy
guidelines into specific practices with particular individuals, new professional 
representations are currently being negotiated and developed.
'Positioning1 of the Thesis
The thesis takes an explicitly constructionist perspective, the nature of which is elaborated 
in the following section. However, the adoption of a constructionist stance carries with it 
more than simply theoretical implications. If one recognises the socially constructed 
nature of collective belief systems and practices, then one must equally recognise the 
constructed nature of one's own work, indeed of the whole endeavour of academic 
psychology, as a culturally and historically situated practice (Rose, 1990). Accordingly, 
it is necessary to articulate the frames of reference which guide the thesis and form its 
point of departure, informing the reader of the prior knowledge, basic assumptions and 
choices about what to include and what not to include which contribute to the 'story'2 
told in the following chapters. In accounting for the 'positioning' of this thesis, I find it 
useful to make a somewhat arbitrary division between the related areas of 'theoretical', 
'methodological' and 'personal' positionings. Each of these is discussed in turn below.
1 Moscovici (1984, p 54) notes that 'the character of social representations is revealed especially in times of 
crisis and upheaval’.
2 I use the term 'story' to emphasis the constructed nature of any empirical research and the way it is re­
worked into a linear format for the purposes of a thesis. It should not be taken to imply that what is presented is 
simply 'anecdotal' or lacks the theoretical grounding and methodological rigour required for social 
psychological research.
'HO
Theoretically, the thesis is positioned within the framework of social representations 
theory. Whilst the form of constructionism that this implies is an issue of much current 
debate (Wagner, 1996), it is safe to say that the theory falls beneath the broad umbrella of 
social constructionist positions within the social sciences. It is therefore compatible with 
a range of other perspectives on mental illness (those considering gender or ethnicity, for 
example) which, although they do not form part the explicit theoretical and 
methodological framework of the thesis, are nevertheless taken-for-granted as the 
background to a theoretically focused piece of research. The specific theoretical 
concerns of this thesis are to extend and develop the theory of social representations in its 
application to professional (rather than lay) collective knowledge structures. It aims to 
investigate various structural and functional features of these ‘professional 
representations’, and to use the application of this theoretical model to the world of 
mental health practitioners as an initial empirical test of its validity.
In choosing to work within a social representational framework, other theoretical 
perspectives and foci have been given lower priority. For example, whilst literatures on 
gender and ethnicity are part of the core background reading for a social psychological 
study of mental illness, given the constraints of space and time, these are not included in 
the body of the thesis. Omission of this material does not imply that these contributions 
are judged uninteresting. The impact of gender, for example, on collective constructions 
of the mental health status of individuals (through differential manifestations of distress, 
help-seeking strategies, professional reactions, treatment decisions, the semantics of 
masculinity and femininity and so on) has been one of the most thoroughly researched 
areas of recent years in this field (Busfield 1996, Miles 1988, Ussher 1991). Similarly, 
the role of ethnicity and social class are not addressed explicitly, although these are both 
controversial areas in which inequalities have been identified (Dohrenwend & 
Dohrenwend 1969, Hollingshead & Redlich 1958, King et al 1994). In particular, ethnic 
inequalities in the diagnosis of certain mental illnesses and prevalence in specific mental 
health service settings are currently of great concern in the world of mental health 
practitioners3.
3 For example, in the British context, the over-representation of young Affo-Caribbean men in secure settings 
and given a diagnosis of schizophrenia is a finding noted by several studies (Harrison et al 1984, McGovern & 
Cope 1987). This example highlights the need to consider (actors such as gender and ethnicity in combination.
Essentially, choices had to be made, and for my theoretical and empirical interests these 
bodies of literature were judged to be of less centrality. Having said this, the empirical 
strategies adopted in the thesis are nevertheless designed to avoid theoretical blinkering. 
Whilst choice of data sources and styles of analysis are necessarily theoretically driven, 
the analytic approach allows possibilities for the data to 'speak' outside of this theoretical 
framework. There would be space, for example, for variations in the gender or race of 
the clinician or of the mentally ill person to emerge as a contributing factor in how mental 
ill health is differentially understood4 .
This brings us to a second area of 'positioning', namely the methodological stance 
adopted. The thesis presents a comparative study of collective professional knowledge in 
two countries - Britain and France. This focus was motivated originally by both 
theoretical and circumstantial factors (illustrating the inter-connections of the types of 
'positionings' I discuss here): A year of post-graduate study in Paris provided the ideal 
opportunity to embark on a cross-cultural piece of research. As my understanding of the 
theory of social representations increased during this time, I realised that comparative 
research could be an extremely valuable tool in bringing into sharp focus the social 
constructive processes associated with what is taken as 'natural' or 'normal' in any given 
society. From a substantive view-point, Britain and France offer an interesting 
comparison of two countries currently moving, each in their own particular way, towards 
'community care' for the mentally ill, united by many common western European values 
but simultaneously differentiated by others.
Whilst the theoretical assumptions of this thesis necessitate a full recognition of the impact 
of cultural, historical and local socio-economic and political factors in shaping the 
uniqueness of any single mental health service, investigations across a range of 'typical' 
adult mental health services in London and Paris have been conducted with the intention
and in relation to specific forms of mental distress, and to avoid assuming homogeneity within social groups 
which may lead to simplistic or over-deterministic arguments.
4 The fact the race and gender of both clinicians and clients do not emerge from analysis as significant 
variables could be interpreted as an important finding in its own right, given the importance of these 
demographic factors which has been so robustly demonstrated in other research.
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of making more generalisable observations about the forms of 'professional common 
sense' which proliferate in France and Britain in the 1990s. The style of empirical 
analysis conducted in this thesis reflects this concern. Its primary goal is to chart 
variations across interview respondents who are differentially located within worlds of 
mental health care in Britain and France. Again, the constraints of a thesis mean that 
adopting this strategy necessarily precludes others. For example, I have chosen not to 
explore narrative structures within each interview, a strategy which could well highlight 
some interesting findings regarding how individuals construct accounts of mental ill health 
within a (public) interview setting.
The actual process of conducting cross-cultural research is, of course, extremely difficult, 
not least in the personal challenge it poses to the researcher in adapting to and 
understanding the complexities and nuances of cultural mores. It also forces the 
researcher to consider the thorny issue of the 'cultural equivalence' of data collected and 
analysed by a researcher native to one country and foreign to another. Whilst some of 
these questions are addressed in the chapter on methodology, this limited account cannot 
do justice to the depth, complexity and personal struggles associated with these issues.
We are moving now into the realm of 'personal positioning'. There is always a personal 
or political agenda behind why anybody decides to study one phenomenon and not 
another (even if this had traditionally remained unacknowledged by mainstream 
psychology operating within the positivist paradigm and its ideal of objectivity). As a 
social constructionist researcher, one has an obligations to give at least some account of 
one's preconceptions and motivations from the start: My initial interest in studying mental 
illness from a social psychological perspective was sparked by the experience of working 
as a research assistant within a team of psychiatrists and clinical psychologists at the 
Institute of Psychiatry in London.. Fresh from the intellectual stimulation of masters 
study at the LSE, my first encounter with the inner world of the British mental health 
system was with the eyes of a social psychologist. But my reaction to this world was 
personal as well as academic. Doubtless I was not the first to have the impression of 
entering a whole new social arena, cut off from the world outside. What struck me 
initially was the 'taken-for-granted-ness' of the social dynamics which structure this
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world, and the way that certain implicit rules and assumptions about the nature of mental 
distress and the role of those employed in the mental health system seem to have 
developed an unquestioned life of their own. Despite the dramatically different context, I 
was struck by parallels with the exclusionary practices reported by Denise Jodelet (1991a) 
in a rural community in France. This seemed to me a perfect world in which to study the 
construction of collective understandings in daily practice, talk and organisational 
structures.
The prior knowledge that I bring to this study of the world of public mental health care is 
that of an interested outsider. Having worked in mental health, the social worlds in 
which I have moved whilst conducting this thesis have been populated with the very 
people I set out to study, namely clinical psychologists, psychiatric nurses, psychiatrists 
and others working in mental health services across London. This informal contact has 
proved a valuable resource in making contacts, checking the 'grass-roots' validity of 
somewhat esoteric ideas and concepts, and ensuring the social relevance of my work. 
Simultaneously, I have not become a true 'insider' - I have not pursued a training in 
clinical psychology that would enable me to become a mental health practitioner myself. 
Whilst those within these professions may argue that I can never really know what it is 
like to work in mental health, I would argue that this has also kept my mind fresh in a 
way which is necessarily overwritten by the socialisation process of any vocational 
training and the daily concerns of mental health practice. My lack of personal investment 
in professional ways of thinking and acting means that I can analyse and evaluate these on 
a different level. My position could be described perhaps as an 'outsider on the inside'. 
If I had been a clinician myself, the thesis I produced would undoubtedly have been 
different.
UF(v)
A note on constructionism
The theoretical basis of this study is the theory of social representations. This is an 
explicitly social approach to social psychology, which takes a constructionist position, and 
aims to provide a multi-level framework for understanding social phenomena, integrating 
psychological understandings with approaches from other social sciences. The reader will 
find this stance reflected in the thesis, which draws on research and writing from a range 
of social scientific sources, and in which consideration of social and political contexts is 
considered to be a vital component.
The epistemological issues associated with social constructionism are complex. Given 
that several different versions of social constructionism can be identified (Sarbin & 
Kitsuse, 1994; Gergen, 1985; Wetherell & Still 1996), I will outline the stance taken in 
this research. The version of social constructionism adopted in this thesis corresponds to 
Sarbin & Kitsusefs (1994) 'contextual constructionism', or to what Wetherell & Still 
(1996) term 'new realism'. It assumes that social meanings are constructed in response to 
phenomena which exist in some sense 'as a reality', and that to explore how societal 
understandings are constructed is not to refute the authenticity of certain ontological 
processes and entities. I take the view that what is termed 'mental illness' cannot be 
completely reduced to a social construction, and that this term corresponds in some way 
to a set of experiences and processes (even if these are heterogenous and vary across time 
and culture). The palpable signs of distress, disturbance and suffering experienced by the 
majority of people designated mentally ill cannot be simply dismissed as a social 
construction, even though this experience may be understood by that person and others in 
a socially determined way. As Mary Boyle puts it '(i)t is obviously the case that
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people claim to hear voices, speak incomprehensively and show other disturbing 
behaviours. What is contested is the interpretation of these observations’ (Boyle, 1990, 
p 166). To explore the socially constructed nature of concepts like mental illness is not 
to deny the existence of certain behaviours and experiences2.
The analytic focus of social representational research, and of this thesis, is on 
epistemological rather than ontological questions. Social representations theory is a 
theory of social knowledge concerned with psycho-social processes in the formation and 
maintenance of social beliefs systems, rather than with relationships between these 
knowledge structures and ontological reality (Markova, 1992). The very term 
’representation’ implies some sort of ’reality’ exterior to the representation. Although 
they may take on a social reality of their own, social representations are always symbolic 
of something. Having said this, pursuance of an analytic split between the experience 
of mental illness and the way it is socially represented should be avoided. After all, what 
defines mental illness in a very real sense is its attention by mental health services and 
the social processes which flow from this.
Terminology
Language use and choice of terms is never a neutral process. In this thesis I use the 
terms ’mental illness’, ’mental distress’ and ’mental health problems’ interchangeably. 
Use of the term ’mental illness’ should not be taken to imply a medical model - I 
recognise the users-movement argument that ’mental distress’ may be a more appropriate 
term which conveys experience rather than objective medical labelling. However, 
’mental illness’ is used as it is the term which holds the most social currency at the 
present time, especially within the community of mental health professionals with whom 
this research was conducted.
The thesis deliberately avoids the term ’madness’. Evidence from various studies
2 A common criticism levelled at social constructionist perspectives on mental illness has been their 
negation of the ’reality’ of mental illness (for example, Gove (1982) on labelling theories; Sedgewick (1982a) 
on the anti-psychiatry movement). These critiques are based, often incorrectly, on the assumption that what 
Sarbin & Kitsuse (1994) define as a ’strict’ constructionist perspective is being adopted. (A position of radical 
relativism in which the ontological status of social phenomena is questioned.) Such misunderstandings have 
often led to social constructionist perspectives on mental illness being dismissed by empiricists or by those who 
work with the mentally ill who adopt a strict realist approach to mental illness (Boyle, 1990).
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(Ayesteran & Paez 1986; Petrillo 1987; Serino 1987) suggests differences in the social 
connotations of the terms ’mental illness’ and ’madness’. ’Madness’ is seen much more 
in the realm of the bizarre, associated with dangerous and florid behaviour, and is a more 
specific term than the generic term ’mental illness’. ’Madness’ is also associated with 
pre-medical belief structures, and as such is less appropriate for a thesis written in the 
English language which focuses on contemporary mental health professionals3.
2 Overview of the Thesis
Writing a thesis is like telling a story. The writer constructs a structure which guides the 
reader through a body of research findings, analysis and theoretical ideas. In order for 
its focus to make sense beyond the world of the author, and its analytic and theoretical 
contribution to be evaluated, the construction of this story must necessarily be reader- 
centred. It does not, therefore, include all the various strands explored during the 
research, whose selective omission defines what is present in the final version of the 
thesis. Nor can a linear structure capture the circular nature of qualitative research. As 
such, the structure of this thesis bears witness more to this process of constructive story­
telling than to the chronological sequence of events and development of ideas from which 
it is constituted.
The thesis begins with a short preamble. Chapter 1 serves to set the scene, and to 
provide the reader with information about the field of study, namely mental health care 
systems in France and Britain. It reviews the history of mental health care in these two 
countries, illustrating a common historical legacy of marginalisation of the mentally ill, 
followed, in recent decades, by similar moves towards integrative, community-based 
policies and practices. Simultaneous with these broad similarities, France and Britain are 
also somewhat different in their current strategies of care for the mentally ill. Theoretical 
approaches to mental ill health have also differed, the most significant difference being 
the greater impact of psychoanalytic ideas in France.
3 The use of the term ’madness’ (la folie) in Denise Jodelet’s (1991a) study of social representations in 
a rural French community seems more appropriate than in this case for two reasons. First, it reveals the weight 
of pre-medical belief systems in contemporary lay understandings. Secondly, the term ’folie’ has more social 
currency in France than its equivalent in the English language. This is evidenced by French mental health 
professionals’ use of the term ’folie’ in the current research (see Chapter 5, section 1).
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Following this prologue, the main body of the thesis begins with Chapter 2. The 
literature review and exposition of the theoretical framework of the thesis are split 
between this and the following chapter. This division is intended to guide the reader 
from the general to the specific, focusing in Chapter 2 on lay and societal understandings 
of mental illness, and in Chapter 3 on mental health professionals and their practice-based 
beliefs about the nature and treatment of mental illness.
Chapter 2 introduces the central tenets of the theory of social representations which forms 
the theoretical foundations for this research. It presents the theory of social 
representations as a powerful tool which allows social psychologists to conceptualise 
processes of social knowledge production and circulation. Social representations are 
common sense theories or branches of knowledge which help individuals and collectivities 
make sense of phenomena in their social world. The strength of social representations 
theory lies in its ability to conceptualise both the agency of the individual and the power 
of society in this process. The second part of Chapter 2 provides a selective review of 
research and writing on mental illness as a social phenomenon conducted from the 
perspectives of social representations theory, social history, sociology and psychology. 
Uniting this work is the pervasive finding that mental illness is understood in western 
societies as a strange, threatening and dangerous ’other’, which has been marginalised 
throughout history by exclusionary practices at macro-social, group and inter-personal 
levels. It is suggested that as the manifestation of unreason and irrationality, mental 
illness is feared in modem western society because it represents loss of control over the 
self and an undermining of the very essence of person-hood. Representing mental illness 
as a distant and different ’other’ allows individuals and collectivities to make sense of a 
phenomenon which is socially and individually challenging. Within this context, 
contemporary policies of reintegrating the mentally ill into society constitute a dramatic 
challenge to society’s historically rooted understandings and reactions to mental distress.
Chapter 3 begins by returning to the theory of social representations, this time with the 
aim of developing a theoretical tool to study professionals. When the world of 
professionals is the focus of study, several problematic aspects of the original theory are 
identified. To overcome these problems, a model of ’professional social representations’ 
is proposed. Five ’building blocks’ of professional social representations are proposed: 
theory, practice, professional roles and identities, lay representations, and organisational
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factors. This model conceptualises professional practitioners as fulfilling a unique role 
in the circulation of social knowledge, acting as translators, vectors and integrators of 
diverse knowledge sources between various social worlds. Following this theoretical 
elaboration, Chapter 3 returns to research on mental illness, this time, with the specific 
focus on understandings amongst mental health professionals. It elaborates the theories, 
roles and daily practices which characterise the world and work of mental health 
professionals, and highlights the multiplicity and diversity of understandings of mental 
distress available to mental health practitioners.
In Chapter 4 the methodology of the current empirical investigations is set out. This 
chapter constitutes a deliberate attempt to sketch a clear and transparent path through the 
practical processes of qualitative data collection and analysis, allowing the reader to 
evaluate the study’s findings with full knowledge of the procedures from which they are 
derived. Although the theory of social representations does not privilege any particular 
method of research, the use of semi-structured interviews complemented by secondary 
data sources (documentary evidence, observations and interviews with key informants) 
is compatible with the epistemological assumptions of the theory in accessing social life 
in situ, integrating individual and collective perspectives, and providing tools for in-depth 
exploration of content. After describing data collection procedures, the chapter considers 
recent developments in the use of computer technology for analysing qualitative data. 
A detailed account of how the process of analysis is both aided and shaped by the use of 
a specific computer package, ’QSR-NUDIST’ is provided. Analysis is both grounded in 
the data and motivated by certain theoretical preconceptions, aiming to inform 
understandings on both substantive and theoretical levels. It is essentially qualitative and 
thematic, but makes some use of quantitative measures. The final section of Chapter 4 
considers the thorny issue of the ’credibility’ of qualitative analysis. It argues that a 
dynamic concept of credibility is needed, and that this can be best assessed through 
multiple criteria. In aiming to ensure its own credibility, the current research adopts 
strategies of ’triangulation’, ’researcher reflexivity’ and ’transparency’.
The following three chapters, Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present the empirical findings of the 
thesis. This begins in Chapter 5 with an analysis of mental health professionals’ most 
basic understandings of the concept of mental illness and its causes. Two key features 
which characterise these representations are uncertainty and multiplicity. No single
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uncontested representation of mental illness emerges, and there is constant debate and 
questioning. For mental health practitioners, mental illness is a polymorphic category 
whose boundaries are not clearly defined, and within which an important binary 
opposition between ’neuroses’ and ’psychoses’ is made. Mental illness is defined in 
essentially social terms, as experiences and social behaviour which are in some way 
different from the norm, distressing (either to the person or to other people), and 
disruptive of social life and personal relationships. For professionals, mental illness is 
not definitively ’other’ - themes of mental illness as a fragile but powerful ’other’ 
compete with themes of similarity. This is one important way in which ’psychosis’ and 
’neurosis’ are differentiated. Professionals’ understandings of the causes of mental illness 
highlight the agnosticism which permeates these representations. Complex but 
provisional causal models draw upon ideas derived from several theoretical perspectives, 
whilst remaining consistent with common sense. Within these causal understandings, 
psychodynamic ideas are given more weight in France, whereas medical and social 
perspectives carry more weight in British.
Chapter 6 focuses on professional practice, illustrating how professionals’ social 
perspective on mental illness and the multiplicity and agnosticism which pervade their 
representations are lived out in eclectic treatment strategies. The chapter focuses on three 
investigative areas. Firstly, it explores what professionals aim to achieve in their daily 
work. This highlights how professionals conceptualise their work as a social rather than 
medical endeavour, which targets both intra-psychic problems and life-style issues. Their 
ultimate aim is to enhance the quality of their clients’ lives within the parameters of 
social acceptability and the enduring existence of mental illness. The second part of 
Chapter 6 investigates the practical strategies that professionals use to achieve these aims. 
In their dual concerns with long-term care and crisis intervention, professionals make use 
of an eclectic package of measures including medication, group activities and various 
’talking therapies*. All of these practical strategies are underpinned for professionals by 
the quality of the relationships they establish with clients. In enabling a connection with 
mental illness, relationships form the bedrock of professional practice. The third area 
of investigation centres on the role of theory in professional representations. Links 
between theoretical understandings and daily practice are typically weak, but theories 
serve several important functions acting as anchors, post hoc justifications for practice, 
components of professional identity construction, and tools to manage relationships with
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mental illness.
The third analytic chapter, Chapter 7, explores professionals’ experiences and evaluations 
of recent moves towards community-based care. The historical significance of this 
relatively rapid shift after several centuries of marginalisation is reflected in its 
disorienting effect within worlds of mental health care. Whilst there is general consensus 
that moves towards community-based care are a desirable ideal, professionals perceive 
significant discrepancies between this and the reality of its implementation. Especially 
in Britain, concern over the limitations imposed by financial constraints is considerable, 
and there is a pervading sense of powerlessness. Implementing new styles of care raises 
particular issues in the domain of professional inter-relationships: Multi-disciplinary team 
working is often experienced as a double-edged sword which overcomes old hierarchies 
but poses new problems of role blurring and ambiguities. Within this, the difficulties 
experienced by social workers and clinical psychologists reflect, respectively, on-going 
debates regarding the remit of mental health services and their relationships with other 
social agencies, and shifts in the traditional dominance of the medical profession. 
Section 3 of this chapter conceptualises current community care policies as effecting 
professional representations of mental illness in three inter-related ways. Firstly, novelty, 
ambiguities and lack of knowledge add uncertainty to representations already 
characterised by much agnosticism and confusion. Second, community care constitutes 
a significant challenge to both lay and professional representations of mental illness. And 
finally, new policies highlight conflicting agendas, bringing into sharp focus the unique 
and difficult ’cross-road’ position of mental health professionals.
The final chapter of the thesis, Chapter 8, draws together its principle empirical findings 
and uses these as the basis for reflection on both theoretical and substantive issues. A 
common theme which emerges across all areas of empirical analysis is that professionals 
understand mental ill health not as an isolated medical event, but in relation to the norms 
of the social world. Despite their expert status, professionals’ representations of mental 
illness are characterised by unusually high levels of agnosticism and uncertainty. 
Professionals of all disciplines are united by broadly similar representations, and 
commonalities between Britain and France generally outweigh differences. The chapter 
argues that a key function of professional social representations is the construction of 
compromise solutions in response to the ethical dilemmas and tensions which are raised
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in many people-based professions, but are particularly rife in the work of mental health 
practitioners. A number of theoretical issues are discussed. These include how otherness 
themes, multiplicity and ambiguity can be accounted for within the framework of social 
representations theory, and a call for a more complex conceptualisation of ’unfamiliarity’ 
than is currently provided. The thesis ends by considering potential avenues of future 
research, and evaluating its contributions in furthering understanding of contemporary 
mental health work, and suggesting practical strategies which may ultimately improve the 
lot of the mentally ill. For example, training to challenge professional representations 
of psychosis as an un-understandable ’other’, and greater participation of practitioners in 
organisational and policy changes may contribute to the successful implementation of 
community-based care as it develops in years to come.
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CHAPTER 1
SETTING THE SCENE: MENTAL HEALTH CARE PAST AND PRESENT
This short chapter serves as a prologue to the thesis. It provides the reader with 
information about the field of study which is a necessary prerequisite to understanding 
the analyses and arguments which this study presents. Specifically, it reviews the 
contextual background to this research project, namely historical and contemporary 
societal reactions to mental illness. A discussion of the history of mental health care in 
France and Britain begins the chapter (section 1). Following this, section 2 moves into 
the present day, reviewing the principle features of contemporary mental health care 
policies in both countries.
1 A  Brief H istory of  M ental H ealth Care in  Britain and France
The history of societal reactions to mental illness in Europe has been elaborately 
investigated by many authors (for example, Barham 1992, Busfield 1986, Foucault 1967, 
Mangen 1985, Miller 1993, Pichot 1983, Porter 1987, Prior 1993, Scull 1979, 1981). 
These reviews suggest broad similarities in the historical development of reactions to 
mental distress in France and Britain. Although the confinement of paupers, mad people 
and other social deviants began in Europe in the seventeenth century, mental illness first 
became the specific target of State involvement in the early nineteenth century. Acts of 
parliament were passed in most European countries requiring the establishment of 
asylums to care for those designated mentally ill. The construction of asylums in remote 
areas deliberately distanced from centres of population served to marginalise mental 
illness, for the supposed good of both society and the inmates themselves. Foucault 
(1967) argues that this move initiated the medicalisation of madness and its 
transformation into mental illness which has shaped our understandings of mental distress 
ever since. A view of madness caused by imbalances in humours, spirits and vapours 
and tensions within the bodily system was gradually replaced by a more ’scientific’ view 
in which problems were localised in the brain. Mental illness fell under the medical gaze 
of ’mad doctors’ and ’alienists’, whose ideas and practices developed in tandem on both 
sides of The Channel. (Early British psychiatrists were strongly influenced by prominent
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French psychiatrists such as Esquirol and Pinel.) The development of nineteenth century 
asylums set the stage for societal reactions to mental distress centred around the twin 
themes of medicalisation and marginalisation. Long term incarceration, squalid 
conditions, overcrowding and inhumane practices became the norm in French and British 
asylums, and this approach to mental illness remained relatively unchallenged well into 
the twentieth century1.
During the first half of the twentieth century, medical interest in mental illness continued 
to develop and asylums became places not only of containment, but also of ’treatment’. 
The remit of psychiatric institutions widened from custody and control to include the 
possibility of cure (Prior, 1993). Developments of medical treatments such as electro- 
convulsive therapy and psychosurgery in the 1930s served to enhance the medicalisation 
of mental illness which had begun in the early nineteenth century, although at this stage, 
there was little challenge to the view that the mentally ill should be segregated from 
society.
It was not until the 1950s that the role of the asylum began to be seriously questioned. 
Following World War II there was a growing trend towards State involvement in public 
health and welfare in most European countries. Together with the development of 
phenothiazines in the 1950s, and increased recognition of the role of social factors in 
mental illness2, this marked the beginning of changes in State reactions to mental illness. 
Essentially, this constituted a Widening in the attentions of mental health practitioners into 
areas of prevention, social relations, behaviour and the mind which, in the custodial 
model of asylums, had previously been left unexplored. While the influence of
1 Some notable exceptions were the attempts to develop more humane ways of dealing with the 
mentally ill by a small number of psychiatrists. Under the influence of the Gheel Lunatic Colony in 
Belgium, a handful of ’colonies’ or ’community schemes’ were established during the nineteenth century:- 
a village scheme in Bicknill, England; the farm-hospital of Sainte-Anne, then on the outskirts of Paris; the 
two ’family colonies’ of Ainay-le-Chateau (1897) and Dun-sur-Aron (1891) in central France described by 
Jodelet (1991a), as well as other experimental schemes in Scotland and Germany (Parry-Jones, 1981). 
Although these schemes influenced only a tiny minority of the mentally ill, they were an important influence 
in the more recent development of community-based strategies of mental health care.
2 Epidemiological studies such as those conducted by Faris & Dunham (1939) and Hollingshead 
& Redlich (1958) began to demonstrate a link between social positioning and the prevalence of mental 
illness. During the 1940s the Tavistock Clinic developed group therapies for war neuroses, while Maxwell 
Jones was developing the principles of ’therapeutic communities’.
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psychiatry remained strong (the American Psychiatric Association first published its 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) in 1952 and its forth 
edition is now used internationally by psychiatrists), this began to supplemented by other 
approaches to mental ill health. A wave of therapeutic optimism developed among 
mental health experts leading, by the end of the 1950s, to a growing belief in the 
possibility of more community based care. For the first time, institutionalisation was not 
the only option for those with long-term mental disturbances. Pharmacological control 
of symptoms suggested the possibility that patients could be engaged in more genuine 
human relationships, the development of a variety of psychotherapeutic techniques and 
the possibility of rehabilitation into the community. These ideas formed the building 
blocks of moves towards care of the mentally ill in the community in most European 
countries. However the translation from ideas to practice has taken several decades and 
has been achieved in different ways in France and Britain.
2 Contem porary  Mental Health Care Strategies 
2.1 France
The development of mental health care in France in the last three decades is characterised 
by the proliferation of many new and radical ideas at an early stage, followed by a much 
slower and less dramatic translation of these ideas into practice. Moves towards 
community based care have been under way since 1985 and this gradual change process 
is still on-going.
The 1950s, 1960s and 1970s saw a huge proliferation of psychodynamic ideas, both 
within mental health and in French society more generally (Castel & Le Cerf, 1980; 
Turkle, 1979). This centred around the ideas of Jacques Lacan, leader of a new school 
of French psychoanalysis, whose ideas represented a radical reworking of the early 
writings of Freud (see Appendix 3). His anti-biological, anti-establishment, poetic, 
linguistic and political version of psychoanalysis captured the Zeitgeist of French 
intellectual society. Moscovici’s (1976) study of the infiltration of psychoanalysis into 
French society in the late 1950s showed moderate diffusion of psychoanalytic concepts 
into many sections of society. However, following the left-wing movement of the late
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1960s, centred around ’Les Evenement’ of May 1968 psychoanalysis was elevated to ’the 
rank of a major ideology’ in contemporary French society (Moscovici, 1984, p58)3.
In the post World War II decades French mental health services had been dominated by 
medical approaches, with psychoanalytic ideas making a marginal impact. The 
developments of the 1950s described above began to be detected beyond the world of 
mental health as early as 1960, when a Ministerial Circular stated that ’(t)he essential 
principle in the struggle against mental illness is to separate the patient from his family 
and social environment as little as possible. ... It must not be forgotten that the majority 
of the mentally ill present important medico-social problems which cannot be resolved 
by hospitalisation, and that hospitalisation may even be detrimental’ (from Jaeger, 1989, 
pl7, my translation.) However, this was not accompanied by legislative changes and 
psychiatric in-patient numbers in France continued to rise over the next two decades. In 
this context, the political events of 1968 fuelled a desire for real changes amongst many 
mental health practitioners. Drawing on both Lacanian theory, and the anti-psychiatry 
movement which was developing in Britain and the United States, there were calls for 
a radical overhaul of the French mental health system. Some attempts were made to 
develop a new approach based on analytic psychotherapy (for example the mental health 
services of the 13th arrondissement of Paris, developed by La Borde and colleagues). 
However, for the most part, the principle effect of these radical ideas in mainstream 
mental health care was the infiltration of psychoanalytic approaches into a system which 
remained structurally unchanged. French mental health became dominated by a 
combination of medical and psychoanalytic ideas and practices (Castel, 1981), although 
the last decade has seen a gradual waning of interest in psychoanalytic approaches.
It was not until 1985 when legislation on ’sectorisation’ was passed, that any significant 
changes to styles of mental health care in France were implemented. ’Sectorisation’ or 
’la psychiatrie de secteur’, based on approaches to public mental health developed by 
Daumezon in Paris in the 1950s, represents the French approach to community based
3 In a study similar to Moscovici’s research, Turkle (1979) found that the extent of diffusion and 
penetration of psychoanalytic ideas into French society was much greater in the early 1970s compared to 
the 1950s. She found interest and understanding across people of all ages and classes, and a six fold 
increase in the percentage of middle class people who claimed that psychoanalysis was a frequent subject 
for conversation.
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care for the mentally ill (Gittleman et al, 1973). (It also applies to services for the 
elderly, people with learning disabilities and children.) ’La psychiatrie de secteur’ is 
based on the principles of a decentralised system in which highly localised networks of 
hospital and community based services are provided by autonomous multidisciplinary 
mental health teams. The 1985 legislation divided France into 789 geographical 
’secteurs’, containing an average population of 70,000. It required a reduction in the 
number of hospital beds and recommended the development of services focusing on 
prevention, rehabilitation and community based support. ’Centres medico-psychologique’ 
would form the basis of community based services, complemented by day centres, 
hospital out-patient departments, 24 hour crisis centres and sheltered accommodation.
At the time of this research project the new ’psychiatrie de secteur’ is still being 
negotiated. The shift in France towards care of the mentally ill in the community is 
gradual. It is neither as rapid nor as radical as the changes in Britain. In-patient 
facilities still form an important part of the mental health system and are mainly provided 
in the large psychiatric institutions constructed in the nineteenth century. This means that 
for many secteurs, hospital facilities are located a long way from the secteur itself, 
leading to lack of integration between hospital and community services and personnel. 
This has also enabled the peaceful coexistence of medical and psychoanalytic approaches. 
Professionals of a psychoanalytic orientation, and those most influenced by the social 
movements of the late 1960s have appropriated community based services, while hospitals 
have remained bastions of medical power.
As an indication of the recent changes, average lengths of hospital admissions have 
gradually reduced over the last three decades (from eleven months in 1965 to three 
months in 1989), although this period has also seen a three fold increase in readmissions 
(Jaegar, 1989). However, average figures such as these mask the considerable variations 
which characterise contemporary mental health services in France. The decentralised 
system places decisions regarding the development of services and use of financial 
resources in the hands of ’chefs de secteur’ (invariably a consultant psychiatrist). As a 
result the development of community based services varies enormously across secteurs 
(Mangen & Castel, 1985). In some, hospital admissions are kept to a minimum and a 
wide range of community services has been developed. In others, mental health services 
remain essentially hospital based with only minimal development of community services.
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The descriptions of the mental health services in which research was conducted in 
Appendix 1 provide examples of contemporary mental health services in three secteurs 
in the Paris region.
2 .2  Britain
In comparison to the gradual and variable shift in styles of mental health care in France, 
contemporary mental health services in Britain have been shaped principally by recently 
introduced policy changes. Since the late 1980s sweeping policy changes have been 
imposed across all areas of health and welfare provision. Not only have changes in 
mental health care been extremely rapid in recent years, but they have also been more 
politicized than in France. As a consequence, these changes have been the focus of a 
large body of literature in the social sciences (see, for example, Barham, 1992; Bomat 
etal, 1993; Braden-Johnson, 1990; Busfield, 1986; Murphy, 1991; Ramon, 1992; Sayce, 
1990; Sharkey & Bama, 1990). The purpose of this review is not to get involved in 
these evaluative debates4, but to highlight the recent policy changes which most authors 
would agree have shaped mental health care in Britain in the 1990s.
Contemporary policy changes can be traced back to the post World War II period when 
the idea of community based care for the mentally ill as a viable alternative to large scale 
institutionalisation began to gain ground5. This was fuelled by the diversification of 
perspectives on mental ill health which occurred in the 1950s and 1960s. The rise of 
social theories of mental illness (translated into social psychiatry), and developments in 
psychology, (translated into cognitive and behavioural therapies) were especially 
prominent during this period6. While psychodynamic ideas prevailed in France, their 
impact remained marginal and indirect in Britain, entering mainstream mental health care
4 Common themes in this literature include concerns about lack of adequate financial resources, the 
ideologies underpinning recent policy changes, the gap between policy rhetoric and practice, and the difficulties 
of introducing community based care in the face of public scepticism or opposition.
5 The term ’community care’ first appears in a report by the Royal Commission on the Law Relating to 
Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency in 1957 (Bulmer, 1987), and the principle of reorienting mental health 
care away from the asylum was expressed in the Mental Health Act of 1959 (Mangen & Rao, 1985).
6 See Appendix 3 for a review of these theoretical approaches to mental illness.
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primarily through group therapy, with individual psychoanalysis remaining within private 
practice. The anti-psychiatry movement of the 1960s constituted a vehement attack on 
institutional care and added further strength to calls for changes in mental health policies. 
In response, a series of government White Papers in the 1970s and 1980s began to 
provide legislation for the gradual dismantling of institutional care and development of 
community services. However, most commentators regard the publication of the Griffiths 
Report in 1988 as the key initiator of a series of policies which have reshaped 
contemporary mental health services in Britain.
The government commissioned report by Sir Roy Griffiths in 1988 set the tone for the 
development of community care for the mentally ill in Britain. It recommended that the 
responsibility for community care should be taken primarily by local authorities, and that 
provision of community services by the private and voluntary sectors should be 
encouraged. A series of government White Papers followed, culminating in the massive 
reorganisation of health and social service resources set out in the 1990 NHS and 
Community Care Act. Legislation in this Act, in which financial control of all non­
hospital based care for the mentally ill, the elderly and people with learning difficulties 
was transferred to local authorities, was implemented in stages during the beginning of 
the 1990s. Changes in mental health care were only one aspect of a range of policies 
transforming health and social services to reflect the right wing ethos of the ruling 
Conservative government. This included a general reduction of the welfare state, major 
cuts in public spending, and the introduction a market structure and ideology into health 
service provision.
Within this context, the introduction of community care for the mentally ill in Britain has 
become a major political and social issue in recent years, commanding much media 
attention and debate amongst the public, mental health professionals and academics alike. 
What began as a principle often associated with left-wing ideologies and social criticism 
has been appropriated in Britain by the political right and firmly relocated at the heart of 
their individualistic and consumerist policies. ’Community care’ has become something 
of a ’buzz word’, an emerging term associated with value-laden rhetoric, whose definition 
remains fluid and unclear. The general aims of recent policy changes have been to 
encourage provision of care for the mentally ill based on a consumerist model of care and 
the twin themes of independence and normalization. Policy rhetoric seeks to reconstruct
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the previously disempowered and institutionalised patient as an independent consumer in 
a free market society. This is implemented in strategies attempting to achieve the 
following aims: reductions in the number of people hospitalised for mental health 
problems and lengths of hospital admissions; provision of care principally in small, 
locally based, non-residential units in the community; flexible and individualised service 
provision targeted towards those with the greatest needs; an integrated network of 
services targeting treatment, prevention and rehabilitation; the provision of these services 
jointly by health and social service agencies; and an increasing role for private and 
voluntary sector agencies in the provision of services, together with increasing reliance 
on networks of family and friends in caring for the mentally ill. The achievement of 
these aims depends on multi-disciplinary mental health teams in which community based 
and non-medical professions (social workers, case managers, community psychiatric 
nurses) play an increasingly important role.
The speed with which these changes have been implemented in recent years is one of the 
defining features of mental health care provision in recent years in Britain. There has 
been widespread reduction of hospital capacities, with the closure of many large 
psychiatric hospitals dating back to the nineteenth century, and little time to develop a 
network of community services. The development of community services has also been 
hampered by financial constraints. The changes charted in this section represent a huge 
shake up of mental health services in a very short period of time. Unlike in France, 
these are the result of politically motivated changes imposed on mental health services 
’from above’. Appendix 1 presents descriptions of the mental health services in London 
where research was conducted. This provides examples how these policies have been put 
into practice in specific mental health services.
The first section of this chapter highlights how France and Britain share a common 
historical heritage in the ways they have reacted to mental illness. The large scale 
segregation of the mentally ill from main stream society reigned unchallenged up until 
the middle of the twentieth century. Mental distress became not only medicalised, but 
also regarded as something dangerous and beneath humanity. Within this historical 
context, the shift towards integration of the mentally ill into the community which has
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occurred in recent decades in France and Britain represents a dramatic change in societal 
reactions to mental illness. It also represents an expansion beyond medical interventions. 
The relocation of mental health care within the community has been associated with a 
diversification in the types of interventions, treatment strategies and professional groups 
associated with the mentally ill.
During the late twentieth century there has been a general trend throughout Europe and 
north America towards care of the mentally ill in the community. (Similarities across the 
European community have been noted by Mangen 1985, Riviere 1991, and Rowland et 
al 1992.) France and Britain have participated in this movement, although they have 
implemented strategies in somewhat different ways. Community based care for the 
mentally ill in France is characterised by variations and gradual change, and is still in the 
process of becoming. In Britain, more rapid and dramatic changes have been imposed 
in recent years. The association of these changes with political agendas has meant that 
community care in Britain is currently an important social issue. Recent decades have 
also seen both similarities and divergences in the development of theoretical 
understanding of mental illness. While the influence of anti-psychiatry and social models 
of mental illness was felt on both sides of The Channel, psychoanalytic ideas have 
dominated in France, whilst psychological and social understandings have held more sway 
in Britain.
This brief review of the history of mental health care and the development of 
contemporary strategies of mental health care in two countries serves as a springboard 
to the main body of this thesis. Having set the scene in this preamble, we can now turn 
to address the theoretical framework which orients this analysis of how mental illness is 
understood by contemporary mental health professionals in Britain and France.
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CHAPTER 2
SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS OF MENTAL ILLNESS
This chapter begins the main body of the thesis. It serves to orient and position the thesis 
both theoretically and substantively. The theory of social representations, which provides 
the theoretical framework for this research study is introduced, followed in section 2 by 
an overview of a large and heterogenous body of theory and research on lay and societal 
understandings and reactions to mental illness. This selective literature review provides 
a necessary backdrop to a study focused on mental health professionals, whose practices 
form part of this broader representational tapestry. The chapter ends with a brief 
consideration of the implications of these common sense understandings for professionals 
working to treat and care for the mentally ill.
Section 1 documents the basic tenets of social representations theory1 and is based on a 
reading of the works of some of its principle proponents (Farr 1987,1989; Jodelet 1991a, 
1991b; Moscovici 1981, 1982, 1984, 1987, 1988). While the theory has inspired much 
lively and critical debate (see, for example, Harre 1984, Jahoda 1988, Potter 1996, Potter 
& Litton 1985, Raty & Snellman 1992), we will not enter into these debates at this point. 
Critical evaluation of aspects of the theory relating to the empirical and substantive focus 
of this research will be tackled in Chapter 3, and in Chapter 8 aspects of the empirical 
findings will be used to support suggestions for some modifications to the theory.
1 Th e  Theory  of  Social  R epresentations: An  Initial O verview
For social psychologists wishing to break out of the individualistic and cognitive 
approaches which have dominated social psychology in the English speaking world from 
the 1960s to the mid 1980s, the theory of social representations is an exciting 
development. Although its reception has generally been most positive in European and
1 While I will adopt the convention of referring to the theory of social representations, this should not be 
taken to imply a consistent and well defined theory in the strict sense. There is currently much diversity of 
opinion about even the most basic epistemological tenets amongst researchers working under the umbrella of 
social representations. I would agree with Wagner (1996) that it may be preferable to refer to the social 
representations approach.
32
Latin American countries, it is clear that together with discourse analysis and social 
identity theory, the theory of social representations is now part of a significant shift 
towards more social approaches within English language social psychology. This is 
evidenced by its inclusion in recently produced undergraduate texts on social psychology 
(eg Augoustinos & Walker 1995; Wetherell 1996), as well as by a growing body of 
empirical research using the theory (see for example Farr & Moscovici 1984; Breakwell 
& Canter 1993).
Social representations theory is essentially a theory of social knowledge. It was 
developed originally by Serge Moscovici as a tool to guide research on understandings 
of psychoanalysis in 1950s French society (Moscovici 1976). While drawing on the 
Durkheimian notion of collective representations - socially shared beliefs about broad 
topics such as religion or science - Moscovici regarded Durkheim’s notion as too static 
for social psychologists studying contemporary society. If they wish to understand the 
dynamic processes through which understandings develop and circulate in late modem 
societies characterised by diversity, reflexivity, an explosion of mass media and 
communication channels, and disintegration of central institutions and their doctrines 
(Giddens, 1991), social psychologists need a theory which can capture the fluidity of 
these individual and social processes. The theory of social representations sets out to 
provide this framework. Its strength lies in its ability to conceptualise both the agency 
of individuals and the power of society, and to capture the dialectical nature of their 
inter-relationship.
The theory of social representations takes an essentially social approach to social 
psychology. Moscovici sees social representations as part of a ’thinking society’ in which 
the thinking is done out loud. Social reality is constructed and negotiated through the 
talk, activities and interactions of individuals and groups, which are part and parcel of 
wider collective practices and belief systems lived out through the structure of society and 
its institutions. From this point of view, society becomes the focus of study rather than 
simply the backdrop, and can no longer be reduced to the sum of a collection of 
individuals. What constitutes a thinking society is greater than the sum of its parts j Not 
only does the theory aim to integrate intra-psychic, inter-individual and societal 
processes, but it also recognises the value of drawing upon social psychology’s sister 
disciplines in the social sciences. As Jodelet (1991b) notes, it is this brave position at
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the crossroads between psychology, sociology, anthropology and social history that lends 
the theory of social representations its richness. There is the possibility for integration 
of a range of perspectives and accompanying methodologies, and for theoretical advances 
through the combination of different approaches from disciplines which have traditionally 
followed rather separate paths in their understanding of social phenomena.
Social representations theory also takes an explicitly social constructionist stance2. 
Moscovici stresses that social representations are involved in a complex interaction 
between the re-presentation and the creation of social reality. They are involved jointly 
in the creation of images and in the creation of meaning. Moscovici offers the following 
definition of social representations:
’a set of concepts, statements and explanations originating in daily life in the course of inter­
individual communications. They are the equivalent, in our society, of the myths and belief 
systems in traditional societies; they might even be said to be the contemporary version of 
common sense.' ... 'They have a curious position somewhere between concept whose 
purpose it is to distil the meaning of the world, to make it more orderly, and perceptions that 
reproduce the world in a reasonable manner.’ (Moscovici 1981, p 181 and p 184).
This constructionist position sees content as equally as important as process, and the split 
between subject and object as meaningless. Social representations cannot be separated 
from the individuals, social groups and collectivities that create and use them. Their 
content reflects something of the experiences and positionings of those who hold them. 
’The representor is thus present in the thing represented’ (Moscovici, 1988, p 232). The 
theory also looks beyond the cognitive and the rational, considering the symbolic, the 
unconscious and the emotional as valid aspects of social psychological investigation.
Common sense theories or shared branches of knowledge - in other words, social 
representations - serve to familiarise what is unfamiliar. These may be concepts or
1 Social constructionism is defined by Gergen (1985) as based on one or more of the following four 
assumptions: Radical doubt in the taken-for-granted world, inviting challenges to the objective basis of 
conventional knowledge; a view of terms in which the world is understood as social artifacts and products of 
historically situated interactions; an assumption that ’the degree to which a given form of understanding prevails 
or is sustained across time is not fundamentally dependent on the empirical validity of the perspective in 
question, but on the vicissitudes of social processes’ (p 268); and finally a view of forms of negotiated 
understandings as critical to social life in their connection to many other social activities. There is currently 
much debate within the international community of social representations researchers as to what form of 
constructionism is most compatible with the theory. The author’s own position in the social constructionism 
debate has been elaborated in the Introduction.
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phenomena which are new to a society, such as AIDS or scientific and technological 
developments, or those which inspire feelings of unfamiliarity through disjunction with 
conventional sets of ideas, images and beliefs. ’It is in this way that the mentally 
handicapped, or people belonging to other cultures, are disturbing, because they are like 
us, and yet not like us’ (Moscovici, 1984, p 25). Unfamiliarity inspires both attraction 
and intrigue as well as fear, threat and a sense of disturbance. It is society’s and 
individuals’ deep-rooted fear of the strange and the abnormal, and desire to live in a safe, 
comforting and secure world which motivates the creation of familiarising social 
representations. The theory suggests that familiarity always wins over unfamiliarity2 - 
what is new or strange is incorporated into familiar established belief systems in such a 
way as to create minimal disturbance to the established order. So the images, ideas and 
language which are historically shared by a given group dictate the way the group tries 
to come to terms with the unfamiliar. For example, Moscovici (1976) found that in 
certain sectors of 1950s French society the new practice of psychoanalysis was made 
familiar by comparing it to the act of a religious confession.
In familiarising the unfamiliar, social representations function to allow individuals and 
collectivities to achieve several things: to order their social world; to position and define 
themselves relative to each other; to explain aspects of the world and in so doing gain a 
sense of mastery and understanding; to guide and justify interactions and social practices; 
and to communicate, by shaping both what is taken-for-granted, and the spaces in which 
debate and negotiation is possible. The circulation of social representations in the 
media, in day-to-day conversations and practices, in politics, in social organisation, and 
in the cultural Zeitgeist, is part of the continual negotiation and reconstruction of social 
reality.
At a meta-theoretical level, social representations theory is based on the assumption of 
a qualitative split between lay knowledge and understandings (which circulate in the 
’consensual universe’ - the world of common sense), and ’scientific’ knowledge produced
2 Much of the empirical research on mental illness reviewed in section 2 of this chapter and in Chapter 3 does 
not support this assumption. It suggests that social representations of mental illness retain unfamiliarity as one 
of their central themes. The notion of unfamiliarity is a particular aspect of social representations theory which 
is challenged by the current research. Consideration of this issue, together with some suggestions for theoretical 
elaboration occurs in Chapter 8.
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within the world of science (the ’reified universe’). Although concepts and ideas 
produced in the reified universe may be translated (through the mass media or eduction) 
into the consensual universe, it is assumed that the processes of knowledge development 
in these two worlds are fundamentally different3. The consensual universe is where 
social representations develop and circulate. Their genesis may involve integration of 
ideas and concepts originating in the world of science with society’s stock of knowledge, 
ideas and beliefs which have developed throughout its changing history. This 
familiarising and sense making process is achieved through two basic processes -  
anchoring and objectification.
Anchoring is defined as ’a process which draws something foreign and disturbing that 
intrigues us into our particular system of categories, and compares it to the paradigm of 
a category which we think to be suitable’ (Moscovici, 1984, p 29). This is achieved 
through the two processes of categorisation and naming, which serve jointly to establish 
a link between what is known and what is not known. The unfamiliar object or idea 
acquires some of the basic characteristics of the category to which it is anchored and is 
readjusted to fit within it. Anchoring processes occur within the context of a web of 
other social meanings and belief systems and are never neutral. More than merely a 
process which allows us to deal cognitively with the complexities of the social world in 
which we live, anchoring involves affective processes and allocation of value judgements. 
It makes description, explanation and evaluation possible. To the extent that the same 
anchors are accepted and shared by members of a society or a social group, 
communication about a new concept is made possible. Through conversations and media 
debates a new representation circulates in society and its nature and social position can 
be modified. So for example, as psychoanalytic vocabulary became anchored in the 
vocabulary of everyday life and thus socialised, terms such as ’neurosis’ could be used 
to refer to previously unnamed states of tension, maladjustment or alienation understood 
previously as half way between madness and sanity (Moscovici, 1976).
Billig (1988, 1993) draws attention to some other aspects of anchoring which he claims
3 This aspect of the theory has important implications for the current research on mental health professionals. 
Chapter 3 discusses problems with this reified - consensual universe split, and suggests some theoretical 
modifications which would allow the theory to deal more successfully with processes of knowledge generation 
and circulation amongst professional practitioners who are socially positioned midway between the world of 
science / experts and the public sphere.
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social representations theory has overlooked. As a rhetorician, he suggests that the 
essence of a thinking society is the capacity of its members to debate and argue the 
meaning of the categories it creates. The basic process of categorisation on which 
anchoring relies is complemented by its opposite, the ability to particularise. By 
representing individual cases either as members of a category or as unique instances, the 
social thinker has the possibility for negation. This means that the choice of anchors is 
always an active argumentative social process involving justification, criticism and 
rejection of the chosen anchor. Billig suggests that anchoring is usually not as smooth 
a process as Moscovici implies. New or unfamiliar concepts are not passively and 
unproblematically assigned to pre-existing categories. Instead ’the unfamiliar is likely 
to be a focus of controversy.... (it) is not painlessly anchored, but the dilemma of how 
to anchor the unfamiliar can lead to a debate about the meanings of the categories into 
which the unfamiliar will be inserted’ (Billig 1993, p 50). These aspects of anchoring 
processes in the development of professional knowledge are addressed by the empirical 
analysis presented in this thesis.
The second process involved in the genesis of social representations is objectification. 
This transforms what are at first purely intellectual concepts in a remote universe into 
things we can see, discuss and imagine in our physical, mediated and interactive world. 
Objectification involves the creation of a tangible social object, the translation of an 
abstract concept into a concrete image. It encourages beliefs in both the physicality and 
the ontological realism of a scientific or abstract concept (Jost, 1993). Concept becomes 
interchangeable with percept, and a visual image is created representing intangible ideas 
or concepts such as health, AIDS, the unconscious or mental illness which can never be 
’seen’ in their natural form.
Objectification is assumed by the theory to involve three stages (Jodelet, 1991b): In the 
first stage of selective construction, elements of the idea or concept are selected, 
decontextualised and sorted. The choice of elements is determined according to the pre­
existing stock of images and meanings which are available and acceptable to a given 
society. This initial process allows scientific concepts to be detached from the world of 
experts and appropriated by lay people. Rather than having to rely on the mediation of 
experts, lay people are able to feel they have a direct relationship with previously distant 
concepts such as AIDS or biotechnology, even if their contact with these phenomena in
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fact remains minimal. This leads to a second stage of objectification - the creation of a 
figurative nucleus, ’a complex of images that visibly reproduces a complex of ideas’ 
(Moscovici, 1984, p 38). The figurative nucleus of phenomena associated with people 
often involves personification. So abstract concepts such as AIDS and mental illness 
become objectified as images of the AIDS patient and the mentally ill person. Once a 
society has adopted a figurative nucleus it finds it easier to talk about whatever this image 
stands for. Finally, the figurative nucleus is naturalised - it develops a reality and 
existence in its own right. The fact that this image is a re-presentation or a metaphor for 
a concept is forgotten, as is the fact that it is merely a conventional and arbitrary reality. 
A representation develops its own authority allowing it to be exploited in various social 
situations to understand, explain and justify the social world and the actions and positions 
of individuals within this.
As an example, Moscovici’s (1976) study illustrates the objectification of psychoanalytic 
concepts in French society. The psyche is visualised by lay people as two areas, the 
conscious and the unconscious, located in space one above the other and linked by 
various conflicts and tensions. In contemporary society, there is a tendency to treat terms 
borrowed from psychoanalysis such as ’complex* or ’repression* as if they actually 
existed, rather than as hypothetical constructs. Attributes or relationships are turned into 
things - what was originally conceived as a process develops a quasi-object status - a 
repression, for example. The social reality of these images permits their use as 
explanatory and interpretative devices, so that the odd behaviour of a friend can be 
attributed to their ’complex’ or their ’neurosis’.
This section has provided a relatively uncritical review of the theory of social 
representations. Although this is the theoretical starting point for this research, it is not 
accepted as an unproblematic theoretical tool. We will return to aspects of the theory at 
various points in the thesis, often from a more critical stance. Chapter 3 uses 
problematic aspects of the ’consensual’ and ’reified’ universes as the starting point for 
a theoretical elaboration which provides the framework for empirical work on social 
representations amongst professional practitioners. In Chapter 4, methodological issues 
relating to the empirical application of social representations theory will be discussed.
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Finally, Chapter 8 presents some theoretical implications of the findings of this research, 
returning in particular to the notion of unfamiliarity and the ’compromise’ function of 
some social representations.
The second section of this chapter turns to the substantive topic of mental illness. A 
review of a vast body of research on lay and societal understandings of mental illness is 
undertaken from the point of view of social representations theory. This serves two 
important functions. Firstly, it highlights the ways in which mental illness has been 
understood both historically and in contemporary society, showing the themes which 
dominate how mental illness is socially represented. Secondly, it illustrates the strengths 
of a social representational approach which can draw together concepts and findings from 
several analytic levels, and in so doing provide a truly social psychological understanding 
of how the power of social forces interacts with interpersonal and intra-psychic processes 
in shaping our societal understandings of mental illness.
2 Research  on M ental Illness: Social Psychological . Societal and 
P sychological Perspectives
The topic of societal and individual understandings of mental illness and reactions to 
those defined as mentally ill has attracted considerable interest across the range of social 
sciences. Between them, sociologists, psychologists, historians, anthropologists, 
politicians and philosophers have generated a body of theory and research which is as 
large as it is diverse. The purpose of this section is not to present an exhaustive review 
of this work, but rather to focus on theory and research which is compatible with a social 
psychological approach based within the framework of social representations theory4. 
I begin with a discussion of work on mental illness conducted by social representations 
researchers (section 2.1). The integrated, multi-level nature of a social representational 
perspective requires the researcher to consider work conducted in many of social 
psychology’s sister disciplines. Accordingly, the focus of the following two sections is 
on work on mental illness conducted by sociologists and historians (section 2.2), and by
4 This review does not include work focused specifically on mental health services, treatment strategies for 
mental illness, and mental health professionals, which is considered in the literature review in Chapter 3 (section 
3).
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psychologists (section 2.3). Section 2.4 reviews a rather different area of study, 
suggesting how mental illness might be understood in terms of ’folk theories of mind’. 
From a social psychological perspective, much of the work in sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 
is problematic both epistemologically and methodologically. This is especially true of 
much of the psychological, individual-based research. Whilst acknowledging these 
problems, this critical review ends by demonstrating how research from several 
perspectives can nevertheless be integrated into an initial understanding of how mental 
illness is socially represented (section 2.5). This serves as the primary framework for 
the current empirical research focused on the world of mental health and the professionals 
who work in this world.
2.1 Social Representational Perspectives
One of the most well known pieces of research using the theory of social representations, 
which has done much to promote the theory across the international academic community 
is Denise Jodelet’s Madness and Social Representations (1991a, first published in French 
in 1989). This is a detailed case study of a ’family colony’ based at Ainay-le-Chateau 
in central France. Established in 1900 the ’colony’ aims to provide an alternative to 
hospital based care for over 1,000 mentally ill men who live as lodgers with local 
families paid a minimal sum to act as ’foster parents’. This is therefore a unique 
opportunity to study how an established community lives in close proximity with mental 
illness, and to investigate what type of representations and related daily practices have 
built up through the colony’s history.
The methods used were primarily ethnographic, involving a range of techniques. 
Participant observation throughout the four year study allowed the author to investigate 
various types of contact with mental illness in people’s homes, in public places and at 
social occasions. In-depth interviews were conducted with community nurses and local 
people who housed lodgers. These were complemented by surveys of the present day and 
historical functioning of the colony through questionnaires and analysis of historical 
documents.
Jodelet reports a picture of massive social exclusion of the mentally ill in a community
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whose routines of life reflect various ways in which its members establish and maintain 
a psychic and social distance from their mentally ill lodgers. Compared to other lay 
people, these villagers may be publicly more accepting and tolerant of mental illness - 
a phenomenon whose constant presence over several decades has made it familiar - but 
their anxieties surrounding their proximity to mental illness are expressed in a range of 
normative practices in interactions with lodgers. These anxieties are denied in speech, 
and may not even operate on a fully conscious level, but they are manifested in concrete 
actions which serve to differentiate lodgers and separate them from family members.
Jodelet suggests that the penetration of insanity into the private realm of the family home 
inspires a sense of fear and fragility in the face of such unknown and unpredictable 
aspects of human life. ’Normal’ family life is threatened and there is an underlying fear 
of aggression or lack of control. Consequently, rituals and practices serve to give a sense 
of mastery and control to foster parents in their interactions with lodgers. Lodgers live 
’as i f  they were family members, but through the organisation of daily life and the 
delimitation of living spaces, they are constantly kept separate. This separation goes way 
beyond social conventions on public-private boundaries in other circumstances. For 
example it is the exception rather than the rule for lodgers to eat with the rest of the 
family. Practices such as washing the cutlery and clothes of lodgers separately from 
those of the family are the norm, and there are strong social taboos against emotional and 
sexual contact with lodgers. The position of villagers is summarised as follows:-
’In instituting the rule of distance and in raising its prescriptions to the level of a practical 
moral code, is the group of foster parents not trying to overcome the contradiction of its life 
of openness towards those who are normally hidden behind the walls of the asylum? And 
whilst participating in their social integration, are its efforts to prevent their intrusion into the 
private domain not an attempt to avert contact with insanity?’ (Jodelet, 1991a, p 137).
Jodelet finds foster parents reluctant to talk about mental illness directly, suggesting a 
certain shame associated with being mentally unwell. Their understanding appears to be 
influenced very little by established psychiatric knowledge. The lodgers’ problems are 
never described using psychiatric nomenclature, nor are they analysed as a medical 
condition. Mental illness is represented as a permanent state which people ’are* rather 
than ’have’. It affects the whole being of the person making them incurably abnormal. 
Representations of mental illness in this rural community appear to be based on an 
underlying three fold model of the human organism which consists of the brain, the body
41
and the nerves. This suggests a pre-medical belief system which allows no place for 
affective aspects of existence. Modem medical knowledge circulates, but remains 
secondary to these older beliefs. For example, although families know that mental illness 
is not contagious, they act as if it were. Medical contagion is denied but magical 
contagion is feared. This involves contagion through visual contact and through bodily 
fluids, reflecting traces of medieval beliefs about humours. Perhaps this is also a 
reactivation of the historical myth that asylums and their inmates were containers and 
transmitters of unspecified physical illnesses (Foucault, 1967).
As a case study investigating the maintenance of social representations in everyday 
practices and patterns of interactions, the principal weakness of this study is its neglect 
of the perspective of the lodgers themselves. In excluding the lodgers and effectively 
silencing their voice, Jodelet risks perpetuating their marginalisation and devaluation as 
a group whose views would not add anything to this detailed in-depth study. 
Furthermore, she misses a vital perspective on social exclusion practices - we cannot 
judge how these practices are experienced by those to whom they are directed. Despite 
this, Jodelet’s findings are an impressive demonstration of how a detailed and in-depth 
approach can reveal implicit deep-seated systems of belief regarding mental illness 
embedded subtly but powerfully within daily practices. The representations of mental 
illness found in this study may have developed historically within a very specific 
environment, but echoes of the themes it reveals are found across a range of other 
empirical investigations.
A study by De Rosa (1987) reveals similar historically grounded, pre-medical and 
emotionally loaded social representations of mental illness amongst lay people. This 
study aims to investigate the figurative nucleus of representations of mental illness using 
a drawing task5. Italian adults and children (aged 5 to 16) were asked to draw a picture 
of a human figure, a picture of a madman, and to draw as a mad person would. The 
author argues that, by bypassing rationalisation and self presentation which may be 
present in verbal techniques, such projective, unstructured and non-linguistic
5 The ’figurative nucleus’ is defined as the core of a social representation containing its most basic semantic 
elements, which may exist in a pre-linguistic or figurative form. The theory postulates that the core of a 
representation exists in a more permanent and consensual form than variable periphery aspects which are more 
sensitive to personal experience.
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/methodologies provide powerful access to the latent semantic universe which structures 
a range of manifested social representations (De Rosa, 1988, 1991).
Thematic analysis of the drawings produced shows a heterogenous range of images linked 
together by themes of otherness, danger and strangeness, and by a strong historical 
grounding. Traces of archaic images which are accorded little expression in currently 
dominant views of mental illness are detected, reflecting a general sense of something 
beyond normality and reason. Madness is anchored into ancient belief systems and 
objectified in images of people who are magical-fantastical, monstrous, demonic, and 
socially deviant6. De Rosa points out parallels between some of the drawings and 
images of madness going back as far as medieval times. This illustrates the historical 
constancy of core themes in social representations of mental distress which draw not only
A
on current stocks of ideas and images, but also on| archaic beliefs about otherness and 
difference which have permeated western societies throughout history. In the drawing 
produced by both adults and children, mental distress is frequently objectified in 
monstrous and bestial forms. Similarities between these drawings and those produced by 
children in France and Italy when asked to draw a monster are noted. Other images 
include misshapen and polymorphous figures, devils and people possessed by evil forces. 
Social deviance is a common theme - the mad person is represented as sexually deviant, 
a drunk, a tramp, a criminal and a person showing odd behaviour. However many of 
the drawings suggest ambivalence towards mental illness. The mentally ill are also 
represented as ’other’ in more positive images including the clown, the jester and the 
artist, suggesting an association with creativity and the lighter side of life.
Despite the innovative methodology used in this study, there is also a considerable 
methodological flaw. By asking respondents to draw both a mad person and a human 
figure, the implication is that the former is somehow different to other human beings. 
The dominant themes in the drawings reflecting various states of deviance could be 
interpreted in terms of the demand characteristics of the situation. However, this 
methodological tautology does not detract from the archaic nature of the images 
produced.
6 Cohn (1993) shows how these themes have always been part of western societies’ fantasies about marginal 
groups, tracing links from Roman and Greek persecution of Christians in the second century to the witch hunts 
of sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe.
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JA number of other studies based on the theory of social representations provide further 
evidence of lay representations of mental illness which are multiple and heterogenous, 
but united by themes of abnormality and ’otherness’. A large scale project conducted in 
Italy in the 1980s explored social representations of mental illness amongst children, 
adolescents, students, parents of psychiatric patients, teachers and mental health 
professionals in Rome, Bologna and Naples (Bellelli, 1987). A range of methods 
including word association tasks, semi-structured questionnaires and in-depth interviews 
were employed.
The word association task (Serino, 1987) asked respondents to generate descriptive terms 
associated with five stimuli:- yourself, a normal person, a mentally ill person, a mad 
person, and a physically ill person. Correspondence analysis of the data showed high 
levels of consensus regarding relationships between representational themes. A 
dimension of normality - abnormality contrasted the self and a normal person with a 
mentally ill and a mad person. Normality was associated with generally positive terms 
implying personal integrity (eg intelligence, altruism, generosity) and social acceptance 
(eg polite, sociable, a hard worker). Mental illness and madness were seen as abnormal, 
defined in generally negative terms implying social stigma and danger. A second 
dimension of physical versus mental ill health contrasted mental illness and madness with 
physical illness. The mental distress terms were defined in terms of social deviance (eg 
dangerous, unstable, isolated, strange, aggressive) and contrasted with terms describing 
physical illness in terms of suffering (eg weak, pale, sad, preoccupied). A significant 
split between illnesses of the body and those of the mind was perceived, with descriptions 
of a physically ill person showing more similarities to descriptions of ’yourself’ and ’a 
normal person’ than either of the mental distress terms. To be ill is to be different, but 
mental ill health is a more threatening and marginalised type of difference than physical 
illness.
Pre-medical knowledge structures associating mental distress with deviance are again 
detected in this research, but are evoked more strongly by the term ’madness’, than by 
’mental illness’, which often produces the use of psychiatric labels (Petrillo, 1987). A 
similar word association task in Spain (Ayesteran & Paez, 1986) confirms that madness 
and mental illness are construed differently by lay people. Madness is seen much more 
in the realm of the bizarre (abnormal, irrational, dangerous, aggressive) than mental
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illness which generates terms such as ’different’, ’unadapted’, ’incapable’, and 
’distressed’.
Finally, two other studies demonstrate multiplicity and the coexistence of medical and 
pre-medical understandings in social representations of mental illness. Zani (1995) 
reports that Italian respondents asked in a structured format about the causes, 
consequences and treatment of mental illness appear to draw on a range of models. 
These include those currently dominant among mental health professionals and experts 
(medical, psychological and social models), as well as older conceptions, particularly a 
criminalised model of mental illness. A study of university students in Finland (Raty, 
1990) finds several coexisting orientations to mental illness. The mentally ill are 
represented as qualitatively different and inferior to normal people. This coexists with 
a view of a ’fuzzy’ border between normality and pathology, and an orientation based on 
social criticism (the mentally ill as victims of society or the object of unjust labelling).
To conclude this section, social psychological research based on the theory of social 
representations demonstrates the socially shared, deep-seated, emotionally loaded and 
historically rooted nature of common sense understandings of mental ill health. While 
the most in-depth analysis is undoubtedly provided by Jodelet (1991a), the other studies 
reviewed in this section demonstrate how similar representational themes can be detected 
across a range of European countries. They also demonstrate the diverse methodological 
strategies that have been applied in social representational research, a theme we will 
return to in Chapter 4. (Other social representational studies focused on understandings 
amongst mental health professionals will be reviewed in Chapter 3.)
Taken together, these studies suggest that lay representations of mental distress are 
multiple and heterogenous, but united by themes of difference, ’otherness’, and 
abnormality. The exclusionary practices enacted by the villagers in Jodelet’s study are 
a reaction to feelings of fear, anxiety and suspicion inspired by mental ill health. These 
emotionally charged themes are central to the lay representations found in all these 
studies. Furthermore, while modem medical knowledge appears to shape lay 
representations to varying extents, common themes derived from pre-medical, archaic
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beliefs are an important component of contemporary common sense theories of mental 
illness (for example, moral and religious views, deviance and inhumanity).
The research in this section indicates the power of history and broadly shared belief 
systems in shaping individuals’ understandings of mental illness. It is to these more 
macro-social concerns that we now turn. Research on societal understandings of mental 
illness, drawn from across a range of social sciences offers the social psychologist 
working from a social constructionist perspective an important way of understanding the 
nature and origins of contemporary social representations of mental illness. The review 
in section 2.2 serves to highlight the web of historically grounded belief systems and 
social practices within which the contemporary understandings and practical strategies of 
both lay people and mental health professionals are embedded.
2 .2  Historical and sociological accounts
One of the most influential writers on the history of societal reactions to and 
understandings of mental illness is Michel Foucault. In his book Madness and 
Civilization: A history of insanity in the age of reason (1967, first published in French 
in 1961) Foucault analyses the treatment and social position of the mentally ill from the 
Middle Ages to the nineteenth century, and argues that these social practices both 
reflected and perpetuated historically dominant representations of mental illness associated 
with unreason, death, animality, sexuality and imbalance7. Foucault’s thesis is that 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, European societies developed a structure 
and value system based on reason. Reason was equated with civilization and new moral 
values of work and rationality prevailed. Mental distress conflicted with this value 
system and was defined as its antithesis - unreason. The social definition of mental 
illness as difference and ’otherness’ both justified and was perpetuated by the exclusion, 
marginalisation and inhumane treatment of the mentally ill. Mental illness became a 
threat and a scandal to society, associated with shame, guilt and stigma. At the same
7 Foucault’s work is complex, both in style and content and this brief review is both a simplification and one 
of several possible readings. Although the power of Foucault’s ideas is undeniable, his work has been criticised 
by Sedgewick (1982) for its poor use of historical evidence, its glorification of mania, and its overemphasis of 
the rationality - unreason divide.
46
time it retained a certain fascination in allowing expression of the passionate and non 
rational side of humanity8. Society coped with this dangerous combination of threat and 
fascination by excluding, distancing and silencing the mentally ill:
’Confinement is the practice which corresponds most exactly to madness experienced as 
unreason, that is, as the empty negativity of reason; by confinement, madness is 
acknowledged to be nothing. That is, on one hand madness is immediately perceived as 
difference....; and on the other hand, confinement cannot have any other goal than a 
correction (that is, the suppression of the difference, or the fulfilment of this nothingness in 
death)’. (Foucault, 1967, p 116)
As an illustration of how Foucault’s ideas continue to be relevant in the modem day, the 
legal plea of diminished responsibility on the grounds of mental ill health is one of the 
most dramatic illustrations of the assumed link between mental illness and unreason.
Similar ideas are developed by Gilman (1985, 1988) who traces the history of visualising 
madness in art and medical texts as a way of illuminating the myths, beliefs and 
ideologies of the society in which they are created. Historically, representations of 
mental distress have emphasised aggressive and bizarre behaviour and down-played more 
passive, depressive states. The image of the mad found in the art of western cultures 
tends to be imbued with a sense of loss of control, disintegration and danger. Modem 
day equivalents of these themes are detected in the drawings analysed by De Rosa (1987) 
described in section 2.1. Similarly, recent studies of media representations of mental 
illness (Glasgow University Media Group, 1994a; Rose, 1996) involving analysis of 
British television output, newspapers and popular magazines, find that although mental 
illness is multiply represented in the media, violence and danger to others are the most 
common themes.
Gilman (1988) argues that ’root metaphors’ such as sexuality as a corruptor of rationality 
have linked the mentally ill historically with other social groups (he cites Jews, 
homosexuals and blacks) which in western cultures have been consistently feared, 
stigmatised, socially marginalised and represented as dangerous forms of ’otherness’. He
8 For example, Becker (1978) notes how the Romantic poets of the nineteenth century fostered associations 
between madness and genius in order to define themselves as different, unique and endowed with special 
creative talents. (Unfortunately, many of these self-professed leanings towards madness back-fired and were 
used as justification for silencing or institutionalising creative thinkers who were perceived as a threat to the 
social status quo.) Society’s fascination with mental illness is also evidenced in the fact that viewing the insane 
for a small price became a popular nineteenth century leisure activity at asylums such as the Bethlem Hospital.
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proposes that representations of mental illness (and illness in general) have served 
historically to localise fears of collapse, disintegration and loss of control, both on 
collective and individual levels. (Similar arguments are put forward by Sontag (1979, 
1990) in relation to syphilis and tuberculosis in the nineteenth century, and cancer and 
AIDS in contemporary society.) This fits with the anthropological analysis provided by 
Gaines (1992) who suggests that modem psychiatric classifications, based on a northern 
European cultural concept of the person as autonomous and self controlled, serve to 
’otherise’ mental illness as the manifestation of various forms of imbalance associated 
with loss of control. ’The mad, especially in the incarnation of the aggressive mad, are 
one of the most common focuses for the general anxiety felt by all members of society, 
an anxiety tied to a perceived tenuousness of life’ (Gilman, 1988, p 11).
Although Gilman conceptualises these representations as constructed and functioning on 
a social level, he integrates an intra-psychic level of analysis into his argument. The 
various ’others’ that societies construct function to reflect both fantasies and fears 
associated with central aspects of human existence (for example, fragility, death, 
sexuality)9. Drawing on the ideas of psychodynamic theorists such as Melanie Klein and 
Otto Kemberg, Gilman suggests that these representations are reflective of 
psychodynamic process of splitting good from bad and projecting anxiety-provoking 
experiences onto others defined as distant and separate from ourselves. In projecting 
individual and collective anxieties onto the mentally ill, he argues, their threat to 
ourselves is reduced. This serves to reassure us as it both displaces internally generated 
fears into* the outside world, and localises them within a specific sub-group of our social 
world10.
Sociologists studying the social position of the mentally ill in contemporary society have 
also picked up on themes of marginalisation and difference, but have tended to
9 ’Others’ may be represented variously as dangerous, exotic, benign or idealised. Their emotionally 
charged construction may inspire high levels of ambivalence - for example, simultaneous fear and fascination, 
attraction and repulsion. The fact that madness and deviant sexuality have historically been such favoured 
subjects for artists, novelists and playwrights, despite the taboos surrounding their open public discussion reflects 
the tensions and ambivalences in societal relationships and definitions of ’Otherness’.
10 This stance is consistent with arguments put forward by several social representations theorists (for example 
Jovchelovitch 1995, Kaes 1984, Moscovici 1993a), who stress that non-rational and unconscious intra-psychic 
process should be included in a social representational approach, and that this does not necessarily risk de- 
socialising the theory.
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conceptualise this as social deviance. Labelling theories developed by sociologists in the 
1960s and 1970s are most radically applied to mental illness by Scheff (1966) who argues 
that the label of ’mentally ill’ is a response by individuals ancf society to rule breaking 
behaviour which violates social norms and is deemed deviant and unacceptable. Social 
institutions such as the legal system and mental health services act as agents of social 
control by imposing socially sanctioned labels on various types of rule breaking 
behaviour. Once a person receives the label of ’mentally ill* certain types of behaviour 
are expected of them and any signs of bizarre behaviour are immediately attributed to 
their illness. The label of mental illness takes on a ’master status’ which overrides all 
other social roles.
The writings of Scheff are just one example of what has become known as the ’anti- 
psychiatry movement’, an umbrella term used to refer to sociological conceptualisations 
of mental illness developed in the 1960s (for example, Cooper 1967, Goffman 1961, 
Laing 1960, Szasz 1962). Although there is considerable diversity in the arguments of 
each of these writers, they are united by common assumptions which question the 
ontological status of mental illness, and advance the claim that the concept of mental 
illness is a moral and social one rather than simply a medical category. These theorists 
recognise the role of social constructive processes in defining what is taken as mental ill 
health, and perhaps most importantly, stress the centrality of power in these processes 
(Sedgewick, 1982b). The coercive nature of the treatment of mental illness, and the 
status of psychiatry as an institution which maintains dominant ideologies are primary 
concerns of this approach.
These macro-social arguments are translated into a micro-social analysis by Goffman 
(1963) in his work on stigma11. Goffman conceptualises mental illness as an example 
of a ’spoiled identity’ which is deeply discrediting in the way it influences personal and 
social identity and interpersonal relationships, and which marks a person out as different, 
undesirable, and in extreme cases, dangerous, bad or weak. A stigmatized person is 
’reduced in our minds from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one’ (p 
12), and seen implicitly as not quite human. A wide range of imperfections are imputed
11 Consideration of Goffiman’s earlier work on ’asylums’ is left for Chapter 3 (section 3.2), which 
focuses specifically on how mental illness is understood and treated by mental health practitioners.
49
on the basis of the original one, which serve in part, to justify the way the stigmatised 
person is treated. The person may be defined in terms of her stigmatising attribute which 
may override other characteristics, and may find herself discriminated against in ways 
that significantly reduce her life chances. These processes have a profound impact on 
the person’s sense of self and personal identity. Goffman’s descriptions of ’phantom 
acceptance’ based on ’phantom normalcy’, in which social interactions are limited while 
a superficial appearance of acceptance is simultaneously maintained show similarities with 
the findings of Jodelet (1991a) described in section 2.1. His insightful writing stresses 
the subtle, implicit but powerful ways that macro-social phenomena enter into everyday 
inter-personal interactions, and as such this approach is compatible with a social 
representational perspective.
However, more generally, the anti-psychiatry perspective is problematic from a social 
psychological point of view in that its conceptualisation of micro-social, interpersonal and 
intra-personal processes is limited and simplistic. Critical evaluations of the anti­
psychiatry movement (for example, Gove 1982, Miles 1987, Sedgewick 1982b) make 
similar points. Anti-psychiatry is criticised for failing to take account of the distressing 
experiences of those suffering from mental illnesses, presenting the increase of public 
tolerance as an overly simplistic solution to mental ill health, and being unresponsive to 
recent changes in mental health care. Nevertheless, as Miles notes, the important 
achievement of this body of thought was that it ’revealed the existence of social processes 
in diagnosis and treatment, and acquainted a wide readership with the arguments of social 
scientists - that mental illness is a social construction and psychiatry a social institution 
that incorporates the values and demands of its surrounding society.’ (Miles, 1987, p 21). 
(The role of anti-psychiatry in shifts towards community based care in both Britain and 
France was noted in Chapter 1, and illustrates the impact of this perspective beyond the 
confines of academia.)
The sociological and historical perspectives on mental illness reviewed in this section 
offer some powerful conceptualisations of mental illness as a socially marginalised, feared 
and discredited social phenomena. These are important considerations for a social 
psychological analysis in which the weight and power of history, culture and macro-social
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structures in shaping everyday practices, interactions and understandings is 
acknowledged. Historical analyses provide a rich account of how and why mental illness 
has come to be feared and marginalised in contemporary society. In its equation with 
unreason and loss of control, mental distress represents the antithesis of the fundamental 
values of modem western cultures which rest on rational individualism. Sociological 
accounts of mental illness in contemporary society serve to contextualise the working of 
mental health services within the dominant power structures of society. In so doing they 
remind us that neat separations between public and societal understandings of mental 
illness and those of ’experts’ and professionals cannot be made. This point will be taken 
up in the theoretical elaborations provided in Chapter 3.
The principal weakness of these perspective from a social psychological point of view is 
their inability to adequately conceptualise psycho-social processes in the construction of 
social knowledge. Although retrospective analyses can access process on a broad societal 
level, through the analysis of historical artifacts and changes, they are necessarily limited 
to speculation regarding more micro-social and individual processes. Similar problems 
beset sociological and anti-psychiatric accounts of mental illness in contemporary society. 
Radical macro-social arguments take precedent, and the subtleties of meaning construction 
which involve the self and the group on both interactive and affective levels are lost.
2 .3  Public attitudes research
A review of research into lay and societal understandings of mental ill health would be 
incomplete if it did not acknowledge the body of research on public attitudes towards 
mental illness conducted within psychology and individual-based social psychology. One 
of the earliest and largest surveys was conducted in the USA by Nunnally (1961). This 
found that the mentally ill were regarded with fear, distrust and dislike by all social 
groups. They were highly stigmatised and ’considered unselectively as being all things 
bad’ (p 233). Another important early study conducted by Cummings & Cummings 
(1957) investigated public attitudes towards mental illness in a small Canadian 
community. The strength of fear and threat inspired by mental illness was indicated not 
only by the failure of their public education program aiming to improve public 
understanding and tolerance of mental illness, but also by the hostile community reactions
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they experienced towards this intervention. The community appeared to have a deep- 
seated investment in its established rejecting views of mental illness to which it held 
tenaciously.
Following this early research, studies have been conducted into lay attitudes towards 
mental illness in many Western and non-Westem countries. (For reviews see Bhugra 
1989, Miles 1987, Rabkin 1972, and Sarbin & Muncuso 1970.) Typically using 
quantitative individual-based methodologies such as Likert type attitude scales or written 
vignettes, these studies have consistently found that lay evaluations of mental illness are 
negative and reflective of rejection and discrimination against the mentally ill. This 
negativity far exceeds the generally negative attitudes that western societies hold towards 
illness in general, eliciting special responses of fear and rejection. Reviewing a range 
of studies, Miles (1987) suggests that three characteristics are commonly attributed to the 
mentally ill:- they are assumed to be easily recognisable, potentially dangerous and very 
unpredictable. The outcomes of mental illness are usually viewed pessimistically.
As a typical example, Phillips (1966) used ’social distance scales’ as a measure of 
American respondents’ willingness to associate with mentally ill individuals described in 
written vignettes. Compared to complete acceptance of all types of social interaction with 
a ’normal person’, there was considerable reported unwillingness to associate with all 
types of mentally ill people. A continuum of rejection of different types of mental illness 
was found, with the person described as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia suffering 
the worst rejection consistently. Less than 2% of respondents said they would let their 
children marry a paranoid schizophrenic. This rose to 10% for the depressed person, 
31% for the person suffering from schizophrenia and 60% for the phobic-compulsive 
sufferer. The majority of respondents claimed they would be willing to work with and 
be neighbours of all the people described except the person suffering from paranoid 
schizophrenia, with whom only 11% would work and 70% would be willing to have as 
a neighbour. Acceptance levels dropped consistently if respondents were also told that 
the person described had spent time in a psychiatric hospital. These results demonstrate 
the desire by lay people to keep themselves and their family distant from the mentally ill. 
Parallels with the work of Jodelet (1991a) and Goffman (1963) described above are clear. 
The social marginalisation of the mentally ill is lived out through limitations imposed on 
the scope and possibilities of day-to-day interactions.
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A common area of investigation in recent public attitude research has been into the public 
diffusion and understanding of ’scientific’ or ’expert’ theories and aetiological models of 
mental illness. Several studies detect echoes of expert theories such as medical, 
psychodynamic and social models in lay populations (for example Fumham & Bower 
1992, Kuyken et al 1992), and show how causal beliefs are related to views of treatment 
strategies, possibilities for change and locus of control (for example, Fisher & Farina 
1979, Norman & Malla 1983.) For example, the second of these studies found that 
adolescents’ beliefs in organic causes are associated with beliefs in a poorer prognosis 
compared to psychosocial causal models which are associated with greater social 
acceptance and more optimistic views of prognosis. Other research describes the public 
as ’woefully ignorant’ (Fumham & Rees 1988, p 214) in expert knowledge terms, 
finding, in this case, that public understandings of schizophrenia centre instead around 
dangerousness, unpredictability, amorality and vagrancy.
While the results of these investigations are useful indicators of the strength of negative 
and rejecting attitudes towards mental illness in the lay population, from a social 
constructionist / social psychological perspective, they are also problematic on 
epistemological and methodological grounds. These problems can be categorised into 
four areas: Firstly, their individual focus means that social processes in the genesis and 
circulation of beliefs and opinions are ignored. Secondly, they fail to acknowledge the 
weight of culture and history in shaping contemporary understandings. This has been 
adequately demonstrated in the research described in sections 2.1 and 2.2. Third, in 
using quantitative methodologies, the complexity of the social meanings associated with 
mental illness is lost. Public understandings are often measured using single scores on 
rating scales, thus reducing the hermeneutic to the numerical. The findings of any 
research can only be as complex as their methodology will allow. Thus, a recent study 
by the Glasgow University Media Group (1994b) using a more complex multi-method 
approach (group discussions of media output, interviews and questionnaires) was able to 
detect ambivalences and coexistent oppositional themes among lay people (for example 
both fearful and sympathetic reactions to mental illness), which in more simplistic 
methodologies may have been reduced to single scores and dominant themes. Finally, 
these studies often take scientific or expert knowledge as a bench-mark, and in so doing, 
fail to take seriously common sense or lay belief systems which social representations 
theory postulates as a qualitatively different universe of knowledge from that generated
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by science, and one which is worthy of study in its own right.
Given these short-comings, perhaps the best approach to this body of individual-based 
findings is to consider them as * indicators * of social representations of mental illness, or 
as snap-shots of the consequences of social meaning construction in the realm of 
individual cognitions12. On its own, research within this paradigm cannot undercover 
the nuances and complexities of social representations of mental illness. Nor can it 
account for whv such public attitudes to mental illness exist. However, the pervasive 
negativity, fear, rejection and social distancing which these studies detect shows parallels 
with the more in-depth qualitative research described in sections 2.1 and 2.2 above, and 
suggests that it would be unwise to reject this body of work out of hand.
2.4 Folk Theories of Mind: Social representations of person-hood?
A final area of theoretical activity which is relevant to the current argument concerns the 
work of philosophers of mind. Although these ideas have not previously been applied 
empirically or theoretically to the topic of mental illness (as far as the author is aware), 
and generally lack a social dimension, they offer an interesting slant on issues of 
psychological threat and loss of control, themes which the research reviewed in previous 
sections consistently uncovers as central to how mental illness is socially represented.
’Theories of mind’ refers to conceptualisations of the cognitive workings of the human 
mind. The 1980s saw an explosion of interest in theories of mind by philosophers, 
developmental and evolutionary psychologists, cognitive scientists, and artificial 
intelligence researchers (Whiten, 1991). For example, developmental psychologists have 
investigated how children develop understandings of others by developing theories of 
mind (Astington, Harris & Olson, 1988), and have conceptualised autism as a failure to 
develop theories of mind (Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusbery & Cohen, 1993). By extension, 
the notion of ’folk theories of mind’ refers to how lay people conceptualise the minds of 
others, as a way of understanding other people’s behaviour. By attributing beliefs,
12 Similar suggestion for conceptualising the relationship between attitudes and social representations are 
made by Fraser & Gaskell (1990) and Jaspers & Fraser (1984).
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desires and other mental states to others, we achieve a powerful ability to predict their 
behaviour and gain a sense of mastery, understanding and control over our social world. 
Whiten (1991) suggests that successful use of theories of mind in the social world rests 
upon the following: An awareness of our own inner experiences; an assumption that other 
people experience similar mental states to our own; and a systematic linkage to behaviour 
and observable events. In other words, we assume that other people’s experiences, 
motivations and mental states are similar to our own, and use this to make sense of, 
explain and predict the behaviour of people in our social sphere.
Although theory of mind literature falls within information-processing and cognitive 
paradigm, presenting essentially asocial arguments, which fail to take account of the 
socially constructed aspects of experience, cognition and notions of person-hood (eg 
Heelas & Lock 1981, Rosaldo 1984), a perspective on social reactions to mental illness 
can be developed by extrapolating from these notions of ’folk theories of mind’. 
Conceptualised as beliefs which are collectively and historically created within a specific 
socio-cultural context, folk theories of mind can feasibly be considered as social 
representations of person-hood. The assumption that folk theories of mind operate on the 
basis of an ’intentional stance* (the belief that other people act according to rational 
intentionality (Dennett, 1987)) can be redefined as a culturally specific way of 
representing the person, constructed within the bounds of western individualism and its 
values of reason and rationality. Parallels can also be drawn with the ideas of Mead 
(1934): Folk theories of mind are essentially shared constructions of the ’generalised 
other’ which are prerequisites of social interaction, and the development of mind and 
identity.
If mental illness is defined socially as irrationality and unreason, this suggests that 
conventional folk theories of mind or social representations of person-hood based on 
reason and rationality cannot be relied upon. Defined as a radically different ’other’, the 
behaviour, motivations and internal state of the mentally ill person become unknowable 
in terms of our own experiences. They can no longer be anchored into our conventional 
theories of mind or social representations of the ’normal person’, and fall outside our 
concepts of the ’generalised other’. Social representations of mental illness constitute 
attempts to develop alternative theories of mind which allow us to make sense of the acts 
of a mentally ill person, but removal of assumed parallels with our own experiences
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renders these models tentative and uncertain. A sense of loss of control based on a 
perceived inability to predict the behaviour of a mentally ill person or to make sense of 
their experiences on our own terms may ensue. This shared representation of mental 
illness as an irrational and unpredictable ’other* becomes self-perpetuating: Faced with 
behaviour which cannot be accounted for by conventional model of mind we are likely 
to interpret this as signs of mental illness.
These ideas offer another perspective on the relationship between mental illness and loss 
of control. The work of Gilman (1988) (reviewed in section 2.2) highlights how mental 
illness symbolises intra-psychic and societal fears of loss of control. From the 
perspective of philosophy of mind, mental illness can also inspire a sense of loss of 
control, associated with a perceived breakdown of conventional sense-making models and 
one’s inability to predict aspects of one’s social world. If we accept the social cognition 
argument that we have a fundamental need for a sense of control and understanding in 
our interactions with the social world, a person defined as mentally ill is threatening 
because we fear that our conventional models of mind may not be appropriate tools in our 
interaction with this person, and that we may not be able to predict their behaviour or 
make sense of them on our own terms. From this perspective, ’otherness’ equates with 
a failure of conventional folk theories of mind. To be ’other’ in this sense is to fall 
outside the bounds of the ’generalised other’ which forms the basis of our collective 
understandings of self-hood and moral action. Representations of mental illness as other 
can be seen as attempts to postulate alternative theories of mind, or shared concepts of 
a ’non-generalised other’, in which the internal experiences and mental processes of the 
mentally ill person are assumed to be somehow fundamentally different from our own.
2.5 An Initial Model of the Social Representation of Mental Illness
Drawing on the conceptualisations and empirical findings reviewed in sections 2.1 to 2.4 
is it possible to develop some kind of integrated understanding of how mental illness is 
socially represented in contemporary western society? Despite the very different foci and 
epistemological approaches of the research reviewed, points of comparison can be found 
across this heterogenous body of social scientific work on lay and societal understandings 
and reactions to mental illness. The most obvious theme uniting this research is the
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representation of mental illness as a strange, threatening and dangerous ’other’. From 
a social representational perspective, the theme of ’otherness’ can be understood as both 
constituted in and perpetuated by exclusionary practices. Such practices can be detected 
equally on a macro-social level (eg Foucault 1967, the anti-psychiatry writers), in the 
micro-social domain (eg Jodelet 1991a, Goffman 1963), and at the level of individual 
cognition (eg Phillips 1966). Much of this research highlights the historically rooted 
nature of these social representations (eg De Rosa 1987), which can be linked to the 
development of western cultural values based on reason (Foucault 1967). The power, 
rigidity and emotionally charged nature of these representations is also highlighted (eg 
Cummings & Cummings 1957, Gilman 1988, Jodelet 1991a). Beyond these common 
themes, social representations of mental illness have been found to be multiple and 
heterogenous |  Echoes of modem scientific understandings of mental ill health can be 
detected in the public sphere, but these coexist with, and are often eclipsed by archaic 
common sense understandings of mental distress.
Extrapolating from these ideas, an initial model of the historical and contemporary social 
representation of mental illness is proposed: In modem western societies whose basic 
values are based on rational individualism, the mind is held to be the core of the person 
(Lukes 1973, Rorty 1987, Turner 1986). Within this cultural context, mental illness has 
become a vessel for intra-psychic and societal fears of collapse and disintegration. As 
the manifestation of unreason and irrationality, mental illness is psycho-socially 
challenging and fear-provoking both because rationally-based folk theories of mind are 
assumed to be inappropriate tools for predicting and understanding the behaviour of the 
mentally ill, and because mental illness represents loss of control over the self. Mental 
illness becomes associated with unpredictability, incomprehension and an undermining 
of the very essence of person-hood. ’Otherising’ mental illness - representing it as 
something different and distant from the rational, controlled self - is a way of coping with 
the threat of this possibility. Representing the mentally ill as ’other’ is safe because it 
creates a clear, unambiguous binary opposition between self / sanity and other / madness. 
It negates views of the mentally ill as ’just like us’, of mental illness as a possibility for 
each and every one of us, perspectives which suggest no clear dividing lines between 
reason and unreason, and between sanity and madness. From this perspective, the 
tendency for individuals to see the mentally as different from themselves can be 
understood as involving similar social psychological processes as the pervasive
57
marginalisation and disempowerment of the mentally ill which occurs on a societal level. 
Both are safe ways of representing potential danger. Social representations of mental 
illness as a different and distant ’other’ function as coping strategies which allow 
individuals and collectivities to make sense of a phenomenon which is socially and 
individually challenging, serving to localise a phenomena which threatens both person- 
hood and society. Through its projection and localisation within a specific person or 
group, the threat of mental illness is contained, and its perceived impact is reduced 
through its positioning as reassuringly distant.
This initial model of how mental illness is socially represented aims to integrate concepts 
and findings at several analytic levels, from the broad macro-social level to the intra- 
psychic level. In so doing, it allows a truly social psychological understanding to be 
developed, in which reductionism to any single level of analysis is avoided. This 
conceptualisation provides an initial broad framework which will be used as a spring­
board for the current research focusing on one specific social sphere, namely the world 
of mental health care and the professionals who work in this world.
Given the model of mental illness representation which has been developed in this 
chapter, what implications for the contemporary world of mental health can be 
extrapolated? How can the daily work of caring for and treating those with mental health 
problems, and the functioning and social role of mental health organisations be 
understood within this social representational field? As a prelude to the next chapter, in 
which the world of mental health and the people who work in this environment is the 
focus, some brief suggestions can be made. The power and pervasiveness of social 
representations of mental illness as something strange and different suggests that these 
themes are likely to permeate the world of mental health. Indeed, if mental health 
organisations are seen as social institutions which function to up-hold and put into 
practice societal values, then the daily routines and structure of these organisations can 
be seen as reflective and constitutive of societal understandings of mental illness. 
Similarly, the individuals who populate this world - the professionals and the mentally 
ill themselves - are unlikely to be immune from the representations which permeate wider 
society.
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Viewed in this light, the contemporary policies of community based care described in 
Chapter 1 take on enormous social significance. They represent a radical departure from 
a historical legacy of marginalisation of the mentally ill. But more than this, they 
challenge how mental illness is social represented, a challenge which is likely to be felt 
not only at the broad macro-social level, but at the level of daily routines and inter- 
individual interactions. Community care policies create a paradoxical situation in which 
society is expected to integrate those it has defined as threatening, different and ’other’. 
Yet the conventions of families living in close proximity with the mentally ill studied by 
Jodelet (1991a) suggest that physical contact cannot necessarily guarantee social and 
psychological integration. The threat of mental illness is enhanced by its proximity, and 
subtle but powerful practices can be brought into play to create a sense of separation and 
distance.
Faced with the task of integrating the mentally ill into society, the work of mental health 
services and the people who work in them must be radically redefined. Community care 
represents a significant challenge to historically established working practices and 
professional roles. This contemporary situation in the world of mental health is the focus 
of empirical investigation in the current study (community care is addressed specifically 
in Chapter 7). Before turning to this empirical analysis, it is necessary to consider the 
world of mental health professionals in more detail. This is the focus of the following 
chapter which proposes a theoretical framework for the study of professional 
practitioners, and reviews research into the world of mental health and the professionals 
who work in this world.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE PROFESSIONAL PERSPECTIVE:
’PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS’ OF MENTAL ILLNESS
This chapter has two broad aims: Firstly, it offers theoretical progression, extending 
some aspects of the theory of social representations so as to provide a theoretical spring­
board from which to embark on an empirical study of mental health professionals. 
Secondly, building on the general discussion in Chapter 2 of the ways mental illness is 
socially represented, it provides a selective literature review of research on mental health 
professionals which is compatible with the theoretical positioning of this thesis.
The chapter begins with an investigation of how social representations theory has 
conceptualised the circulation and development of social knowledge (section 1). It is 
argued that the dichotomised model of science and common sense is problematic for 
research addressing social representations which develop in other social spheres. A more 
complex model of the social circulation of knowledge is proposed, involving interactions 
between professional practitioners, policy makers, ’experts’, the media and ordinary 
people. Based on this, section 2 presents a model of ’professional social representations’ 
as an important component in this social circulation of knowledge. ’Professional social 
representations’ are the representations which circulate in professional worlds regarding 
the object of their work - for example, the representations of mental illness held by 
mental health professionals. Five ’building blocks’ of professional social representations 
are proposed: theory, practice, professionals roles, lay representations and organisational 
factors. It is suggested that professional practitioners fulfil a unique role in the 
circulation of social knowledge, acting as translators, vectors and integrators of diverse 
sources of understanding between various social worlds.
Having developed this general theoretical framework, section 3 turns specifically to the 
world of mental health professionals. This constitutes a shift in emphasis from the 
theoretical and the general to the substantive and the specific. As such, it serves to 
familiarise the reader with the contemporary world of mental health care and to locate 
the current study in relation to previous research on mental health professionals.
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1 Th e  Theory  o f Social Representations: Problem s and P rospects
1.1 The Consensual and the Reified Universes
The overview of social representations theory in Chapter 2 presents the original theory’s 
assumptions regarding the nature of lay and scientific knowledge. To reiterate briefly, 
a sharp distinction between the ’reified’ and the ’consensual’ universes is made, and it 
is assumed that knowledge generation in these two worlds is based on fundamentally 
different and contrasting epistemologies. In the ’consensual universe’ (the world of 
common sense, lay people and social representations) there is a drive towards creating 
familiarity, a bias towards confirming hypotheses, and a predomination of memory over 
logic. The consensual universe operates on human (as opposed to logical) principles. 
Everyone has the right to express an opinion, and what is essential is the maintenance of 
social relations and the fulfilment of human and societal needs (such as a sense of order, 
mastery and understanding, location of threat etc) through communication and expression 
within the confines of a shared meaning system. In contrast, in the ’reified universe’ (the 
world of scientific knowledge generation) the principles of logic determine the rules of 
the game. Moscovici describes the epistemology of the reified universe as unnatural, as 
a procedure which ’goes so much against the grain of what human beings do 
spontaneously, that a solid apparatus of logic and proof must be marshalled’ (1981, p 
191). Scientific modes of knowledge attempt to establish objective laws and ’truths’, 
based on rationality and logic. Knowledge, and the rules of its generation, is highly 
formalised and assumed to be independent of its creators.
In inter-relating these two distinct universes of knowledge, the focus of social 
representations theory is principally on the flow of ideas and knowledge from the world 
of science into common sense. ’Common sense is science made common’ (Moscovici, 
1984, p 29). As science evolves and produces ever increasing amounts of knowledge, 
there is a need to transfer this into the lay or consensual universe in ways which make 
sense to the lay person. Through processes of anchoring and objectification, social 
representations are involved in transforming, familiarising and integrating unfamiliar 
scientific concepts into pre-existing lay belief systems. The media and education are the 
principle carriers and transformers of scientific knowledge which serve to re-present and 
popularise science such that its products become part of modem collective life (Farr,
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1993b). Thus, the everyday talk of individuals is replete with references to viruses, 
unconscious processes, the ozone layer, inertia, radiation and myriad other concepts 
which derive from the world of science, but which have become socially meaningful and 
part of social reality. This ’new common sense’ makes sense to lay people because it is 
integrated into and re-presented in a form consistent with ’old common sense’, the corpus 
of knowledge based on tradition, implicit folk beliefs and first hand experience which is 
prevalent in conversations, the spoken word and everyday thinking (Moscovici & 
Hewstone, 1983). This link between the scientific and the consensual universe in not 
entirely uni-directional: There is also a flow of ideas in the opposite direction from 
common sense to science. Science takes elements from ordinary knowledge and 
transforms them into scientific knowledge. In doing so, it works to make what was 
familiar to the lay person unfamiliar and difficult to understand. This conceptualisation 
of the relationship between scientific and common sense knowledge as presented in 
Moscovici’s early writings on the theory of social representations (eg Moscovici 1981; 
1984; Moscovici & Hewstone 1983) is summarised graphically in Figure 3.1 below.
In presenting this meta-model of the relationship between science and common sense, 
Moscovici certainly succeeded in his aim of proposing that common sense is much more 
than a dilution of scientific knowledge, that it is based on complex principles which are 
different, but not inferior to scientific epistemologies, and is therefore worthy of serious 
consideration by the social psychologist. However, while such a sharply dichotomised 
model may have been useful in the infancy of social representations theory, its continued 
value is becoming increasingly limited as the theory matures. The concepts of the reified 
and the consensual universes have been some of the most criticised aspects of the theory 
of social representations in recent years, many of most important critiques coming from 
proponents of the theory (eg Bangerter 1995; De Rosa 1994; Purkhardt 1993; Raty & 
Snellman 1992; Wells 1987). From the perspective of the current research, this original 
conceptualisation of science and common sense becomes both over-simplified and 
unworkable as a framework for the study of professional practitioners. The problems 
with this meta-theoretical model are summarised in the following five points, which lead 
to suggestions for theoretical reformulation. The first two points take issue with the 
assumption that the theory of social representations is applicable only to lay knowledge. 
This arises from two flawed assumptions :-
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Figure 3.1: Moscovici’s original model of Science and Common Sense
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1) Firstly, the world of science is assumed to be exclusively a reified universe, down­
playing its properties as a social system in its own right. This conceptualisation is an 
oversimplification, even a caricature of science, and fails to offer an adequate description 
of the workings of the modem scientific community. Moscovici’s description of the 
principles which guide scientific knowledge in the reified universe appear to describe the 
principles of classic positivist epistemology, based on refutation of hypotheses through 
empirical tests. But this is not the only way that knowledge is accumulated by scientists. 
This is confirmed by the body of work on the sociology of scientific knowledge begun 
by Fleck (1935) in relation to scientific understandings of syphilis, and continued by 
Kuhn (1963, 1970) and many others. Broadly speaking, this work conceptualises science 
as a social institution (eg Merton, 1973), and highlights the ways discourses and 
knowledge are constructed in science (eg Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay 1983, Gilbert & 
Mulkay 1984). It shows how scientific knowledge is culturally situated and socially 
constructed and how its progression and change cannot be explained by logic and rational 
argument alone. Like lay people, scientists may follow ’hunches’ and search for 
consensual validation of their ideas through debate and conversation with contemporaries 
over lunch and in coffee bars. Various sub-groups within science interact and clash, and 
ideological and power struggles are enacted as part of everyday life. In short, while 
scientists may claim to use certain formalised methods, theoretical concepts and lines of 
reasoning, they are nevertheless not immune to more ’natural’ or informal types of 
knowledge generation. These social processes are essentially those which are 
characteristic of social representation development and circulation. It seems reasonable 
to suppose therefore, that social representations theory could be fruitfully applied to our 
understanding of the development of scientific knowledge
2) Secondly, the distinction between science and common sense is overaccentuated: 
Science is conceptualised as entirely separate from the consensual universe and from 
common sense. From this point of view, science falls outside the world of social 
representations, and would therefore be an inappropriate subject for research based on 
the theory. However, I would argue that there are considerable overlaps between the 
consensual and the reified universes (a point also made by De Rosa 1994), and that the 
world of science operates within the world of social representations, rather than separate 
from and immune to '®  social knowledge which circulates in lay belief systems. Much 
scientific or ’expert’ knowledge, especially in the social sciences, technology and
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medicine develops in response to social problems and in close relationship with social 
developments.
The implication of these two points is that social representations theory could be applied 
equally to the world of science as to lay thinking. This idea has also been pursued by 
Bangerter (1995), Jost (1993) and Moscovici (1993b) who, despite his original 
conceptualisation of science and common sense, has suggested more recently that a social 
psychology of science based on social representations theory and theories of groups 
processes, conformity and persuasion, would allow us to understand better the inner 
workings of the scientific community and its construction of knowledge. By extension, 
social representations theory could also be used to understand knowledge generation in 
other social spheres such as the world of professionals, of politics or the law, all of 
which form part of the modem social world replete with social and collective 
representations. It is this belief that social representations theory can be applied to 
spheres of knowledge other than lay common sense that prompts use of the theory (albeit 
with some modifications) as a tool to study mental health professionals.
3) It is unclear what the theory of social representations takes to be ’science’. As the 
theory derives originally from Moscovici’s empirical research on the diffusion of 
psychoanalytic theories into lay consciousness (Moscovici 1976), one can only assume 
that a broad definition of the term ’science’ is being used. Yet as many commentators 
have pointed out (for example, Stevens, 1983) it is debateable whether psychoanalysis 
qualifies as a science. It is unclear whether the term ’science’ encompasses the social 
sciences or even the humanities. Yet those within these communities would certainly 
argue that they inhabit very different worlds based on different epistemological 
assumptions. In many fields the epistemology of the reified universe competes with other 
styles of knowledge construction, for example constructionist and hermeneutic 
epistemologies in the social sciences. Not only can multiple different ’sub-worlds’ of 
specialist knowledge be identified, but within each of these there are variations in the 
degree of linkage with the ’real world’ inhabited by lay people. For example, while pure 
researchers spend most of their time in laboratories, libraries and offices in universities 
and research institutes, aiming to elaborate specialised and abstract theoretical knowledge 
of an esoteric form, applied researchers, working in factories, hospitals and government 
institutions, who share much of the theoretical knowledge of their pure research
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counterparts, may be more concerned with the generation of exoteric knowledge and the 
application of theoretical knowledge to practical problem solving.
4) This conceptualisation of the development of social knowledge fails to adequately 
address issues of power and the very real inequalities which exist in society, permeating 
everyday interactions, conversations and practices and shaping the forms of knowledge 
which develop and come to dominate. The influence of social power relations receives 
little attention in social representations theory (Joffe 1995, Rose et al 1995), and is only 
acknowledged implicitly in the distinction between hegemonic, emancipated and polemic 
representations (Moscovici, 1988). It is assumed that in the consensual universe ’society 
views itself as a group made up of individuals who are of equal worth and irreducible’ 
(Moscovici 1981, p 186). Clearly this is not so. The rules of hierarchy and legitimacy 
according to which scientists in the reified universe offer opinions according to their level 
of qualification (eg ’as an expert in the field’, ’as a medical practitioner’ etc) apply 
equally to all social spheres from politics to the world of common sense. Thus the 
opinion of the black teenager on racial harassment by the police carries a very different 
status from the opinion of the Oxford don on the same subject. Communication and 
expression of opinion is far from equal and fair. It is shaped by the social positioning 
of speakers and by the unequal power relations which structure society. And these power 
relations are also part and parcel of the circulation and development of social 
representations. I will return to this issue in Chapter 8, where I will argue that the 
theory of social representations should take more account of issues of power and social 
inequalities.
5) The suggestion that social representations and the consensual universe deal principally 
with familiarising the unfamiliar fails to deal adequately with the concept of unfamiliarity. 
As the literature review in Chapter 2 adequately demonstrates, unfamiliarity in the form 
of themes of strangeness and ’otherness’ remains at the heart of social representations of 
mental illness. Again, this issue will be taken up in more detail in Chapter 8 where, in 
the light of empirical findings, it is argued that the nature and sources of unfamiliarity 
should be given more attention within the theory of social representations.
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1.2 A Reformulated Model of the Social Circulation of Knowledge
Given the various problems discussed above, it seems timely to propose a new, 
reformulated model of the development and circulation of knowledge in modem society 
which overcomes the simplistic dichotomisations inherent in the original 
conceptualisation. Figure 3.2 below represents this model graphically. Several features 
are worthy of comment:
First, the new model includes more ’players’ than the original one (see figure 3.1). Two 
new components or ’social arenas’ have been added - the world of professionals and the 
world of politics and public policy. The arrows in the figure show the principle channels 
of communication between these spheres, although others may also be possible. 
Consideration of mental health professionals in the initial stages of this research led me 
to realise that the position of many professional practitioners could not be accounted for 
by Moscovici’s original formulation of two distinct worlds of science and common sense. 
Professionals such as doctors, lawyers, teachers are vital players in the translation of 
knowledge and ideas between the world of science, research and expert knowledge, and 
the public domain. It is not only through the media (as the original model suggests) that 
lay people come to understand scientific and other expert knowledge, but through direct 
face-to-face contact with a whole host of professional practitioners - teachers, GPs, 
nurses, social workers and the like. This places professionals in a important position as 
’vectors’, carrying and translating knowledge and ideas between social spheres. 
Similarly, the social circulation of knowledge cannot be adequately understood without 
consideration of the role of politics which often plays a powerful part in shaping societal 
understandings and practices (for example, in the introduction of community care policies 
for the mentally ill). This introduces notions of power into our understanding of the 
development of social representations. Drawing on the work of Foucault (1980), the 
social practices of professionals can be seen as perpetuating ideological power in 
privileging and normalising certain definitions and reactions to, for example, sexuality, 
the body or the mind, and in so doing rendering other definitions unthinkable^ I Social 
practices which perpetuate, resist and renegotiate social power relations are lived out both 
within and between the various social spheres presented; in Figure 3.2.
Another modification is that all the social spheres are now conceptualised as falling
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Figure 3.2: Reformulated model of the Circulation of Knowledge
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within the world of social representations. Previously, the world of science was 
conceptualised as split off from the world of social representation circulation and I have 
argued above that this was problematic. The ’world of social representations’ can be 
considered to correspond to ’social reality’ or the modem social world in its widest sense. 
Professionals, politicians, lay people and ’experts’ all inhabit this social world, 
exchanging views through media discussions, gossip and conversations in pubs or over 
lunch. The various circles in figure 3.2 represent functionally different social spheres 
(the media, the lay public, politics etc), each with specific fields of expertise, rules and 
characteristics. But they are united by their common participation in a shared social 
reality, and their boundaries may be more fuzzy and overlapping than it is possible to 
represent graphically. Styles of knowledge generation associated with the development 
and circulation of social representations are in operation across all social spheres, 
although in some, namely the world of expert knowledge and possibly the world of 
professionals, this may coexist and compete with the epistemology of the reified universe.
Finally, because of ambiguities over what constitutes scientific versus non-scientific 
disciplines, the ’world of science* has been replaced with ’the world of experts’. This 
would then encompass not only researchers in the natural sciences, but those who claim 
to be ’experts* in any areas of the sciences, social sciences or humanities. This is not to 
deny that substantial differences may exist between, for example, economists, social 
anthropologists and astronomers. Nor that individuals in other social spheres (eg 
professionals, the media or politics) may also consider themselves as ’experts’. What 
differentiates those in this ’world of experts’ is their claim to the advancement of 
understanding and esoteric theoretical knowledge independent of other agendas of a 
political or practical nature.
In summary, the model presented in figure 3.2 is, I believe, a more complex and 
comprehensive model of the circulation of knowledge in society than Moscovici’s original 
model of the reified and consensual universes. Modem lay knowledge and common 
sense develop through a complex interaction between expert knowledge, the work of 
professional practitioners, politics, the media and historically based ’folk beliefs’. The 
model recognises that social representations circulate not only in the world of common 
sense, but across all social spheres. From this perspective, the theory of social 
representations could be fruitfully applied to a range of social spheres. The current
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research focuses on the world of professional practitioners, and specifically those who 
work in mental health. In the following section specific features of the world of
professionals and the ’professional social representations’ which circulate in this world
/
will be elaborated.
2 Th e  Building Blocks of  ’Professional Social Representations’
I propose the term ’professional social representations1’ to refer to the social 
representations which circulate in professional worlds and are held by professionals 
about the object of their work. Teachers* social representations of children, mental 
health professionals’ social representations of mental illness, representations of crime held 
by the police, lawyers’ social representations of the law, and so on, constitute 
professional social representations. As systems of shared beliefs and taken-for-granted 
working practices, professional representations constitute the ’professional common sense’ 
which is picked up implicitly through training and experience, and perpetuated in the 
organisation of a professional world. These professional representations are likely to be 
highly elaborated and characterised by specific features which merit theoretical as well 
as empirical consideration.
’Professionals’ can be defined as occupational groups with special competencies who 
respond to central needs and values of society and are characterised by the following 
features: autonomy and prestige; specialised training; service orientation; the power to 
define specific spheres of social reality through self generated ideologies; and distinctive 
ethics which justify the privilege of self regulation (Larson, 1977). The model of 
professional social representations proposed here is designed specifically as a theoretical 
tool to aid our understanding of professionals whose work involves people2. Teachers,
1 For elegance of expression this term may sometimes be shortened to ’professional representations’. The 
reader should assume that the two terms are equivalent and that the term ’social’ remains implicitly in the 
shortened form.
2 These have been referred to in organisational psychology as ’human service’ occupations (Hasenfeld, 
1992). Some writers on professionalism (for example, Toren 1972) characterise occupational groups such as 
social work, nursing and occupational therapy as ’semi-professionals’ in the sense that their knowledge bases 
derive from several allied disciplines and are less unique than, for example, those of medicine or psychology. 
However, if one considers the enactment of unique practical skills and competencies as a defining feature, this 
distinction on the basis of theoretical knowledge becomes less valid, except as a way of describing differentials
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social workers, nurses, the police, doctors all aim to change, advise or control people and 
aspects of their lives in one way or another. Their work is essentially moral, social and 
ideological. The decisions they make, their aims and goals their daily routines are 
implicitly imbued with value judgements of ’right’ and ’wrong’, of what is desirable, 
what is socially acceptable, what is ’normal’. Their work is part of social reality, and 
its effectiveness, quality and legitimacy are judged according to the cultural and social 
norms dominating in society at a given point in time. The work of these people-based 
professionals is also ’social’ in that they work through the medium of relationships in 
which the ’object’ of the work (the child, the mentally ill person, the law-breaker etc) is 
as much an active participant in the work as is the professional. All of these features 
suggest that the world and the work of professional practitioners would be rich and 
appropriate material for the theory of social representations which aims to conceptualise 
the social nature of beliefs, values and practices.
Within the ever increasing body of empirical studies using the theory of social 
representations, there have been several studies investigating social representations among 
professional populations (eg de Rosa 1991, Palmonari et al 1987, Serino 1987, Zani 
1987). However, these studies have been more concerned with application of the theory, 
rather than with theoretical developments. I take the position that as the theory matures 
and expands, such theoretical considerations are both well over-due and increasingly 
necessary if the theory is to prove itself as a valuable tool for social psychological 
research in the years to come. If the theory of social representations is to expand its 
remit into aspects of society beyond lay thinking and common sense, we must do more 
than simply apply the original theoretical concepts - we must develop and expand them 
to take account of the characteristics of social worlds such as the media, ’experts’ and 
professionals which differentiate them from common sense. Processes, contents and 
structures of the social representations which circulate in each of these social spheres are 
likely to differ according to the relationship between representor and the object to be 
represented. Taking the example of mental illness, politicians, mental health
of status. Throughout this thesis I use the term ’professionals’ to refer to all mental health disciplines which 
require specialised training. A further characteristic of these professions is that they have traditionally been 
employed by the State, although with privatisation and the reduction of the welfare state in recent years, this 
is no longer a defining feature. The limitation of this model to ’people-based’ professionals does not imply that 
it is necessarily inappropriate to non people-based professional worlds such as accountancy or architecture. It 
may well be, albeit with some modifications. For the time being however, I leave this question open.
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(professionals and lay people have very different relationships with mental illness and the 
mentally ill. We should not, therefore, assume that representations of mental illness 
circulating in these worlds will show identical contents. Nor can we assume that these 
representations will be characterised by the same processes and internal structures, even 
if they are, nevertheless, united by common themes.
Figure 3.3 below builds on figure 3.2 in elaborating the proposed features of 
professionals social representations circulating in the world of professionals. (The 
outlines of this representational field and the worlds with which it is interlinked are 
dashed rather than solid in this figure, to indicate the fluid and unclear nature of these 
boundaries and divisions.) It is proposed that professional social representations 
comprise five components:- theory, practice, professional roles and identities, lay 
representations, and organisational factors. Professional practice - the day-to-day 
work of social workers, teachers, the police, doctors etc - is arguably the most important 
defining feature of professional representations, which differentiates professionals from 
lay people and ’experts’ alike. Abstract theoretical knowledge of their field is part of 
professionals’ training and is likely to form part of their subsequent social representations 
as professionals. Training also serves to socialise professionals into certain roles and 
professional identities. Professional roles and daily practice are necessarily shaped by 
their organisational context. Rather than seeing organisational factors simply as the 
contextual background, this models proposes that professionals’ representations and 
experiences of the organisations and institutions they work in and form part of, and the 
beliefs and ideologies that these imbue, are part and parcel of professional social 
representations. The final element of professional representations is lay beliefs and 
knowledge, which professionals do not leave at the door when they enter the school, the 
hospital or the office and don their ’professional hats’, but carry with them as members 
of society and as human beings.
At this early stage, the relationships between these five components of professionals 
social representations are not specified. The theory of social representations proposes 
that all representations are integrated structures of beliefs and actions (Wagner, 1994) 
whose elements may show compatibilities and consistencies, as well as inconsistencies, 
diversity and heterogeneity (Rose et al, 1995). Thus, rather than forming distinct sub­
components, the inter-relationships between these elements and the consequent structure
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JFigure 3.3: Components of Professional Social Representations
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\of professional social representations may be considerably more integrated, complex and 
fluid than it is possible to present graphically. One of the purposes of the current study 
will be to investigate the relationships between these elements in more detail, as well as 
to provide an empirical test of this proposed model for professional social representations 
in the field of mental health.
This model of professional social representations aims to provide theoretical progression, 
while at the same time retaining the distinctive epistemology and basic assumptions of the 
theory of social representations. Having said this, theoretical speculation can often 
benefit from insights drawn from other perspectives. The development of this model 
does not limit itself to consideration of social representations literature, but casts a wider 
net, drawing upon literature and ideas generated by other theoretical perspectives and in 
areas such as sociology and organisational psychology. Sections 2.1 to 2.5 which follow 
take each of the five proposed components of professional social representations in turn, 
drawing on previous literature from a range of theoretical positions to elaborate the 
proposed nature of the elements of professional social representation in more detail.
2.1 Theoretical Models
A crucial feature of professional social representations which differentiates them from lay 
social representations is theoretical knowledge. Causal models and abstract 
conceptualisations developed through research and intellectual thought in the ’world of 
experts’ can be distinguished from lay theories in being formalised, explicit and 
communicated through the written word and formal teaching. (In comparison, lay 
theories are implicit and communicated informally through conversations, the spoken 
word or routine practices.) A large part of professional training in any field is the 
formalised teaching and examinations which act as a process of socialisation into certain 
theoretical ideas and styles of thought. This body of knowledge includes both esoteric 
and academic theories and more exoteric ’theories of practice’ (for example, models of 
teaching or social work practice, care strategies in nursing, theories of treatment 
interventions in clinical psychology) which use theoretical ideas to structure and guide 
professional practice.
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Moscovici (1993) suggests that within the scientific community, theories can be 
considered as social representations. Like social representations, theories shape the 
practice of researchers, act as lenses through which research findings are evaluated, are 
produced collectively through continual debate and negotiation, and are an important 
aspect of group identity construction, their proponents often being fervent believers rather 
than simply holders of knowledge. This is a useful step towards applying the theory of 
social representations to social spheres other than common sense, but the current model 
of professional social representations suggests that it is preferable to consider theory as 
one of several components of these representational fields rather than as social 
representations per se. It is suggested that theoretical knowledge may serve two 
important functions in professional social representations:
Firstly, theories may serve an anchoring function in professional social representations, 
helping those who hold them to make sense of, orient themselves to, and gain a sense of 
familiarity and mastery in the world in which they work. Theories provide the names 
and categories which are required for anchoring to be achieved, structuring what 
professionals do, and how they think about what they do3. They play a part in practical 
decision making, in the ways professionals conceptualise their work and its aims, and in 
communication and debate amongst colleagues.
Secondly, theoretical models may offer professionals a way of justifying their work and 
their position, acting as useful rhetorical devices to legitimize professional practice.; For 
people-based professionals whose work involves reacting (often at great expense to the 
tax payer) to phenomena such as mental and physical illness, crime or unemployment, 
which seem to endure regardless of how they are tackled, this legitimation function of 
theories may be particularly important. By holding abstract theoretical models which lay 
people do not, professionals can lay claim to their public position as ’expert’ practitioners 
who are supposed to have knowledge and skill in a certain field over and above that of 
lay people. Practice in a professional capacity differs radically from actions as a lay 
person in that it is publicly accountable and carries with it social expectations to achieve 
certain changes. Theoretical models provide legitimation for variations in working styles
3 This relationship between knowledge and action would also be predicted by models developed within 
the social cognition framework, such as the expectancy-value model of attitudes, intentions and behaviour 
developed by Ajzen & Fishbein (1980).
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and may function to provide post hoc justifications for action within professional 
representations.
These two functions of theoretical knowledge in professional social representations 
suggest different relationships between theory and practice. Theory used as an anchor 
suggests a ’theory then practice’ relationship. Whereas theory as a post hoc justification 
for action suggests ’practice then theory’. The empirical analyses in Chapter 6 aims to 
shed light on this relationship between theory and practice in professional social 
representations, and to investigate the nature and the role of theoretical knowledge in 
representations of mental illness held by mental health professionals.
2.2 Professional Practice4
The practice of professionals differs in several important ways from that of lay people, 
and these factors merit conceptual elaboration. As expert practitioners, professionals are 
in constant daily contact with the ’object’ of their professional social representations, as 
personified in the mentally ill person, the criminal, the child etc. This necessarily places 
them in a very different position to the lay person, the politician or the ’expert’. Not 
only do they choose to have this contact, but it occurs within specific parameters of the 
professional - ’client’ relationship, which as noted above, carries with it expectations and 
social accountability. While lay people may be heavily influenced by the media in the 
development of certain social representations (of crime or mental illness, for example), 
professional representations are shaped by a specific type of direct personal experience.
The day-to-day work of professionals is likely to be shaped by complex and dynamic 
interactions with the other four components of professional social representations - 
theoretical knowledge, professional roles and identities, organisational factors and lay 
representations or common sense. The current study aims to elaborate the nature of these
4 The term ’practice’ is used here in a ’narrow’ sense to refer simply to what is actually done by 
individuals in daily working life, rather than in the sense used, for example, by Pierre Bourdieu whose wider 
notion of practice (’habitus’) is compatible with the functioning of social representations (Doise 1985). Taken 
in its narrow sense, practice becomes an integral component of wider social representations.
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relationships in professional representations of mental illness, using empirical analysis to 
investigate, for example, the interactions between working practices and organisational 
factors in a time of rapid policy and organisational change.
2.3 Professional Roles and Identities
Professionals approach the object of their work as a teacher, a doctor, or a nurse. In this 
sense their own professional identity is part and parcel of their professional social 
representations and neat subject-object splits cannot be made. For example, 
representations of children as blank-slates, innocent beings in need of love and protection, 
or unruly agents whose energies must be channelled and controlled would imply very 
different self-images and roles for teachers who subscribe to these representational 
perspectives.
Breakwell (1993) suggests that an integration of concepts from social identity theory 
(Tajfel, 1978) can enrich the theory of social representations by accounting for how and 
why particular groups or individuals respond to, reproduce or reject representations. 
Thus we would expect professional group identities and inter-group relations to play a 
part in the infiltration, acceptance or rejection of representations across different 
professional groups. In the world of mental health for example, social workers, 
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists define themselves in relation to each other and 
carve out their representational positions accordingly. Social representations can serve 
both inter-group purposes (enhancing differentiation or allegiances between groups, for 
example) and intra-group purposes (building group cohesion, aiding communication, and 
so on). Work by Hayes (1991) illustrates how the use of concepts from social identity 
theory is particularly useful to studying representations in organisational contexts, in 
which diverse sub-groups aligned with different representational positions are united 
within a common organisational culture.
2.4 Organisational Factors
The forth component of the proposed model of professional social representations is
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organisational factors. From the specific local context (the school, the solicitors practice, 
the hospital, the day centre) to the wider institutional system (the education system, the 
legal system, the health service), professional social representations are both reflected in, 
and shaped by organisational factors. From the multi-level stance of social 
representations theory, organisations cannot be separated from the people who work in 
' them, and the beliefs and representations which circulate in and structure these worlds. 
Organisational factors can therefore be considered as part of professional social 
representations, just as these, in turn, are part and parcel of the organisational systems 
in which they are lived out. Hospitals would not be hospitals without the medical 
professionals who work in them, nor would these people be medical professionals if they 
were not united by an organisational structure and by certain shared beliefs.
This perspective is compatible with several other approaches to the study of work 
organisations. For example, conceptual similarities between social representations theory 
and theories of organisational culture are noted by Kummerow & Innes (1994)5. In this 
vein, Hasenfeld (1992) approaches ’human service organisations (schools, hospitals etc) 
as collectivities which adopt and uphold the value systems of wider society through the 
daily routine of the people who work in them. Research conducted in hospital settings 
(eg Strauss et al, 1985) supports a model of these organisations as dynamic systems in 
which the structures that emerge to handle the work reflect negotiated order among the 
various actors (staff and clients), dominant ideologies and the nature of the work itself. 
Hasenfeld (1992) suggests that human services organisations are often experienced by 
those who work in them as constraining them from working as they would like to ideally, 
according to their theories and representations of their work, by imposing rules and 
regulations, organisational structures and limitations on resources. These control 
mechanisms are particularly complex and weighty because of the moral nature of the 
work and the associated requirement for work to be judged and perceived as fair and 
trustworthy. Control and regulation may be instituted internally (for example, record 
keeping, monitoring and standardised procedures) or externally through government
5 They note that both approaches share their origins in the early work of Durkheim, both focus on 
collective, taken-for-granted and historical aspects of beliefs, and both highlight the function of collective belief 
systems in reducing uncertainty and anxiety. Organisational culture is defined by Schein (1985, p 9) as ’a 
pattern of basic assumptions - invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its 
problems of external adaptation and internal integration - that has worked well enough to be considered valid 
and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those 
problems.’
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regulations or public inquiries. One could speculate that at times of rapid or radical 
policy changes this sense of constraint may be particularly acute, as new styles of 
working imposed by policy makers and managers clash with established working 
practices. At such times, imbalances of power between the various social actors (policy 
makers, professionals and lay people) are brought into sharp focus.
Another informative perspective is the human relations approach to organisational 
psychology which highlights how organisational functioning is a product of the 
complementarity between organisational goals and the personal needs of those who work 
in them. Thus, similar to social representations theory, intra-psychic, inter-personal and 
collective levels of analysis are integrated. Psychodynamic perspectives have developed 
this approach further, using systemic and group dynamic theories to highlight how 
organisations are shaped by the unconscious concerns of their members and the 
unconscious forces shaping the societies in which they live (eg Jacques 1955, De Board 
1978). Jacques (1955) suggests that structures, processes and cultures in organisations 
can be understood as unconscious defense mechanisms used individually and collectively 
to cope with anxiety6. Social change is resisted by organisations and their members 
because it undermines established unconscious defense systems. This resistance may be 
particularly acute when change is imposed rather than chosen by organisational members. 
Given the linkages noted in Chapter 2 (section 2.2) between societal reactions to mental 
illness and defensive intra-psychic processes (’otherising’ and the projection of fears of 
collapse and disintegration onto the mentally ill) these ideas may prove useful to 
understanding the content and processes of representations circulating in organisations 
whose work focuses on mental ill health.
These organisational factors will be the focus of analysis presented in Chapter 7, which 
takes the current organisational changes in mental health as its starting point, and seeks 
to investigate how these changes are evaluated and experienced by mental health 
professionals.
6 As an example, Menzies (1960) applies these ideas to a study of nursing staff in general hospitals. She 
suggests that strategies such as the depersonalisation of patients, the denial of personal feelings, and ’ritual task 
performance’ in which work is conducted according to rigid task lists and discretion and initiative are 
discouraged, can be seen as coping mechanisms against anxiety, guilt and uncertainty engendered by the 
emotionally difficult nature of nursing practice.
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2.5 Lav Knowledge
Teachers, doctors, social workers and the police may don their professional hats between 
certain set hours, but they are also members of society, who read the newspapers, chat 
with friends in pubs and sitting rooms, believe in superstitions and so on. It is argued 
that this common sense knowledge is too pervasive, too deeply rooted to be wiped out 
by the secondary socialisation of professional training, or left at the door when a person 
enters the school or hospital and becomes a professional for the duration of their working 
day. The proposed model of professional social representations conceptualises aspects 
of lay representations as part and parcel of professional representations. Not only do 
professional representations develop within social reality and the world of social 
representations, but these representations enter into the representations which circulate 
in professional worlds. If lay knowledge were not included, if it was conceptualised as 
entirely separate and excluded from professional representations, this model would risk 
reproducing errors made in the past by the theory of social representations, organisational 
psychologists and sociologists alike, in which the overlaps of common sense styles of 
knowledge with expert worlds and organisations have not been adequately recognised7.
The existence and status of common sense or lay knowledge in professional 
representations will be investigated in the empirical analysis of data obtained from mental 
health professionals. At this stage, it is hypothesised that lay knowledge may be more 
implicit and hidden from view than other components of professional representations. 
This is suggested by the public accountability of professional practitioners, whose social 
legitimacy depends crucially on the public perception that they bring different types of 
knowledge and expertise to their daily work than the understandings of lay people. Lay 
understandings of children, mental illness or disease are unlikely to be verbalised by the 
professionals who work in these fields (especially if they carry with them negative 
connotations), but may nevertheless be implicit components in the construction of 
professional social representations. As an example, research into teachers’ attributions 
of poor classroom performance to lack of motivation in boys compared to lack of ability
7 Problems with social representations theory’s original conceptualisation of the world of science have 
already been noted in section 1.1. Much of the work by sociologists (eg the anti-psychiatry writers) provides 
a rather simplistic model of professionals playing roles which perpetuate existing power structure (see Chapter 
2, section 2.2). Similarly, organisational psychology has tended ignore the role of folk beliefs in organisations 
and the practices of those who work in them.
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in girls suggests the influence of socially pervasive gender stereotypes or social 
representations which are not fully extinguished by professional socialisation-(eg Dweck 
et al 1978).
2.6 Professionals as Integrators. Translators and Vectors
The previous five sections have elaborated aspects of the five components which, it is 
proposed, constitute professional social representations. These components are of 
different and potentially incompatible natures, encompassing abstract theoretical 
knowledge, daily routines of individuals, broad organisational cultures and ideologies, 
intangible common sense beliefs and professional identities. It is suggested therefore, 
that professional representations act to integrate and translate diverse spheres of 
knowledge, beliefs and actions. Following from this, a second proposal is that this 
reflects the difficult and unique social positioning of professional practitioners at the 
interface between the diverse social spheres of politics and policy directives, ’experts’ and 
theoretical knowledge, and the lay public and their folk belief systems (see Figure 3.2).
j Often the agendas, directives and knowledge systems of these various social spheres are
\
incompatible or even conflictual. Conflicts may emerge particularly at times of change, 
when the status quo is challenged by, for example, new developments in the world of 
experts or changes in policy directives. The discovery that AIDS affects both 
homosexual and heterosexual groups, the introduction of community care for the mentally 
ill, and changes to the National Curriculum are all recent examples of this. Such changes 
may spark crises of public legitimacy as professionals attempt to implement new solutions 
suggested by politicians and experts to enduring social problems such as mental illness, 
unemployment, or crime.
Translation of theories from the world of experts and of policy directives into day-to-day 
practical strategies is not easy as it requires reconciliation of different types of social 
knowledge. Policy directives and recommendations from theory may be ambiguous or 
over-general, and require active interpretation or reconstruction to be put into practice. 
What is abstract, conceptual and ideological must be translated into the day-to-day, the 
concrete and the interpersonal. This suggests that professional representations will be the 
site of compromises between the demands and directives of various spheres of knowledge
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differing in nature and origin, and (given that incompatibilities may exist and harmonious 
integration may not be possible) inconsistencies, continuous negotiations and power 
struggles. As an example, teachers may struggle to reconcile local education policies of 
comprehensive schooling, with parents’ demands for streaming, while attempting to put 
the various ’expert’ recommendations into practice, considering the wishes of children, 
and balancing all these with their own beliefs and judgement based on classroom 
experience, personal values and professional training.
In translating and integrating diverse sources of knowledge, professionals act as ’vectors’ 
between various social spheres. The term ’vector’ is used to imply the communicative 
function of professional practitioners who, along with the mass media, are points of 
contact and exchange, or carriers of opinions and concerns between politicians, experts 
and the public. But, as the argument above highlights, the ideas and understandings 
which professionals disseminate between various social arenas do not remain constant 
through this communication process, but are re-presented or translated in form and 
content. Policy directives and research recommendations cannot be realised without 
agents to put them into practice. Professionals are the implementors of public policies 
and expert knowledge in the public sphere. It is through the work of professionals that 
lay people feel the direct impact of education reforms, community care policies, medical 
advances and the like. Teaching children about safe sex at school, visiting new mothers 
at home, stopping drivers who break the speed limit, charging £100 for an hour’s legal 
consultation, giving the mentally ill depot injections and sheltered housing - these are all 
examples of how the work of professionals impacts directly on the organisation and daily 
routines of people’s lives. Professional practice is a powerful shaper of lay 
representations which involves quite different processes from the ways that policy and 
expert knowledge filter into and interact with lay representations through the media.j
i
One of the principle aims of the current empirical study is further investigation of these 
complex dynamics in the world of mental health. This will serve not only to extend our 
knowledge of the experiences, beliefs, knowledge and practices of mental health 
professionals, but also as an empirical test of the model of professional social 
representations elaborated in this chapter. The position of mental health professionals as 
vectors between ’expert knowledge’, policy and the public sphere, and the resultant 
translations and negotiations on the part of mental health professionals that this position
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requires, suggest that professional representations of mental illness are an interesting area 
of study, both in their own right, and as important shapers of lay representations of 
mental illness. The empirical analyses will aim to shed light on how diverse spheres of 
knowledge derived from various sources are inter-related within professional 
representations of mental illness, uncovering the integrations, compromises, tensions and 
inconsistencies that exist within these representational fields.
3 Professional Social Representations am ongst M ental Health  
Practitioners
Having elaborated a general theoretical framework for social representational research 
focused on professional practitioners, this section focuses on the specific professional 
world with which the current research is concerned, namely the world of mental health 
professionals. Compared to the previous two sections of this chapter, this constitutes a 
shift in emphasis from general theoretical conceptualisations concerned with structure and 
process, to specific content and substantive issues. Thus, while sections 1 and 2 have 
positioned the current research theoretically, this section positions the study substantively. 
It begins with a review of the contemporary world of mental health professionals. This 
highlights aspects of this unique social sphere with which it is necessary to be familiar 
in order to appreciate the findings of current and previous empirical studies. In section
3.2 a selective critical review of previous research serves to locate the current study 
within the corpus of existing social scientific research on mental health professionals and 
their understandings of mental ill health. This material is drawn together in section 3.3 
which postulates some initial observations about professional social representations of 
mental illness as characterised by multiple and diverse knowledge spheres, suggestions 
of rejection and psycho-social distancing, and debate, ambiguity and uncertainty.
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3.1 The W orld of Mental Health Professionals8
The world of mental health practitioners or professionals through which mental health 
services for the population are provided is made up of a diffuse network of social actors 
and organisational structures whose daily practices and workings are underpinned by 
broad belief systems (or professional social representations) regarding the nature of 
mental distress and societal reactions to this phenomenon. In order to understand the 
nature and development of these practices and belief systems, it is necessary to know 
something of the groups of professional practitioners and bodies of ’expert’ theoretical 
knowledge which populate this professional world.
Chapter 1 highlights how the second part of the twentieth century has seen dramatic 
changes in mental health policies in both France and Britain, associated with a widening 
of the remit of mental health services beyond the medical into the realms of the 
psychological and the social. This is reflected in historical expansions in the professional 
groups who work with the mentally ill and have carved out distinct areas of specialist 
practice in response to the historical dominance of psychiatry. Contemporary mental 
health services in Britain and France are delivered by multi-disciplinary teams of 
practitioners consisting typically of psychiatrists, psychiatric nurses, social workers and 
clinical psychologists. (Occupational therapists and case managers also form part of these 
teams in Britain.) Appendix 2 provides a review of the professions which make up 
mental health teams in Britain and France, considering their historical development, their 
knowledge bases and their contemporary practice. The very existence of these 
professional groupings within the contemporary world of mental health is in itself an 
informative indicator of how mental illness is socially represented. As Prior (1993) puts 
it:-
’(M)ental illness is essentially defined through the sum total of practices which surround it.
And given that, it follows that the organization of the division of labour necessarily reflects 
a great deal about what such illness is considered to be at any one time.’ (p 77) ... ’(T)he 
appearance of the roles of occupational therapist, social worker, community psychiatric nurse 
and clinical psychologist reflect both changes in the occupational structure and changes in our 
understanding of what mental illness is and how it ought to be organized. Indeed, the very
o
Although the analytic focus of the current research is on professionals and their social representations, 
this is not to deny that people designated as mentally ill patients or clients are as important social actors as 
professionals in the enactment and negotiation of daily routines and social representations in the day centres, 
out-patient clinics and hospital wards which form the network of public mental health services.
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existence of such roles underlines the fact that, in the closing years of the twentieth century, 
mental illnesses are far from being perceived as purely medical and organic problems.’ (p 
102)
Another indicator or point of access into contemporary professional representations of 
mental illness is through the bodies of abstract conceptual knowledge which circulate in 
the world of mental health. The role of this theoretical knowledge in professional social 
representations has been discussed in section 2.1 above, and will be one of the foci of the 
current empirical investigations (see Chapter 6). Theories of mental illness form the pool 
of abstract and ’expert’ understandings into which professionals are socialised during 
training, and on which they draw in constructing their daily practice and their 
representations of mental illness.
Appendix 3 provides a brief review and commentary on the main bodies of theoretical 
knowledge which have developed in recent decades in the world of mental health in 
France and Britain. Five broad theoretical positions on mental illness are reviewed: 
medical; psychodynamic; social; cognitive-behavioural; and systemic9. These five 
perspectives are all generally accepted positions in the current expert literature on mental 
health. They are bodies of knowledge to which most mental health professionals have 
at least some exposure during training, and they constitute the bases of many of the 
current ’theories of practice’ used in day-to-day mental health work. This corpus of 
theoretical knowledge has certain characteristics which are likely to have important 
implications for the development of professional representations of mental illness:
Firstly, the various theories of mental illness are diverse and constitute a heterogenous 
body of expert knowledge. Each one suggests very different conceptualisations of the
9 Critical commentaries by social scientists on these theoretical positions have focused principally on the 
medical model. While there is not space in this thesis to consider these in detail, an interesting example is the 
work of Gaines (1992) who uses a cultural reading of one of the ’bibles’ of psychiatric practice, DSM (The 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders published by the American Psychiatric Association) to 
illustrate how psychiatric nosologies mesh with cultural notions of person-hood. Gaines suggests that the various 
mental illness categories imply failures of reason imbued with a moral dimension and associated with 
insufficiencies or excesses. Central to these illness categories is the notion of failures of self control. A concept 
of the ideal self based on Northern European Germanic Protestant notions of person-hood as rational and 
controlled is implicit, with the DSM system serving to place distance between this culturally idealized self and 
the mentally ill as ’other’-. This analysis shows many parallels with the sociological and historical 
conceptualisation of mental illness as a dangerous form of ’otherness’ reviewed in Chapter 2 (section 2.2). It 
illustrates how knowledge systems which develop within a specific professional sphere are social and cultural 
products and may not be equivalent in different cultural contexts.
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nature of mental ill health, the aetiological factors involved (genetics, childhood trauma, 
social conditions, or family dynamics for example), and the practical strategies most 
appropriate in treating mental health problems. In social representational terms, this 
diversity suggests multiple possible ways of anchoring mental illness. The various 
theoretical orientations offer practitioners diverse and often contradictory guidelines 
regarding how to work with the mentally ill, suggesting strategies as diverse as 
administering medication, initiating changes in social circumstances, talking about early 
experiences or modifying behaviour.
Secondly, despite this diversity, the different theoretical positions are historically inter­
related and these relationships are characterised by important power imbalances. As in 
any social sphere, the development of expert understandings is a social process. Theories 
of mental illness develop in reaction to other theories, diffuse within the community of 
mental health experts and practitioners, take hold, displace other models, are 
marginalised or fade into oblivion and history. While medical models have dominated 
the world of mental health historically, (arguably as a result of the power of medicine 
more generally in western society (Zola, 1972)), more recent theoretical perspectives 
such as social, cognitive and family systemic models constitute important challenges to 
the power base of psychiatry and the medical model10. Beyond these general trends 
which have occurred on both sides of The Channel, the development of theoretical 
perspectives and their relative power balances differs somewhat between France and 
Britain. In particular, there are significant differences in contemporary psychodynamic 
perspectives in France and Britain (see Appendix 3 for details). Psychodynamic 
perspectives hold much more sway in France, while cognitive-behavioural approaches 
have remained principally within the English speaking world.
Thirdly, these bodies of knowledge are not fixed but provisional, partial and continuously 
up-dated. Historically speaking they are relatively ’young’, most contemporary expert 
understandings of mental ill health having developed in the later parts of the twentieth 
century. Even in this relatively short period, there have been considerable changes and
10 As an example, Gilman (1988) and Boyle (1990) chart the historical development of theoretical models 
of schizophrenia, from Kraeplin’s original proposal of the concept, through the ideas of Freud and Jung with 
an emphasis on linguistic and hermeneutic aspects, the anti-psychiatry movement, family systemic theories, and 
the new biological theories of the 1970s. Each of these perspectives developed in reaction to what had gone 
before, building on some ideas and rejecting others.
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developments within each theory (for example Stevens (1983) and Turkle (1979) chart 
developments in psychoanalysis, while Gaines (1992) and Light (1982) analyze changes 
in psychiatric nosologies). Despite the backing of fervent disciple communities, no 
definitive ’proof for any single theoretical perspective can be marshalled (even on the 
epistemological terms of their proponents). Similarly, no single perspective can provide 
a definitive understanding of mental ill health. The imperfect fit of mental illness into 
any single theoretical system allows space for constant debate within the community of 
mental health practitioners and experts. Jodelet (1991a) notes the implications of this in 
the construction of lay representations of mental illness
’there exists no real "hard core” of knowledge about this affliction and the scientific and 
medical world has been unable to agree on any homogeneous position. Thoughts, 
judgements, opinions on the subject frequently lead the thinker back to an autonomous social 
construction in which expert, legitimate knowledge plays only a minor role.... What is more, 
the vague and unresolved map of the psychiatric world offers the public little reassurance, a 
state which will favour the proliferation and survival of the vagaries of everyday common 
sense.’ (Jodelet, 1991a, p 8)
In summary, the theoretical knowledge which circulates in the world of mental health can 
be characterised as diffuse, heterogenous, and provisional. The role that this type of 
knowledge plays within professional social representations will be an important area of 
investigation in the current empirical study.
3.2 Research on Mental Health Professionals
The world of mental health services, treatments and care strategies has been the focus of 
an enormous amount of analytic and evaluative research, conducted from perspectives as 
diverse as social policy evaluation, nursing studies, sociology, psychology and psychiatry. 
This review limits itself to research which can tell us something of how mental health 
practitioners understand and conceptualise mental health problems. Despite this 
volume of work on mental health services, it is somewhat ironic (given the argument put 
forward in section 1.2 above regarding the role of professional representations in the 
development of lay and societal knowledge) that social science researchers have tended 
to pay less attention to understandings of mental distress amongst mental health 
practitioners than to those circulating in the lay world. This section provides a critical 
discussion of an illustrative sample of research on mental health professionals conducted
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from various perspectives. It focuses in more detail on those studies which are 
epistemologically compatible with the current research.
The Anti-psvchiatrv view
The 1950s and 1960s saw a huge proliferation of sociological work which developed 
labelling and deviance theories and radical anti-establishment positions to challenge the 
medical model of mental illness and promote an alternative social model of the mental 
illness category. The anti-psychiatric view of mental health practitioners has generally 
been that they are agents of the oppressive and coercive regime of the psychiatric system, 
and as such, subscribe to simplistic, medicalized and negative understandings of mental 
distress in which difference and abnormality are paramount and there is little or no 
attempt to understand the person’s experiences (see Perrow 1965 or Weinstein 1982 for 
reviews of work by sociologists conducted in psychiatric hospitals). For example 
Goffman’s (1961) ethnographic study of St Elizabeth’s Psychiatric Hospital in Washington 
DC documents the details of how staff enact daily routines which contribute to the 
hospital as a ’total institution’ in which inmates are stripped of all capacity to act in an 
autonomous, self determining way. Although Goffman is primarily interested in taking 
the patients* perspective, he conceptualises the psychiatric hospital as a place where both 
patients and staff loose their ability to act in autonomous ways. Hospital staff are 
characterised as locked into routine practices and ways of thinking which serve the needs 
of the institution and their own collective need to maintain the legitimacy of their social 
position. As a consequence, they are unable to interact with patients on their own terms, 
and are restricted in the flexibility of their reactions. Im a similar vein, Rosenhan’s 
(1973) study of ’being sane in insane places’ describes how staff persistently interpreted 
the ’normal’ behaviour of investigators posing as mentally ill patients as evidence of
psychiatric illness. Rosenhan discusses the ’stickiness of psycho-diagnostic labels’ which
*
develop in the minds of professional observers and come to develop a life and influence 
of their own which shapes interpretations of a patient’s past, present and future.
Critical evaluation of this type of research from a social representational perspective 
mirrors the comments made in Chapter 2 about the anti-psychiatry movement in general, 
and I will not repeat these arguments here. The anti-psychiatry perspective on psychiatric 
institutions and the people who inhabit them has been criticised for (among other things)
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conceptualising staff simply as villains motivated by custodial rather than therapeutic 
goals (Perrow 1965), presenting a homogenized view which fails to account for individual 
diversity (Weinstein 1982), and promoting a ’vulgar version of the societal reaction 
perspective’ (Killian 1981)11. In their focus on a systemic level of analysis, these 
approaches offer a valuable conceptualisation of the drastically unequal power relations 
between staff and patients in mental health services. However, this systemic focus also 
renders their accounts of how the people who work in these organisational structures 
make sense of and understand the nature of mental ill health relatively unsophisticated 
and simplistic. They fail to capture both the diversity of understandings within 
professional groups and the nuances of meaning associated with mental distress. (A 
cogent argument could also be made that developments in mental health care over the last 
three decades render these studies out-dated. However, while organisational structures 
have certainly changed dramatically, and anti-psychiatric writing has had a significant 
impact in shaping the very systems of which it is so critical, several recent studies of 
hospital closure in Britain (Korman & Glennerster 1990, Prior 1993, Tomlinson 1991) 
suggest that aspects of institutionalisation remain, even within small community-based 
services.)
Attitude Research
One of the most commonly used multi-dimensional measures of attitudes towards mental 
illness, the OMI (Opinion about Mental Illness Scale) was developed by Cohen & 
Struening (1962) using samples of mental health practitioners. The five dimensions 
measured by this scale are Authoritarianism (the mentally ill as different and inferior to 
’normal’ people); Benevolence (a kindly, paternalistic view); Mental Hygiene Ideology 
(adoption of a medical model); Social Restrictiveness (mental illness as a threat to 
society); and Interpersonal Ideology (a psychodynamic perspective). Most attitude 
research has tended to compare the various professional sub-groups and to search for 
factors which can predict and/or change attitudes to mental illness. Reviewing a number 
of studies (mainly conducted in the United States), Rabkin (1972) reports that lower
11 Killian comments that, ’it is not that the social processes on which sociologists have focused their 
attention in recent years are not real and significant. It is rather that so many sociologists have been as dogmatic 
and as self-righteous in promoting their versions of an ill-defined, uncertain, often intuitive body of knowledge 
as have psychiatrists in defending their myths.’ (Killian, 1981, p 238).
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status personnel (nurses and hospital aides) typically show more authoritarian and 
restrictive attitudes towards mental illness. Similarly, Schroder & Ehrlich (1968), 
replicating the study by Phillips (1966) (reported in Chapter 2, section 2.3) report that 
levels of rejection of the mentally ill measured by social distance scales are almost as 
high amongst psychiatric nurses as those of the lay public. Rabkin (1972) reports that 
those with more professional training (psychiatrists and clinical psychologists) are found 
in several studies to be more liberal and tolerant in their attitudes, although psychologists 
usually score low on the Benevolence dimension. Younger professionals and those with 
more education have generally been found to express the most liberal attitudes. Whilst 
several studies show that training and experience can produce attitude change amongst 
mental health practitioners, the usual problem of a weak association between attitudes and 
behaviour are also encountered.
Section 2.3 of Chapter 2 has already discussed the substantial epistemological and 
methodological problems of research using the concept of attitudes to study collective 
beliefs about mental illness. These points apply as much to research on mental health 
practitioners as to work on lay populations and will not be repeated here. While these 
studies may provide indications of the diversity and multiplicity of understandings of 
mental ill health which exist amongst mental health professionals, and are suggestive that 
many of these views are characterised by negativity and rejection, there are other studies 
which capture the complexities of social psychological aspects of professionals’ 
understandings of mental ill health more successfully.
’ Socio-PsvchologicaT Perspectives12
A recent study which is highly relevant to the current research, both in terms of its social 
constructionist stance and in its focus on similar contemporary mental health services, has 
been conducted by the sociologist Lindsay Prior. In ’The Social Organisation of Mental 
Illness’ Prior (1993) investigates how definitions of mental illness, as reflected and
12 This section covers research which is generally compatible with the epistemological stance of the 
current study in taking account of both social constructive processes and the agency and diversity of individuals. 
Having said this, not all the authors of this research are social psychologists (for example, Prior is a sociologist 
and the work of Kirk & Kutchins is conducted from an organisational perspective). This is illustrative of the 
position of social representations theory and research located at the interface between several social scientific 
perspectives.
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constituted in the organisation of mental health services, have changed through the 
twentieth century. The study draws on an imaginative range of historical evidence 
including architectural plans for the lay-out of psychiatric hospitals, the development of 
the various mental health professions, text-books used in mental health training and policy 
documents13. It also encompasses detailed investigations of specific contemporary 
hospital and community mental health services in Northern Ireland. These suggest that 
conceptualisations of mental ill health amongst mental health personal differ between 
hospital and community locations.
In the hospital context, the medical ideology reigns supreme - mental illness is seen as 
a problem residing within individuals which is treated and controlled with medication. 
There is a general consensus amongst the staff that the role of the hospital is first and 
foremost to treat disease, with any other functions serving a secondary role. The work 
of occupational therapists, social workers and CPNs, for example, is seen as necessary 
and essential, but secondary to the central work of the medical treatment of illness. The 
majority of problems are conceptualised by staff and patients alike as somatic problems 
or as problems derived from deficits within the individual. Thus, while the work of 
hospital nurses may be focused on patient behaviour as the prime object of observation, 
discussion and analysis, this is taken as an indicator of the ’real’ psychiatric problems 
residing within the patient’s body.
In comparison, professionals working in the community adopt a much wider concept of 
treatment which includes aspects of the person’s life that would be considered peripheral 
to treatment in the hospital setting. This is associated with a generally broader view of 
the mentally ill person, and his or her needs and capacities. Such things as personal 
relationships, the interpersonal milieu of their living environment, mundane material 
conditions, and the role of purposeful, structured activities are considered by these 
professionals as central to their work of monitoring and reacting to mental health 
problems. While notions of disease and the use of medical treatments still feature, 
community based professionals’ conceptualisations of psychiatric disorder give particular 
weight to the role of the family and social relationships in both the aetiology and the
13 The findings of these historical investigations are discussed elsewhere (see Chapter 1, section 3.1 of 
this chapter, and Appendix 2).
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treatment of mental distress. Thus, for CPNs for example, it is the home visit rather 
than the hospital bed which is the cornerstone of mental health work. Compared to their 
hospital based colleagues, the wider gaze of community based mental health professionals 
is directed towards social relations rather than simple biological characteristics of isolated 
individuals. Prior conceptualises this as ’the professionalization of the mundane’ in 
which any aspect of daily life can be considered under the remit of mental health work, 
worthy of interpretation and open to manipulation in ways considered to be of 
’therapeutic value’.
Prior notes how in the hospital setting, contact between professionals and clients occurs 
for the most part within tightly defined and formally structured settings, limited by time, 
space and purpose. The day-to-day life of the hospital consist of two parallel but distinct 
social worlds - the world of the staff and the world of the patients - differentiated by 
physical and symbolic boundaries and structures. This symbolic order of difference is 
also detected in community services, and is marked out through language, demeanour, 
dress, and the various physical locations (offices, store rooms, dispensaries and staff 
meeting rooms) to which staff but not patients have access. Thus, although patients may 
have moved from long-stay hospital wards to community based accommodation, their 
daily lives change very little with this shift. Prior notes how group homes in particular 
manage to retain many features of institutional life. The rules and structures governing 
the daily routines of patients’ lives remain essentially the same, and for this patient 
population, community care is more a case of institutional substitution than of 
deinstitutionalisation.
Such use of physical space and the structure of daily routines to mark out a symbolic 
difference between staff and patients has been noted in other social psychological studies 
of the care of the mentally ill in both hospital and community settings (for example, 
Goffman 1961, Jodelet 1991a). It also accords with the author’s own observations of 
numerous mental health services in both Britain and France, and highlights, a pervasive 
tendency to construct a psycho-social difference between the mentally ill and those who 
care for them. Thus, although professionals’ relationships and interactions with the 
mentally ill differ substantially from those of lay people, the enacting of collective 
routines and structuring of daily activities serve to enforce similar representations of the 
mentally ill as different and ’other’. However, while lay people may simply represent
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mental illness as a strange and incomprehensible ’other’, mental health professionals 
engage in a continual process of sense-making and attempts to understand mental illness. 
Prior notes how much day-to-day staff interaction centres around a constant interpretation 
and analysis of various aspects of patients’ behaviour and cognitive and emotional 
responses to their social world. There is continual work amongst mental health
practitioners of collectively constructing, comparing and renegotiating hypotheses about 
patients. In terms of the theory of social representations, this can be conceptualised as 
the work of anchoring or making sense of mental illness, which for professionals is not 
achieved effortlessly, but is never quite done, and must be continually worked at and 
revised14.
This theme of enduring uncertainty regarding the nature of mental illness is drawn out 
from an organisational perspective by Kirk & Kutchins (1992), who describe mental 
health organisations as characterised by unusually high levels of ’internal uncertainty’. 
This refers to the consequences for practitioners of the contested and multiple nature of 
’expert’ knowledge about mental ill health, which is unable to provide widely shared and 
definitive guidelines for how to effectively help people presenting with mental health 
problems. While this uncertainty allows practitioners considerable latitude and space for 
creativity, these authors conceptualise much of the daily work in mental health 
organisations as attempts to manage ambiguity and uncertainty, and to reconcile this with 
the public image of professionals as practitioners who use specialised (scientific) 
knowledge to solve particular problems. Managers, for example, strive to create the 
impression that the organisation is pursuing carefully coordinated goals. Similarly, the 
use of diagnosis provides an illusion of ’technical rationality’ which connotes systematic 
problem solving and provides practitioners with a ’scientific’ rationalization of their 
actions. Endemic uncertainty in the world of mental health leads to the following 
situation:-
’Trained professionals are hired because they are supposed to know what to do with clients 
and how to do it, usually behind closed doors. Even if they do not know how to resolve the 
problems that clients present, they will at least act in a predictable way, usually by making 
diagnoses and providing medication or the talking cure; the predictability of the therapist’s 
responses reduces uncertainty. Furthermore, internal organisational structures and procedures 
are created to clarify who is responsible for what tasks so there will be a minimum of
14 This supports Billig’s (1993) conceptualisation of anchoring as an active argumentative social process 
(see Chapter 2, section 1).
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confusion and conflict.’ (Kirk & Kutchins, 1992, p 165-166)
Another interesting and very detailed analysis of psychiatric systems and the people who 
work in them is a study conducted in three Chicago psychiatric hospitals by Strauss and 
colleagues (Strauss et al 1964). Beyond the insightful and detailed findings of this study 
(which this brief review cannot adequately capture), and despite the fact that its findings 
are now rather dated, this study is of importance for its epistemological compatibilities 
with the present research. The authors’ conceptualisation of ’psychiatric ideologies’ as 
belief systems that have important links to and consequences for the development of 
professional identities, are constantly negotiated in daily practice and staff interactions, 
and which inter-related with the structure and organisation of hospitals shows significant 
parallels with the model of professional social representations proposed in the current 
research. The findings of this study suggest again that multiple understandings of mental 
ill health derived from various theoretical perspectives circulate and interact in the world 
of mental health professionals. Three broad psychiatric ideologies are identified. These 
compete in staff interactions, and each generates its own morality and guidelines for 
practice. ’Somatic* or organic understandings of mental ill health are endorsed most by 
psychiatrists although these views are least popular amongst other mental health 
professionals. ’Psychotherapeutic’ ideologies are most favoured by nurses although this 
group is also the least ideologically committed. The third ideology, a ’sociotherapeutic’ 
understanding is endorsed most by social workers and rejected most by psychiatrists.
Previous work using the theory of social representations to investigate understandings of 
mental illness amongst mental health practitioners has mainly been conducted in Italy as 
part of the large scale multi-method project already discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.1). 
Commonalities between the representations expressed by lay people (adults, children of 
various ages and students) and mental health professionals are reported by De Rosa 
(1991) in a study using word association tasks. Despite significant differences between 
the groups, common themes structuring the core representations of all respondents 
emerge from correspondence analysis of word associations to five stimuli - yourself, a 
normal person, a mad person, a mentally ill person, and a physically ill person. This 
reveals two dimensions of abnormality - normality and physical illness - mental illness. 
In all cases mental illness is associated with deviance and abnormality and contrasted to 
physical problems and to the self. This suggests a widely shared basic representation of
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mental illness as a specific type of non-medical ’other’, and supports the working model 
for the current research of lay representational themes as part of professional social 
representations (see figure 3.3).
Beyond these common core representational themes, several characteristics differentiate 
lay and professional representations of mental distress. Zani (1987, 1993) reports that 
compared to student populations, mental health professionals place more emphasis on the 
diversity of mental health problems as phenomena involving a range of symptoms 
manifested both in acute crises and on a long term basis. Professionals place more 
weight than students on social and environmental causes, and have more complex notions 
of treatment in which the principle aims are symptom reduction and increased adaptation 
to the social world. They emphasise the benefits of a range of treatment strategies, citing 
the use of psychotherapy, drugs, changes in social circumstances and hospitalization. 
Compared to students they show a stronger conviction that treatment can be achieved in 
a community setting. Differences between professional groups are also detected by the 
Italian study. For example, Serino (1987) reports some differences which parallel those 
reported in Rabkin’s (1972) review of attitude research (see above): Psychologists and 
psychiatrists describe mentally ill and mad people in terms that imply less differentiation 
from self in comparison to the descriptions given by lay people. However, the 
representations produced by psychiatric nurses show more similarities to those of lay 
people, with difference and differentiation between self and the mentally ill remaining 
central to the representational structure. Zani (1987, 1993) notes that the biggest 
differences appear between clinical psychologists and ’medically based’ professionals 
(psychiatrists and psychiatric nurses). While the language of psychiatrists and psychiatric 
nurses draws heavily on traditional nosographic terminology (terms such as agitated, 
delirious, psychotic), clinical psychologists make less use of traditional terms, and 
represent ’self and ’normality’ differently from nurses and psychiatrists. These 
professional differences can also be detected amongst students of psychology, medicine 
and nursing. Again, this offers support to the current model which incorporates the 
professional cultures and identities into which practitioners are socialised during their 
training as part of professional social representations.
Finally, Thommen et al (1992) use analysis of theoretical literature, professionals’ 
comments on video playbacks of therapeutic sessions, and individual interviews to
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investigate the social representations of therapists practising Rogerian and cognitive- 
behavioural therapy. Differences between the groups in perceptions of the client and the 
therapeutic situation, behaviour in therapy sessions, and the formation of the client- 
therapist relationships reflect the two theoretical positions. For example, cognitive- 
behavioural therapists focus on clients’ goals and intentions, orient therapy sessions 
according to logical success-oriented action plans, and develop goal centred, teacher-pupil 
type relationships with clients. In comparison, Rogerian therapists focus more on clients’ 
needs and expectations, and develop more empathic, companion-like relationships in 
therapy. This research suggests a close linkage between theoretical beliefs and practice, 
and a central role for theory in shaping practice. This will be one of the topics of 
empirical investigation in the current research (see Chapter 6).
3.3 Professional Social Representations of Mental Dlness; An Initial 
Conceptualisation
Drawing together the findings of previous research on mental health professionals’ 
understandings of mental illness, and the theoretical conceptualisation of professional 
social representations presented earlier in the chapter, some initial comments on 
professional representations of mental illness can be developed. Although much of the 
work reviewed in section 3.2 fails to provide an in-depth analysis of how contemporary 
professionals* social psychological understandings of mental ill health are built up through 
social practices, communication and interaction (research by Prior (1993) and Strauss et 
al (1964) being important exceptions), nevertheless some pointers to the nature and 
content of these professional representations are indicated.
A common theme which emerges is the diversity and multiplicity of knowledge spheres 
which are available to mental health professionals. ’Expert’ understandings provide 
various ways of conceptualising mental illness as, for example, an organic illness, a 
learned problem of behaviour or cognition, or a product of emotional experiences in 
childhood. These bodies of knowledge appear to be integrated in various ways. In some 
cases research suggests that medical understandings reign, possibly to the exclusion of 
other types of understandings. This has been detected mainly in hospital settings (eg 
Goffman 1961, Prior 1993) and amongst medically trained psychiatrists (eg Strauss et al
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1964). More frequent however, seems to be the development of practice-based belief 
systems in which there is coexistence and integration of several spheres of knowledge/ (eg 
Prior 1993, Strauss et al 1964, Zani 1987, 1993).
However, what is also clear is that the availability of these expert discourses does not 
render professionals’ understandings of mental illness entirely different from those of lay 
people. Several studies indicate similarities between the beliefs and practices of 
professionals and those of lay people when confronted with mental distress. Signs of 
rejection and the maintenance of psycho-social distance from the mentally ill can be 
detected on a collective level in the daily rituals of institutional life (eg Goffman 1961, 
Prior 1993, Rosenhan 1973) and in the linguistic responses of individual practitioners (eg 
De Rosa 1991, Schroder & Ehrlich 1968, Serino 1987). Ritualised working practices, 
in which interactions with mentally ill patients are limited in time and space and rigidly 
defined according to professional-patient roles, serve to maintain and erect boundaries and 
to establish symbolic differences between practitioners and patients (or between self / in­
group and the mentally ill ’other’ / out-group). There is much in these studies to remind 
us that mental health professionals work within a socio-cultural context in which mental 
illness is feared and represented as ’other’, and that these understandings permeate and 
live on through the representations circulating amongst mental health professionals. (This 
suggests at least initial support for the inclusion of lay knowledge within a model of 
professional social representations (see Figure 3.3).)
Within this social context, mental health professionals are in a unique position compared 
to other professional groups, in that they work with a phenomenon which generally 
evokes profound fear and mistrust. As the discussion in Chapter 2 illustrates, a common 
reaction to mental illness both individually and collectively is the creation and 
maintenance of psycho-social distance. But in choosing to work in close physical contact 
with the mentally ill, mental health professionals draw our attention to the complex 
meanings associated with mental illness and our reactions to it. Rather than simply being 
unanimously feared, mental illness can provoke ambivalent reactions from threat and fear 
to fascination, pity and intrigue. Motivations for becoming a mental health professional 
are multiple, but may revolve around a desire to understand this unfamiliar and un­
understood aspect of human experience.
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Debate, ambiguity and uncertainty are also themes which this material suggests may 
be central to professionals representations of mental illness. Theoretical understandings 
of mental ill health are provisional and partial, and studies suggest that mental health 
professionals spend much of their working lives engaging in continual attempts to manage 
uncertainty and negotiate ways of making sense of mental illness and the mentally ill 
people with whom they work (eg Kirk & Kutchins 1992, Prior 1993)} Once we reject 
the simplistic and deterministic position of the anti-psychiatrists who see mental health 
practitioners as merely enacting repressive institutional regimes, it becomes possible to 
conceptualise how the multiple perspectives available to professionals make for 
complexity, diversity and potential lack of agreement regarding how the mentally ill 
should be treated and cared for. From this perspective, professionals’ established daily 
routines could be seen as ways of striving for a sense of clarity and strategy in the face 
of considerable representational uncertainty. Despite their expert status, and their daily 
contact with the mentally ill, professionals’ understandings of mental illness retain much 
of the uncertainty and sense of ’unknowingness’ which characterises lay representations 
of mental illness. We should not expect to find a single, well-defined understanding of 
mental illness amongst mental health professionals.
This brief attempt to postulate some features of professional social representations of 
mental illness suggests there is much to explore in how mental health professionals 
understand mental illness. It opens up a realm of unanswered questions and 
unsubstantiated suggestions from which the empirical work in this thesis takes its starting 
point. Questions such as how the various theoretical perspectives are drawn upon by 
professionals in their understandings of mental ill health, its nature and its causes; what 
practical strategies of treatment and care various professionals in different context use; 
what the relationship between theoretical spheres of knowledge and professional practice 
is; how professionals conceptualise their work and roles; and how current policy changes 
and moves towards community based care are evaluated and experienced by 
professionals. The empirical analyses in Chapter 5, 6 and 7 offer answers to these and 
other questions.
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CHAPTER FOUR
METHODOLOGY
This chapter has two aims. Firstly, it provides a description of the research methodology 
used in this research, sketching a path through the stages from initial decisions about data 
collection, to data analysis, and presentation of findings. It is my conviction that clear, 
transparent accounts of methodology are essential, in that they allow the reader to 
evaluate research findings with full knowledge of the procedures from which they are 
derived. The second aim is to discuss a number of issues related to methodology. In 
particular, this chapter considers the following issues:- relationships between the theory 
of social representations and empirical methods (section 1); the use and status of 
interview data (section 2.1); strategies of qualitative content analysis (section 3.1), with 
particular reference to the use of specialised computer packages (sections 3.2 and 3.3); 
and evaluation and establishment of the credibility of qualitative research (section 4).
The chapter begins with a consideration of the methodological and epistemological 
implications of using the theory of social representations. As Bourdieu et al (1991) 
remind us, theory and method are inseparable, and as social scientists we need to be clear 
about the epistemological implications of the techniques and methods of social research 
we use. Theories provide specifications or epistemological guidelines for empirical work. 
Similarly, the role of empirical research is not simply to collect data in a given 
substantive area, but also to advance and inform our understanding of a theoretical 
perspective.
1 M ethodology  and the  Theory of Social Representations
In his discussion of theory and method in social representations theory, Farr (1993a, p22) 
notes that ’(i)t is a singular feature of the theory that it does not privilege any particular 
method of research. ’ Moscovici declines to specify what methodological approaches are 
suitable for the study of social representations, advocating instead that such a new theory 
should rely on the creativity of researchers using a variety of methods. He is, however,
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concerned to break away from experimental methods and their associations with the 
positivist epistemology of mainstream psychology. Instead he recommends techniques 
such as observation which focus on description rather than explanation, allowing 
researchers to capture the complexities and socially situated nature of social 
representations, thereby serving to strengthen links between social psychology and other 
social sciences (Moscovici, 1984, 1988).
A review of previous empirical work using the theory of social representations certainly 
demonstrates methodological diversity. In an attempt to capture the complex inter­
relationships between the individual and the social, between process and content, and 
between word and deed, a combination of methods are often used. Such methodological 
triangulation is an important source of validity for qualitative research methods (see 
section 4). To give just a few examples: Jodelet (1991) used depth interviews, 
observations and questionnaires in her study of madness; Moscovici’s (1976) study of 
psychoanalysis used questionnaires and analysis of the press; De Rosa (1987) used 
thematic analysis of drawings, questionnaires and paper and pencil tasks to investigate 
representations of mental illness; Zani (1993), in another study of mental illness, used 
free association tasks and semi-structured questionnaires. A range of other methods 
including ethnographic observations (Duveen & Lloyd, 1993), analysis of literature, films 
and architecture (Chombart de Lauwe, 1984), and experimental methods (Abric, 1984) 
have also been used to study social representations.
However, such methodological diversity should not lead to the conclusion that ’anything 
goes’ in social representations research. If the interface between theory and method is 
taken seriously, there are some important epistemological assumptions of the theory 
which must be considered in relation to methods of data collection and analysis.
Firstly, echoing Moscovici, the theory is concerned with socially situated phenomena, and 
therefore requires methods which sample social life in situ}  Secondly, the integration 
of the individual and the social assumed in the theory of social representations has several 
important implications. Methods which sample not only the thoughts, words and deeds
1 Having said this, it should be noted that there is also a growing strand of social representations 
research, based primarily in Aix-en-Provence, which makes extensive use of laboratory based and 
experimental methods.
100
of individuals, but also social institutions, culture and historical factors must be adopted. 
These social factors should be taken seriously as a central part of the research, not simply 
as background or contextual information. Thus individual-based methods should be seen 
as sampling social actors who cannot be separated from the social world in which they 
live. Individual-based methods are just one of many possible ways of tapping into social 
representations which can be found in the heads of individuals, in communication 
between individuals, and in social practices and institutions.
Thirdly, the social constructionist perspective of social representations theory implies that 
both process and content are equally as important aspects to be studied. While certain 
processes (namely anchoring and objectification) may be detectable across 
representations, methods must be sensitive to the unique content of representations 
emerging within specific social circumstances. Methods such as depth interviews, 
observations and focus groups, if used with care and sensitivity, are tools for in-depth 
analysis which can uncover the subtle, complex and implicit aspects of social 
representations (as shown for example in the use of interviews and observations by 
Jodelet, 1991). To this end, methods which produce qualitative data may be preferable./ 
However, there is no reason why qualitative techniques must be used exclusively. 
Quantitative data can also provide fruitful insights into social representations, and a range 
of powerful multi-variate techniques can be used to chart complex structures and 
relationships within representations (see Doise et al, 1993).
Section 3.1 considers how the epistemological assumptions of social representations 
theory also shape the strategies of data analysis which are adopted in the current analysis. 
Before that, section 2 describes the methods of data collection used in the present 
research.
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2 D ata  Collection
2.1 Primary Data Source: Semi-structured Interviews 
Theoretical Perspectives on Interviews
The choice of semi-structured interviews as the primary methodological tool in this study 
is motivated by both practical and theoretical considerations. On a practical level, 
interviews with individuals are relatively easy to arrange. Given that the research focuses 
on professionals, whose working schedules are very tight, it would be extremely difficult 
to organise group discussions. While observational data has been used as a secondary 
technique (see section 2.2), observations of specific treatment encounters in mental health 
services are limited by strict codes of confidentiality and access.
In-depth interviewing is a technique which has been used previously in many studies of 
social representations (eg Jodelet, 1991; Herzlich 1973; Giami 1987). Farr (1982) 
conceptualises the interview as ’a peculiar form of conversation in which the ritual turn- 
taking is more formalised than in the commoner, more informal encounters of everyday 
life’ (pl82). He draws attention to the social and interactional nature of interviews, thus 
highlighting their appropriateness for studies of social representations in which the 
socially constructed and contextually embedded nature of beliefs and knowledge is 
recognised. Interviews should be understood as social events in which the interviewer 
is a participant observer. The data they provide should be interpreted against the 
background of this context.
The language-based nature of interviews offers direct access into the meanings, 
understandings and belief systems of social actors, while their ’open’ nature allows these 
to be explored in depth. Conceptualising social representations as ’integral units of 
beliefs and action’ (Wagner, 1994, p243), interviews can be seen as one route of access 
into these integrated systems, with equivalent status to observations of action. Wagner 
suggests we should consider behaviour (investigated using observational techniques) and 
beliefs (investigated primarily through language-based methods such as interviews and 
focus groups) as expressions of the same underlying construct or representation. ’(E)ither
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one could be used to describe the representation’s content and structure: each has its
merits and shortcomings as a data source.... Which one we finally use depends upon our
/
familiarity with different methods.’ (Wagner, 1994, p253). The interview schedule used 
in this research aims to recognise this integration within social representations by asking 
respondents to give accounts both of their beliefs and of their behaviour in day-to-day 
work.
Given this choice of method, one should also recognise the possible short-comings of 
using interviews as the primary data source. De Rosa (1988) notes that data collected 
through interviews may be shaped by self presentation and rationalisation, and cannot 
give access to symbolic Or non-linguistic aspects of social representations. Farr (1977) 
also cautions against taking interviewee’s accounts at face value: ’Attributional artifacts’ 
on the part of both the interviewer and the interviewee may bias results, especially when 
investigating issues to which value judgements are attached. From a positivist 
perspective, it would also be possible to question the reliability and validity of data 
obtained through semi-structured interviews. Biases such as evaluation apprehension 
(Rosenberg, 1969) and demand characteristics (Ome, 1962) could be seen to apply 
equally well to interviews as to experimental settings in which they were originally 
developed. However, given the constructivist stance on which this research is based, 
such criticisms hold less weight. From this perspective, interviews can be seen as social 
situations in which participants construct accounts as expressions of their current social 
representations. While there will always be shortcoming associated with any method, it 
is hoped that awareness of these issues, together with the methodological and analytic 
strategies employed (triangulation of data collection, a reflexive stance, and transparency 
of analysis) will guard against possible biases.
Practical Issues: Conducting interviews 
Location of interviews
Detailed descriptions of the services from which interview respondents were drawn are 
provided in Appendix 1. Interviews were conducted with professionals working in public 
mental health services in urban and suburban areas of London and Paris. The areas
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chosen in each city are broadly similar in socio-economic terms and can be characterised 
as covering poorer suburban areas and more mixed central and urban areas. They are 
all areas associated with many social problems and high levels of deprivation.
In France interviews were conducted in three ’secteurs’:- the first arrondissement of 
Paris, and secteurs 4 and 15 of Seine-St-Denis, the departement covering the north east 
suburbs of the Paris area. In Britain, interviews were conducted in two district health 
authorities:- West Lambeth, and Lewisham and North Southwark. Given the 
considerable diversity in provision and style of mental health services across secteurs, it 
was felt necessary to use respondents from three ’secteurs’ in Paris. In comparison, use 
of two district health authorities appeared to adequately represent mental health services 
typically found in the London area. Interviews were conducted in France in 1992 and 
in Britain in 1993.
Access to respondents
Access to respondents was obtained in France through psychiatrists connected to the 
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, and in Britain through connections with 
the London School of Economics. In both countries establishing initial contact was 
difficult and involved many telephone calls. However once the relevant consultant 
psychiatrists and ’chefs de secteurs’ had agreed to participation of their services in the 
project, access to interview respondents was relatively unproblematic2. In each of the 
services I presented myself as a researcher studying for a doctorate in social psychology, 
conducting a study into the views of British and French mental health professionals 
regarding mental illness, its treatment and care.
Sampling
Sampling can be described as ’purposive’ and based on ’natural’ rather than statistical 
groups, defined in terms of broad affinities shared by group members (Gaskell, 1994). 
The various professional groups of psychiatrists, social workers, psychiatric nurses and
2 The role of psychiatrists as gate-keepers and heads of service indicates the dominance of psychiatry 
and medicine in contemporary mental health services.
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so on can be defined as ’natural groups’ in that they share certain professional values and 
ideologies while also forming part of the larger ’natural group’ of mental health 
professionals. The aim in constructing the interview sample is thus not to replicate the 
actual numbers of different professionals in mental health services (where, for example, 
there may be only one psychologist and up to forty nurses), but to obtain samples which 
reflect the full range of professional positionings in British and French mental health 
services. The diversity of professional positions (at least eight distinct professional 
groups can be identified), and the range of different types of mental health services in 
each area (hospital wards, community day centres, day hospitals and so on) dictates that 
samples are relatively large (n=30 in each country). Identification of potential interview 
respondents relied on snowballing of connections in each of the services I visited. The 
majority of people approached were willing, open and interested research participants, 
and only a very small number of people declined to be interviewed. ’Non response bias’ 
was therefore minimal. Table 4.1 shows the distribution of interview respondents’ 
professional backgrounds and work locations3. A full list of each of the sixty interview 
respondents and their specific roles is provided in Appendix 4.
Design of the interview topic guide
Interviews were semi-structured: While they were guided by a set of broad questions, 
they were also allowed to develop according to the unique dynamics of each interview 
situation, such that respondents’ comments initiated specific probes and follow-up 
questions. The interview topic guide consisted of a pool of questions which allowed 
access to respondents’ social representations of mental illness through accounts of then- 
daily work in caring for and treating the mentally ill. It was designed to be appropriate 
to the full range of professionals interviewed in both countries, and was constructed 
following several practice interviews (in France), which indicated that questions should 
be centred explicitly on the daily practical work of respondents. (The use of more 
general questions in pilot interviews often generated ’text-book’ responses - descriptions
3 It can be noted from this table that some differences in the types of professionals involved in mental 
health services exist between France and Britain. Specifically, occupational therapists and case managers are 
included in the British sample, but do not form part of mental health teams in France. (See Appendix 2 for 
descriptions of the various mental health professions.)
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of theoretical perspectives, policies and the like - which contained little of respondents’ 
own views.)
Table 4.1: Breakdown of interview respondents according to profession and place of 
work
Professional Status France Britain
Psychiatrists
Hospital 2 1
Community 2 1
Both 2 3
Clinical Psychologists
Hospital - -
Community 3 3
Both 1 -
Psychiatric Nurses
Hospital 3 2
Community 6 3
Both - -
Charge Nurses
Hospital 1 1
Community 2 2
Both - -
Social Workers 5 3
Occupational Therapists
Hospital - -
Community - 1
Both - 2
Community psychiatric nurses - 2
Case Managers - 2
Others 34 45
Totals 30 30
4 Movement therapist (hospital and community); receptionist (day hospital); nurse’s union official, 
former psychiatric nurse.
5 Movement therapist (community); art therapist (hospital and community); psychotherapist, not 
psychiatry trained (hospital); program worker (community).
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The pool of questions which provided the final topic guide for interviews is presented in 
Appendix 5. Questions are grouped into four broad areas:- daily practice; mental illness; 
the service in which respondents work; and community care. In the majority of cases 
this ordering of questions was followed. Initial accounts of their day-to-day work with 
patients served to put respondents at ease before they contemplated the harder, more 
abstract questions relating to mental illness. The final group of questions on community 
care was used with British respondents only. This revision mid-way through the research 
was made as it was realised that, at the time when the interviews were conducted (May - 
December 1993), community care constituted a major challenge to British mental health 
professionals, and to their social representations of mental illness. However, while 
French respondents were not asked explicitly about the impact of community care 
policies, their answers to questions regarding the services in which they worked often 
included references to recent moves towards care in the community. (This relates to 
issues associated with interviewing as a foreigner, discussed in the following section.)
Throughout the interviews the terms ’mental illness’, ’the mentally ill’ and ’patients’ or 
’clients’ were used, as these are the terms most commonly used by mental health 
professionals. In the aim of focusing more on personal opinions than formal theorising, 
a ’naive’ style of interviewing was adopted. This involved using lay rather than technical 
terms, and encouraging respondents to describe their personal opinions, their work and 
its aims in simple lay terms as if they were describing these to someone who knew 
nothing about care of the mentally ill. Probes and follow up questions encouraged 
respondents to reflect on the fundamental bases of their work and their taken-for-granted 
assumptions.
Conducting the interviews
All interviews were conducted at respondents’ place of work, usually in a quiet location 
with no interruptions (although this was not always possible). Confidentiality was 
assured, and respondents were offered a copy of the interview transcript. Interviews 
were taped with the permission of respondents, using a small audio-cassette recorder and 
generally lasted between 45 minutes and an hour. The majority of respondents appeared 
to be relatively at ease in the interview setting. Although many clearly found some of 
the questions challenging, several respondents commented after the interview that they
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seldom had the chance to reflect on the bases of their everyday work, and found the 
opportunity to do so useful.
A major issue in conducting the interviews in France was the fact of interviewing in a 
foreign language. While my French language skills were obviously sufficient to allow 
this to be possible, it still presented some difficulties, both in conducting the interviews 
and in the transcribing process. However, the position of foreigner also has some 
advantages. Specifically, it is much easier to take a naive stance in asking respondents 
to clarify how they are using terms or phrases. Responses can often prove extremely 
revealing, in that they force consideration of the ’taken-for-granted’ assumptions behind 
terms used in everyday talk. A second issue which resulted from my position as a 
foreigner in France, is that respondents often contextualised their comments within 
detailed descriptions of the French mental health system and political issues in France. 
This provided valuable insights into respondents’ evaluations and experiences of current 
community care policies.
Conducting essentially the same interviews in two different countries also revealed the 
impact of some interesting cultural differences. As a British person interviewing in 
France, I was struck by the relative ease with which French respondents discussed 
abstract, theoretical and philosophical issues compared to British respondents. While it 
is not in the remit of this thesis to go into the cultural factors which lead to this, it can 
be noted that French respondents generally seemed more at ease with expressing and 
verbally contemplating their opinions and beliefs than did British respondents.
Finally, the fact that these interviews were conducted with respondents ’as professionals’ 
should be considered. One of my major concerns was to avoid obtaining accounts which 
simply mirrored the professional ideologies into which respondents were socialised in 
their training and professional development. I aimed to avoid this by stressing that I was 
interested primarily in each individual’s own opinions and beliefs.
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2.2 Secondary Data Sources
As a supplement to individual interviews, several secondary data sources are used. The 
purpose of these is to provide a view of the world of mental health professionals which 
differs from that provided by interview data and which can inform analysis and 
understanding of the primary data source. Social representations theory stresses the 
interplay between the individual and the social, seeing historical, cultural, and socio­
political data are vital supplements to individual-based methods. Combining methods 
which use various levels of analysis has been a common strategy among social 
representations researchers (see section 1), and is advocated by Sotirakopoulu & 
Breakwell (1992) as a way of doing justice to the complexities inherent in the phenomena 
of social representations. The strategy of drawing on more than one data source has 
much to recommend it. Many authors (eg Flick 1992, Denzin 1978) have advocated the 
use of ’methodological triangulation’ to enhance the credibility of qualitative research. 
Essentially this means combining a variety of methodological approaches to study the 
same phenomenon. Triangulation aims to overcome the inherent weaknesses associated 
with any one method and to provide a richer picture of the phenomenon under study. 
From a constructionist perspective, the strategy serves to add breadth and depth to 
interpretation and analysis, rather than enhancing the ’objective truth’ of findings. Three 
sources of secondary data are used in this project:-
i) Documentary sources
A review of academic texts allows situation of the current research within specific 
historical and political contexts. Consideration of the historical bases of current day 
mental health services is vital if one is to fully comprehend the social meaning of current 
moves towards community care for the mentally ill. Government publications, official 
statistics, commentaries written by practitioners and social researchers, and literature 
produced by local health services for purchasers and users of services provide information 
on recent policy changes and implementations of community care both locally and 
nationally6. These various documentary sources offer access into an important
6 The historical and contemporary review in Chapter 1 is informed by many of these documentary 
sources.
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component of professional social representations, namely the changing official roles, aims 
and ideologies of mental health services and the people who work in them.
ii) Observations
During the period of data collection there were many opportunities to casually observe 
the day-to-day workings of the services in which respondents were interviewed (although 
issues of confidentiality prevented direct observation of consultation or therapy sessions). 
This allowed familiarisation with the social world with which I was interacting, and was 
particularly important in France where I had no previous knowledge of mental health 
services. It allowed me to grasp the daily realities of mental health care and the work 
of my respondents, providing an important point of comparison with their accounts of 
their work which emerged in the context of interviews. This process of familiarisation 
and casual observation was greatly facilitated by the willingness of interview respondents 
and other team members to integrate me and allow access to many aspects of service 
functioning. For example, I attended several weekly team meetings in which care 
strategies for new and existing clients were discussed, I was shown around hospital wards 
and day centres, and visited occupational, art and music therapy sessions. At one day 
centre in France, I ’shadowed* a team member for a day, participating in group activities 
(food preparation and a picnic in a nearby park) and attending the daily staff meeting.
in) Interviews with kev informants
Prior to the main data collection period in each country, I conducted several interviews 
with ’key informants’. These people were chosen for their ability to provide a broad 
overview of mental health services and current issues within the world of mental health. 
In France I interviewed an academic psychiatrist, considered to be an expert on mental 
health service research, and a practising psychiatrist who was also involved in evaluative 
research. In Britain I interviewed an academic psychiatrist (again an expert in mental 
health service research), a district service manager, and a hospital manager. These 
interviews were important for several reasons. They offered a global perspective on 
mental health services in each country and provided personal contacts and guidance in 
selecting ’typical’ services for data collection. Most importantly, they offered a 
perspective on the interface between official policies and daily realities in mental health 
care. This allowed me to anticipate many of the issues with which professionals were 
currently concerned prior to conducting interviews.
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To summarise the approaches to data collection used in this research project, I return to 
the concept of triangulation. Banister et al (1994) identify five different types of 
triangulation: ’data triangulation’ (collecting data from a range of actors and a range of 
contexts), ’investigator triangulation’ (clearly not feasible in a PhD), ’triangulation of 
methods’, ’triangulation of theoretical perspectives’, and ’triangulations of levels of 
analysis' (using a combination of individual based, group based and societal based 
approaches (see Doise 1986)). The current research uses triangulation of data, methods 
and levels of analysis. These are summarised in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Strategies of Triangulation
Type of Triangulation Application
Data triangulation Interviews conducted
- in two different countries
- with a range of mental health professionals
- in a range of geographical locations (2 district health 
authorities in Britain, 3 ’secteurs’ in France)
- in a range of services (hospital and 
community based services)
Triangulation of methods Primary data source: Interviews 
Secondary data sources: 
Documentary sources 
Observations
Interviews with key informants
Triangulation of levels of 
analysis
Data collection and analysis integrates the following 
levels:
- intra-psychic / individual
- inter-individual
- group
- organisational / institutional
- social / cultural
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3 D ata  Analysis
The following sections provide a deliberately detailed account of the data analytic 
procedures used in this research study. I consider it vital that the reader should be given 
as clear an account as possible of how the link between data and findings has been 
constructed by the researcher. This issue of ’transparency’ will be discussed in more 
detail in section 4, which argues that this is an important strategy in aiding evaluation of 
the credibility of qualitative research.
3.1 The Data Analytic Strategy
The approach to data analysis which is adopted meshes with the epistemological 
assumptions of the theory of social representations. Thus, it aims to investigate both 
content and structure, and to generate findings which are both specific and general. 
Analysis provides an in-depth description of the content of professional social 
representations of mental illness, and of the internal structure of these representations (ie 
inter-relationships and organisation of themes and domains within these representations), 
and is conducted with continual reference to the generic characteristics of social 
representations.
The analytic work of this study focuses on the primary data source - interviews with 
mental health professionals - and uses the secondary data sources (documentary sources, 
observations and interviews with key informants) to inform this analysis and 
interpretation. In order to achieve the type of in-depth analysis with which social 
representations studies are associated (and which I believe is one of their prime 
strengths), I adopt a strategy of analysing interview data which combines what are 
sometimes referred to as ’manifest’ and ’latent’ approaches to content analysis. Thus, 
a balance is struck between taking respondents’ accounts at face value, and looking 
’beneath’ these to investigate implicit or unspoken themes. Numerous examples in the 
literature attest to the value of this approach. For example in Jodelet’s (1991) study of 
madness, the most central themes of exclusion and difference in villagers’ representations 
were hidden implicitly in talk and daily practice, but were not obvious in the manifest 
content of interviews. The potential impact of demand characteristics and social
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desirability in the interview situation leads me to adopt an approach to analysis which is 
sensitive to underlying themes which may be unspoken, taken-for-granted, or taboo. I 
would also argue that the considerable social taboos and unease surrounding mental 
illness which have been demonstrated in numerous research studies (see Chapter 2), 
suggest that an approach which goes further than manifest content is required for this 
particular subject area.
I adopt an explicitly constructivist approach to data analysis. This recognises that there 
is not one ’objective truth’ waiting to be discovered in the data, but many different 
’stories’ which could emerge from interpretations of such a rich and complex data corpus. 
The story that this analysis constructs does not aim to be an exhaustive ’map’ of the data. 
Rather it is a perspective on the data founded on the theory of social representations. No 
doubt other readings of the data based on other theoretical perspectives would be 
possible.
However, having adopted a constructivist position, I am also concerned to avoid 
relativism. I do not believe that all possible accounts which could be produced from this 
data set have the same status. Issues surrounding the evaluation of qualitative research 
are discussed in section 4. In the meantime, suffice it to say that I aim to produce an 
account which has credibility, based on theoretical grounding and methodological 
procedures, and the interactions between the two. Therefore, my approach to data 
analysis combines a theory-driven (deductive, ’top down’) approach, with a data-driven 
(inductive, ’bottom up’) approach. My view of the data is from the perspective of social 
representations theory and the previous research findings in this area. However, I also 
adopt an approach which ’lets the data speak’, and which allows the data to inform (ie 
both support and challenge) our understanding of its substantive area, and the theory of 
social representations itself. In concrete terms, this approach requires a system of 
analysis which is flexible enough to capture the variations and richness of the data, while 
at the same time allowing the researcher to synthesize, integrate and ultimately make 
sense of its complexities through linkages with prior theoretical concepts. This process 
is greatly aided and enhanced by the use of specialised computer software (discussed in 
the following sections).
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The reader will find parallels in the procedures described in section 3.3 with the 
Grounded Theory model of inductive qualitative data analysis proposed by Glaser & 
Strauss (1967). In particular, parallels can be seen in the development of a flexible and 
open-ended indexing system which can tolerate ambiguity and uncertainty, thus avoiding 
premature closure and encouraging both creativity and a close relationship with the data; 
in the use of memos during coding and data exploration to record emerging 
characteristics of categories; and in the gradual linking of categories, often in hierarchical 
relations involving various levels of abstraction. The advantages of this analytic strategy 
are summarised by Henwood & Pidgeon (1995, p i 17): ’(T)he value of the 
methodological strategies of the grounded theory approach is that they help to keep 
researchers on an analytic path, while committing them to be extremely wary of simply 
reproducing their pre-existing perceptions, ideas and concepts unchanged. ’ However, the 
current approach is only partially inductive, and I concur with Bulmer (1979), Bryman 
(1988) and Bryman & Burgess (1994), that the notion of theory-neutral data analysis in 
which the researcher suspends all prior theoretical knowledge and preconceptions, is open 
to some doubt. It implies, rather naively, that theory and method can be separated, a 
position I have argued against earlier in this chapter7. Furthermore, it is not the aim of 
the present research to be entirely inductive, as it departs explicitly from the theory of 
social representations.
The analytic strategy integrates qualitative and quantitative approaches. While qualitative 
analysis of the content and themes of interview respondents’ accounts is the principle 
strategy, it is also possible, given the large number of interviews conducted (thirty in 
each country), to supplement this with quantitative analyses. Descriptive statistics and 
comparisons of frequencies can be extremely informative indicators of the dominance, 
relative occurrence and co-occurrence of themes and patterns within the data. They offer 
a means of surveying the whole corpus of data which supplements the depth and detail 
of qualitative investigations. However quantitative analyses should be interpreted with 
a degree of caution. There are two reasons for this:
7 With respect to this argument, it is worth noting that recent revisions of Grounded Theory accept 
that the researcher must have a perspective from which to begin their analysis (see Henwood & Pidgeon, 
1995).
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Firstly, the theory of social representations does not equate the frequency of expression 
of a theme with its importance or relative influence. Indeed often what is absent from 
social representations is just as interesting as what is present. A theme may be absent 
from a discourse for many reasons - it may be taken-for-granted, associated with taboos 
or sensitivities, or considered to be irrelevant. For example, Moscovici (1976), in his 
study of representations of psychoanalysis in 1950s France, found a striking absence of 
the concept of libido. He proposed that libido had been filtered out of lay representations 
as an unacceptable aspect of psychoanalytic thought within the context of Catholicism and 
strong social taboos against the open discussion of sexuality. Analysis of data should 
therefore consider both what is present and what is absent. The second reason for 
treating quantitative analyses with some caution is technical and relates to how interviews 
are segmented into text units. The details of this procedure are described in section 3.3. 
Essentially, text units are not all of the same size (they vary from two to ten lines of 
text). This means that quantitative analyses can offer rough indications of relative 
frequencies, rather than precise measurements.
However, quantitative analysis can be useful for another reason. Not only can it provide 
backing for qualitative analyses, but it can also be used as a methodological tool, to check 
the credibility of analytic procedures. For example, in the initial stages of the current 
analysis, quantitative checks on the amount of data indexed into broad themes were made 
at intervals, allowing the researcher to establish that data codification was being 
conducted in a reliable and consistent way (see section 3.3).
3.2 Computer Support for Data Analysis: OSR-NUDIST
The data analysis for this research was conducted using the computer package ’QSR- 
NUDIST’. While computer technology clearly provides a way of organising and 
managing the large volume of data with which the current project is involved, the use of 
computer packages for qualitative research has other important implications. This section 
reviews these issues, offering responses to some contemporary debates based on the 
experience of using QSR-NUDIST in the current research. This is followed by a 
description of the principle features of QSR-NUDIST which illustrates how this package 
can support and facilitate the strategy of data analysis described above.
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’CAQDAS8’: A Revolution in Qualitative Analysis?
The rapid development of CAQDAS programmes in the last five years is an exciting and 
challenging development in qualitative research. For a field that has traditionally 
distanced itself (often on epistemological grounds (Kelle 1995)) from the technological 
revolution which has transformed quantitative research, the introduction of computer 
technology represents a radical new departure. Although many of the packages have been 
developed by members of the qualitative research community themselves, there is 
currently a ’healthy scepticism* towards these programmes, even amongst the developers 
themselves. For example, Seidel (1991) (developer of ’The Ethnograph’), warns of the 
’analytic madness’ that may derive from the misuse of computer technology.
It is indisputable that the use of computers opens up possibilities for the management and 
analysis of large volumes of data. While Fielding & Lee (1991) suggest that this frees 
researchers to put their mental energy into analytic rather than mechanical tasks, and 
Mangabeira (1995) notes that the speed of qualitative research can be enhanced, Seidel 
(1991) warns of the dangers of an infatuation with the volume of data. I would concur 
with the former of these view points. There are strong theoretical reasons why a sample 
of sixty interview respondents is required for the current research, and given the volume 
of data that this generates, the use of a computer package, not only in storing and 
organising data, but also in allowing selection of data for fine-grained analysis has proved 
indispensable.
A second area of debate centres around how the nature of qualitative analysis is affected 
by the use of computers. It is clear that CAQDAS programmes are more than just tools. 
They are innovations which change and shape the very process of qualitative research. 
Many authors argue that CAQDAS programmes can enhance the rigour and creativity of 
qualitative analysis, and can lead to new ways of interacting with data (eg Fielding & Lee 
1991, Kelle 1995, Mangabeira 1995, Richards & Richards 1994a, 1994b, Weitzman & 
Miles 1995). The use of these packages may also have important political implications 
in enhancing the credibility of qualitative research within a social context dominated by 
the positivist approach of natural science. However, concern is also voiced that use of
8 ’Computer-Aided Qualitative Data Analysis’. The use of this term in the literature on computer 
technology and qualitative analysis refers to packages such as ’The Ethnograph’, ’Textbase Alpha’, 
’HyperRESEARCH’, ’ATLAS-ti’ and ’QSR-NUDIST’.
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computers may distance researchers from their data (Seidel 1991), may encourage ’quick 
and dirty’ qualitative research (Fielding & Lee 1991), and may implicitly encourage the 
styles of working favoured by their authors (Mangabeira 1995).
A third concern is the issue of segmentation of data. All CAQDAS programmes involve 
the segmentation of data into text units of various sizes. In so doing, there is a danger 
that the contextualised meaning, temporality and narrative structure of data are over­
looked. Most packages attempt to overcome this problem, at least to some extent, by 
providing systems of linkages between text segments and their original context. 
(ATLAS-ti also offers direct linkages between text segments known as ’hyperlinks’). 
However, in my view, segmentation remains one of the most significant drawbacks in the 
use of CAQDAS programmes.
In response to these comments, I would to stress the flexibility of these packages, which 
allows each one to be used in potentially myriad ways. CAQDAS programmes are not 
fixed entities about which absolute judgements can be made. Viewed thus, these potential 
strengths and pitfalls becomes issues that researchers should be aware of. It is vital, 
particularly at this early stage in their development, that a reflexive stance on the effects 
of using of computer packages on processes of qualitative analysis is maintained. There 
is no guarantee that computer programmes will not be used for ’quick-and-dirty’ 
research, but this lies more with the researcher than with the package itself. Similarly, 
the researcher could become distanced from the data, but this again depends on how the 
programme is used. While the epistemological preferences of their authors can be clearly 
detected (for example, QSR-NUDIST and The Ethnograph are based on a Grounded 
Theory approach, while ATLAS-ti derives from linguistic analyses), my personal 
experience has been that the power and complexity of these packages overrides their 
origins and does not tie the user to these strategies, but rather opens up infinite 
possibilities for analysis. Thus, for this research I have been able to construct a style of 
analysis using QSR-NUDIST which combines both inductive and deductive approaches 
to the data9.
9 In a recent study of the use of CAQDAS programmes (’The effects of technology on research culture: 
the case of computer support for qualitative data analysis’ conducted by The Centre for Research into Innovation 
Culture and Technology, Brunei University), the current research is presented as a case study of the 
’reappropriation’ of CAQDAS packages by new generation qualitative researchers who have developed ways 
of using these packages to suit their own needs.
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Technological innovation is a double-edged sword. The power and potential of CAQDAS 
packages is considerable, but given their flexibility, the quality of the research conducted 
using them derives ultimately from the intelligence, sensitivity and analytic rigour of the 
researcher, rather than from the specific features of any particular package. 
Interpretative analysis is a semantic not an algorithmic process, and computers will never 
be able to take over the interpretive work which lies at the heart of qualitative analysis. 
However, their powerful ability to manage, manipulate and structure data material and 
the conceptualisations emerging from this interpretative work, can enhance the process 
of qualitative analysis. It seems likely that there is an exciting future ahead in the 
development of computer assisted qualitative data analysis which is currently in its 
infancy.
QSR-NUDIST10
Early CAQDAS programmes such as ’The Ethnograph’ and ’Textbase-Alpha’ are 
essentially *code-and-retrieve’ systems which facilitate the mechanical aspects of analysis, 
but offer little more. NUDIST is one of the new generation of qualitative data analysis 
packages sometimes referred to as ’code-based theory-builders’ (Weitzman & Miles, 
1995) which facilitate and encourage a more complex interaction between researcher and 
data through their ability to index and inter-relate data and concepts in multiple and 
flexible ways (ATLAS-ti and HyperRESEARCH also offer these facilities).
The NUDIST package provides facilities not only to code data, but also to manipulate 
conceptual and text-related codes (referred to in NUDIST as ’nodes’) within a 
hierarchical indexing system in an extremely flexible way. This second facility - the 
main strength of NUDIST - allows qualitative data analysis to become an on-going 
process, rather than simply a two-stage process of allocating text segments to codes 
followed by explorations of the pattemings this produces. The analysis process becomes 
a continuous cycle of data exploration, coding, and manipulation and development of the
10 The name ’NUDIST’ stands for Non-numerical, Unstructured Data Indexing, Searching and 
Theorising. ’QSR’ refers to the programme distributors Qualitative Solutions & Reserach Ltd. This review 
describes Version 3.0 of the programme.
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indexing system informed by these investigations. The package provides facilities to 
explore data in three ways11:-
i) Using string or pattern searches, which search the text for specified words or phrases, 
and allocate the relevant sections of data to a node.
ii) By scanning through data documents and allocating text units to nodes.
iii) The results of investigations of data currently coded in the existing indexing system 
can be used to create new nodes.
The power of NUDIST lies in its flexible indexing system. A tree structure of 
hierarchically related nodes can be developed, in which each node is conceptualised as 
the ’parent’, ’sibling’ or ’child’ of other nodes12. Thus the meaning of any one node 
derives not only from the working definition of this node used by the researcher, but also 
from its relationship to other nodes. Within this indexing tree, nodes can be considered 
either as textual level codes for data, or at a more conceptual level, as theoretical ideas, 
which do not necessarily reference text directly. Any text unit can be indexed at as many 
nodes as needed, allowing the researcher to take account of co-occurrences of themes.
The indexing system does not have to be well thought out at the beginning of the analysis 
process. Rather, the package is designed to encourage creative analysis by allowing the 
indexing system to develop as the researcher explores different aspects of the data. Thus 
the structure of the indexing system reflects the state of the analysis at a particular point 
in time. All major changes are date stamped allowing the researcher to chart the history 
of the project’s development. There are no limits to the size or depth of the indexing 
tree, and it can be continually reorganised by moving, deleting or merging nodes at any 
point in the analysis. Memos can be attached to each node, allowing the researcher to 
record on-going thoughts about a node, its definition, or its relationship to other nodes.
11 The current user-interface of NUDIST (version 3.0) is problematic in that although some direct coding 
of text is possible, the researcher tends to be ’taken away from’ the original data documents, and works much 
of the time with segmented pieces of text.
12 Compared to ATLAS-ti, the possible relationships between nodes in this hierarchical structure are 
somewhat limited. However, other relationships between nodes (for example mutual exclusivity) may be 
implicit in the researchers own conceptualisation of the indexing structure. Thus, as I have argued above, 
reflexivity allows the researcher to overcome many of the potential limitations of these packages.
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The indexing system can be thought of as a representation of the researcher’s theoretical 
conceptualisations of the structure and content of the data.
A series of powerful index system searches based on Boolean operators (intersects, 
unions, overlaps etc) allow the researcher to test hypotheses and ask questions of the 
data. These searches can provide answers to questions about pattemings of themes within 
the data set, and about co-occurrences and relationships between nodes. The ability to 
store the answers to these investigations as nodes within the indexing system (known as 
’system closure’) allows data analysis to become an on-going process in which questions 
addressed to the data are used to inform subsequent analysis and findings. A text editor 
is incorporated in the package allowing write up of findings to be conducted simultaneous 
with data exploration.
Figure 4.1 shows the data analysis process, as conceived by the authors of NUDIST, in 
diagrammatic form, illustrates the inter-relationships between indexing, searching and 
theorising which are possible using NUDIST13.
3.3 Analysis: Development and Use of an Indexing System
In order to explore the nature of the professional social representations expressed in 
individual interviews, analysis must facilitate the answering of three broad inter-related 
questions: Firstly, what themes can be extrapolated from professionals’ verbal accounts 
of their work and their understandings of mental ill health? Second, how do these vary 
across different respondents? Respondents can be categorised according to nationality, 
according to professional groupings, and according to whether they work in hospital or 
community based settings. These provide several a priori ways of splitting and 
comparing the data during analysis, (although as will be seen later, few clear-cut 
differences between groupings made in these ways are detected). Thirdly, how do the 
various themes inter-relate? In other words, are themes regarding for example, practical
13 This is based on a diagram contained in the Introductory Workshop on the OSR-NUDIST 
Qualitative Data Analysis Software (1995) Qualitative Solutions & Research Pty Ltd: Melbourne, Australia. 
This document has also been used to inform earlier parts of section 3.2. Descriptions of the development 
and use of the NUDIST package are also provided by Richards & Richards (1994a, 1994b) and Weitzman 
& Miles (1995).
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Figure 4.1 The process of data analysis using QSR-NUDIST
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To answer these questions requires investigations both across interviews and within each 
interview narrative, an analytic process which necessarily evolves over time and involves 
considerable lack of clarity and ambiguity. Qualitative data analysis involves constant 
uncertainty, inspiration, reworking and questioning. It requires considerable personal 
involvement from the researcher in confronting complex pattemings and exploring the 
semantic intricacies of the data, yet being able to step back from these to see them within 
a wider picture, and ultimately to make some credible interpretations and abstractions. 
QSR-NUDIST offers support for this fluid and evolving process by allowing the 
researcher to search and explore the data in several ways, to modify the indexing system 
continuously on the basis of these explorations, and to record on-going ideas using 
memoing facilities attached to nodes and documents. It is difficult to tie down this 
process into clear, tightly written specifications. However, in the name of enhancing the 
transparency of this research, this section attempts to provide a descriptive account 
(which is necessarily a reconstructed narrative) of the process of data analysis.
Initial indexing
Analysis using QSR-NUDIST requires segmentation of data into text units. This was 
done according to ’units of meaning’ of a maximum of ten lines, with a new text unit 
being created every time the respondent moved on to a new idea, theme or issue. Text 
units of this size allow both contextualisation of themes and relatively fine-grained 
analysis. However, the significance of the exact size of text units, and the decisions 
made in devising these is reduced by the facility in NUDIST for multiple coding of each 
text unit. Contextualisation of text units is provided through the use of headers and sub­
headers, with the major questions serving as sub-headers dividing interview transcripts. 
Thus, any text unit can be identified as part of a particular interview and as a response 
to a specific question.
The first stage of the analytic process was essentially a data management strategy, 
designed to categorise the large volume of data into several broad thematic areas. These 
categories were developed through pilot work with a sample of 10% of interviews (three
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interviews from each country). This aimed to establish a set of indexing codes to account 
for broad themes within the data in a consistent and logical way, and to exclude from this 
initial indexing data which, for the purposes of current investigations, can be considered 
’irrelevant’. Fourteen broad categories were created. The first of these describes ’base 
data’ for interview respondents (professional status, nationality and location of work). 
The remaining thirteen categories (which are usually mutually exclusive) reflect both 
variations in the data and the theoretical orientation of the research. Based on the model 
of professional social representations proposed in Chapter 3, the creation of these codes 
recognises that professional social representations of mental illness are likely to consist 
of a combination of theoretical and practical sources of understanding which coexist with 
other knowledge / belief systems, specifically those relating to professional identities and 
the institutional setting in which respondents work. These initial indexing categories are 
presented in Table 4.3 together with working definitions which emerged from pilot work.
Careful checks were made during pilot work on the content of each indexing code, 
establishing that data assigned to each code accurately reflected its working definitions. 
Checks on non-coded data confirmed that this data can be considered ’irrelevant’ to the 
current enquiry and that informative data was not being discarded14. These checks on 
non-coded data were repeated once the whole corpus of data had been coded with any 
relevant data being reincorporated into the indexing system.
This initial indexing resulted in 75% of text units being coded. An equal amount of 
French and British data was included. However, this accounted for a slightly higher 
percentage of British than French data (83 % of text units for British data and 68% of text 
units for French data). This can be explained by differences between interviews 
conducted in the two countries. French interviews are longer and contain more data 
which is not considered to be relevant (for example descriptions of French health and 
social services and current social problems). In Britain, shared knowledge of these social 
systems is usually taken for granted. It is also apparent from interview transcripts that 
when interviewing in my own language I was able to direct interviews more successfully 
than when interviewing in a foreign language.
14 Un-coded data includes, for example, references to other work, comments on social problems, local 
and national politics, details of respondents’ personal lives, and misunderstandings between interviewer and 
respondent.
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Table 4.3: Indexing categories created in initial stages of analysis
Code
Number
Name Working Definition
1 Base Data Indexing of professional status, nationality 
and location of work
2 Daily Practice Descriptions of day-to-day work
3 Treatments References to practices which can be 
considered as treatment / care
4 Models Theoretical models which inform practice / 
understanding
5 Assessment Assessments of mental health and treatment 
choice
6 Aims Aims of treatment / daily work
7 Outcomes Impacts of treatment / care strategies and 
evaluations of these
8 Role How respondents see their role
9 Personal Personal qualities needed and effects of 
work on the person
10 Professional Comments on respondents’ profession / 
other professionals / relationships between 
professionals
11 System The psychiatric system and community care
12 Mental Illness Descriptions / conceptualisations of mental 
illness
13 Causes Perceived causes of mental illness
14 Cure Comments on the concept of cure applied 
to mental illness
The relative use of each of the 13 codes was approximately equal for French and British 
data, with the exception that a greater proportion of British text units were coded under 
’system*. This is accounted for by more detailed questioning of British respondents 
regarding the implementation of community care policies (see section 2.1). Quantitative
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analyses were used to check the reliability and consistency of this initial indexing. 
Counts of text units assigned to each code were made at three points:- after completion 
of the pilot work; when half the interviews had been coded; and when initial coding had 
been completed for the full set of interviews. At these three points, the overall 
percentage of data coded, and the frequency of use of the 13 codes were found to be 
constant. This suggests consistent use and definition of the initial codes which form the 
bedrock of subsequent analysis.
Subsequent Analysis
Having established an initial framework for segmenting and organising interview data, 
subsequent analysis set out to explore the content of these broad themes in more detail. 
This involved a spiralling process of analysis in which fine-grained exploration of each 
theme opens up new questions and avenues of investigation, the results of which can be 
fed back into and integrated into the developing ’tree structure’ of nodes. This on-going 
process makes it possible to move to increasingly higher levels of abstraction in making 
sense of the data, while simultaneously generating an increasingly complex indexing tree 
to capture the complexities and nuances of the data.
This spirally process is best illustrated through an example: Investigations of the data on 
treatment strategies highlighted the use of psychotherapies as an important practice. Thus 
a node was created which contained all references to the use of psychotherapeutic 
strategies. Following this, retrievals of text units indexed at this node suggested 
quantitative differences in the numbers of French and British respondents using 
psychotherapies. This also suggested that psychotherapy was being used and 
conceptualised in qualitatively different ways in the two countries. These differences 
revolve around the concepts of ’coping’ and ’listening’ which were then investigated 
using word searches. The results of these searches were used to create new nodes which 
were integrated into the developing indexing structure in the area of ’aims of work’, and 
were used in subsequent fine-grained analysis in this area15.
15 The results of this analytic example are presented in Chapter 6.
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This example illustrates how NUDIST facilitates a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative investigations. It also shows how, although sheer volume of data dictates a 
strategy of addressing each broad thematic area in turn, an integrative approach can 
nevertheless be adopted. The results of explorations in one area inform and feed into 
other areas, such that themes can be detected across the interview narratives. This guards 
against segmentation and helps develop a more conceptual level of understanding. 
Through this process, the initial ’flat’, non-hierarchical indexing system provides the 
starting points for an increasingly more complex ’tree-structure’ of hierarchical codes. 
Adding subsequent layers or ’children’ to this indexing system allows analysis of a 
particular theme to become successively more fine-grained. Other explorations were 
conducted during this process by posing questions such as ’how do British respondent’s 
views of the causes of mental illness compare to those of French respondents?’ or ’do the 
various professional groups conceptualise the aims of their work in different ways?’ To 
answer these question, new nodes which divided existing nodes according to the 
comparison being made were created. These allowed examination and comparison of the 
relevant text units. Nodes could then either be integrated into existing tree structures or 
deleted as required. Another frequently employed investigative strategy was to use the 
range of ’Boolean operator’ facilities offered by NUDIST. For example, it is possible 
to investigate the intersects and the unions of two or more indexing nodes, to collect 
together all the nodes within a specific sub-tree, or to restrict analysis to documents 
indexed at a particular node. Using NUDIST’s text editor facility, the results of these 
investigations, together with relevant interview extracts were transferred directly into text 
documents which formed the basis of the three analytic chapters.
The final version of the indexing ’tree structure’ is presented in Appendix 6. This 
emerged from a on-going process of development and reorganisation in which nodes were 
continually merged, deleted and moved within the tree structure. Thus the final tree 
structure reflects my final conceptualisations of the data, and is informative in 
understanding the analysis presented in subsequent chapters.
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4 Ensuring  Credibility  in  Qualitative Research
The final section of this chapter is devoted to consideration of what I believe is a vital 
issue for qualitative research: How can the credibility of such research be evaluated and 
ensured? My first concern will be the definition of terms in relation to this issue. 
Following this, section 4.2 considers some strategies of evaluation and suggestions for 
good practice made by other qualitative researchers. Finally, section 4.3 demonstrates 
how the credibility of the current research has been ensured. Having recognised the 
complexities of the issue of research credibility, which it is argued should be seen as fluid 
and dynamic rather than a static criterion,! the credibility of this research is best assessed 
through several criteria. Strategies of triangulation, researcher reflexivity, checks on the 
consistency and internal validity of coding strategies, and transparency will be cited./
But first, why is this issue of the credibility of qualitative research so important? [Many 
authors (eg Farr, 1993a; Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992) point to the dominance of
positivism in the Anglo Saxon social sciences. Particularly in psychology, the role of*1
qualitative research has been undervalued16.' Farr (1993a) notes that in the English 
speaking world, the dominant position of positivism requires researchers to be explicit 
about the methods they have used. Consequently, evaluations of French social 
representations research have been lowered by the fact that French researchers are 
traditionally less concerned to present clear accounts of their methodology. Other authors 
(eg Silverman, 1993; Bryman, 1988) note that much qualitative social science research 
has an anecdotal quality, with little or no attention paid to how its credibility can be 
evaluated. If qualitative research is to continue to gain ground in the social sciences, its 
authors can no longer afford to avoid issues of the credibility of their methods and 
findings. We must work at establishing strategies for good practice in qualitative 
research and developing criteria for evaluation which are appropriate to the 
epistemological and methodological bases of our research.
16 Although in modem social psychology the rise of approaches such as discourse analysis, social 
representations theory and feminist research, among others, has done much to raise the profile of qualitative 
research over the past decade.
4.1 Defining ’Credibility*
A review of literature on qualitative research methods demonstrates a profusion of terms 
relating to the evaluation of research. ’Quality’, ’trustworthiness’, ’validity’, 
’authenticity’, and ’credibility’, are some of the terms which are often used 
interchangeably. However, these terms are used to signify broadly the same issue. This 
can be defined as the interaction between theory, data collection and interpretation of the 
data. The data collected, and the strategies of analysis used should interact closely with 
the theoretical perspective of the research. In other words, theory should suggest certain 
approaches and techniques of data collection and analysis, while data should be able to 
offer support, refutation, or refinement of the theory.
To avoid confusion, I have chosen the term ’credibility* to refer to this linkage between 
theory, data collection and interpretationj The choice is somewhat arbitrary, buj I wish 
to avoid the term ’validity’ as it may carry connotations of the measurement approach to
i
evaluation developed within psychometrics. There are parallels between ’credibility’ and 
’construct validity’, defined by Anastasi (1968, p i 14) as ’the extent to which the test may 
be said to measure a theoretical construct or trait’. However, this concept and many 
other criteria used to evaluate research from a positivist perspective are essentially static, 
in that they rely on numerical measures which are used to evaluate the whole research 
process. / 1 would argue that what is needed is a more dynamic concept of credibility. 
The relationship between theory and data is two-way and fluid. Research should be
considered as a dynamic process in which the meaning of data and its relation to theory,
I
is never fixed, but develops and changes through the life-time of a research project. 
Similarly, any single piece of research fits into an on-going body of related research and 
theoretical debate, through which both theories and methods develop. Consequently the 
credibility of research cannot be evaluated ’once and for all’. Evaluations can be made 
at certain points in time, but these are liable to change, such that research can only ever 
be said to be ’provisionally credible’17. Furthermore, evaluations are always made in 
relation to the researcher’s aims in conducting the study, rather than in absolute terms.
17 Banister et al (1994) describe this issue as ’inconcludability’ and make the following comment: ’While 
a positivist who believes that it is possible to capture facts and arrange them in mathematical form will see 
inconcludability as a fatal problem, qualitative researchers who follow the changes in meaning in the course of 
research will both understand and welcome the opportunity for others to supplement their account.’ (Banister 
et al, 1994, pl2).
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I would argue, therefore, that credibility is best assessed through a variety of criteria, 
which consider this complex issue from different perspectives, and at different points in 
the research process. This is the approach I have adopted in the research reported here. 
Before presenting these strategies, however, a brief review of how other researchers have 
tackled the evaluation of qualitative research is necessary, in order to contextualise my 
own choice of evaluation methods.
4.2 Evaluating Qualitative Research
Although there is little agreement amongst qualitative researchers as to how their methods 
should be evaluated (Kelle & Laurie, 1995), two broad perspectives can be identified. 
The first is to apply the standard positivist criteria of reliability and validity. This 
approach has been advocated as a way of assessing content analysis by, for example, 
Krippendorff (1980). The second perspective (which has gained more ground in recent 
years) advocates that the application of the standard positivist criteria of reliability and 
validity to qualitative research conducted within a constructionist epistemology is 
problematic (eg Banister et al 1994; Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992; Flick, 1992; Silverman, 
1993), and that more appropriate criteria must be established. I would agree with this 
argument that the epistemological stance of most qualitative research is not compatible 
with the measurement approach of the classic tests of reliability and validity. This is 
because meaning, with which qualitative analysis is primarily concerned, is never fixed 
and cannot, therefore, be quantified in a single static measure. However, I would add 
a qualification, which essentially locates my argument mid-way between these two 
positions. Epistemological differences should not, I believe, be used as an excuse for the 
whole-sale rejection of previously well-established techniques. Some of the positivist 
criteria for evaluating research methods can be usefully combined with other non­
positivist criteria for evaluating qualitative research. In particular, as I have 
demonstrated in the current research, evaluations of the consistency and internal validity 
of coding techniques can prove useful tools. What I would object to is the exclusive use 
of these criteria of evaluation for qualitative research.
Given this starting point, what other strategies of good practice which can help ensure 
the credibility of qualitative research without using standard positivist criteria have been
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proposed? One of the most frequently cited strategies is ’triangulation’ (eg Banister et 
al 1994, Flick 1992). Various types of triangulation and their aims have been discussed 
in section 2.2 and it not necessary to consider them further. Another commonly cited 
strategy is ’researcher reflexivity’ - the researcher’s constant vigilance to ways in which 
research activity inevitably shapes and impacts upon its findings (eg Henwood & Pidgeon 
1992, Lincoln & Guba 1985). This can take a variety of guises, from the interactions 
of researchers with their object of study during data collection, to the influence of 
strategies used to analyze and make sense of data. One of the benefits of a reflexive 
approach is that the researcher is able to produce ’transparent’ research findings. 
Transparency (also referred to as ’documentation’ (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992) or 
’codification* (Barton & Lazarfeld, 1969)) refers to the clarity with which the path from 
data to findings is presented. Transparency does not in itself ensure credibility. Rather, 
it is a practice which enables readers of a research report to evaluate credibility on their 
own terms. It is also an important way in which knowledge about the practicalities of 
how to do qualitative research can be disseminated within the research community.
The list of proposed strategies designed to enhance the credibility of qualitative research 
is probably endless, and it is not my intention to provide an exhaustive review. Three 
other approaches which are commonly advocated by researchers searching for non- 
measurement based criteria of evaluation will be mentioned:- respondent validation, ’fit’ 
with the data, and generalisability. Respondent validation refers to ’acceptance’ by the 
participants in the study of the researcher’s interpretations. This criteria has been 
advocated by, among others, feminist researchers, as an attempt to redress power 
differentials between researchers and those who participant in research. While ’giving 
something back* to participants is a desirable aim, this criteria of evaluation can also be 
problematic. There may be times when the perspectives of researcher and respondents 
simply do not match, for example when studying the beliefs of fascist groups (Billig, 
1977), or when taboo and unspoken themes which may not form part of participants’ 
conscious experiences are uncovered by the researcher (eg Jodelet 1991). Depending on 
the nature of the research project, respondent validation may be a useful strategy, but it 
is not sufficient on its own to ensure the credibility of research findings.
Researchers taking an inductive approach to qualitative research often cite ’fit’ between 
findings and the data as an important criterion for validity (eg Henwood & Pidgeon
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1992). This is certainly an important issue, although the term ’fit* risks implying that 
what is contained in the data corpus is fixed and static, rather than open to several 
possible readings. However, unless one is taking a radically inductionist approach, 
connections between data and findings are not the only relevant links. Findings should 
also correspond with theoretical perspectives, in such a way that they can offer insightful 
support, elaboration or disconfirmation of a theory. This relates to the final criterion of 
evaluation - generalisability. Does the research offer contributions to knowledge which 
can be generalised beyond the specific data set on which it has focused? In qualitative 
research generalisability is usually understood in terms of concepts and theories, rather 
than in the quantitative sense of generalising from sample to population.
4.3 Strategies for Credibility in the Current Research
Given this range of suggestions for good practice in qualitative research, what procedures 
have been implemented to ensure the credibility of the findings reported in this thesis? 
Based on the arguments developed in the preceding two sections, a range of strategies are 
brought into play, some of which derive from classic measurement approaches, whilst 
other are more typically associated with constructivist epistemologies. Each of these 
offer a different perspective on the research process and together they address credibility 
at various points during the life-span of the project.
Triangulation of data, methods and levels of analysis, and the use of quantitative 
approaches to supplement an essentially qualitative enquiry have already been discussed. 
Reflexivity, requiring continual questioning of how particular strategies may shape 
findings has been maintained throughout the research process. For example, awareness 
of how demand characteristics and social desirability may play a part in constructing 
interview accounts has been discussed in section 2.1. A variety of techniques employed 
during the process of data analysis also demonstrate a reflexive stance. These include 
searching for the existence of patterns or themes in more than one domain, investigating
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deviant or unusual cases, exploring data which does not fit with developing 
conceptualisations, and consideration of rival explanations of findings18.
Several techniques employed during data analysis ensure the reliability and internal 
validity of processes of coding and investigating data. In the initial stages of data 
analysis, checks were made on the consistency of use of the thirteen broad codes (see 
Table 3). Data allocated to each code was examined to establish that its content matched 
working definitions of codes. The content of non-coded data was also examined to 
ensure that interesting data was not being lost from further analysis. The circular process 
of data analysis described in section 3.3 aimed to produce a final indexing system with 
internal logic and consistency, which could provide a detailed mapping of both themes 
within the data corpus, and my own understandings of structures and relationships within 
this. These strategies are designed to ensure close linkages between findings, data and 
theory, ensuring that findings are able to inform understandings of both the substantive 
area of mental illness and the theory of social representations.
The use of this comprehensive range of validity checks is particularly important given 
that only one person has been involved in data analysis. I have had to police and 
evaluate my own strategies. While the use of multiple coders is a strategy frequently 
advocated to enhance the validity of qualitative research, the on-going interactive process 
of data analysis and exploration which this project has involved makes this option 
unfeasible. However the fact that this process has involved constant reworking of themes 
and finding, as data is explored and re-explored from different perspectives has ensured 
that checks on analysis equivalent to ’test-retest reliability’ have been incorporated into 
the process of data analysis (although this criteria cannot be measured or evaluated 
formally).
Finally, this chapter has presented as transparent an account as possible of the path taken 
from initial decisions about data collection, through data analysis, to the final write up 
of findings. This will enable readers to evaluate the strategies adopted in this empirical 
work, and hopefully to be clear ’where the findings come from’. The production of a
18 Miles and Huberman (1994), Chapter 10 provide a comprehensive review of strategies of data 
exploration designed to enhance the rigour and authenticity of analysis, many of which were adopted during the 
data analytic work of the current research.
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clear account of the process of data analysis is aided considerably by the use of ’QSR- 
NUDIST’, which encourages qualitative data analysis to become a recordable process. 
I believe that the expanding use of computer software for qualitative data analysis will 
do much to enhance the transparency and quality of qualitative research in the future.
Ultimately, all research is based on a relationship of trust between the researcher and the 
reader. Readers must decide for themselves on the credibility of this research. I hope, 
however, to have presented sufficient evidence using a range of criteria, for readers to 
be convinced of the credibility of the findings which are presented in subsequent chapters.
A Note on the Presentation of Findings
In the analytic chapters which follow, conceptual arguments are backed up with extracts 
from interviews interspersed in the text. These are chosen as typical illustrations which 
serve to concretise and bring the findings to life, as well as to enhance the transparency 
of analysis. Whilst there is clearly a need to be concise, the opposing requirement to 
capture narratively constructed meanings, together with a moral obligation to respondents 
to re-present their views in the best way possible, means that specific statements must be 
contextualised within the narrative structures from which they are drawn.
Extracts from French interviews have been translated by the author with verification 
where necessary by a native French speaker. Personal identifier numbers for respondents 
are included with each extract, and the reader may check the profession and location of 
work of each respondents in Appendix 4. The following abbreviations are used:-
F = French respondent 
B = British respondent 
I =  Interviewer
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CHAPTERS
CONCEPTUALISING MENTAL ILLNESS: SOCIAL DEFINITIONS
AND AGNOSTICISM
The empirical analysis of this thesis begins by exploring the very bed-rock of professional 
social representations of mental illness - the notion of ’mental illness’ itself. How do 
professional practitioners in France and Britain conceptualise mental ill health, its nature 
and its causes?
I The chapter illustrates how professionals* most basic understandings of mental ill health 
are far from fixed and clearly established, but are fraught with debate, questioning and 
uncertainty. \ Section 1 shows how professionals represent mental illness as a 
polymorphous category whose boundaries cannot be clearly defined, and within which 
an important binary opposition between ’neuroses’ and ’psychoses’ is set up. j Section 2 
explores how the various forms of mental illness are understood in relation to three 
defining themes - difference, distress and disruption. These themes delineate the territory 
on which practitioners’ on-going debates about the nature of mental illness are played out] 
They also unite in defining mental illness in essentially social terms. In other words, 
mental ill health is understood as a problem of social life, defined in relation to social 
norms, and impacting upon social relationships. In section 3 the focus turns to 
professionals’ understandings of the causes of mental illness. This highlights the 
agnosticism which permeates professional social representations of mental illness. 
Professionals construct complex but provisional representations of a web of causal factors 
which integrate ideas originating in various theoretical perspectives. ^Whilst echoes of 
both theoretical knowledge and lay understandings of mental illness permeate all the 
exploratory areas in this chapter, this analysis highlights how these knowledge systems 
are translated, re-presented and integrated within professional social representations .J
In previous social representational research some authors (eg Abric 1984, De Rosa 1987) 
have conceptualised basic themes such as those explored in this chapter as the ’core’ or 
’figurative nucleus’ of a social representation. However, for jthis research which 
proposes a more complex model of professional social representations structured in terms
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of various inter-related spheres of knowledge, it is more useful to conceptualise basic 
themes as the ’bed-rock* of these representations.1 The multiplicity, agnosticism and 
essentially social definitions of mental ill health which this initial analysis reveals are 
themes which are echoed in many aspects of professional social representations of mental 
illness, and which reoccur throughout the empirical analyses of this thesis, j This three- 
dimensional rather than two-dimensional conceptualisation of social representations is 
congruent with the position of Rose et al (1995) who argue that it is useful to differentiate 
various levels of consensus within social representations. A degree of implicit 
consensual reality provides the underlying ground rules for representational debate and 
dissensus which is lived out at ’higher’ levels through daily talk and practice. \This model 
allows the researcher more space to chart fluidity and inconsistencies between 
components of the representational field than is possible if the core-periphery structure 
is adopted. \ It is the underlying taken-for-granted bases of professional social 
representations which is the focus of this chapter!
1 M ental  Illness: A  Polym orphous Category
Consistent with the expectation that professional social representations will be highly 
elaborated, we find that professionals understand mental illness not as a unitary 
phenomenon, but as a polymorphous category in which various types of mental ill health
r
are compared and contrasted J, The most important differentiation within this heterogenous 
field is between ’psychoses’ and ’neuroses’. This binary opposition permeates the 
entirety of professional representations, and is therefore a distinction which we will return 
to at several points in subsequent sections of this and the following chapters. Seventy 
five percent of interview respondents refer to neurosis and / or psychosis at some point 
during the interview, (although these are not terms used by the interviewer). No 
differences between French and British respondents or between professional groups can 
be detected in this respect, suggesting that these are meaningful terms across the world 
of mental health practitioners, regardless of status or orientation;
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The terms ’neurosis’ and ’psychosis’ occur in both medical and psychoanalytic discourses 
on mental ill health1. Undoubtedly, the centrality of these terms simultaneously in two 
expert knowledge systems which have wielded such power and influence in the twentieth 
century accounts for their important role in structuring contemporary professional 
representations. | However, neither of these expert knowledge systems provide clear, 
unambiguous conceptualisations of neurosis and psychosis. Within the medical / 
psychiatric paradigm, ’neurosis’ and ’psychosis’ serve as important descriptive tools, but 
their exact definition remains elusive2. Similarly, the proliferation of psychodynamic 
theorising has produced divergences and lack of consensus. The semantics of the term 
’psychosis’, for example, varies considerably between Freudian, Kleinian and Lacanian
f
thinking. This debate and uncertainty in expert discourses is translated into professional 
social representations, opening up a space in which professionals construct their own 
understandings of neurosis and psychosis, i As will be shown in section 2, these 
understandings are based on binary oppositions created around the theme of difference.
Beyond these important umbrella terms,j professionals refer to various other forms of 
mental ill health. ’Schizophrenia’ and ’manic-depression’ are commonly cited mental 
health problems (Referred to in 60% and 37% of interviews respectively), which seem to 
have the status of ’prototypical psychoses’. (These are also found to be the most 
commonly named illness in lay representations (Raty 1990).) Through their collective 
association with specific experiences or ’symptoms’, these terms serve to concretise 
forms of ’psychosis’, an initial step towards objectifying the abstract concept of mental 
illness within professional social representations. They may also function to aid 
communication between the professionally diverse members of mental health teams,
1 The distinction between neurosis and psychosis made in nineteenth century German psychiatry was 
imported into the psychodynamic domain in the original writings of Freud. Despite their fundamentally different 
approaches, Laplanche & Pontalis (1983) argue that psychodynamic thought is largely at one with the clinical 
boundary lines between neurosis and psychosis made in medical psychiatry.
2 For example The Oxford Textbook of Psychiatry (Gelder, Gath & Mayou, 1989) (one of the most 
commonly used psychiatric texts in Britain) states that the classificatory labels ’neurosis’ and ’psychosis’ are 
problematic because of lack of clearly agreed criteria, little commonality of the conditions embraced by the 
terms, and the fact that more specific diagnostic classifications are more informative. However, it notes that 
’although psychosis has little value as a category in a scheme for classifying mental disorders, it is still in 
everyday use as a convenient term for disorder which cannot be given a more precise diagnosis because 
insufficient evidence is available’ (p79). Similarly, the major internationally used psychiatric classification 
systems DSM-IV (The American Psychiatric Association, 1994) and ICD-10 (World Health Organisation, 1992) 
shie away from the clear definition of the terms psychosis and neurosis, while nevertheless retaining the terms 
on a descriptive level.
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allowing them to agree on what they are talking about even if their views on treatment 
and aetiology diverge3. Similarly, phobias, anxiety and obsessions are referred to as 
specific forms of neurosis. ’Depression’ (a term used in 70% of interviews) has a more 
ambiguous status associated with both sides of the neurosis / psychosis divide, and 
described both as a mental health problem in its own right, and as a symptom of other 
forms of mental illness.
Use of these specific illness terms is generally more common amongst British interview 
respondents compared to those in France. This may reflect the greater influence in 
Britain of the medical model of mental illness whose historical dominance has left its 
legacy in the language of mental health professionals (although the use of terms 
originating in medical discourses cannot be taken simply as in indicator of subscription 
to a medical model). It is also possible that this is a reflection of the socio-political 
context of mental health care in Britain, in which there is much public scepticism
r
surrounding current community care policies and the competency of professionals.! The 
use of expert terminology which differentiates their language from lay discourses may 
help professionals enhance their credibility as ’experts’ and justify their professional 
practice (the justificatory role of theory in professional social representations is discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 6).
In contrast, the term ’madness’ (which is rarely used in a serious sense by British mental 
health professionals) retains legitimacy in the world of French mental health 
professionals4. As the interview extracts below illustrate, the term ’madness’ (la folie) 
is associated with ’psychosis’ and is used by French professionals to signify states of 
delirium and behaviour perceived as bizarre, dangerous and radically outside of social 
norms. The semantics of ’madness’ among French mental health professionals parallel 
those detected in research on lay representations conducted in Spain by Ayesteran & Paez 
(1986) (see Chapter 2, section 2.1).
3 This relates to the anchoring function of theoretical concepts which is explored in Chapter 6, section
3.
4 As an indication of this cross cultural difference, the terms ’mad’ and ’madness’ occur in 18 of the 
30 French interview transcripts (and 61 text units), compared to 5 interviews (and only 10 text units) in the 
British sample. Text units refer to ’units of meaning’ which are generally between three and ten lines long.
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’It has been the case that I’ve called a psychiatric patient mad. But I’m talking about a 
particular point in time, not a permanent state of the person. That is, a point when the 
clinical signs are particularly critical. For example, for someone who has a manic depressive 
psychosis, I’d consider him to be ill, but when he starts to have a manic episode I’d want to 
say that he’s mad.’ (F2)
Generally speaking, the people who are called mad in the French system are the psychotics. 
People termed neurotic aren’t mad. That’s how it is.’ (F4)
\ Despite this relatively elaborated lexicon of mental ill health in professional social 
representations, uncertainty and questioning remains. This is revealed on a very basic 
level by debates over the most appropriate terminology and the extent and boundaries of 
these semantic categories. Use of the term ’mental illness’ is often questioned during
interviews,! and it is clear that although this term is a recognised anchor, it is far from
I
secure and uncontested. Several interview respondents take a critical stance on the term 
’mental illness’ which they associate with a medical model, implications of biological 
causation and abnormality, and neglect of subjective experiences and suffering:-
’One of the reasons why I don’t use the term mental illness or disagree with it, is that I think 
for me when someone’s in distress or they’re coming with symptoms, that those symptoms 
are all things that make sense and I think that if you call it an illness you’re almost trying to 
make it something that doesn’t make sense. You know, it’s something wrong, so lets make 
it better.’ (B2)’
’It must be said that the notion of "mental illness" is itself something which one should have 
a critical view of. Because the word "illness" doesn’t take full account of psychic suffering.’ 
(F13)
B15: You can’t ask the question what is mental illness without also looking at what are the
boundaries of mental illness ......  For me mental illness would be those psychological
difficulties that I would believe have at least some significant biological underpinning, which 
can explain why people are presenting in the way they are. So I would be including the 
psychotic illnesses. I consider psychotic illness as illness. So schizophrenia and manic 
depressive illness. But after that I don’t use the term illness. You would find people who 
would view anorexia as a mental illness - I don’t think it’s an illness. Or alcoholism as an 
illness - 1 don’t think it’s an illness.
I: What would you say those sort of things are?
B15: Psychological difficulties. I use illness in a very specific way.
In their search for a more appropriate language, professionals may use terms such as 
’psychological difficulties’, ’mental health problems’, or (in France) ’madness’. /But 
whatever terminology they adopt, professionals’ polymorphous representations of mental 
distress have fuzzy and ill-defined boundaries. They find it difficult to specify what 
constitutes mental illness and what does not. | This implies a continuum of mental health 
and illness, as opposed to a view of mental health and illness as qualitatively different
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states. These ’different kinds of difference’ are part of the binary oppositions constructed 
between neurosis and psychosis. Figure 5.1 below summarises the semantics of different 
forms of mental illness in professional representations. The themes presented in the 
bottom part of this figure, and the debates which surround each of these are explored in 
more detail in sections 2 and 3 which follow.
2  So cial  Definitions o f  M ental Illness: D ifference. D isruption  and 
D istress
Having established that mental health professionals represent mental illness as taking 
multiple forms, we turn in this section to how these forms are represented/ J  Through 
what themes do professionals understand the nature of mental ill health and differentiate 
its various forms? | Analysis of interview narratives highlights the agnosticism which
l
pervades professional representations of mental illness. Questions asking respondents to 
describe the nature of mental illness often proved the hardest part of the interview, 
evoking much reflection by interview respondents. Similar difficulties in eliciting lay 
beliefs about mental illness through verbal accounts are reported by Jodelet (1991a)5. 
For lay people and professionals alike, there is something essentially intangible about the 
notion of mental distress which defies clear articulation. Whilst it seems un-surprising 
for lay people to deny psychiatric knowledge, the carry over of such claims to ignorance 
into the world of professionals is striking given their academic training and social position 
as experts. ^Despite this expert status, professionals are highly aware of the difficulties 
of trying to capture and describe the abstract concept of mental illness. This collective 
sense that the true nature of mental distress cannot be known with certainty is a key
i
feature of professional representations 'of mental illness.
i
5 ’(M)any detours were needed before we could get through to these conceptions ... We passed through 
concrete descriptions of cases, comments on events, behaviour, expressions, real-life narratives etc. These 
conceptions always emerged indirectly, sometimes without the interviewees knowing it, and were almost 
invariably preceded by an absolute refusal to admit any psychiatric knowledge.’ (Jodelet, 1991a, pl50). These 
comments resonate with the experience of collecting interview data with professionals, and highlight the analytic 
difficulties of capturing taken-for-granted or non-verbal belief systems. To gain access into these, techniques 
which go beyond manifest verbal responses (for example, observational data and more interpretative styles of 
analysis) must be employed. The design of the interview schedule, the analytic strategy, and the use of 
secondary data sources facilitate this process in the current research.
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Figure 5.1: Professional Representations of Neurosis and Psychosis
Polymorphous Category of Mental Illness
O bsessio n s 
Phobias Psychological 
difficulties
D epression M adness
Manic dep ression  
Schizophrenia
NEUROSIS 
Characterised as:
- an  exagerration/ extension 
of ’norm al’ experiences
- a  quantitative difference
- a  tem porary  state
- ’cu rab le’
Caused by:
- multiple causation b u t w eight given 
to  relational a n d  social
factors
Aspects of the representation:
- relatively m ore certainty
- possibilities for familiarisation
"Prototypical p sychoses"
y
PSYCHOSIS 
Characterised as:
- m ad n e ss
- incom prehensible
- d e ta c h e d  from  social reality
- qualitatively different /  ’o ther’
- a  p e rm an en t sta te
- no t ’cu rab le’, risk of 
relapse is alw ays p rese n t
- fragility
- serious a n d  chronic 
Caused by:
- multiple causation  b u t w eight given
to genetic /  biological factors
Aspects of the representation:
- high levels of uncertainty
- rem ains unfamiliar
; But this ’unknowing* is not absolute. Rather it is played out around three inter-related 
key themes: Difference, distress and disruption6.j These provide the foci for
professionals’ on-going debates about the nature of mental illness. By weighting these 
themes differently and by creating bipolar oppositions revolving around these conceptual 
axes, professionals are able to distinguish and compare various forms of mental ill health.
The underlying theme which unites these notions of difference, distress and disruption 
is an essentially social conceptualisation of mental illness. In trying to capture what it 
means to be mentally ill, professionals construct a model of the person as a social being. 
The mental health of an individual is not understood in isolation, but in relation to the 
social context, its norms and expectations for behaviour, life-style and experience. 
Difference is clearly a comparative evaluation, based on notions of ’normality’. Similarly, 
disruption entails a break with social and/or personal life-style norms. Even the theme 
of distress (which could be defined simply in intra-psychic terms) is given a social gloss, 
in that it is perceived as deriving not only from internal states, but from social 
experiences (for example, alienation from others or stigma)^
J  Integrating these themes might lead to a statement that mental illness is conceptualised 
in professional social representations as experiences which are different, abnormal and 
distressing, and which disrupt the person’s life and levels of social functioning.] Yet 
such a simplistic statement suggests a misleadingly fixed and stable representation, and 
fails to capture the debate, ambiguity and unanswered questions which exist around each 
of these themes. These are presented in graphical form in Figure 5.2, and explored in 
more detail in the following three sections.
6 In quantitative terms, these three themes occur in the descriptions of mental illness given by both 
French and British respondents of all professional origins, and can be detected in 82% of interviews. The 
remaining 11 (out of total of 60) respondents produced a variety of replies to the question ’what is mental 
illness?’ Most common amongst these were replies based on causal models (ie explanations rather than 
descriptions), perhaps motivated by the desire to present oneself as a competent ’expert’ in the interview setting.
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Figure 5.2: Mental Health Professionals’ 
Conceptualisations of Mental Illness
DISTRESS
derived from:
- internal state (eg se n se  of loss of control, fear)
- social position (eg isolation, feeling m isunderstood , 
stigm a, se n se  of being different)
Questions: - Are the mentally ill d istressed  
o r distressing?
MENTAL 
ILLNESS
DIFFERENCE - * ■
=  incomprehensibility, 
d isconnection 
from  social reality,
fragility (w eakness?)
Questions:
- quantitative difference /  similarity 
(neurosis?) o r qualitative 
difference (psychosis?)?
- und ers tan d ab le  or
incom prehensible ’o ther’?
- tem porary  o r perm anen t?
DISRUPTION
= disruption of 
- life c o m p a red  to  personal 
a n d  social no rm s
- relationships
- cop ing  stra teg ies
Questions:
disruption o r different w ay  of living? 
not coping  o r a  w ay of cop ing?
2.1 Different Forms of Difference
\
The resounding message of research reviewed in Chapter 2 is that ^difference and 
’otherness’ are at the heart of societal understandings of mental illness, and that the 
power of these themes is both reflected in and perpetuated by individual and collective 
reactions to mental illness and historical practices of marginalisation. | Much of thef
research reviewed in Chapter 3 on mental health institutions and the people who work in
i
them also finds themes of difference created symbolically in the daily routines of mental
* { 
health services and the understandings of professional practitioners. . It is no surprise
therefore, to find difference as an important representational theme in the current
research. But analysis also reveals the complexities of this notion of difference in
ii
professional social representations, jlf to be mentally ill is to be somehow different,
abnormal or ’other’, what kind of difference is this? Is this a permanent difference
I
between people, or a temporarily different state? \ Is mental illness an exaggeration of
t
’normal’ ways of being, or a qualitatively different phenomenon? What implications does 
this have for the ability of other people to understand the experiences of the mentally ill? 
Are the various forms of mental illness similar in these respects? These questions, all 
centred around the notion of difference, are issues with which mental health professionals 
continually battle, and for which they are able to produce only provisional and tentative 
answers.
Quantitative versus Qualitative Difference?
’A great word when you’re going through your training is empathy. I don’t think I can ever 
honestly empathise with somebody who is mentally ill. 1 can’t experience what it’s like to 
have auditory hallucinations. Everybody has a certain degree of paranoia, but I don’t think 
anyone can experience what actual pathological paranoia is. So I think you can only do your 
best, you know what I mean - you can only try and assume what that person is feeling, but 
I don’t think you can ever take on board what that person’s experience actually is. It’s not 
a real experience, you know, you can’t possibly understand what a mentally ill person is 
going through.’ (B6)
’Mental illness ....it’s being outside reality, it’s being completely cut off from the outside 
world. It’s about rejecting something, shutting oneself away in one’s world. Whether it’s 
depression or schizophrenia....it’s escaping from the outside world’ (F12)
These two interview extracts illustrate] the representation of mental illness as a radically 
or qualitatively different phenomenon, j This qualitative difference is defined in both 
phenomenological and consensual terms, jit is the experience of mental illness, and the
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perception of this as outside of the norms which constitute social reality that renders 
mental illness qualitatively different. From this perspective, to be mentally ill is to be 
’outside of reality’, to have experiences that other people do not have, and therefore towbe abnormal. ^Professionals perceive a gap between their own (and ’normal’) experiences 
and those of the mentally ill, and this gap renders full understanding of mental illness 
difficult or impossible.| Mental illness, from this perspective, remains fundamentally 
unknowable. This representational theme supports the suggestion made in Chapter 2 
(section 2.4) that mental illness is associated with perceived failures of conventional folk 
theories of mind or notions of the ’generalised other’.] Being unable to imagine what it 
is like to be mentally ill offers no way of applying a theory of mind based on one’s own 
subjectivity, with the result that the mentally ill person remains unpredictable and un- 
understandable.
?
jThis ’qualitative difference’ parallels themes in lay representations of mental illness as 
a radically different ’other’ which are detected by Jodelet (1991a) and many other 
authors. It is also perpetuated by numerous structural features of mental health services
in which symbolic differentiation between staff and patients is marked out through daily
\ \
routines and the use of physical spaces7  ^However, what differentiates these themes of 
’otherness’ in professional representations from those in lay understandings is that (at 
some level at least) they do not exist as an unquestioned reality. Although symbolic 
difference is instituted structurally, professionals take a reflexive stance on their own 
social representations - their knowledge is taken as provisional rather than taken-for- 
granted.| There is recognition of some of the social and psychological processes which 
may be involved in constructing representations of mental illness. For example, some 
professionals recognise how constructing the mentally ill as ’other’ may be a defensive 
strategy for denying the possibility of mental illness in oneself. The second of these 
interview extracts shows how some professionals are also actively involved in challenging
7 For example, in psychiatric hospitals and many community centres the eating facilities for staff and 
patients are usually separated. Similarly, toilets facilities are often designated for staff or patient use. The fact 
that staff have open access to patient designated areas (canteens, day rooms, sleeping facilities and so on), whilst 
many staff-only areas are off-bounds for patients highlights how this construction of a psycho-social distance 
between staff and patients also imbues power inequalities. Goffman (1961), Prior (1993) and Rosenhan (1973) 
also comment on the construction of symbolic differentiation between staff and patients in mental health services.
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views of mental illness as un-understandable, and renegotiating more ’meaning-full’ 
representations of mental ill health8:
T o talk about mental illness is bit of a defense. In other words, to say that another person 
is ill and I’m not, whereas actually we’re all involved in it, each with our own difficulties.’
(F10)
’It’s very difficult not to be "them and us", which is I think in this kind of setting so easy - 
they are the people who have got mental illnesses and we’re alright. And I often think there’s 
a lot of misunderstanding of cultural aspects, religion coming into it - different backgrounds, 
different languages, different ways of expressing things. ... I have found something quite 
interesting in working with people who are defined as being very psychotic, that the content 
of what they say sometimes makes sense. It doesn’t necessarily make sense initially - you 
have to get to know the person, get the circumstances, get the background, the social history 
of the person.’ (B13)
[ This reflexivity amongst professionals offers support for Markova’s (1992) suggestion 
that ’scientists’, who are generally aware of the problems and limitations of their 
knowledge systems, take a more critical stance on their own theories than lay people, 
who are more willing to accept scientific knowledge as ontologically real./
The status of mental illness as definitely and unananimously ’other’ is also called into 
question by the coexistence of a ’quantitative difference’ theme within professional social 
representations. For example:-
I: How would you describe what mental illness is?
B5: It’s a continuum from what normal life experiences are. The problem is defining what 
is normal I guess. So there’s no easy answer to that. An exaggeration of perhaps many 
things that occur for people who are normal in inverted commas. An exaggeration of some 
of their behaviours, some of their emotional responses to things.
’For me mental illness is something extreme, an extreme of normality in inverted commas. 
What turns normality into pathology is extremity, an extreme position....What I mean is, I 
don’t think we should say that its something different, that’s not true.’ (F17)
From this perspective, mental illness is an exaggeration or extension of other experiences. 
Mental health and illness are conceptualised as a continuum rather than as distinct 
categories. \This poses questions oflwhere on this continuum mental illness ’begins’, an 
issue which remains unanswered in professional social representations (see section 1).
8 This is associated with much of the work of the contemporary users’ movement in Britain, who 
campaign to promote more benign and empathetic social representations of ’meaning in madness’. (This issue 
is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.)
Conceptualising mental illness as a quantitative difference opens up the possibility for 
’similarity’ as well as difference: Parallels can be drawn between experiences of mental 
illness and other more ’normal’ experiences. There is scope for understanding, for 
making sense of mental illness by anchoring it into one’s own experiences, for applying 
conventional theories of mind.
Evidence for this ’quantitative difference’ representation of mental illness has been 
reported elsewhere, by Prior (1993) in his study of the contemporary social organization 
of mental illness in Northern Ireland (see Chapter 3, section 3.2). Prior (1993, p46) 
argues that ’psychiatric illness is now regarded as an abnormality in only a quantitative 
rather than a qualitative sense - as something which differs from normality in degree, 
rather than in kind.’ However, whilst Prior claims that the ’quantitative difference’ 
model has superseded a more archaic ’qualitative difference’ model, the current research 
suggests that the latter has continued life and currency in professional social 
representations. This coexistence of different types of difference is also detected by Raty 
(1990) in a social representational study on Finish students (see Chapter 2, section 2.1) 
in which qualitative difference is associated with danger and incomprehensibility whilst 
quantitative difference is associated with less threat and an ambiguous boundary between 
normality and pathology. It also accords with the multiple coexistence of diverse 
understandings of mental illness found in many other studies (for example, De Rosa 
1987; Glasgow University Media Group 1994a; Strauss et al 1964).
i\
! Temporary versus Permanent Difference? j
A second question centred around the theme of difference concerns temporality. Is 
mental illness a temporary state, a difference which people can move in and out of, or 
is it a more permanent difference? jln other words is the difference which is mental 
illness a state or a trait? Again, uncertainty surrounds this issue and both these positions 
coexist within professional social representations, often being used to differentiate 
between types of mental ill health, especially neuroses and psychoses (see below). 
However, the balance is more in favour of views of mental illness as a permanent, trait-
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like difference9. | Mental illness is frequently described as a chronic and long-term
i
problem) a state which may lie dormant, but which is liable to manifest itself throughout 
the person’s life. As will be seen in Chapter 6, [this has important implications for the 
daily work of mental health professionals which is conceptualised as a long-term 
endeavour involving ’maintenance’ rather than ’cure’.f
Fragility (Weakness?)
’I’ve worked with patients for a good number of years, and they’ve stabilised, but I would 
never swear that they won’t come back again. There are always relapses because it’s linked 
to personalities which are often fragile, and sometimes it only takes something small for 
things to go wrong.’ (F14)
’I have some psychotic patients, and it’s true that for those patients there’s a different 
structure, a different kind of fragility. Cure for psychotic patients - 1 think that basically they 
stay the same, even though they may not have delusional episodes, they still have quite a 
distinctive structure. In fact they often take medication, or come into hospital, and even if 
they leave without any delusions, there’s a particular structure which is still there.’ (F13)
When a view of mental illness as a permanent trait-like difference is combined with 
themes of qualitative or fundamental differences, associations with ’fragility’ are often 
expressed. This is particularly associated with ’psychotic’ illness. This notion of 
fragility hides within it another important semantic which remains unspoken: Fragility 
is often used in a way that implies weakness. The following interview extract betrays 
this hidden theme10:-
I: How would you define this fragility that you talk about?
F17: Some people would say that it’s a weakness, but I don’t think so. That’s very 
derogatory. It suggests that being strong is the ultimate, but that’s not true. Anyway...it’s 
true, I think, that in everyday language fragility means weakness. Often there is a sensitivity, 
so that if you are fragile in yourself, you may be more affected by things in social life, you 
may be less able to protect yourself. For me, at the moment, fragility is extreme sensitivity
9 As a quantitative indicator of this balance, 49 respondents (out of a total of 60) express the ’trait / 
permanent difference’ position compared to 23 respondents who express the ’state / temporary position’. 
However, the majority of this second group (17), also express the ’trait / permanent difference’ position.
10 This interview respondent is unique in verbalising many of the tacit assumptions within professional 
representations. Her position as a newly qualified psychiatric nurse struggling to assimilate the norms and 
values of mental health work apparently provides a more reflexive stance on many taken-for-granted and taboo 
issues in professional social representations, and her interview responses were much less guarded and censored 
by self presentation than those of some other respondents. The use of this single interview as a vital resource 
in going beyond what is explicitly verbalised in an interview situation illustrates how thematic analysis of this 
form cannot rely solely on quantitative measures such as the frequency with which a theme is expressed.
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to things. It’s not unusual to come across very sensitive personalities who are very fragile 
people. I don’t know, but in the end the term "fragile" is pejorative.
This suggests that professionals may represent mental illness implicitly as a form of 
weakness or moral inferiority, but that this is reconceptualised into the more socially 
acceptable notion of fragility.^ j The work of Gilman (1988) discussed in Chapter 2 
highlights how ’otherness’ in social representations can take various forms (for example, 
exotic others, dangerous others or benign others)./ Amongst professionals as well as 
within the lay community (Raty 199), mental illness is often represented as a weak or 
fragile other, which is implicitly, but importantly inferior to ’normality’. This is 
supported by the fact that ’fragility’ at the level of the person is also an important theme 
in professionals’ causal models of mental ill health (see section 3 below).j Paradoxically!
t
as we will see in section 2.4,|there are also some implicit suggestions that mental illness 
may be a powerfully dangerous or threatening form of otherness j
Neurosis and Psychosis
I
; These different types of difference (quantitative versus qualitative and temporary versus 
permanent) coexist in professional social representations both within and between the
\ f
representations expressed by individual practitioners. The commonest way they co-occur
i
is as a means of differentiating and creating binary oppositions between ’psychosis’ and 
’neurosis’.* Firstly, as the interview extracts below illustrate, psychosis is associated with
4
qualitatively different experiences whereas neurosis is described as a quantitative form 
difference. The psychotic person is described as living in a world of their own in which 
they lack ’insight’ or the ability to recognise consensual views of the world and their 
dislocation from this. This renders psychosis a more serious or severe form of mental 
illness. In contrast, neurotic problems are described as paralleling other experiences and 
are associated with a greater ability to recognise violations of social norms.
I: How would you describe what mental illness is?
B4: Mental illness is... it depends on the severity really. Neurotic illness, neurotic illness 
blends into normality. It’s two or more standards deviations from the norm of behaviour.
And psychotic illness - well psychotic illness is completely split off from the norm.
’The patients, especially the psychotics, the schizophrenics, they are quite simply on another
planet, they live on earth, but they’re strangers on earth The neurotics, who
understand are people who simply have difficulties coping with their inner drives, but they
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are perfectly grounded on this earth  the neurotic state is a normal state, it’s a state of
suffering, it’s the state of being human.... Human suffering is neurotic suffering, the normal 
person is neurotic.’ (F24)
’There are parallels between what goes on in neurosis and what goes on in psychosis but it 
seems to me that the two things are different. I might have, say, an overvalued idea, a bee 
in my bonnet about something which might be similar to a psychotic who’s got a delusion, 
but they’re not the same. So 1 find the border line between what we would say is mental 
illness and normality very difficult to define. I suppose I feel that at some stage someone 
who is psychotic passes through some kind of a barrier which is beyond the ordinary, the 
acceptable neurotic experience. There’s something about neurotic experience which is 
comprehensible to all neurotics, and yet there are aspects of psychosis - this an idea of 
Jaspers - which are incomprehensible, which is beyond our understanding.’ (BIO)
(Re: neurosis) ’C’est la folie du mec normal.’ (Its madness in a normal guy) (F7)
< ( 
Secondly, neurosis and the specific illnesses associated with this umbrella term (phobias
and obsessions for example) are more often described as a temporary state-like difference
which may affect the person for a single discrete period. In contrast, psychosis and
specific psychotic illnesses (schizophrenia and manic depression) are frequently described
as trait-like differences which set people permanently apart from others and may recur
throughout their life-span. For example:-
’Perhaps this distinction doesn’t exist, perhaps it does, I don’t know. In any case, my 
reference points are neurosis and psychosis. Within the neurotic state there are certain 
clinical expressions which can be got rid of, which can be cured. In psychosis there are 
certain raw forms which may disappear and the person may be able to adapt to them in some 
way. So psychosis is more serious, you can care for someone with psychosis, you can 
improve their quality of life, maintain them, ease the expression of their difficulties, but, as 
far as we know, for the time being, you can’t cure them.’ (F2)
Cure for the psychoses is a very questionable issue. I think it’s possible to maintain people 
in an affectively flattened state, where the overt florid symptoms are under control, but the 
residual negative stuff tends still to be present invariably, which effects people’s ability to 
socialise etc. I don’t think that pharmacology cures people with psychotic illnesses. I think 
it enables them to function in society at a debilitated but nonetheless reasonably functional 
level. For many other mental health problems, there are strategies now. For want of a better 
word I’ll describe them as neurotic disorders. These are much more amenable to various 
techniques. I think you can cure neurotic processes. But psychotic processes and depressive 
illnesses very often, I think you’re constantly on a holding operation with them. (B22)
| Again, the roots of these conceptualisations of neurosis and psychosis can be traced in 
both classic medical psychiatry and psychodynamic theorising, j Despite the definitional 
divergences and uncertainties noted in section 1, splits between neurosis and psychosis 
in terms of difference and ’insight’ are expressed relatively unanimously and confidently 
in both medical and psychodynamic texts. For example, the Oxford Textbook of 
Psychiatry (Gelder, Gath & Mayou, 1989) offers three possible criteria for the definition
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of psychosis:- greater severity, lack of insight, and inability to distinguish between 
subjective experiences and reality. ICD-10 (World Health Organisation, 1992) and DSM- 
IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) define neuroses as problems in which 
insight and reality testing remain intact, and gross social norms are not violated. The 
anti-psychiatrist Laing (1982) argues that one of the defining features of classic 
psychiatric thinking is to see a ’veritable abyss of difference’ between ’normal’ people’s 
mental life, and that of the schizophrenic or psychotic person, such that empathy and 
understanding are deemed impossible. In other words, medical psychiatry supports the 
view that conventional folk theories of mind, which are based on rationality and assumed 
to be the norm, cannot be applied to people suffering from psychotic forms of mental ill 
health. Similarly, in psychodynamic theorising, neurotics and ’normals’ are typically 
clustered together and set against the psychotic personality which is regarded as 
fundamentally different (and as a consequence, less amenable to the psychoanalytic 
method)11. Psychodynamic definitions of neurosis and psychosis rest on one or more 
of the following criteria: degree of ’seriousness’ of symptoms; disturbances of the 
capacity to communicate; contact with reality; awareness of the problems; and social 
adaptability (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1983). There is also some evidence that these 
differentiations have social meaning as part of contemporary common sense, even if they 
are not described using the expert terms ’neurosis’ and ’psychosis’ (for example, analysis 
of mental illness representations in the Greek media conducted by Bastounis, 1996).
In summary, although representations of various forms of mental illness are united by 
themes of difference and abnormality, they are simultaneously differentiated according 
to the nature of this difference. There is a tension within professional representations 
between coexisting views of mental illness as, on the one hand, something fundamentally 
different, disconnected from reality and falling outside of social norms and understanding, 
and, on the other, mental illness as an understandable extension or exaggeration of 
normality.| Sometimes mental illness can be successfully understood and familiarised by 
anchoring it into commonly shared or ’normal’ experiences. At other times this link 
disappear, no anchors into ’normal experiences’ are found, and mental illness remains
r
an incomprehensible and unfamiliar ’other’. If a split can be made, it is between neurosis
11 For example, Freud (1962) comments ’(Ohe neuroses have no psychical content that is peculiar to 
them and that might not equally be found in healthy people. Or, as Jung has expressed it, neurotics fall ill of 
the same complexes against which we healthy people struggle as well.’
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as ’similarity’ and psychosis as ’otherness’. \ Depending on its form, mental illness 
appears to oscillate between being familiarised as ’similarity’ and remaining an unfam iliar 
and un-understandable ’other*. This coexistence of contrasting themes illustrates the 
ambiguity, uncertainty and multiplicity which characterise professional representations 
of mental illness. \ It is argued in Chapter 8 that this ambivalence and uncertainty is an 
important source of the threat which imbues social representations of mental illness. 
Ambivalence challenges understandings of mental illness as definitively ’other’, and 
undermines ’safe’ differentiation and distancing from the self of this psycho-socially 
feared phenomenon.
2.2 Disruption
I: I’m interested to know what for you personally, your concept of mental illness is?
B9:1 see it, I suppose, as an illness where your perception changes in such a way that you 
cannot function to a level that you normally function at. Something that actually changes 
your ability to be and to live as you normally live. What seems to be important is how the 
person fits or doesn’t fit with social norms.
’Mental illness is showing symptoms which prevent the person who has the symptoms leading 
a satisfactory life. There are some people who have symptoms and manage to live with them. 
There are others for whom they’re invalidating or for whom they cany a level of psychic 
suffering which is difficult or unbearable.’ (F30)
’Mental illness is not being able to make decisions which effect your life. Not being able to 
cope in society. And being unable to ask for help probably.... I don’t think there’s a clear 
definition. Probably some people would say it was showing certain signs and symptoms - I 
don’t think so. It’s some sort of coping thing, brought on by a lot of different reasons.’ 
(B ll)
jrhe second key theme of professionals’ conceptualisations of mental illness is disruption. 
Like the theme of difference, disruption provides an essentially social understanding of 
mental illness. \ What is central to the state of mental ill health is not the presence of 
’symptoms’ perse , but their impact on a person’s life^ To be mentally ill is to have your 
personal and social life disrupted. This is frequently described by British respondents as 
problems of ’social functioning’ or ’coping’. Mental illness is something which disrupts 
relationships and the person’s ability to live life in a way which is acceptable, both in 
relation to their own life-style norms and in comparison to social norms. It is this 
disruption of day-to-day life that much of the work of mental health professionals targets 
(see Chapter 6), suggesting that professionals envisage these features of mental distress 
as relatively changeable and fluid.
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Again, however, this is not a fixed and unquestioned representational theme, but one 
which inspires debate and reflection. There are echoes here of the anti-psychiatric / 
sociological position on mental illness as an unacceptable form of social deviance, and 
the moral and coercive ramifications of mental illness as disruption are not lost on 
professionals. In their explicit interview narratives, some professionals attempt to counter
the more implicit themes of lacking, inability and weakness and the need for this to be
|
made socially acceptable.; Mental illness is reconceptualised by a minority of interview 
respondents, not as a lack of social functioning or coping skills, but as a wav of coping
f
in itself. jThere is an attempt here to revalue difference, and to offer a point of access 
or ’anchor’ into what is generally taken to be an un-understandable way of being by 
applying rationality-based folk theories of mind. What appears to be different is not 
necessarily incomprehensible, but can be understood as the implementation of certain 
strategies which may be familiar and make sense to the representor. For example:
’For me, madness is another way of managing compared to what is the usual way. Generally 
speaking that’s what it is, but it’s as good as the position that everyone else has most of the 
time, it’s just another way of coping with things.’ (F4)
I: What does the concept of mental illness mean for you personally?
B20: Well I suppose I think of it - off the top of my head - as an individual’s psychological 
and physical system coping with the environment. Coping with various demands and 
pressures from outside, from the environment and also from the individual’s response to that.
And I suppose I think of the person as a system that is a mind and a body, and the solution 
to the stressful situation is a dysfunctional one. The managing, the coping mechanism is 
dysfunctional - it has large unfortunate consequences in some areas of life. So I see it as way 
of coping I suppose.
2.3 Distress
[The third key area which completes the triad of ’social’ themes through which basic 
conceptualisations of mental illness are constructed is distress. Descriptions of mental 
illness as involving distressing experiences are found in the interview narratives; of 
respondents from across the range of professional groups in both France and Britain. 
Feelings of fear, often associated with a sense of loss of control, hopelessness and 
depression are most typically cited. As the second of the interview extracts below 
illustrates, professionals can use a person’s report of distress as a tangible, pragmatic 
criterion for mental illness, which effectively by-passes other more complicated and 
uncertain issues surrounding the nature of mental ill health. But distress is also given a
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social slant in that it is conceptualised both as a direct subjective experience, and as a
!
feeling deriving from the person’s position in relation to others. I For example, the 
mentally ill are frequently described as experiencing a sense of alienation and
misunderstanding, prejudice and stigma by others, together with an awareness of falling
\\
outside social norms j \ In other words, distress is a potent combination of subjective 
experiences and ’self as object’ evaluations which are tied up with themes of difference 
and disruption.^ For example
I: Could you describe how you see the state of being mentally unwell?
B26: It’s a nightmare. It’s strange - the worst thing that people experience and talk about 
mostly is the tremendous sense of isolation and being alone, and being misunderstood, and 
nobody can actually understand what they are going through. And it’s frightening, the 
absolute terror of it all. And not being in control of their lives. It’s as if the illness is 
controlling them and they have no control over it. A lot of people describe it like a blackness 
around them - like a shroud. Lots of people come up with different descriptions, but they 
all sort of tie in. And also the guilt about suffering mental illness and stigma and all those 
types of things. And being different. And seeing themselves as not functioning as other 
people, not being normal - "I’m not normal, there’s something wrong with me."
I: What would you say mental illness is for you?
F9: That’s a difficult question you’re asking, it touches more on philosophy .... we’re not 
really used to asking ourselves those sort of questions! For me, for the time being, mental 
illness is something very concrete - it’s someone who comes to see me and says ’I’m 
suffering, I don’t feel right in myself, things aren’t going well, help me’.
This theme of distress adds further complications to the ’otherness* theme explored in 
section 2.1. ^The recognition of distress requires an ability to empathise - a link between 
the self and the experiences of the mentally ill person,| between representor and what is 
represented. Rather than remaining an incomprehensible ’other’, the existence of distress 
as one of the core themes in professional representations suggests that, to some extent at 
least, professionals are willing and able to represent mental illness in ways which parallel 
rather than contrast with their own subjective experiences. [Distress provides a way of 
making sense of mental illness by anchoring it into one’s own subjectivity. ’Similarity’ 
wins over ’otherness’.
th is  theme is also a radical departure from lay representations in which the distress of 
the mentally ill person is typically negated. In lay knowledge the mentally ill are usually 
represented as distressing (typically in inspiring fear) rather than distressed, and this is 
an important constituent of mental illness as a feared and rejected ’other’. In 
comparison, in professional representations there is a tension between these subjective
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and objective forms of distress. In their daily practice, professionals face the moral 
dilemma of how to respond to people who are more distressing (to their family, or to 
society in general) than subjectively distressed themselves. Their expert status often 
demands that they are the final arbitrators in this ethical issue. As our ’key* respondent 
F17 (see footnote 10) suggests, this throws up questions about the whole raison d ’etre 
of mental health work. Perhaps this is why many professionals do not reflect on the 
representational themes which they live out in daily practice, and struggle to articulate 
these ideas in the interview setting12.
’What does it mean to care for a mentally ill person? ... It’s a double edged sword, because 
you see the real psychotics and the schizophrenics, and they’re not asking you for anything, 
these guys, they’re fine. There are some, of course, who do suffer terribly, but there are 
others who seem to be almost euphoric all the time, who seem to be completely happy. In 
fact, I think that the care work we do is a response to a demand which isn’t theirs. What are
they asking from us? It’s very rare for the patient to say ’get me out of this’ We can’t
tolerate the suffering of others, we can’t tolerate them having a deviant attitude. In fact, what 
I think we’re trying to do is to readapt them to the system which we belong to ourselves. 
But, having said that, fortunately I don’t work believing that, because if I did, I don’t think 
it would be possible. That would be like saying, in a way, that madness is alright, that it’s 
alright not to do anything with madness. If you think philosophically, that’s what we’re 
doing - readapting someone who doesn’t necessarily want to be readapted.’ (F17)
2.4 Danger?
Social representations of mental illness detected in research with lay people are replete 
with themes of danger and violence associated with reactions of fear and threat. What 
happens to these representational themes when lay people become professionals? Does 
their professional training and experience eradicate themes of danger, or does this endure 
in some way within professional representations? On an explicit level, the theme of 
danger is not a defining feature of professionals’ representations of mental illness in the 
ways that difference, distress and disruption are. It seems that professional training 
serves to reduce associations with violence and physical dangeijfrom a core characteristic 
which is synonymous with societal understandings of mental illness, to one of many 
representational themes in the world of mental health professionals. For example, the
12 On a pragmatic level, pressure of work also prevents mental health professionals taking a more 
reflexive stance on their day-to-day practice.
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risk of suicide or violent behaviour by patients is referred to by interview respondents as 
just one of many aspects of their daily work.
However, physical violence is not the only form of danger which emerges from
J
professionals’ narratives. [There are also references to a more implicit form of 
psychological danger. This emerges from the potent combination of two psychologically 
threatening aspects of mental health work - proximity to the distress of others, and 
uncertainty.! References to the stressful nature of mental health work are common, and 
it is clear that practitioners’ daily work requires much psychological investment. 
Practitioners oftei| talk about the need to be strong, to have personal equilibrium and to 
protect oneself, jrhe distress of others can become too distressing if it is allowed to 
permeate the boundaries between self and other. Mental health professionals work with
a constant sense of psychological risk and threat to the integrity of the self associated
V ' \
with the distress of others. I^Jhis sets up a tension between the needs of self and the needs 
of others associated with the notion of being a ’professional carer*. Later in the thesis 
(Chapter 8) it will be suggested that one of the principle functions of professional social 
representations is to aid the reconciliation and integration of such tensions and paradoxes^
The following interview extracts illustrate this sense of both physical and psychological 
danger which derives as much from a sense of uncertainty and unpredictability as from 
the difficulties of being confronted with physical violence and distress in others.
’I think I’m going to stop working in psychiatry because it’s a job which is too difficult. ... 
There are some very difficult cases in which the person is always in a state where you have 
to keep a distance and protect yourself, and it’s really hard to learn anything about them so 
you can help them. And you don’t always succeed - you can be confronted with patients who 
kill themselves, with people who spend their lives in psychiatric services, with extremely 
violent patients. And you’re always wondering if you’ve done the right thing - when you go 
home you’re wondering "what is he going to do?" ... You have to protect yourself. And 
you have to come to the realisation that you can’t stop a patient from killing himself, that 
you’re taking risks. Like when you send a violent patient back to his family, you’re placing 
trust in him, but you can’t prevent everything.’ (F13)
I: What personal qualities do you think you should aim to have to be a good professional 
working in mental health?
B19:1 think you need a very good sense of your own self identity. Because I think that quite
often people that you see are very vulnerable, very damaged, very disturbed I think you
need to be quite a strong person, especially if you’re working with people with long term 
needs. Because it can feel a bit gloomy otherwise.
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’You need to have stamina. You need to be able to expose yourself to the pain of others, and 
here [a 24 hour community centre] you are a lot less protected from that than in hospital 
work, in my experience. You need to be flexible as well, you need to be adaptive.’ (F2)
\
iThe model of professional social representations proposed in Chapter 3 conceptualises lay
knowledge as a component of the representational field, which may exist in a more
\
hidden or implicit form than other aspects of professional knowledge |(see section 2.5). 
This data offers tentative support for this theoretical prediction, illustrating that! the theme
i
of mental illness as a dangerous, threatening and powerful form of otherness is not absent
I»from professional representations, j  INeither is it explicitly verbalised, but hidden more
f i
subtly within professional discoursbs of risk, paradoxically, mental illness is associated 
with both fragility or weakness and danger / power, another example of the ambiguities 
which surround mental illness. This analysis also suggests that there is not merely a 
reduction in the importance of danger themes compared to lay understandings, but that 
danger is reconceptualised in ways which are congruent with the agendas and concerns 
of professionals. Whilst professionals recognise that the risk of physical violence and 
danger may be less than is commonly supposed by the lay population, jthey are 
concerned, as publicly accountable ’experts’, with the need to specify risk.j Their daily 
work involves a stressful combination of being unable to control or definitively tie down 
this risk, together with their psychological proximity to the distress of mental illness, and 
a professional responsibility for the safety and well-being of their patients and those who 
associate with them .! Danger in professional social representations is reconceptualised 
into discourses of stress and risk. :
3 M ulti-causal M odels: An  A gnostic Stance
^Section 2 has established that professionals’ basic conceptualisations of mental illness are 
essentially social, and that the debate which permeates these representations revolves 
around themes of difference, distress and disruption. From this starting point, we turn
now to how professionals understand the causes of mental ill health. | Two essential
\  {
features of these models are multiplicity (of causal factors) and uncertainty. Firstly, 
mental health professionals construct eclectic explanatory accounts of mental illness which 
integrate ideas from diverse theoretical origins. Whilst various spheres of esoteric, 
’expert’ knowledge are re-presented within professional representations, these models also
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show some similarities with lay understandings of (mental) health and illness. Secondly, 
an agnostic stance to the causes of mental ill health is typical. Mental health
professionals assume that their aetiological models are nothing more than provisional, and
? ?
that definitive understandings of the causes of mental illness are not possible. ?Despite\ 4
their status as ’experts’, interview respondents feel that their knowledge of the aetiology 
of mental illness is limited13.
These characteristics support initial expectations regarding professional representations 
of mental illness set out in Chapter 3, section 3.3. Diversity and multiplicity of 
knowledge spheres has been detected in previous research on the world of mental health, 
and the provisional, partial and continually changing nature of expert knowledge and 
theoretical systems was also noted. Furthermore, multiplicity and uncertainty are related. 
It is because of their uncertainty regarding expert knowledge of causal factors that 
professionals generally opt for an eclectic position. For example
I: What about your ideas of causes of mental ill-health?
B3: Well I’m as little of an expert as anyone else on that. I’m sure you know there are 
various theories and schools of thought about contributive factors. I don’t have my particular 
hobby horse that I would think, oh this is what I think - it’s definitely environment and I 
exclude everything else, or it’s definitely brain chemistry or whatever. I’m sure it’s elements 
of all those things. And nobody actually knows enough to say it’s definitely this. So in a 
way you work with all of them. I’m sure all of them have relevance and application at 
different times and with different clients. Some are more obvious causes with some clients 
than with others. So I’m open to all that stuff definitely - environmental, genetic, chemical, 
etc. But I don’t have my own pet theory that I use as a tool to work with.
The absence of definitive expert knowledge opens up a space for professionals to 
construct their own causal models of mental illness which integrate ideas originating in 
several theoretical perspectives whilst also retaining a compatibility with common sense 
belief systems.!  ^ Section 3.1 below explores these models and their components in more 
detail. Although when looking across the whole sample of interview data, a common
13 These two features of professionals’ causal models are demonstrated quantitatively in the allocations 
of text units to data analytic codes. For example, when asked in interviews to speculate about aetiology, 38% 
of respondents state explicitly that they don’t know or are very unsure about the causes of mental health 
problems, (although the majority of these respondents (16 out of 23) then go on to offer some tentative 
suggestions about causal factors). A common strategy is to justify this uncertainty by reference to the limited 
state of expert knowledge and the inconclusive nature of research findings in the field of mental health. 
Multiplicity and eclecticism is demonstrated by the fact that of the 53 respondents who provide at least some 
account of the causes of mental ill health, 42 refer to two or more causal factors, and 28 to three or more 
potential causes.
157
causal model uniting professionals of different disciplines in both France and Britain can 
be elaborated, significant variations on this theme also exist. In particular, French and 
British professionals typically give different weights to various causal factors. These 
cross-cultural differences are discussed in section 3.2. Secondly, differential weightings 
of the components in this model are another important way in which various forms of 
mental illness are compared and contrasted. Again the most significant differentiation 
is between neuroses and psychoses. This is the focus of section 3.3.
3.1 Building and Eroding Life Resources
Despite their agnostic stance, professionals nevertheless construct hypothetical models 
which implicate a relatively consistent web of factors in a ’bio-psycho-social’ model. 
Their basic causal model is summarised graphically in Figure 5.3 below. iThis illustrates 
how professionals' causal understandings take a 'balance sheet' format, consisting of the 
summation and negation of factors which increase or decrease the likelihood of mental 
illness. Factors 'within' the individual are played off against aetiological factors in the 
social environment. The former, which can be termed a person's 'resources for life', are 
made up of the combined effects of childhood experiences, family relationships and 
genetic / biological factors. ^Problems in either or both of these areas are associated with 
the notion of fragility or vulnerability, which equates to diminished life resources. This 
stock of emotional strength and coping skills is what individuals take with them into the 
social world. Experiences within the social world, particularly difficult social 
circumstances and stress, are seen as potential eroders of a person's life resources. | If the 
person has fewer resources to draw on, is ’fragile’ or 'vulnerable', they may act as 
contributors to the risk of mental illness or as 'triggers’ which may provoke the onset or 
relapse of mental illness.^ Other people whose internal resources are stronger tackle these 
hurdles more successfully, and so do not become mentally ill. | This model of 
contributory factors which interact over time provides professionals with an implicit 
computational device to assess how and why a person becomes mentally ill. | Mental 
illness can be explained as the outweighing of a person’s 'resources for life’ by factors 
which can contribute to mental illness or erode mental health.
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Figure 5.3: A Multi-causal Model of Mental Illness
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|This integrative computational causal model includes notions of the family, childhood 
experiences, biology, stress and fragility^ Professionals typically account for mental 
illness using two or more of these factors such than none of them is seen to explain 
mental illness on its own or lead directly to mental health problems. The analysis which 
follows explores each of these concepts and their origins in expert theories of mental 
illness in more detail.
Most important is the theme that family relationships and childhood experiences can lead 
to mental illness in later life. This is detected in 73% of interview transcripts (n=44, 
21 in France, 23 in Britain) and is often cited as the principle causal factor. For 
example:-
I: What ideas do you have about causes of mental illnesses?
B2:1 think there are so many different causes, but that it very often goes back to having had 
poor or inadequate care at an early stage. And I think that it’s not that everyone who has had 
inadequate care at an early stage will then go on to develop mental illness, but I think if you 
then aren’t able to establish meaningful relationships or some sort of safety around you, then 
you’re very vulnerable to stresses, to losses, because you haven’t got any experience of 
something solid behind you really. I think that it very often goes back to that, and 
particularly if someone has been in a situation where in whatever way, they’ve been abused 
- it makes one more vulnerable.
I: What do you see as the causes of mental illness?
F6: It’s difficult, often it goes back to early childhood. Usually there have been some 
emotional deficiencies. Emotional deficiencies - lack of affection in important areas. Often 
people haven’t had any orientation at the parental level, from their mother and father who 
often may not have been around, they may have been brought up by someone else, so that 
from the very beginning they didn’t have the things that a person needs for a stable life in the 
future .... People also talk a lot again about childhood abuse and the absence of bench marks, 
which can lead to social alienation.
Aspects such as difficult family dynamics, relationships with parents, lack of emotional 
support and various other experiences during childhood are often cited as causal factors. 
References to child abuse (psychological, physical and sexual) are common, particularly 
amongst British respondents, perhaps reflecting the high social profile of child abuse in 
Britain during the period when interviews were conducted. Theoretically, the origins of 
these views are multiple. While many interview respondents, especially in France, offer 
psychodynamic accounts of how early family experiences are associated with mental 
illness, there are also traces of learning theories and family systemic approaches which 
implicate the family in suggesting the impact of early socialisation and of communication 
patterns and dysfunctional family dynamics. The continual implication of the family
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throughout the last hundred years of mental health care is charted by Prior (1993) who 
notes how the various features of family life have received attention according to the 
Zeitgeist of the times. In this study, the focus is generally on relational and emotional 
features of the family. This suggests a ’relational’ understanding of mental illness which 
complements themes of mental illness as a social phenomenon, and is also detected in the 
importance professionals place on relationships in the care and treatment of mental illness 
(see Chapter 6).
However, another way in which the family is implicated by mental health professionals 
is through genetic inheritance. The origins of these views can be clearly located in the 
medical model of mental illness, to which modem explanations in terms of organic 
factors (chemical imbalances and brain structure) can also be attributed (although notions 
of an organic basis to mental illness can also be traced further back into pre-medical 
belief systems). After early family experiences, genetic / biological factors are the 
second most commonly cited causal explanations, provided by just over half of interview 
respondents (n=32). However, as sections 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate, the use of these causal 
accounts varies as a function of the nationality of the speaker and the type of mental 
health problems referred to. Specifically, medical accounts are more commonly used by 
British respondents (by 25 out of 30 British respondents compared to only 7 French 
respondents), and (by professionals in both countries) when explaining illnesses falling 
under the umbrella term ’psychosis’.
^The notion of ’fragility’ which is used by professionals to describe mental illness also 
occurs in their explanatory accounts\(detectable in 28% of interviews), j ’Fragility’, 
’vulnerability’ or ’susceptibility’ are ways of differentiating the mentally ill as people who 
are weaker than others and who lack the strength and coping skills necessary for social 
life. |Notions of fragility feature in common sense understandings of mental illness14, 
and cannot be attributed to any specific expert theories. In some cases, professionals 
anchor fragility into modem genetic theories or psychodynamic views of the impact of 
early childhood experiences. However, for the most part, the origins and specific nature 
of this fragility are left unarticulated. For example:-
14 For example, organic or character weaknesses and their opposites, ’inner strength’ / strength of 
character are implicated in the genesis of mental illness following trauma in the lay community studied by 
Jodelet (1991a).
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I: Why do you think it (mental illness) affects one person and not another?
F8: I don’t know. People talk about fragility, perhaps at the genetic level. That wouldn’t 
be a direct cause of mental illness, but it would be a fragility which you might have within 
you, which risks evolving into a manifest pathology that might come out if the fragility is 
activated by an unfavourable environment.
'Why some people are affected more than others? - that is something I see - a member of a 
family will have mental illness and not others - and I think maybe one of the reasons is to do 
with the personality of that individual, and maybe how emotionally strong he can be. People 
get hardened emotionally as a way to protect themselves, and sometimes people can’t. And 
if they can’t, they get an influx of messages, emotions that they can’t defend themselves 
against. ... I think we have ways of coping with things. We can cut off to protect ourselves. 
In some cases I think people don’t have a cut off point. So they get affected more 
emotionally, which can make them tip.’ (B13)
\ Against the effects of genetic / biological factors, family relationships, childhood 
experiences, and the notion of fragility, professionals bring a second set of causal factors 
into play. Various forms of stress and social factors are conceptualised as potentially 
provoking or increasing the risk of mental illness] These accounts (detectable in 65% of 
interviews) range from a few radically social accounts of mental illness which draw on 
critical left-wing and anti-psychiatry arguments (ie that mental illness is a form of 
deviance or is the product of the maintenance of an underclass within the capitalist 
system)15 to, more typically, accounts which implicate social stressors as contributory 
factors in multi-causal models. Factors such as unemployment, poverty, poor housing 
and social and cultural marginalisation are cited. The notion of ’stress’ provides the link 
between a person’s social circumstances and their mental health status. Stress is 
described both as a chronic state associated with general social circumstances, and as an 
acute reaction to a particular situation or event. Life events revolving around change and 
loss (for example, bereavement, change or loss of job, moving house and ending close 
relationships) are often described as ’triggers’ to mental illness or to a relapse of mental 
health problems. The following interview extracts give a flavour of the role of stress and 
social factors in professionals’ causal narratives:
’It [mental illness] is constitutional, which is why it’s important to know about people’s 
family histories, and also it’s to do with relationships. Having said that, I would be perfectly 
willing to discuss how that is obviously affected by the kind of area you live in, the state of 
your flat etc. Nevertheless, many people can live in very deprived situations and don’t end
15 Although hints at anti-psychiatric views are found in several interview narratives, two British 
respondents adopt this more radical stance. Interestingly, one (a CPN) also describes, at another point in the 
interview, how much of his daily work involves the administration of long-acting medication. This illustrates 
both the coexistence of diverse themes and the weak links between abstract beliefs and practice within 
professional social representations (see Chapter 6, section 3).
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up ill. I can’t see that as a total explanation. But obviously there are stressors which play 
a part. Like unemployment, money worries.’ (B20)
’Well, you know...to find a cause for mental illness is extremely difficult. People talk 
generally about stress... in the sense that it makes the person confused with respect to the 
meaning he’s given to his life up till then. For example....suppose you had taken a certain 
direction in your life, and then something destabilises you, an enormous stress, which means 
that all of a sudden your life makes no sense any more, you say to yourself "what’s the point" 
etc. I think that at that point we can say there’s a cause there. But your neighbour, to whom 
the same thing happens, may not show the same mental illness as you...’ (F8)
While professionals’ accounts of the role of social factors in mental illness can be traced 
quite directly to expert theories and research highlighting the social origins of mental 
health problems (most famously, Brown & Harris, 1978), stress discourses can be traced 
across a much more diffuse range of both expert and lay knowledge systems. Almost all 
expert models of mental illness implement the concept of stress in some way, usually as 
a mediating factor linking aspects of physiology, cognition or experience to factors in the 
outside world. Stress is conceptualised both biologically / physiologically (for example, 
Sterling & Eyer 1981; Toates 1996) and psychologically (for example in the literature on 
life events (eg Cochrane & Robertson 1973)). It is also becoming an increasingly 
important concept in expert discourses on general health and illness. As Helman (1990) 
notes, the concept of stress has undergone a dramatic increase in importance in all areas 
of western medicine over the last fifty years, conceptualised variously as a causal or 
contributory factor in illness, a factor which reduces resistance to health problems, or as 
an inadequate adaptation to change. ’Stress’ is also a key concept in lay discourses, as 
several studies have shown (for example Fumham & Bower (1992) on lay understandings 
of schizophrenia, Stainton-Rogers (1991) on lay models of health and illness). Lay 
concepts of stress are typically of a diffuse and invisible ’force’ which mediates between 
the individual and their social environment, and which is combined in lay thinking with 
older explanations for disease and misfortune (Helman, 1990). j Young (1980) argues that 
the notion of stress in contemporary western society is congruent with the rise of 
individualism in emphasizing individuals’ responsibilities for their health status and down­
playing social determinants. \ The position of stress in professionals’ aetiological models 
of mental illness should be understood, therefore, as a manifestation of more global ways 
in which contemporary western societies make sense of the links between the experiences 
of individuals and the social environment.^
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Similarly, the general structure of the explanatory model of mental illness detected in this
■vr
research shows consistencies with other lay belief systems, reminding us of the location
of professional knowledge within a broader tapestry of culturally and historically rooted
11  -   ..............
systems of thought and social practices J {Although professionals’ accounts of the causes
\ i
of mental ill health are phrased in the language of modem expert knowledge, the concepts 
they implicate echo those of more archaic pre-medical and pre-scientific lay belief 
systems. For example, the notion of erosion of internal resources by the social 
environment emerges consistently in western lay understandings of physical and mental 
illness (for example, Herzlich, 197316 and Stainton-Rogers, 1991 on lay concepts of 
health and illness; Jodelet, 1991a on madness; Hallam, 1994 on lay and expert notions 
of anxiety). The outside world as a depletor of individual resources or source of attack - 
whether this is by germs, stress, or physical factors - is a common theme. / It suggests 
an antagonistic and oppositional relationship between the individual and society, and 
couches explanation of illness in essentially social terms. Implicit within this is a 
collective representation of modem society as potentially hostile and a source of demands 
on the individual, and of social life as the successful negotiation of external challenges. 
It is invariably the modem, urban, social environment and its association with excesses 
and imbalances, rather than the natural or rural environment which is implicated as a 
source or provoker of illness JJ Individuals need internal strength and resources to cope 
with the demands of social life and those who are weaker, more fragile or have less
i
robust internal resources may succumb to mental or physical illness.^ Forms of illness 
may be partially understood in terms of factors within the isolated individual, but they 
are more fully explained, by lay people and professionals alike, as the result of on-going 
interactions between the person and the social world. (The tension between the individual 
and the social in these models is consistent with the basic values of modem western 
individualism, in which the person is assumed to be a bounded, independent and unitary 
being, and in which a strong separation between the individual and the social world is 
made.
16 There are particularly strong parallels with the ’reserve of health’ representations detected by Herzlich 
(1973) as one of three coexistent understandings of physical well-being amongst middle-class Parisians. Similar 
to a person’s ’resources for life’, a ’reserve of health’ (physical robustness and a resistance to fatigue and 
illness) is seen as constitutional, developed in childhood and potentially eroded by life-style.
3.2 Franco-British Differences: Psvchodvnamic and medico-social models
The causal model elaborated above encapsulates! howl both British and French! mental 
health professionals account for mental illness by drawing upon and integrating several 
expert discourses. However, when the sample of interview respondents is split along 
national lines, some interesting cross-cultural differences emerge in the weighting and 
combination of hypothetical causal factors. These suggest a differential impact of the 
various expert theoretical positions on mental ill health on either side of The Channel.
Professionals in France place relatively more weight on childhood experiences as the 
principle cause of mental health problems in later life17. That French professionals draw 
on ideas originating in or consistent with psychodynamic theories confirms the dominance 
of psychoanalysis as an influential and widely diffused social representation in 
contemporary French society (Turkle, 1979). Even though several French interview 
respondents and key informants perceive a recent diminishing of interest in 
psychodynamic ideas in the world of mental health in France (with a corresponding 
perceived rise of medical and cognitive approaches), the legacy of the huge proliferation 
and influence of psychodynamic ideas in France during the post World War II decades 
is clearly detectable in interview accounts with professionals in the 1990s. In 
comparison, psychodynamic themes are only one of several expert discourses which are 
voiced by British respondents.! British professionals place relatively more emphasis on
\ f
both medical and social factors in constructing their causal accounts of mental illness18/ 
A bio-psycho-social causal model is most favoured by British respondents, the most 
common combination of causal factors cited in interviews being genetics / biology, 
childhood experiences and stress / social factors (this combination is detectable in 16 
British interviews).
17 This is indicated in the data both thematically and quantitatively. In quantitative terms, although 
references to childhood experiences and family relations occur with equal frequency in British and French 
samples, there are relatively fewer references to other causal factors by French respondents. Of a total of 11 
respondents who cite only one causal factor, nine of these are French respondents who use psychodynamic 
themes alone in their explanatory accounts.
18 This is confirmed quantitatively by the relative use of data codes. Chi-squared tests show that 
the greater frequency of the ’genetics / biology’ code in the British sample compared to the French sample 
is statistically significant at p <0.001. References to social factors and to stress are also significantly more 
frequent in the British sample (p<0.01).
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Many of the discourses implicating social factors (for example, poverty, unemployment, 
bereavement, stress, prejudice and so on) have their origins in academic and research 
activity conducted in the English language. These include the anti-psychiatry movement, 
labelling theories, social psychiatry and associated research into social support and life 
events. The Anglo-American origins of these knowledge systems offers a plausible 
reason for why social factors feature more heavily in British professionals’ accounts of 
the causes of mental ill health. However, the greater influence of medical explanations, 
which derive from a genuinely international paradigm is more complex.
There are several indications that j in the British world of mental health] unlike in its 
French counterpart, }he medical model has the status of a dominant paradigm] ^Medical 
terminology is more common in the language of British professionals] (see section 1), and 
even for those British respondents who reject medical terminology or explain mental 
illness in other ways,? medical approaches are a constant reference point.] \ Despite a 
profusion of other expert theories, the power and influence of medical perspectives in 
Britain remains considerable, exerting itself as a ’default’ against which alternative 
perspectives must define themselves, and as a perspective which professionals find it hard
f
not to take account of. Of the 30 British respondents, 25 draw upon medical discourses 
in some way. This group includes all the British psychiatrists, psychiatric nurses and 
psychologists interviewed. (Those who do not refer to medically based causes are 
occupational therapists and social workers.) The differences between British and French 
professionals are particularly marked amongst psychiatrists, the professional group that 
might be most expected to endorse a medical perspective. Compared to references to 
genetic / biological causes by all the British psychiatrists in the interview sample, five 
of the six French psychiatrists make no explicit references to medical causes. Although 
psychiatrists in both countries go through a similar medical training, it seems that medical 
theories have a stronger impact on the causal models of British psychiatrists. In 
comparison, French professionals (from all disciplines) appear to be freer to talk about 
mental health problems in non-medical ways (as ’madness’), and to construct causal 
models of mental illness which take no account of medical perspectives (even though, as 
we will see in Chapter 6, they make as much use as their British colleagues of medical 
treatments).
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3.3 Explaining Neurosis and Psychosis
As well as these cross-national differences, professionals* causal representations vary 
according to the specific form of mental distress being accounted for. These explanatory 
accounts reinforce the important distinctions professionals perceive between neurotic and 
psychotic illnesses. This differentiation is set up, not through the use of different causal 
models for different types of mental distress, but through the differential weighting or 
importance accorded to specific factors within the generic causal model described in 
section 3.1. Broadly speaking, neuroses are attributed more to relational factors and 
experiences in the social world (for example chronic stress, or traumatic life events). For 
psychoses there is a greater tendency to cite genetic / organic causal factors. Not 
surprisingly, this split is also detectable in the expert literature. For example, DSM-IV 
(1994), ICD-10 (1992) and The Oxford Textbook of Psychiatry (1989) all limit biological 
/ organic explanations to psychotic disorders, typically defining ’neurotic’ problems in 
negative terms as the absence of demonstrable organic disorder. A second important 
distinction is that professionals’ uncertainty is markedly higher in relation to the causes 
of psychotic illnesses, compared to their causal models of neuroses. For example:-
’The neuroses are relatively well charted now. Their causes are those formative and 
emotional moments during the period of growing up which went wrong or were associated 
with bad experiences. It’s really causes of an emotional nature in the widest sense. 
Psychosis is something completely different. For psychosis I would be very cautious. I have 
absolutely no idea where psychosis comes from.’ (F24)
’There is chemical imbalances in the brain - that’s been proven. I’m talking largely about 
schizophrenia and psychotic type illnesses. Obviously things like anxiety states, I believe that 
anxiety states and neurotic states are based on life events and life circumstances. I think a 
whole lot of things like that come into play - like poverty, just basically having a very, very 
hard life, can probably provoke an anxiety or neurotic state, or depressive state.’ (B6)
’I see psychosis very much in a biochemical way, in a genetic way, but certainly precipitated 
and influenced by environmental factors to a very large extent. Things like life events, 
bereavements, social stresses, loss of any sort really, financial difficulties, family difficulties. 
In somebody who is medically predisposed to mental illness. ... Much wider issues I think 
are at the root of a lot of neuroses. Certainly past personal events, upbringing and family 
circumstances are very much more in my mind, contributory to neurotic illnesses although 
they are also very, very important in psychotic illness as well.’ (B8)
The combination of a greater sense of ignorance, and the importance attributed to genes 
and biology serves to reinforce |he construction of psychosis as a fundamental and un­
knowable form of otherness. It builds on the notion of psychosis as a qualitatively
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different, permanent, trait-like phenomenon which is likely to reappear throughout a 
person’s life.! The genetic make-up of a psychotic person marks him out as different 
from birth. It also implies that people without this different form of genetic make-up, 
brain structure or chemical imbalance are safe from psychotic break-down. Although 
professionals are unable to cite any definitive proof, the suggestion of a genetic basis for 
psychosis, implicit in contemporary scientific interest in bio-technology and genetic 
research, may be psycho-socially attractive: Not only could this offer a way of anchoring 
the elusive and intangible notion of mental illness, but it also suggests that people 
suffering from what are seen as the most serious, dangerous and undermining mental 
health problems could be definitely identified and categorised as ’other’ and different 
from self / in-group. However, jthe flip-side of this argument is that explaining neurotic
problems more in terms of social circumstances or relational difficulties opens up the* \
possibility of neurosis in anyone.^ jThe representation of neurosis as an exaggerated form 
of ’normal’ experiences, which is temporary and relatively open to change, may render 
this a more acceptable and less fearful possibility. \
To summarise the themes which have emerged in this chapter, it seems that there is 
something essentially intangible and unknowable about mental illness which generates an 
agnostic stance, not only amongst lay people, but within the professional community. J 
At a most basic level, professionals are fundamentally uncertain about questions such as 
what constitutes mental illness, where the boundaries of mental illness lie, and what 
causes mental health problems, j As we will see in Chapter 7, in their requirements for 
rapid and radical changes in working practices, contemporary community care policies 
have the effect of amplifying the uncertainties which permeate this professional 
community. This is in sharp contrast to society’s expectations that mental health 
professionals have some kind of definite and privileged understanding of mental illness. 1 
Whilst the explicit debate and reflexivity which characterise professionals’ interview 
responses is a testament to the active nature of their social representations and their 
continual struggle to make sense of and grasp the elusive notion of mental ill health, they 
only ever seem to arrive at provisional and tentative understandings.
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Nevertheless, practitioners in France and Britain across the range of professional groups 
are united in perceiving a common battle-ground and reference points for the debate over 
making sense of mental illness, i Their understandings are united by the assumption that 
mental illness is a social phenomenon. In other words, the mental health problems of an 
individual can only be understood with respect to the social world in which they 
participate. Mental illness is represented as experiences and social behaviour which are 
in some way different from the norm, distressing (to either the person or to other 
people), and disruptive of social life and personal relationships.
Beyond the universality of these most basic conceptualisations, professionals construct 
causal understandings of mental ill health which borrow from the various theoretical
perspectives differentlydepending on their nationality. The influence of psychodynamic
i
theorising is felt more amongst the French sample, whereas in Britain echoes of medical 
and social perspectives are more strongly detected. Beyond this, it is not possible at this 
representational level, to differentiate practitioners further in terms of their professional 
groupings. | Interview respondents typically construct multi-factorial understandings of the 
causes of mental illness which borrow from (but do not simply reflect) several modem 
expert knowledge systems, whilst retaining some consistencies with lay understandings 
of health and illness), It seems that no one theoretical system provides a sufficiently rich
x
and definitive account of mental illness for professionals to anchor their understandings 
into a single expert model unconditionally.\\Despite the potential incompatibilities of 
these knowledge forms in their pure forms (for example, in the ways they conceptualise 
and explain mental health problems), they are successfully combined within professional 
representations. The integrative ’balance sheet’ models that professionals construct are 
sufficiently complex to allow them to account for why mental illness occurs in one person 
and not another, and for why different individuals experience different forms of mental 
distress. These causal belief systems highlight a ’relational’ theme which complements 
professionals’ understanding of mental illness as a social phenomenon. j Mental illness is 
both explained and described as something associated with problems or disruptions in 
relationships. As will be shown in the following chapter, this ’relational’ understanding 
is lived out in professionals’ practical work with the mentally ill in which they 
conceptualise professional-client relationships as the building blocks of any treatment 
strategy.^
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In comparison to common sense understandings, the themes in this chapter do not suggest 
a blanket rejection of mental illness based on fear and suspicion. Professional 
representations allow more space for ambiguity and ambivalence regarding the theme of 
difference and ’otherness’. IThe notion of the mentally ill as fundamentally and 
permanently different and ’other’, which is at the core of common sense understandings, 
is present in professional representations, but is most often limited to problems defined
as ’psychotic’ .^Professionals construct mental illness as an ambivalent form of otherness,
\
a phenomenon which is paradoxically both weak and powerful. Themes of internal 
fragility and weakness, as both descriptions and explanations for mental illness, coexist 
with the power of mental illness to generate disturbance in others, and stress and 
psychological burden in professionals.! [The mentally ill are both fragile and dangerous,
v
I
liable to an ill-defined risk of violent or unpredictable behaviour. For professionals,
I
mental illness is not definitely ’other’ - ’otherness’ coexists with its opposite - similarity; 
The later is most frequently associated with problems defined as ’neuroses’. Ways of 
making sense of mental illness by anchoring it into other more ’normal’ experiences and 
empathising with the experience of distress are part of these professional representations 
of mental illness as a polymorphous category.
The polymorphic nature of mental illness based around the distinction between neurosis 
and psychosis, the triad of difference, distress and disruption, and the characteristics of 
uncertainty and eclecticism are basic themes which underpin all aspects of professional 
social representations. The following chapter illustrates how these themes and 
characteristics are lived out in the daily practical work of mental health professionals/
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CHAPTER 6
WORKING WITH THE MENTALLY ELL:
SOCIAL MANAGEMENT AND INFORMAL ECLECTICISM
Having charted the semantic bed-rock of professional representations of mental illness in 
Chapter 5, this chapter investigates how these themes are lived out in daily professional 
practice. What do professionals aim to do in their daily work with the mentally ill? 
What treatment strategies do they utilise? What is the role of theory in daily practice?
The chapter is structured to address each of these questions in turn. It shows how, just 
as professionals’ basic understandings of mental ill health are essentially social and 
multiple, so they construe their own work as a social endeavour involving a range of 
treatment strategies. Section 1 focuses on how this is perpetuated in professionals’ goals 
of the social management rather than eradication of mental health problems. Within the 
limits that the perceived enduring nature of mental illness creates, professionals aim to 
improve their clients’ quality of life and conformity to social norms. Section 2 focuses 
on the treatment strategies that professionals enact in their day-to-day work in order to 
achieve these aims, highlighting how agnosticism is extended into daily practice and is 
associated with the use of multiple treatment strategies. Professional-client relationships 
are seen as the bedrock to the diverse practical strategies employed in daily work. 
Section 3 addresses the specific issue of the relationships between theory and practice. 
It illustrates how professional practice is often essentially atheoretical, but that despite 
this disjunction, theory serves several important functions within professional social 
representations.
In terms of the theoretical model of professional social representations proposed in 
Chapter 3, the analytic focus of this chapter is on the substantive content of components 
of the representational field, and their functions and inter-relationships. The chapter casts 
a broad net over the relationship between mental health professionals and mental illness, 
focusing primarily on professional practice as well as elucidating the functioning and 
positioning of theory. It also touches on professional identity construction, thus 
highlighting the relationship between representors and what is represented.
171
1 A im s and Go als: Improving  life  quality w ithin the  parameters o f  mental
ILLNESS
In order to understand professional practice as the enactment of social representations, 
it is necessary to elucidate the motivations, aims and goals which underpin the treatment 
strategies and routine practices of daily professional life in mental health care contexts. 
Figure 6.1 summarises graphically how professionals represent their work in interview 
narratives. It shows that professionals’ ultimate concern is with enhancing the life quality 
of their mentally ill clients. This is achieved through a two-stage process, involving 
initially, assessment and attempts to understand a client’s problems, followed by the 
implementation of strategies aiming to bring about various types of change. These 
changes depend upon, and are limited by, constraints imposed by mental illness and by 
the social environment. Whilst individual practitioners may have different specific 
aims1, this generic model of professional practice exists as a consensual and relatively 
taken-for-granted reality within communities of mental health practitioners in both France 
and Britain. Professionals’ principle concern is with the mentally ill as social beings, and 
they see themselves as legitimately involved in myriad aspects of their clients’ daily lives. 
As one respondent puts it:
’the main difference between psychiatry and general health care is that you see a person and 
you look into their life really, rather than just seeing a collection of symptoms. ’ (B4)
The sub-sections which follow explore the related components of this model of practice. 
Section 1.1 focuses on initial assessment strategies. This is followed in section 1.2 by 
an exploration of the various types of changes which professionals regard as feasible 
goals to work towards.
1 Much of interview respondents’ descriptions of their daily work mirrors the standard roles and working 
styles of the various professional groups described in Appendix 2. For example, occupational therapists see the 
assessment and improvement of clients’ ’daily living skills’ as central to their work, whereas social workers 
typically focus on issues relating to housing, employment and State benefits. Whilst this confirms that the 
practitioners studied in this research are ’typical’ of British and French mental health professionals more 
generally, what is of more analytic interest is how the expectations and guidelines of the various professional 
bodies are drawn upon and interpreted in the development of collective working practices in specific mental 
health service settings.
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Figure 6.1: The Work of Mental Health Professionals: Strategies and Aims
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1.1 Assessment: Provisional anchoring and initial sense-making
Assessment and understanding emerge from interview narratives as an essential goal to 
be achieved in the daily work of all mental health practitioners, both as a way of judging 
the problems and needs of new clients, and to rate the effectiveness of on-going practical 
strategies. Professionals conceptualise assessment as a multi-faceted task which involves 
the collection of a whole gamut of information about the lives of their patients (for 
example, their family relationships, living conditions, and abilities to conduct basic tasks 
of daily living such as shopping and cooking).
If the mental health services studied in this research operated according to a straight 
forward medical model (the approach which has exerted the most normative influence 
historically), we would expect assessments of mental health status to be limited to 
diagnoses conducted by psychiatrists according to standardised medical and psychiatric 
nosological systems. Here, however, we find all professional groups involved in more 
holistic assessments, of which psychiatric ’diagnosis’ is only one strategy which may or 
may not be included2. Although as the (formal or informal) heads of multi-disciplinary 
teams, psychiatrists are most concerned with assessment as a technique for planning and 
overseeing treatment strategies, assessment is generally described as a collective 
endeavour conducted from different perspectives by all professional groups. This 
centrality of assessment in the daily work of multi-disciplinary mental health teams can 
be accounted for in three ways. The first of these is structural, the second semantic and 
representational, and the third relates to the multi-faceted nature of professional practice.
Firstly, the importance of assessment relates to social structural aspects of the provision 
of mental health care. As the analysis in chapter 7 highlights, limited financial resources 
are a major shaper of contemporary professional practice, especially in Britain. Careful 
assessments of need are essential in deciding how to allocate scarce resources, which 
increasingly in Britain, are being targeted and limited to those with more serious and long
2 For example, a French psychiatrist who is generally very critical of the use of standardised diagnostic 
criteria such as DSM-IV, nevertheless talks of diagnostic labels as something ’which 1 keep in reserve in case 
I need to use medication’ (F20). In quantitative terms, references to assessment as an important part of daily 
work are equally prevalent in France and Britain, and are made in 53 % of interviews. Respondents’ use of the 
terms ’assessment’ or ’evaluation’ rather than ’diagnosis’ (which is very rarely used in interview discourses) 
suggests that contemporary mental health professionals do not see themselves as medical practitioners.
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term mental health problems. The social positioning of mental health practitioners as 
publicly accountable implemented of government policies whose work is funded by 
public monies also heightens the importance of assessment3. Society designates the task 
of assessing who is mentally ill and who is not to mental health professionals. Within 
the former category, professionals must further decide who is most ’dangerous’, ’at risk’ 
or ’in need’ and worthy of the scarce resources of mental health services. Given the 
threat and uncertainty which characterise lay representations of mental illness, it is a 
social imperative that professionals make assessments which gain consensual acceptance 
both within the world of mental health and in the public sphere.
Secondly, as the preceding point suggests, the social representational status of mental 
illness places assessment and understanding high on the agenda. The polymorphic nature 
of professional representations highlighted in Chapter 5 has important implications for 
how a client is subsequently treated. If professionals’ basic understandings are deeply 
permeated with a collective sense of uncertainty and with notions of fundamental 
difference and incomprehensibility (especially with respect to ’psychoses’), the problem 
of sense making may be made easier by the continual gathering a vast body of 
information. This aids two important representational processes: Firstly it allows
professionals to anchor the problems of a particular client, at least provisionally, into a 
category of mental health problems, and in so doing, to give it a name which can be used 
in communication with other professionals. Secondly, evaluation serves to concretise and 
objectify these problems into a distinct set of needs which can then be addressed in 
practice. Understanding and assessment of clients and their problems addresses the 
tensions between representational uncertainty and societal expectations of professionals 
as possessing definitive expert knowledge. Bridging the representational gap between 
themselves and their mentally ill clients, whose behaviour and experiences may be 
construed as incompatible with socially consensual norms and understandings, is regarded 
by professionals as central to their work. For example:-
I: What would you say your aims are generally in all the work you do?
B15: I would certainly hope that when someone was interviewed by me, that I would have
3 The central role of assessment is enshrined in recent British policy legislation. For example, three of 
the six principle directives made in the Griffiths Report on Community Care (1988) (widely agreed to be the 
for-runner of major policies changes implemented in the early 1990s) focus on identification, needs assessment 
and prioritisation.
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understood as much as possible, why they are in the difficulty they are in, that has resulted 
in them either being referred or referring them self for help. That I would have understood 
that, that they would feel understood, and that I will provide the best, or the most appropriate 
help possible. Obviously in psychiatry there will be a group who will not feel understood, 
because my understanding is this person is mad. But even then, I would hope that over time, 
particularly if they are better, that we would come to some mutual dialogue about their 
problem, that would result in some help with the difficulties that they or their family or 
society, sometimes, are experiencing as a result of their behaviour.
The third reason why multi-faceted assessment forms such an important part of the daily 
practice of all professionals relates to how they construe their work as a social endeavour, 
aiming to implement a wide range of social-psychological changes in the lives of the 
mentally ill. It is to these goals of various and multiple changes that we now turn.
1.2 Practical Goals: ’Managing* not ’curing* mental health problems.
T suppose the overall aim is to enable people to enhance the quality of their life, by 
improving their psychological health and enabling them and empowering them thereby to 
tackle other social problems that they might have.’ (B17)
Generally speaking, mental health professionals see the ultimate goal of their work as 
enhancing the quality of people’s lives. This is conceptualised as a two-pronged 
endeavour, involving the inter-related tasks of improving a person’s social functioning 
and ability to live within social norms, and helping them cope with their intra-psychic 
experiences. If mental illness is manifested in distress, difference and disruption, then 
the role of mental health professionals is to reduce distress and suffering and restore some 
sort of ’normality’ in the person’s life. Consistent with the ethos of current community 
care policies which seek to minimise dependence on state welfare systems, a key criteria 
for this ’normality’ is the ability to live in an independent and self sufficient way within 
the community and its implicit norms. These expectations both rest upon and perpetuate 
the themes of autonomy, self-regulation and responsibility which make up western notions 
of authentic person-hood, and have been linked to Judeo-Christianity, the Renaissance, 
the profit motive of modem capitalism, and post-war Thatcherite politics (Henriques et 
al 1984, Rorty 1987, Turner 1986).
However, whilst ’quality of life’ and ’normality’ may be goals to work towards, 
professionals remain sceptical about the possibilities of attaining these goals. Instead they 
aim for approximations. Just as the lodgers in Jodelet’s (1991) study live ’as i f  they are
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members of this rural French community, so the professionals investigated in this 
research see themselves as involved in constructing this ’as i f  status for their clients. 
As the interview extract below hints, mental health workers are tacit partners in 
constructing an illusion of normality with their mentally ill clients, and in finding 
strategies which minimise the impact and social visibility of mental illness.
(referring to the aims of her work) ’when someone, even though they may still be in the 
system, manages to live an everyday life again which you could call "classic". I’ve been 
avoiding the word "normal" since the beginning, but that’s what it is. It’s normality, the 
norms of society. The point at which someone manages to conform to those norms, even if 
they come to see the doctor once a month for medication, or if they need to see the nurse or 
a social worker from time to time. (F27)
It is this struggle to establish a socially acceptable space for mental illness within the 
norms of society that renders the modern-day, integrationist work of mental health 
professionals intrinsically moral, and imbues it with tensions between conflicting agendas. 
(We will return to this issue in Chapter 8, which considers the role of professional social 
representations in aiding the reconciliation of various conflicting agendas.)
Across the board, professionals see their work as a long term endeavour which involves 
them in managing rather than solving problems associated with mental ill health4. They 
take the presence of mental health problems, in society and in the lives of specific people, 
as a given, as something which is unlikely to go away, and which sets limits on the work 
they do. We return here to the notion of mental illness as a permanent trait, which 
competes with, but generally carries more weight than views of mental illness as a 
temporary state (Chapter 5, section 2.1). For professionals, mental illness is something 
they work with, rather than work to get rid of. Mental illness is ’kept at bay’ by their 
on-going work, but remains as a risk factor or vulnerability, which differentiates those 
with mental health problems from others. Across the disciplines in both Britain and 
France, professionals do not see themselves as involved in curative practices, and 
statements endorsing the general ’curability’ of mental health problems are strikingly
One of the most frequently cited personal qualities which professionals see as necessary to work in the 
field of mental health is patience. One British respondent (BIO) talks of entering this world with ’too high 
expectations of what you can achieve’ and of having to ’recalibrate’ his scale of expectations.
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absent from the interview narratives5. Much more typical are bold and unconditional 
rejections of the notion of cure applied to mental illnesses. In fact, the notion of cure 
even seems to hold a quasi-joke status within the professional community:
I: Is concept of cure something which you use or that means anything to you?
B17: No... it’s a joke that you often find mental health professionals using here a lot in 
saying ’how are you getting on with so and so?’ ’Cured him, cured him’, and predictably, 
everyone will burst out laughing, because it is a joke the concept of cure. It’s essentially 
redundant. ... I think it’s also a joke because it implies that you’re using a medical model you 
know, here’s a disease, we’ve found a cure, we’ve done something, patched it up, cured him 
and the person can go now. Also I think because it implies a great sense of omnipotence - 
these wonderful professionals who can go around waving our magic wands, and popping pills 
and people are cured.6
The professionals in this study clearly do not see themselves as medical practitioners, and 
they reject an exclusively medical view of their work. Whilst medical factors figure 
within professionals’ aetiological models of mental illness (Chapter 5, section 3), and 
there is widespread use of medical interventions (see section 2), these are positioned 
within more complex and multiple professional representations of mental illness and its 
treatment.
The representational distinction between neurosis and psychosis again acts as an important 
reference point for the goals of practice. Neurotic illnesses are judged to be more 
transient and, as such, open to the possibility of permanent eradication, whereas the more 
enduring and severe nature of ’psychotic’ problems place limits on the types of changes 
professionals can hope to achieve. The experience of psychosis leaves scars and is seen 
as too fundamental to ever be fully eradicated or recovered from. This places the 
emphasis on goals of supporting people and helping them ’live with’, ’manage’ and 
’accept’ their mental health problems. The focus here is on reducing disruption and 
distress, whilst accepting the endurance of some kind of perceived fundamental 
difference. Even if psychotic problems are not manifestly obvious, they are often 
assumed to be ’in remission’.
5 Explicit interview questions about the notion of ’cure’ aimed to investigate the current status of medical 
models in the professional community, given their historical dominance and the recent changes in the world of 
mental health.
6 This extract illustrates a common tendency within the community of mental health workers to 
characterise medical perspectives as simplistic and superficial. Whilst medical practitioners might well see this 
is a mis-representation (and this is the position of several psychiatrists interviewed in this study), it can equally 
be argued that this constitutes a socially meaningful representation within a professional community whose 
’scientific’ and, hence, social status has always been inferior to that of the general medical profession.
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I: In the work you do with patients, what would you say you are trying to achieve? What 
are your aims?
F24: If it’s a neurosis, it’s a question of modifying the personality so that die person feels 
better and, if the case arises, is even cured. In the case of psychotics and drug therapy, the 
aim is that they can live with their psychosis without too much trouble. But there are no 
pretensions there of a cure.
I: Would you say the concept of cure is something you use or think about?
B30: No, I suppose I don’t actually feel that we cure anybody. I think we can help people 
to make life a bit easier, and understand it. And again I think that’s because of working with 
people who have long term mental health problems, psychoses and things. I think people can 
go into remissions, but I don’t think they are actually cured. (B30)
Given that the eradication of mental health problems is not on the agenda, professionals 
aim to institute a range of more modest changes. The following comments are typical:
’I think that if we can teach people to live with their illness, with our support, then that’s 
pretty good. Help the person to recognise his illness when he doesn’t feel well and if he 
manages to build up a good relationship with the doctor and the nurses, to come and ask for 
help.’ (F18)
I: What would you say your aims are in the work you do with patients?
B12: Ideally it would be helping people towards either greater understanding of why they are 
like they are, or helping them actually change and move on. Or sometimes accepting the fact 
that they can’t do anything about the circumstances and come to terms with their limits.
Professionals speak in interview of aiming to reduce their clients’ distress (especially at 
times of crisis, when this is a prerequisite to other interventions), helping people to 
’manage* their mental health problems, and aiming to help clients come to terms with, 
accept or understand their mental health problems7. This focus on clients ’making sense 
o f  their mental health problems, and exploring how they fit into their subjective life 
history and sense of self, can be seen as another response to mental illness as strange and 
unfamiliar, not only to other people, but also to those who experience it. Again the aim 
is to find a connection with mental illness, to familiarise and make sense of extraordinary 
experiences. Another central aim of professional practice is to offer support in the tasks 
of daily living. If, as we have seen in Chapter 5, mental illness is construed as a 
diminished stock of ’resources for life’, professionals conceptualise a role for themselves 
in ’making up for’ this reduced stock of coping skills and emotional strength, by 
providing long-term social support which may be lacking in other areas of their clients’
7 Although notions of ’understanding’ are most closely aligned with psychotherapeutic perspectives 
(especially humanistic approaches), these aims are not limited to those professionals who practice psychotherapy 
formally. This is illustrative of the widespread diffusion and legitimacy within the practitioner community of 
the range of ’patient oriented’ approaches which have developed principally since the 1960s.
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lives, past and present.
This range of aimed for changes has undergone a paradigmatic shift away from 
individualistic medical approaches. Modem day mental health work extends far beyond 
the body or the mind of the mentally ill individual, into much wider aspects of the 
persons’ life as a social entity and member of society. Tasks which were traditionally 
the remit of social workers, occupational therapists and community psychiatric nurses are 
now part of the daily work of all members of multi-disciplinary mental health teams. But 
this engagement with the mentally ill as social beings brings with it a second source of 
limitations to their work. If professionals see social factors such as unemployment and 
poverty as implicated in the aetiology of mental illness (Chapter 5, section 3), they also 
experience the inequalities of the social world as setting further parameters on the 
changes they can hope to implement. For example:
’(I)t’s often a matter of helping people understand their situation, relieving some of the bad 
symptoms or feelings they have. But they are still often lonely and isolated. And all those 
things - they’re unemployed and they’re in grotty housing and they are still unsatisfied. So 
there’s a limit to what we can do.’ (B15)
The following section explores what practical strategies professionals implement in their 
daily work in attempting to achieve these conditional changes in social, interactional and 
intra-psychic domains.
2 E clectic Practice: Tackling  M ental Illness from  M ultiple Perspectives
From a social representational perspective, professional practice constitutes the 
objectification of professional representations - the ways that implicit assumptions about
the nature of mental illness are lived out and perpetuated in concrete terms. As a
manifestation of the multiplicity of their representations, the practical work of the sample 
of British and French professionals investigated in this research is united by a common 
theme of eclecticism8. And as the enactment of representing of mental illness as a social 
phenomenon, contemporary care of the mentally ill constitutes the implementation of a
8 Eclecticism amongst mental health practitioners is also reported in studies conducted in Italy (Zani, 1987, 
1993).
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range of practical strategies which involve professionals in the minutiae of their clients 
lives. Yet simultaneously, mental health care still involves the more traditional hospital- 
based treatments. The sections which follow chart the semantics of these multiple 
strategies, showing how they coexist and are practised variously by different professionals 
in France and Britain. Section 2.1 sets out the inter-relationships between three broad 
models of professional practice. This is followed in sections 2.2 to 2.4 by a more 
detailed exploration of each of these three care strategies in turn.
2.1 Complementary Strategies and Professional Uncertainty
Asked in interview about their daily practical work, professional cite a range of activities 
from administering medication to long-term psychoanalysis, discussion groups, visits to 
clients’ homes and various other formal and informal activities in a range of settings. In 
order to conceptualise rather than simply describe these activities, an analytic strategy 
which allows some meaningful categorisation and comparison of these practices must be 
adopted. To this end, a quantitative cluster analysis on data analytic codes developed in 
QSR-NUDIST was employed. The details of the analytic procedure are presented in 
Appendix 7. This analysis produces three relatively distinct clusters of variables, which 
can be interpreted as three broad practical strategies implemented simultaneously in 
contemporary mental health care. These three strategies (whose validity is confirmed by 
their correspondence to descriptions in interview narratives) are presented graphically in 
Figure 6.2, which illustrates how the concepts associated with each model are inter­
related. Table 6.1 shows the relative frequency of use of the various treatment 
interventions employed in these different styles of care.
By far the most commonly cited practical strategy is the use of professional-client 
relationships. This is associated with a general understanding of mental illness as the 
product of the combined effects of biological and genetic factors and childhood 
experiences and relationships. Both quantitative and thematic analyses suggest this as a 
’generic’ model of practice which forms the basis of the other two more specific
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Figure 6.2: Three Models of Professional Practice
1) A GENERIC MODEL
Causal Factors Treatment /  Care Strategy
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models9. The second and most complex model of practice constitutes long-term care 
strategies, centred around group activities and complemented by various one-to-one 
talking therapies. Thirdly, a ’crisis intervention’ model is associated principally with the 
use of medication.
Table 6.1: Frequency of Use of Strategies associated with 
Three Models of Professional Practice10
MODEL OF
PROFESSIONAL
PRACTICE
Associated Activities No. of British
Respondents
(n=30)
No. of French
Respondents
(n=30)
GENERIC Development of
MODEL Professional - Client 
Relationships
21 22
LONG-TERM Group Activities 14 9
CARE Psychotherapies 3 7
Counselling
Cognitive - Behavioural
10 5
therapies11 8 0
CRISIS
INTERVENTION
Medication 8 9
9 The variables in this ’generic’ model co-occur in the majority of interview transcripts, and there are 
significant correlations with the other two models of practice (see Appendix 7). Qualitative analysis presented 
in section 2.2 suggests that professional-client relationships are construed as the ’building blocks of care’.
10 This is not an exhaustive list all the activities cited by interview respondents. Other activities such as 
relaxation therapies used by movement therapists and art therapy are not included here because they are limited 
to a small number of specifically trained professionals. Given the importance of family relationships in 
professionals’ aetiological models of mental ill health, it is notable that family therapy is not a regularly practised 
strategy. (Only two French psychiatrists report using family therapy, although referrals to family therapists are 
mentioned by a few British respondents). From this sample it appears that family therapy remains a 
marginalised and specialist approach which has not filtered into main-stream mental health services. However, 
another approach which involves the active use of families is family placements initiated recently for a small 
number of cases in two of the three secteurs investigated in France (sectuer 4 and secteur 15). There are many 
parallels between these placements and the rural family colony of Ainay-le-Chateau studied by Jodelet (1991), 
and it is probably the very existence of these colonies in France which prompts professionals in main-stream 
mental health services to experiment with this approach. (As far the author is aware, no such equivalents exist 
in Britain.)
11 Results of a chi-squared test show that this difference between French and British respondents is 
statistically significant at p <0.005. (None of the other cross cultural differences in this table reach statistical 
significance).
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It might be expected that long-term care and crisis intervention strategies would 
constitute relatively distinct areas of practice, enacted by different groups of practitioners 
working separately in different locations. Crisis intervention practices might be the realm 
of hospital-based professionals, whereas long-term strategies would be enacted by 
practitioners based in day centres and other community services. This pattern of practice 
is reported by Prior (1993) in a recent study in Northern Ireland, and in terms of the 
structural organisation of mental health services in the current study described in 
Appendix 1, there is certainly evidence for this. For example, service provision in 
Lewisham & North Southwark was being reorganised during the data collection period 
into two parallel teams devoted to ’continuing care’ and ’acute response’. Statistically, 
it is certainly true (both in France and Britain) that periods of client contact are longer 
in community based services than hospital wards. However, examination of interview 
data suggests that, from the professional perspective, these activities are construed as 
much more overlapping and complementary than is apparent at first glance12. The three 
models of practice constitute the various perspectives, implemented simultaneously, 
through which multi-disciplinary mental health teams aim collectively to tackle the 
diverse range of problems which coalesce in their representations of mental ill health. 
Contemporary styles of mental health care break down traditional areas of specialism, and 
the activities of the various professional groups working in a range of service settings are 
now more similar than they are different13. Essentially, professionals perceive the 
various treatment strategies open to them as compatible approaches which build upon 
rather than contradict each other:
’I tend to think more in terms of the complementarity of theories and therapeutic practices - 
that’s what I do in practice. I prescribe medication and I use an approach which takes its 
reference points from psychanalysis and a systemic approach to the family. (F20)
This perceived complementarity of multiple treatment strategies (used in tandem either 
by the same practitioner or by different practitioners working simultaneously with the 
same client) is striking if one considers the very different theoretical foundations of these
12 As well as the thematic evidence below, this contention is supported in quantitative analysis which finds 
that long-term and crisis intervention strategies are practised by the same individuals, and that there are no clear- 
cut associations between the implementation of specific strategies and either professional status or location of 
work (see Appendix 7 for details).
13 Analysis in Chapter 7 shows how this overlap is associated with difficulties in carving out new 
professional inter-relationships within multi-disciplinary mental health teams.
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practices (see Appendix 3). Rather than seeing the approaches of, for example, 
psychotherapy and medical intervention as necessarily in conflict because of their 
differing views on the nature and aetiology of mental health problems, practitioners are 
more likely to see them as different, but potentially compatible perspectives, whose 
combination offers a more rounded and robust approach to mental health problems than 
the use of any single method. In fact, although professionals may express preferences 
for certain aetiological models of mental illness over others, the incompatibility of 
different practical approaches is a theme which is strikingly absent from the whole data 
corpus.
Eclecticism and the use of multiple treatment strategies are also associated with the sense 
of uncertainty which pervades professional representations of mental illness, and is 
manifested in practitioners’ sense of limited mastery of the techniques they use, and their 
potential outcomes:
’Nothing is standardised - there are no fixed rules at all - it’s all quite fuzzy round the edges.
There’s no set way of doing things - if one thing fails you try another and then another, or 
you try several things at once, or whatever.’ (B4)
’When things start to go better for a patient he’s no longer with us. So that leaves you 
always wondering if what you’re doing is working, because you don’t necessarily have any 
means of evaluation.’ (F2)
Professionals recognise that there is no one ’right’ way to treat mental health problems; 
that despite their best efforts mental illness endures; that any single treatment has both 
strengths and limitations; that their own ability to predict the outcome of any strategy is 
limited; and that under these circumstances the ’safest’ approach is to implement several 
treatment strategies simultaneously. A very broad conception of ’treatment’ is the norm 
across this professional community. The widening of the remit of mental health care 
beyond the bounds of the hospital and into the realm of daily life has brought with it the 
’professionalisation of the mundane’ (Prior, 1993). Virtually any activity can be 
considered ’therapeutic’, and implementation of specific time-limited activities can be 
complemented by the benefits of a ’therapeutic environment’ (the reassurance of the 
hospital structure, or the supportive, non-judgemental climate of a day centre, for
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example)14.
2.2 Professional-client Relationships: The ’Building Blocks* of Care
B3: As I see my role, it’s the relationship between myself and the client which is very much 
part of the therapeutic process. It’s that that facilitates and decides whether the treatment is 
going to be successful or not - in a way I think it’s based on a relationship very much. In 
that you can have a therapeutic relationship with a client - hopefully. If you don’t have a 
therapeutic relationship which is supportive and trusting, it would be unrealistic to expect 
other treatment to be successful. I think that’s the foundation for the treatment. ... The 
reason why I say that is because often a lot of the clients who come here, a lot of their 
problems are based in or stem from relationship difficulties, interpersonal problems, conflicts 
within their family, either currently or going back to childhood. And often for the first time 
in their lives, I think when they come here they're getting their first chance, in a way, to 
have an appropriate relationship with somebody. And not just with their key worker but 
with other clients around in the whole environment.
Professionals from all disciplines in both France and Britain are united by a common 
generic model of their practical work as resting upon the establishment and development 
of relationships with mentally ill clients. The use of professional-client relationships 
might be expected to be central to the work of a range of people-based professionals 
(teachers, GPs or social workers, for example). But the strong representational theme 
which emerges from this analysis of mental illness as a problem associated with relational 
difficulties in its genesis and nature, confers a special importance on relationship 
formation. Relationships with clients are seen simultaneously as ’compensation* for other 
relational difficulties and sources of support, and ’building blocks’ for professional 
practice. Relational skills are the comer stones of practitioners’ professional identities - 
they cite interpersonal skills such as empathy, listening and communication skills first 
and foremost as the personal qualities needed to work in the field of mental health. The 
forging of relationships with the mentally ill is crucial because it impacts upon all three 
of the central features of mental ill health: Firstly, it allows a connection across the gap 
of difference perceived between professionals (and consensual reality) and the mentally 
ill, with the possibility of overcoming or at least reducing these differences, by creating
14 There are clear echoes here of the ’therapeutic community’ concept developed by Maxwell Jones in 
Britain in the 1940s (Clark 1977). The principles espoused by Jones, that the treatment of mental health 
problems can be the product of normal interactions as part of healthy community life, are also lived out in the 
heavy use of group activities in contemporary practice. However, echoing Goffman, these themes coexist in 
the professional community with less positive views of the working environment, which, among other things, 
constrains or hinders the work of mental health professionals (see Chapter 8).
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connections and understandings based on trust, support and continuity. Secondly, these 
relationships allow a space for the person to express and air their distress, with the 
potential to reduce the degree of suffering experienced. And finally, they act as 
important foundations from which professionals can encourage other changes which may 
serve to reduce the disruption of mental ill health in the lives of their clients and the 
social worlds they participate in.
At the very heart of these relationships, which form the basis of all professional practice, 
the essentially moral nature of mental health work, and the tensions and dilemmas which 
professionals face daily are revealed. Although professionals aim to understand their 
clients’ points of view, and to involve them as willing participants in treatment strategies, 
as social agents, they are frequently faced with the need to reconcile this with quite 
different agendas emanating from the person’s family or from society at large.
’My role is simply to have a relationship which is as real as possible with these people. As 
real as possible in the sense that I am part of an institution, so that the cards are dealt in 
advance. Which means that, at the same time, that relationship is impossible because we’re 
within this framework.’ (F4)
This paradox is an essential feature of professional practice which any socially oriented 
research must seek to understand. Chapter 8 offers a functional perspective on 
professional social representations as serving to aid the reconciliation of these conflicting 
agendas.
Listening or Coping?
It is also within the context of professional-client relationships that some subtle, but 
important cross-cultural differences between Britain and France are revealed. Interview 
accounts of the perceived purpose of relationships with the mentally ill highlight how 
divergences in psychodynamic thought which have developed over a number of decades 
on either side of the Channel filter into professional social representations. (These 
different versions of psychodynamic theory are detailed in Appendix 3). Broadly 
speaking, French professionals place more emphasis on the role of ’listening’ (l’ecoute),
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whereas British practitioners talk more about ’coping’15. In France, where 
psychodynamic theorising is dominated by the ideas of Jacques Lacan, the linguistic 
nature of psychotherapy and its central aim of understanding the language of the 
unconscious is stressed. Listening is described as a way of making contact with the 
mentally ill, of bridging the gap which is perceived to exist not only between mental 
health and mental illness, but between existentially distinct beings. This connection is 
often perceived as only partially possible, which is why the effort, difficulty, but 
necessity of listening are emphasized.
’What he (Lacan) offers essentially, in my opinion, is his work on discourse that was begun 
by Freud. It was the linguists of the time that were Lacan’s fundamental tool. So it’s the 
field of speech and discourse in particular. ... Fundamentally, analytic practice involves 
listening to a discourse and trying to grasp what is in the language that can highlight the most 
important elements which explain the structure and organisation of the subject and the psychic 
organisation.’ (F10)
’My goal is to listen first of all, and to help them get better - 1 can’t put it any differently.
... That’s not to say that I succeed or that one succeeds all the time, but the fact of listening 
is, in itself very important for them - you listen to what you can, that doesn’t mean you 
understand. I’m of the opinion that listening is not comprehension, you can’t understand 
certain things and we’re not there to understand some things. But you can open up a space 
to talk for the person, give him something, a presence, nothing more than the fact of being 
listened to. Because these are people who, beyond the institution, are alone, nearly all of
them So it gives them the possibility to have someone to whom they can talk freely. It’s
the fact that it gives them the possibility to be themselves, without any sort of judgement.’
(F5)
The greater emphasis amongst British professionals on relationships with clients as a 
vehicle to aid ’coping’ can be traced to, among other things, the ’ego psychology’ branch 
of English language psychodynamic theorising, which developed principally in the USA 
in the 1950s onwards. This version of psychodynamic ideas is often described as more 
optimistic than its French counterparts as it assumes the possibility of change through the 
exploration of ego defense mechanisms. The aim is to facilitate adaptation to ’reality’16. 
The client is encouraged to develop ways of managing emotions and psychic conflicts in 
ways that support and develop ego strength, and to develop ways of coping with everyday
15 Simple word searches in the data corpus indicate these imbalances: References to ’listening’ are made 
by 19 French respondents compared to 9 British respondents; references to ’coping’ are made by 18 British 
respondents, but only 6 French respondents. Thus, these are relative rather than absolute differences. It is 
certainly not the case that ’listening’ is unimportant to British professionals and English language psychodynamic 
literature, nor that notions of ’coping’ are not part of French thinking and practice.
16 One of Jacques Lacan’s objections to the American school of ego psychology, was its uncritical stance 
in failing to question the nature of this reality, or to recognise its socially constructed nature (Turkle, 1979).
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life which conform to social norms.
I: Generally, what would you say the aim of what you do is?
B11: To get people who are not coping with their problems, not coping with their illness, not 
coping in society able to look at their difficulties and develop better coping strategies.
’I think of mental illness where systems try to come up with solutions and come up with bad 
ones. What we’re doing is trying to help people to cope by coming up with a better one. 
Come up with a better way of dealing with this which isn’t going to cripple your life, or 
interfere with your relationships or stop you getting a job.’ (B20)
2.3 Long-term Care Strategies
The second model of professionals practice which emerges from interview narratives is 
a model of long-term care based principally on group activities and involving a range of 
one-to-one ’talking therapies’. As such, this model represents the translation of the ethos 
of modem community care policies into contemporary professional practice. Figure 6.2 
shows how this model is based upon themes of mental illness as disruptive of personal 
and social life, and as an extreme version of other more ’normal’ experiences. 
Associations with the ’similarity’ face of mental ill health may legitimise this style of 
practice, much of which is implemented in public and community-based settings. Perhaps 
professionals see difference which is a matter of degree as having more potentially for 
integration into ’normal’ community life, than more fundamental, qualitative difference.
Group Activities
Group activities form an integral part of all the mental health services sampled for the 
current research, conducted by a range of professionals and used with clients showing the 
full spectrum of mental health problems in both hospital and community settings. As 
well as providing a useful environment in which to make assessments of their clients as 
social beings, professionals see the activities and processes which occur in group work 
as essential to their broad aim of enhancing life quality. If, as section 1 highlights, 
improving quality of life involves simultaneously improving social functioning within the 
bounds of social acceptability, and dealing with intra-psychic problems, then group work 
fulfils both these aims by both teaching ’life skills’ and, through the use of inter-personal
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relationships within the group, helping people deal with their experiences of mental ill 
health.
The range of activities covered by group work betrays an implicit assumption that the 
work of mental health professions now constitutes a legitimate involvement in the details 
of people’s lives. Groups are seen as a means of teaching people essential skills which 
they need to live an independent and ’normal’ life within the community17. For 
example, how to plan, shop for and cook healthy food; how to relate to others in socially 
appropriate ways (’social skills training’); how to manage one’s finances. Essentially the 
focus is on how to manage one’s life within the parameters of social acceptability. Skills- 
based groups aim to equip the mentally ill with the minimum practical and social skills 
necessary to live (superficially, at least) as valid members of society. They focus on 
reducing, or at least managing, the disruption and difference associated with mental 
illness.
Professionals also conceptualise the group encounter as a tool which is central to the 
reduction of distress. The group experience per se is a vital treatment strategy in its own 
right, in helping participants deal with their intra-psychic experiences of mental illness. 
Through the formation of relationships within the group and opportunities for self- 
expression and increased ’insight’, groups focused on creative writing, relaxation, anxiety 
or anger management, and formalised ’therapeutic’ groups are all seen to offer something 
qualitatively different to professional-client dyads:
F12: I think it (group work) is really just a mediator for interactions, whether you’re doing 
modelling, painting or aerobics. It’s a means of relating to the patient. It’s also a period of 
time when you’re with them, when you can discuss things with them. What it offers, at the 
end of the day, is a means of communication with the other person.’
B20: Movement therapy ... is a non-verbal medium, or a form of group therapy which uses 
something in addition to words. And the aims are slightly different in each group, but 
broadly speaking it’s an attempt to .... I suppose something to do with increasing awareness 
of what they are feeling, what they are experiencing, as represented by their body movement 
behaviour, and the way that can be symbolic of what’s going on for them, or can express 
things that they are not saying verbally.’
Echoes of theories of group dynamic and ’therapeutic community’ principles can be heard
17 The common term used by British mental health professionals for this type of group work is ’activities 
of daily living’ (or ADL) groups.
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in these interview narratives, although these links are rarely articulated explicitly. Whilst 
professionals may be unaware of their theoretical origins, assumptions about the link 
between group encounters and intra-psychic experiences have seeped into and become 
centrally integrated into professional representations of mental illness in both Britain and 
France.
Talking Therapies*
The use of various one-to-one talking therapies is a second strand of attack in long-term 
care strategies. The figures in Table 6.1 illustrate differences between Britain and France 
which are summarised as the greater use of cognitive-behavioural techniques and 
counselling in Britain, compared to a greater reliance on psychodynamic psychotherapies 
in France. Beyond this, qualitative analysis of interview narratives highlights more 
substantial differences in the social signification of these practices. Far from representing 
fixed and unitary practices, each of these terms means different things in different social 
contexts, translated into various practical strategies depending on their historical 
development and status in each country.
Regardless of nationality, psychodynamic psychotherapy in the ’broadest* talking therapy 
in the sense that it constitutes, for many professionals, not only a way of working, but 
a more generic way of thinking. In professional sense-making, psychodynamic 
perspectives are important anchors. (Aims of understanding mental health problems - for 
both professionals and clients - are strongly associated with the use of psychotherapies.) 
Thus, although the numbers of interview respondents who term what they do 
’psychotherapy’ are relatively small, this masks the widespread use of a psychodynamic 
approach as an integrative ’meta-perspective’ on the eclecticism of daily practice. For 
example:
I: Can I ask you about theoretical models that you use in your practical work?
B5: Very eclectic. The one that I use most is behavioural.... I also use cognitive work with 
people where it’s appropriate. But I guess overlapping all of those is a more dynamic 
approach. I find it difficult to detach where the person is at now from their experiences in 
the past, and I think it’s important to note that.
’Psychoanalysis provides some extremely important elements to situate a case a bit, and to 
know which directions to work in so as to not cause any damage or push the patient back into
his defenses Psychoanalysis can also help us to structure a hospital admission. In certain
cases you might be able to say it would be better to suggest this or that activity rather than
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another. Or for example, not to use the imperative with certain psychotic patients. I think 
psychoanalysis can help us with those sorts of questions - questions about language and the 
weight of words. ... So it give us some reference points on what we ask of a patient, what 
we can say to the staff who are looking after that patient - the nurses and the other hospital 
staff (F10)
The actual practice of psychotherapy is much more prevalent in the French mental health 
services studied than in their British counter-parts, and is utilised principally by clinical 
psychologists and psychiatrists. The later constitutes one of the most striking differences 
within a specific professional group: Of the six French psychiatrists interviewed, five 
claim to practice some kind of psychotherapy (and the sixth attends a psychotherapy 
discussion group). In contrast, none of the British psychiatrists interviewed practice 
psychotherapy. Long-term psychotherapy is taken in France as a valid and normal part 
of the work of public mental health services whose position goes unchallenged. In 
comparison, to practice psychotherapy within the context of British public mental health 
services is to take on a marginalised and contentious position in the face of widespread 
scepticism within the British professional community regarding the efficacy and ’value- 
for-money’ of individual psychotherapy.
Not only are psychotherapies used more frequently in France, but the nature of these 
therapeutic strategies is also different. ’Lacanian’ theories and practice and classic long­
term psychoanalysis feature in France, whereas ’brief psychotherapy’ is more the norm 
in Britain. The conceptual differences between ’listening’ (in France) and ’coping* (in 
Britain) highlighted in section 2.2 constitute another significant cross-cultural variation. 
In comparison, psychotherapeutic perspectives are rarely put into practice in their pure 
form in Britain. These cross-national differences in practice are broadly in line with the 
causal models of mental ill health described in Chapter 5: The French place more weight 
on ideas aligned with psychodynamic perspectives (childhood experiences and family 
relationships), compared to the bio-psycho-social causal models prevalent in Britain.
The strength of these differences, derived from their historical and social rooted-ness, 
may be masked by the ’snap-shot’ nature of this research, conducted at a time when the 
two countries are converging in their attitudes to psychodynamic ideas and practice: 
Whilst the practice of psychoanalysis in France has diminished substantially since its 
heyday in the 1970s, a more open approach to psychodynamic work has developed in
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recent years in British mental health services, manifested in the rise of ’counselling’18. 
The weight of historical differences is evident in the differential development of other 
talking therapies, and in the way these various labels are used to refer to essentially the 
same practices on either side of The Channel. The term ’psychotherapy’ is used in a 
much more general way in France, to refer to styles of interaction which involve listening 
to, supporting or interpreting what a mentally ill client says. A French psychiatrist makes 
the following comment: -
’There aren’t any people who are not suitable for psychotherapy, although perhaps you need 
to make clear what you mean by psychotherapy ... Even if I’m prescribing medication - even 
when people come to have their prescription renewed or changed, I spend half an hour with 
them talking about things. That’s a type of psychotherapy - it can be a supportive dialogue. 
I prefer to call that psychotherapy - it’s not an ordinary type of conversation.’ (F20)
In Britain, the term ’psychotherapy’ is used in a much more constrained way to denote 
a very particular type of formal practice in which the in-depth exploration of past 
experiences and unconscious processes is the principle agenda. Supportive practices of 
the kind referred to above are seem more usually as ’counselling’, although the 
possibilities of combining or slipping between these approaches in the course of daily 
practice are recognised:
’I think supportive counselling, it’s for people who aren’t perhaps terribly interested in 
understanding why they are experiencing the world as they are, why they are having 
difficulties in relationships, why they react as they do. That’s not to say that doesn’t come 
into it, but perhaps at a less deep level. It’s very much working with the here and now, and 
what’s actually going on in their lives, looking at that, and making some sense perhaps of 
difficulties, problems, issues, painful feelings. I think with analytic work it’s much more 
using the relationship between you, and perhaps going more deeply into earlier causes, 
unconscious things that are going on. I mean it’s difficult to draw a line between them. One 
can move into the other, and often does. (B27)19
In fact, there is no equivalent to the term ’counselling’ in the French language, and 
although Table 6.1 indicates that counselling practices are used by five French
18 During the late 1980s and early 1990 counselling courses have sprung up across Britain, offering 
recognised qualifications for those wanting to practice ’talking therapies’ without the rigours of psychotherapy 
or clinical psychology training. The number of counselling courses in the UK recognised by the British 
Association for Counselling has increased from 2 in 1989 to 32 in 1996.
19 This view of counselling accords with the definition offered by The British Association for Counselling 
(1996): ’The task of counselling is to give the client an opportunity to explore, discover and clarify ways of 
living more resourcefully and towards greater well-being.’
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respondents, these are referred to in interviews as ’psychotherapie de soutien’ (supportive 
psychotherapy), supportive consultations, relational work, or simply talking20. This 
suggests that the greater general acceptability of psychodynamic ideas and practices in 
France translates into less need to construct a separate discipline of counselling, which, 
while borrowing many ideas from psychodynamic thought, defines itself as an explicitly 
different endeavour.
The third type of ’talking therapy’ used by professionals in this study is limited entirely 
to the British sample. Like counselling, cognitive-behavioural therapy is a relatively new 
treatment strategy currently gaining popularity in the British world of mental health, 
where it has replaced the purely behavioural approaches of the 1960s and 70s (see 
Appendix 3). Although some French respondents are aware of the slow diffusion of these 
techniques into the world of French mental health (perceived as the influence of the 
English-speaking world), at the time of data collection none of the professionals 
interviewed in France actually practised cognitive-behavioural therapies. As the interview 
extracts below illustrate, the position of cognitive and behavioural perspectives in British 
professional representations is relatively circumscribed, taking the form of a useful 
practical tool for tackling certain mental health problems (specifically, anxiety, depression 
and phobias) within broader, more eclectic practical approaches and ways of thinking. 
On their own, cognitive-behavioural approaches are generally seen as insufficient ways 
of understanding mental health problems, which must be anchored into other spheres of 
knowledge simultaneously if their essence is to be captured more successfully.
’My thinking would always be broader than behavioural thinking, and would always be 
broader than cognitive thinking, but the therapeutic strategies I may recommend may well be 
because those models are useful in symptom relief. They have a theoretical model that 
underpins some human behaviour, but I don’t think cognitive or behavioural models address 
meaning on the more deeper level that I’m interested in. They can be very useful, but they 
don’t for me underpin my understanding of the person. (B15)
I use the three approaches [cognitive, behavioural and psychodynamic] to give a more holistic 
approach, because the constraints of things like behavioural work are that it’s just dealing 
with overt behaviour. There’s no feeling for what’s going on in people’s heads, it’s too 
reductionist. But because of the process that’s involved, of breaking things down into very 
small steps, you can actually see some change quite easily, which is both rewarding for the 
client and for the therapist. It’s very effective in certain problems. Things like anxiety it’s 
very useful for. Things like phobias - simply phobias, not complex phobias. And very
20 The fact that as a British researcher, I coded these activities under a category termed ’counselling’ 
when analysing the data is a clear example of the impact of the researcher’s perspective and social 
positioning in the research process.
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satisfying when you feel you’ve done something really good.’ (B5)
A final component of long-term community-based care strategies described in interviews 
is the use of long acting medication21. Although medication is primarily associated with 
crisis intervention, the administration of slow release ’depot’ injections (primarily by 
community psychiatric nurses and case managers) allows mental health services to 
manage and contain the risk of violent, dangerous or socially unacceptable behaviour ’by 
proxy’, ensuring the ’as i f  status of the mentally ill living apparently independent lives 
in the community.
2.4 Crisis Intervention Work
In tandem with these long-term care strategies, the practical work of mental health 
professionals also involves them in crisis intervention work which addresses the less 
benign and more threatening face of mental illness. The use of medication (often within 
the ’containing’ environment of the hospital ward) is perceived by professionals as 
important medium through which they can tackle the distress of mental illness. When 
a patient is intensely distressed, or in a state of apparent dissociation from consensual 
reality, displaying behaviour which is bizarre, dangerous or unpredictable according to 
rational-based theories of mind, medication is seen as a ’first resort’. It allows 
professionals to re-establish some sort of contact with intensely disturbed clients, contains 
the most dangerous and threatening facets of mental illness, and in so doing, reduces the 
distress and fear that extreme disturbance provokes in others.
’Someone who has voices in their head, or hears things, or feels like their body is falling 
apart, or has other strange bodily sensations, if medication can allow them to not have those 
agonies, then they should take it. Because that’s what a lot of our patients tell us - I don’t 
feel well, I feel this or that in my body - it’s really dreadful. You have the impression of 
feeling their distress which transmits itself to us. It’s there - it flows out of them, and you 
can feel how unwell they really are. So I think that at that point, you really need to use 
medication. Because it’s not simply through talking that those voices are going to go away.’
(F12)
Just as ’psychotic’ forms of mental illness are generally attributed more to biological or
21 Medication does not appear as part of the long-term care model in Figure 6.2 because cluster analysis 
does not allow a variable to appear in more than one cluster.
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organic factors and are more likely to be constructed by professionals as dangerously 
’other’, so the use of medication is a strategy most commonly used with psychotic 
illnesses. But within the context of a practitioner community which rejects an exclusively 
medical view of its work, the use of medication is legitimized by its combination with 
other treatment strategies. Similar to cognitive-behavioural therapies, medication is seen 
as a practical tool, whose focus is relatively circumscribed and can be applied, with little 
recourse to related medical models, as a valid and useful component in an eclectic 
’package’ of care strategies. At the same time, the legacy of widespread reliance on 
medication in post-war mental health services, and the associated anti-psychiatry back­
lash are detectable in professionals’ contemporary awareness of the potential for abuse 
and repression in the use of medication. As a point of controversy and debate, medical 
intervention encapsulates many of the paradoxes and tensions inherent in mental health 
work (for example, debilitating side-effects and denial of freedom versus the need for 
’containment’ and rapid symptom reduction). Even those professionals who reject or are 
extremely sceptical about medical approaches to mental illness may sanction the use of 
medical interventions in their practical work.
3 Theory  in  Professional Practice; D isjunctions and Insufficiencies
At several points in the analysis presented thus far there are indications of a split between 
theory and practice in professional social representations. We find, for example, that 
professionals in Britain and France subscribe to rather different causal models of mental 
illness (Chapter 5, section 3.2), yet when it comes to their practical work, they enact 
broadly similar combinations of treatment strategies22. For example, although medical 
perspectives hold more sway in Britain, the use of medical interventions is broadly equal 
in both countries. Weak links between theory and practice are also indicated by practical 
eclecticism based on a perceived complementarity of strategies derived from very 
different theoretical traditions. Professionals judge the value of the strategies they 
employ in practical terms. If a treatment strategy, or, more likely, several strategies in 
combination ’work’ - if they help professionals achieve the aims they set for themselves -
22 An important exception is the more dominant position of psychodynamic perspectives in France, a 
cross-cultural difference which is lived out in practice.
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they are worth employing regardless of the theoretical models from which they derive. 
And in describing their collective models of practice, professionals offer intuitive rather 
than formal theoretical backing for the central role they allocate to relationships with 
clients.
The analysis in this section addresses the position of formal, theoretical knowledge 
systems as one of the key components of professional representations which differentiates 
them from lay representations or common sense. The role of theory in daily professional 
practice is explored in section 3.1, and in section 3.2 four functions of theory within the 
representations of mental health practitioners are identified.
3.1 Multiple agendas and the limits of theory
I: Do you make use of any theoretical ideas in your day to day practice?
F22: Personally I don’t, no. I think my style of working is according to experience. It’s not 
so much theoretical, it’s more what I’ve picked up from experience or learned from other 
people about how to act in relation to a certain person.
’I think you can have all the models in the world and then decide to use something completely 
different. I think it depends very much on the individual client and it can be a very eclectic 
approach. And with some people I might use a bit of one and a bit of another. It depends 
on what difficulties they have and what else they’ve got. ... I think a model should only be 
a check list. It should be a reminder about what things you should be looking at so you don’t 
miss anything. It shouldn’t be used rigidly, I think it’s uncreative to use it so rigidly.’ (B19)
For practitioners in mental health, their daily practice is more of a skill based on intuition 
and experience than an exact science based on the application of principles and theories. 
Adaptability and openness to the nuances and uniqueness of a specific situation and the 
problems of a particular individual are prized ways of working in this community, where 
practical experience is valued more than familiarity with esoteric bodies of knowledge. 
In the day-to-day routines of mental health services, practitioners must take account of 
much more than the theories they learned about in professional training. The multiple 
faces of mental distress which manifests itself in myriad ways mean that theory is simply 
’not enough’ for competence as a mental health practitioner:
I: How do you see the relationships between theory and practice?
F13: It seems extremely difficult to me, because when I begun my hospital training, even 
though I’d learned that depression is like this, hysteria is like that, psychosis is like that,
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when I found myself faced with patients I was completely disarmed. During the next three 
years I participated in a supervision group. It was run by a psychoanalyst, and we worked 
as a group every week. ... That helped me make the link between what I was reading and 
practice. It requires a lot of experience. When you start out in psychiatry it’s extremely 
difficult. There are things that you can see quite clearly - someone who is very unstable. 
But beyond that, all the nuances - it’s really very difficult. There are so many infinite 
possibilities of expression of suffering and of each type of pathology - you need to be 
constantly adapting yourself.
Professional practice must be adaptable, not only to the polymorphous nature of mental 
ill health, but also to the convergence of the multiple agendas of clients, society, policy, 
and scarce resources:
I: What practical considerations come into your decisions about how to deal with a particular 
person?
BIS: The first one is what does the patient want. I may want to give them medication, and 
they may say no. I may then consider sectioning them, in which case they get it. Or they 
may not be sectioned in which case I can do nothing. So there’s those elements - what does 
the patient want. And then what’s available. So for example I can quite readily get brief 
focal psychotherapy for someone, I can get behavioural treatments quite readily. If I want 
family therapy we’re a bit short on that. Equally as at the moment, a number of people who 
come into hospital could be treated in the community - even people with severe mental 
illnesses, if we had adequate community support teams.
Deciding how to respond to a particular person with mental health problems involves 
professionals in complex multi-factorial decision making processes, characterised by 
uncertainty and compromises. Professionals cannot rely on theoretical ’recipes’ - their 
practice is a fluid and negotiated endeavour in which theory is only one component whose 
role may be minimal in relation to other practical factors. Unlike in the world of 
academic research, where research programs and clinical trails can be designed with 
closer correspondence to theoretical ideas, and where theories can be considered as social 
representations per se (Moscovici, 1993), professionals are confronted more directly with 
the need to take account of many different perspectives on what is ’desirable’, possible 
and socially acceptable. This highlights the role of professional social representations in 
achieving compromise and reconciliation between the agendas of various social spheres, 
an issue which will be taken up further in Chapter 8.
Having established that theory generally plays a limited role in the construction of 
professional practice, variations in this general principle can also be detected. Clinical 
psychologists stand out as the professional group whose interview narratives contain most 
theoretical references, suggesting a stronger role of theory in shaping their practice than
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other professionals. The close links of clinical psychology to its parent academic 
discipline and the profession’s recent struggles to enhance its status (Appendix 2), may 
account for this. Clinical psychologists in Britain adhere to a ’scientist practitioner’ 
model of work (Pilgrim & Treacher, 1992), and professionalisation is currently a central 
concern. The other group of respondents for whom theory plays a greater than average 
role is psychotherapists. For French orthodox psychotherapists (whose professional 
origins are either psychiatry or clinical psychology), a clear link between psychodynamic 
theory and practice can be maintained, and theory is an essential reference point. But 
for other more eclectic practitioners, referring back to theoretical principles only serves 
to highlight incompatibilities or limitations in their daily practice. For example, social 
models of the aetiology of mental illness suggest that changes in large scale social 
inequalities, which are beyond the remit of mental health work, would do much to 
alleviate the mental health problems of individuals. Talking about the use of causal 
models in professional practice, a British psychiatrist makes the following comments
’It can be useful if things can be changed. But sometimes it’s just frustrating when you know 
what could be done but it’s out of your control. The person doesn’t want it done, or the 
family doesn’t want it done or you don’t have the means of getting it done. Like somebody 
who’s living in a dreadful flat, somebody who’s living in bed and breakfast and can’t get into 
permanent accommodation.’ (B4)
Finally, some interesting cross cultural differences in the citation of theoretical ideas in 
interviews with British and French practitioners can be detected. British respondents cite 
a range of ’theories of practice’ - formulations of practical strategies (often aligned with 
certain professions) which derive from abstract models of mental illness, but aim 
specifically to guide practice. Examples which are commonly cited include Beck’s 
cognitive model, humanistic theories associated with Carl Rogers, Gestalt therapy, and 
Pepleau’s nursing model (a relational model of nursing practice in which the nurse-client 
relationship is central)23. Specific ’theories of practice’ are cited less frequently in 
France where more general and abstract psychodynamic principles are the most common 
theoretical reference points. Whilst this is again indicative of the greater role of 
psychodynamic perspectives in France, it also highlights a contemporary British concern
23 For the purposes of this analysis, what is important is the role these theories and models play in 
professional practice, rather than their specific contents. Readers wishing to know more about these models are 
referred to Beck (1967) for cognitive therapy, Peris (1969) for Gestalt therapy, Rowan (1983) for humanistic 
approaches, and Pepleau (1988) for Pepleau’s nursing model.
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with the transparency and public accountability of professional practice. (This 
justificatory role of theory is explored more in the following section.) Speculations on 
deeper cultural differences which this may betray can also be made: Esoteric and abstract 
levels of thought and expression may be more acceptable in France than in Britain, where 
the social legitimacy of abstract ideas relies more on their links to the concrete and the 
practical.
3.2 Four Functions of Theory in Professional Representations
The preceding section highlights the limited role of theory in the construction of day-to- 
day professional practice. Nevertheless, theoretical knowledge systems do form a 
significant component of professional social representations, enabling several important 
representational processes. Data analysis confirms the proposals put forward in Chapter 
3 regarding the anchoring and justification functions of theory, and suggests two further 
functions in aiding professional identity construction, and mediating the emotional impact 
of mental illness. Each of these aspects is elaborated in turn below.
i) Anchoring functions
A principle role of theoretical knowledge is in the anchoring processes which are central 
to the genesis and development of social representations. Given the uncertainty that 
infiltrates professionals’ conceptualisations and reactions to mental illness, theories and 
’expert’ knowledge provide essential categories, names and spheres of understanding as 
ways of making sense of and responding to mental health problems. Theory is a tool 
which professionals use to cope with uncertainty, to aid communication within multi­
disciplinary mental health teams, and to bridge the perceived gap of difference between 
themselves and the subjective experiences of their mentally ill clients:
I: How would you describe what mental illness is?
B3: That’s quite difficult... It would be very easy, I suppose, for me to say what it is looking 
at it from a medical view point and my training as a psychiatric nurse, with various illnesses 
and symptomatology that make up various classifiable diagnoses. But that’s very much a 
medical view point. ... I think symptoms and diagnoses are all very handy for giving a name 
to a collection of problems that a client is suffering. So it’s a name we can all agree on, 
therefore we know what we’re talking about when we use it. That in a way is its main 
function. It’s just to be able to classify a set of problems or behaviours of difficulties that the 
client is experiencing or showing.’ (B3)
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The point was made in Chapter 2 that anchoring is rarely achieved effortlessly, and that 
choice of anchors is always a controversial issue involving debate and negotiation (Billig, 
1993). This is certainly the case for professional representations of mental illness, in 
which daily work rarely involves the straight forward translation of theory into practice, 
and the use of terms derived from psychiatric nosologies are a point of much controversy 
(Chapter 5, section 1). The perceived limitations of any single theoretical perspective 
lead professionals to construct complex representations of mental illness in which echoes 
of a range of theoretical perspectives are integrated. As such, the anchors which 
theoretical spheres of knowledge provide are only ever partial and provisional, and are 
complemented by sense-making processes derived from experience and common sense 
understandings.
ii) Theory as post hoc justification
I: Do you use any particular models or theories in your practical work?
B14:1 suppose we base things on Pepleau’s nursing model, but that’s very much so that we
can answer questions like this and we’re able to quote a model.
While this respondent clearly has a particular ’theory of practice’ at her finger tips, it 
serves in this case not as a guide to practice, but as a post hoc rhetorical resource to 
justify a particular course of action. The intuitive, informal and atheoretical nature of 
much of what professionals do in the name of mental health care conflicts with social 
expectations that, as ’experts’, mental health professionals should enact specific 
competencies and forms of knowledge over and above those of lay people. The citation 
of theoretical bodies of knowledge serves to bolster the (often fragile) public legitimacy 
of mental health professionals by enhancing the apparent gap between professional and 
common sense understandings of mental ill health. This accords with Timms & Timms’ 
(1977) analysis of the value of theory in the social work profession, and with the 
organisational analysis provided by Kirk & Kutchins (1992, see Chapter 3, section
3.2)24.
24 Kirk & Kutchins conceptualise mental health services as systems struggling to manage uncertainty, in which 
psychiatric diagnosis serves as the ’rationalisation of action’. They comment that ’(i)f no precise goal is 
established, if there is incomplete understanding of how to achieve vague objectives, and if there are few 
systematic methods of monitoring organisational outcomes, then staff and managers have considerable leeway 
in explaining what they do.’ Kirk & Kutchins (1992, pl71).
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At the time of this research project, public justification of mental health care is a 
particularly cogent issue in Britain. Much public attention is focused on the policies and 
practices of care in the community, and the treatment strategies employed by 
professionals (especially in relation to patients deemed ’dangerous’) are under constant 
media scrutiny. The increasing focus on accountability, quality assurance, and value for 
money in the market-led National Health Service of the 1990s add to this imperative for 
professionals to justify their working practices, both publicly and to colleagues and 
managers. A British psychiatric nurse sums up the situation thus:-
’The thing is, the way that nursing in mental health is going, everything has to be 
documented. In any documentation, if you don’t show there is some sort of theoretical or 
research base, they’re going to come down awfully quickly on that.’ (B6)
iii) Professional identity construction
For professionals whose field is characterised by a huge diversity of approaches and 
theoretical positions, and a history of power struggles between these, choosing one 
theoretical perspective over others is far from neutral. It is a value-laden stance, which 
some professional use to define themselves in relation to colleagues and to construct their 
professional identities. Whilst many interview respondents are relatively unconcerned by 
theories and esoteric knowledge, others (most commonly, clinical psychologists and 
psychiatrists) incorporate a particular theoretical perspective into their professional 
identity. Thus, for example, a British clinical psychologist defines herself as a ’systemic 
therapist’, whilst a French psychiatrist defines herself as a ’Lacanian psychotherapist’. 
In a similar vein, professionals often describe themselves as ’non-medical’, even if they 
do not align themselves with any other particular theoretical stance.
iv) Theories in mediating relationships with mental illness
’Often theory acts as a mediator, it gives you reference points so that you can understand an 
certain illness, by going through the theory to understand it. It’s a mediator, it allows you 
to protect yourself a bit, and hopefully also to understand.’ (F4)
While the preceding three functions of theory could apply equally to mental health 
professionals as to teachers, medical practitioners or other professional groups, a forth 
implicit aspect of theory identified in this research relates specifically to mental illness.
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For professionals working in mental health, theory is more than simply a means of 
categorising mental health problems. It is something which helps them cope with the 
emotional responses that mental illness and its associated uncertainties typically inspires. 
’Expert* knowledge systems may serve similar functions for professionals as dominant 
representations of mental illness as ’other’, in offering a way of containing a source of 
psychosocial threat. Faced with the paradoxes inherent in the role of ’professional carer*, 
(the simultaneous requirements to establish contact with a psycho-socially threatening 
social object, and to maintain ’professional boundaries’), reliance on principles and laws 
derived from bodies of ’expert’ knowledge may help professionals maintain a sense of 
’keeping the upper hand’ over mental illness whose chaos, irrationality and lack of 
control might otherwise threaten to take over. Established theory and practice offer the 
reassurances of structure and distance to professionals who choose to work with mental 
illness, yet simultaneously betray the difficulties of this position in their frequent 
references to stress and the required qualities of strength and personal equilibrium (see 
Chapter 5, section 2.4). Recalling the psychodynamic perspective on organisations 
reviewed in Chapter 3 (for example, Jacques 1955, Menzies 1960), the use of theoretical 
understandings could be conceptualised as a collective defense mechanism to help those 
who work in mental health systems cope with the anxieties invoked by mental illness and 
its associated uncertainties.
\ In summary, this chapter has shown how mental health professionals represent their work 
as a multi-faceted social endeavour which involves them in many aspects of their clients’ 
personal and social lives.! Medical practices may be part of this, but professionals do not 
conceptualise themselves as medical practitioners. Nor do they see themselves as 
involved in curative practices.\ Within the context of community-based care and a sense 
of the enduring nature of mental health problems, professionals aim to enhance life 
quality by managing rather than eradicating mental illness.!
Faced with uncertainties about how best to approach mental health problems, 
professionals collectively adopt strategies of eclecticism.! Underpinned by a broad 
conceptualisation of the relational nature of their work, professional practice targets the 
multiple faces of mental illness, falling broadly into crisis interventions and long-term
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care strategies. Whilst use of medication as a means of reducing intense distress is 
common in the first of these, long-term care is typically centred around various group 
activities (usually involving ’social skills training’ and the management of mental illness 
experiences). These are complemented in Britain by counselling and cognitive- 
behavioural techniques, and in France by psychotherapies. Analysis highlights how the 
meanings of each of these techniques are not fixed, but vary subtly between Britain and 
France. Thus the term ’psychotherapy’ refers to a broader and somewhat different set 
of practices in France compared to Britain, where many of these activities are understood 
as ’counselling’. This indicates an important cross cultural difference in the status and 
nature of psychodynamic perspectives, which have significantly more influence in 
professional representations of mental illness in France.
\with the widening of the remit of mental health work into virtually any aspect of a 
client’s personal and social life, professional practice has become increasingly informal, 
and only a small proportion of what professionals conceive as ’therapeutic’ is the formal 
application of specific treatment techniques, ^he day-to-day activities of mental health 
professionals can be conceptualised as the enactment of informal eclecticism in the social 
management of mental illness. Analysis suggests a cleavage within professional social
representations between theory and practice, although in the various functions it serves,
1
formal theoretical knowledge is far from unimportant in professional representations, j 
^Throughout this chapter, there have been indications of the value-laden and ’moral’
l
nature of mental health work. Professionals are continually confronted with tensions 
between ’abnormality’ and social acceptability, and with the conflicting agendas of 
various social spheres which coalesce in decisions about how to react to individual 
showing signs of mental distress. I These are themes discussed in Chapter 8. Before that, 
'fhe following chapter considers the impact of organisational factors j j In particular, it 
addresses the radical changes associated with recently introduced community care 
policies, and the effects of these on the social representations of mental illness circulating 
amongst mental health workers.
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CHAPTER 7
COMMUNITY CARE AND PROFESSIONAL DISORIENTATION
The focus of this chapter is on how recently introduced policies of community based 
mental health care impact upon and are experienced by the professional community. 
Against a history of marginalisation of the mentally ill, recent policy shifts aiming to 
replace hospital-based care with community-based styles of care represent the most 
radical change in societal reactions to mental distress since the beginnings of confinement 
in the sixteenth century. This momentous challenge to how mental illness is socially 
represented must necessarily have a dramatic effect in the world of mental health 
practitioners. How do the professionals charged with implementing these changes 
evaluate their current and future success? What specific problems and issues does this 
raise for professionals’ daily work? What is the impact of contemporary mental health 
policies on the representation of mental illness which circulate in this professional 
community?
In answering these questions, this chapter highlights how, at this early stage in its 
development, ’community care’ remains a loose and ill-defined umbrella term which 
practitioners are struggling to construct and implement. The disorienting effect of these 
changes on mental health practitioners in France and Britain is considerable. Despite 
this, section 1 shows how professionals’ evaluations of these shifts are not wholly 
negative. Whilst they applaud the general principle of reintegrating the mentally ill, this 
sits uneasily with their current experiences of the realities of community care and their 
sceptical views of its future. The analytic focus of section 2 shifts from broad 
professional opinions to specific experiences in the day-to-day implementation of these 
policies. The ramifications of these changes are felt particularly by professionals in the 
domain of professional inter-relationships and the tensions which multi-disciplinary team 
working raises. For various structural and historical reasons, this transition is 
particularly difficult for social workers and clinical psychologists. Whilst the focus of 
the first two sections of this chapter is on the organisational component of professional 
social representations as it relates to daily practice and the construction of professional 
identities, section 3 provides a conceptualisation of the broad impact of community care 
on professional representations in their entirety. This effect is three-fold: community
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care increases uncertainty within representations already characterised by agnosticism; 
it challenges several aspects of professional representations; and it highlights the 
conflicting agendas which converge in mental health work.
1 E v a l u a t in g  C o m m u n it y  C a r e : D is c r e p a n c ie s  o f  P r in c ip l e s  a nd  P r a c t ic e
1.1 Current Realities: British and French Perspectives
The brief historical overview of State reactions to mental illness in Chapter 1 describes 
how Britain and France share common histories of the social segregation of the mentally 
ill and have pursued broadly similar policies of de-institutionalisation in recent decades. 
The legacy of widespread institutionalisation of the mentally ill leaves a similar mark on 
professionals on both side of the Channel: The majority opinion amongst professionals 
in both Britain and France is that a shift from segregated to integrated care of the 
mentally ill is generally desirable. For today’s practitioners, the justificatory principles 
behind this ideal derive from the concept of ’normalization’1 and the anti-psychiatry 
movement of the late 1960s (professionals in both countries often cite the writing of 
Goffman, Laing and Szasz). There is consensus on the need to implement new societal 
reactions to mental ill health, to the extent that this is taken-for-granted as an implicit 
assumption behind much of professionals’ talk about community care.
This is an important starting point from which to understand the professional perspective 
in this change process. It suggests that the relatively cynical explicit debate about 
community care which circulates amongst professionals must be understood within a more 
implicit taken-for-granted framework of general concordance with the endeavour of 
reintegrating the mentally ill. However, overlaid on this general backing of the principle 
of integrated care, a more complex picture of professional opinions about the reality of 
community care policies emerges from interviews. For professionals, there is a striking 
disparity between their constructions of the ideal of community care and their perceptions 
of its reality. Their specific preoccupations and concerns regarding the later reflect a
1 ’Normalization’ is a term associated with integrative strategies in the field of learning disabilities 
developed originally by Wolfensberger (1972).
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historical snap-shot of the different styles of implementation of community based care in 
Britain and France in the early 1990s. It is therefore useful to divide the data along 
national lines.
The British Experience
Recent policy changes in Britain have been both more rapid and more extreme than their 
equivalents in France, with some of the most dramatic changes being implemented around 
the time that this study was conducted2. For professionals working through these 
changes, the biggest single issue associated with community care policies is concern over 
financial resources. In the world of mental health in Britain, community care policies 
have almost become synonymous with problems of resources. (When questioned about 
the current state of community care for the mentally ill, 77 % of British respondents make 
reference to insufficient financial resources.) Typically, lack of funding is used to 
account for the perceived gap between the ideal of community care and its 
implementation in reality:
’I think theoretically it (community care) is very good. I think the basis of the theory behind 
it is very good and it should work. But at the end of the day, sadly, it all comes down to 
money. And if the money is not available to implement the services that are required then 
it’s going to be very difficult for it to work.’ (B16)
Lack of government funding for community care is judged to have effected mental health 
care in several ways. First, professionals feel it places limits on the style of work they 
do and narrows the range of mental health problems they work with. Professionals feel 
forced to target more long-term and serious problems at the expense of minor and short 
term mental health problems, and to work reactively at the expense of preventative work:
2 The final phase of implementation of the National Health Service and Community Care Act 
(1990) came into operation in April 1993. At this point, management (but not provision) of community 
care for the mentally ill was fully transferred to local authority control. (Interviews with British 
professionals were conducted just after this change in the period May to December 1993.) It should also 
be noted that changes in mental health care occurred within the context of much broader reforms of the 
National Health Service. Concurrent moves towards an ’internal market’ engendered dramatic changes in 
funding structures and inter-agency relationships across the whole field of health care.
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I: How would you say that community care policies have effected the work of mental health 
professionals in recent years?
B15: It’s certainly made psychiatry target the seriously mentally ill. That’s the first thing. 
Target and prioritise more than before.
’In an ideal world one should be able to do more preventative work and more early 
intervention which would help prevent some of the damage which does occur with these 
clients. I think by the time we do intervene now it’s so late on with the problem, it’s got so 
tangled up and twisted that we spend so much more time on untwisting it. If there could be 
more people in doctors’ surgeries and things like that, who were mental health trained, we’d 
be able to do some proper prevention. But at the moment it’s a joke, we’re just picking up 
the pieces.’ (B18)
Secondly, it has limited the development of comprehensive networks of community 
facilities. Professionals perceive a need for more sheltered housing, more ’half-way 
houses’, and more 24 hour drop-in centres in the community. Third, professionals are 
concerned that cuts in hospital budgets have placed pressures on in-patient facilities, 
forcing professionals to discharge patients rapidly, often before they consider them to be 
well enough to leave hospital:
’Unfortunately the way things are going, as soon as someone appears to be well they’re out 
of the door. Hopefully they’ve got adequate follow up and they shouldn’t come back in, but 
it’s not always so. Also, a big thing is the number of beds - we don’t have enough beds to 
cater for everyone so we’ve got to get people out.’ (Bll)
Despite this pervading concern with insufficient financial resources, professionals in 
Britain do not see funding alone as the solution to narrowing the gap between reality and 
their ideal of community-based care. A second major concern is that the shift from 
segregated to integrated care for the mentally ill has been both too rapid and too extreme. 
Professionals feel that policy makers have not planned for or thought through the major 
social implications of such a rapid shift away from hospital based care (for example the 
need for public education to counter fearful and negative representations of mental 
illness). In particular, they see hospital based care as a necessary component of care, 
whose role has been overlooked by policy makers:
’I think there is always a need for acute beds. There will always be some people who need 
those acute admissions to hospital. They are shutting down all the old asylums, which is 
good, but there is nowhere for people to go for asylum. I’m not saying that the huge 
hospitals were great, they certainly weren’t. But there now isn’t that sort of place of asylum 
- it’s either acute beds or you’re out there. In an ideal world I think there should be some 
sort of safe place for people to be.’ (B25)
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The present mental health system is also seen as encouraging splits in the style and 
location of responses to different types of mental health problems. While many minor 
mental health problems are now effectively excluded from the remit of professional work, 
a minority suffering from serious and acute problems become ’ghetto-ized’ in hospital 
wards:
’If you’d have visited the ward four years ago it would have been very different. When there 
was less pressure on beds we would have been admitting people with alcohol problems, drug 
problems, obsessional problems, neurotic problems. I think what community care has done 
is alter the character of admissions. The emphasis is to try to treat people in the community, 
so the impact is that people who come to the ward tend to be more severe or more dangerous 
or aggressive. It means that you are dealing fundamentally with psychosis.’ (BIO)
This situation of the marginalisation of ’psychotic’ patients from mainstream community 
facilities may contribute to professional understandings of psychosis as a dangerous and 
fundamentally different ’other’.
A final concern amongst British mental health professionals is their experience of 
community care policies as producing increasing volumes of paperwork. The cost of 
integrating health and social services, and the growing concern with accountability mean 
increasing bureaucratization of daily work with inevitable trade-offs in the amount of time 
and energy professionals can devote to direct patient contact.
The French Experience
In France, where the recent transition towards community based mental health care has 
been less rapid, professionals’ experiences and preoccupations are slightly different. 
They share concerns about lack of resources with their British counterparts, but the 
consensual strength of feeling associated with financial issues in Britain is not matched 
in France. In line with the more cautious approach to transforming mental health 
services in France, the effect of poor resourcing is judged primarily to effect the speed 
of application of community care policies:
’I think a certain orientation already exists at the political level, in the various government 
circulars. But it seems to be an orientation which at the moment isn’t accompanied by facts 
or by resources. There is a need to reduce hospitalisations from the current level, but there 
are difficulties because we’re not given the financial means to set up the facilities necessary 
in the secteur. There are really big difficulties in that respect. You can’t push for policy 
change and at the same time not accompany that change with resources.’ (FI)
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Perhaps the most significant structural difference between Britain and France in the 
implementation of community care policies is the more decentralised system in France. 
As a consequence, the reality of community care in the early 1990s in France was much 
more variable than its counterpart in Britain. French government circulars regarding 
mental health services suggest targets and orientations, but control for implementing these 
policies lies much more at a local level than in Britain. And it is principally the ’chef 
de secteur3’ (invariably a psychiatrist) who holds the power to decide how policies are 
implemented in any given area. As one respondent puts it ’each secteur is extremely 
influenced by the personality of the head psychiatrists’ (FI6). This means there is much 
more leeway than in Britain to retain hospital services until replacement community 
facilities have been properly established, but it also brings with it certain professional 
concerns. Unlike their British counterparts who bemoan enforced reductions of hospital 
facilities, French professionals are concerned with over-reliance on hospitalisation in the 
absence of community facilities:
’In my opinion, the flaw is that the hospital houses certain people - 1 think half our patients 
are here simply as somewhere to stay, in the absence of other accommodation elsewhere.
They don’t really need hospital care, but they don’t receive care anywhere else.’ (F24)
A second major concern amongst French professionals at the time of data collection 
centres around integration of services. Hospital and community services are described 
as poorly integrated, with little mutual understanding or coordination of staff working in 
different locations. One respondent comments ’sometimes we learn things about the other 
services through the patients!’ (F2). This fragmentation is perpetuated by the fact that 
in many secteurs, in-patient facilities are located in hospitals which may be 20 or 30 
kilometres away from the actual secteur.
’The principle difficulty at the moment is that we have problems communicating because the 
service is very compartmentalized. There’s the drop-in centre, the community clinic, the 
hospital - each one makes its own interventions, and if we don’t communicate we risk the 
person being seen differently by each one. And what worries me is that that induces even 
more fragmentation.’ (F6)
The third area of preoccupation amongst French professionals centres around the 
boundaries between social services and mental health services. As mental health
Head of mental health services in a geographical area corresponding to a population of 70,000.
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professionals’ work moves more towards concern with clients as social beings and 
involvement in their daily lives, questions are raised about the limits to psychiatric 
services and the respective roles of mental health professionals and social services:
’I don’t think it is the responsibility of psychiatry to deal with problems of housing, or 
people’s problems which are of a purely social nature. But at the moment, psychiatry is 
trying to do everything.’ (F16)
As we will see in section 2, these unresolved questions about inter-relationships between 
mental health and social services raise particularly difficult issues for French psychiatric 
social workers.
1.2 (Problems of) Knowledge and power4
A collective sense of powerlessness, frustration and alienation pervades British 
professionals’ accounts of the organisational changes they are experiencing. Professionals 
feel that control over many of the current changes is out of their hands, and that these 
changes have been forced upon them too rapidly, by policy makers who have little 
understanding of the complexities and realities of mental health care. The source of 
decisions regarding mental health policies is perceived to be located firmly within the 
world of politics, and whilst some practitioners call for increased politicisation of 
professionals, other become resigned or disillusioned by the system within which they 
work:
’I get very angry about what’s happening in the NHS, very angry about the way things are 
managed. And really I feel completely powerless - 1 feel like I’d like to slap somebody and 
say "Look! What do you think you’re playing at?" But we can’t do it, and we’re all just a 
very small cog.’ (Bl)
’It seems as though we can have answers as to how it should be, but we don’t feed that back 
into the system - we’re totally split from the people who make the policies and who have the 
power. And I think probably that as mental health professionals we should be feeding that
4 As discussed in section 2.1 of Chapter 4, the interview schedule used in Britain included more 
specific questions on community care than the schedule used in France. Nevertheless, French interviews 
generated a considerable amount of data relating to recent mental health policies. The impact of this cross- 
cultural variation in data collection is thus relatively insignificant, and it is only on questions of knowledge 
of community care policies and their origins discussed in this section that no data for French respondents 
is available.
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back up. Feeding up the stress, feeding up the lack of resources, feeding up the examples.
... It would empower us a bit more - we might feel a bit less oppressed if we stood up for 
ourselves.’ (B23)
Marginalisation of practitioners from decision making during mental health service 
reorganisation, and associated feelings of helplessness have been reported in similar 
studies in Britain (Ramon, 1992) and America (Fourcher, 1975). However, in the 
current research, this general sense of powerlessness is not detected amongst French 
professionals, a finding which may be linked to both the slower pace of change and the 
decentralised organisation of mental health services in France. French professionals may 
feel psychologically closer to decision making about how community based care is put 
into practice, and thus more able to influence the changes to their work this will entail.
British professionals’ sense of powerlessness and lack of control over recent changes is 
accompanied by relatively poor knowledge and understanding of the current policy 
changes and their origins. Many professionals feel inadequately informed about current 
policy changes, describing their sources as the media or informal conversations with 
colleagues. A few respondents, notably all the social workers in the British sample, refer 
to recent training programmes designed specifically to help them negotiate changes in 
working practices. Some professionals keep up to date by reading journals and 
specialized media, but many feel they don’t have enough time to do this. Younger 
professionals may have learned about the shift to community care in their initial training, 
but many of the older generation give the impression of feeling lost amongst a mass of 
changes and policy directives which they only vaguely understand:
I: Where does your knowledge of community care policies come from, and what do you see 
as its historical and theoretical origins?
B20: I don’t really know actually. My points of information are my colleagues and purely 
what affects me as I go along. ... But as far as the theory goes - 1 haven’t got a clue - 1 don’t 
know who first suggested it or anything.
For many respondents, questions about the historical and theoretical origins of community 
care proved the most difficult part of the interview. Over half the British sample (n= 16) 
gave ’don’t know’ responses similar to the extract above. Of the others, the style of 
community care they are currently experiencing is understood in terms of various 
motivations, the most frequently cited being financial. This interview extract captures 
the pessimistic and cynical attitude to current changes which pervaded much of the world
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of mental health in Britain at the time of data collection:
I: What do you see as the origins of community care policies?
B14:1 suppose I don’t think I can base my feelings about it on any sort of theory. I think 
again it comes down to money - my views are along those lines. I feel it’s a lot to do with 
saving the government money. All the large hospitals that have closed down - these people 
are supposed to cope in the community, but nothing is provided, and these prime sites are 
sold off. ... As regards theory - for me there isn’t anything to base it on. It’s money - 1 feel 
it’s all money.
1.3 Views of the Future: Professional Scepticism
Although professionals in both Britain and France generally judge community based care 
for the mentally ill to be ’the right way forward’, they see its future as precariously 
dependent on three factors:- financial resources, socio-political factors and public will. 
They are highly aware of the ambiguities of the notion of ’community’ in modem society, 
encapsulated in the paradox of attempting to integrate mentally ill people into a social 
environment which may be hostile or itself implicated in the development of mental 
health problems. As we saw in Chapter 6, along with the enduring nature of mental 
health problems, professionals see the social problems of ’the community’ as a source of 
restriction to their work, and by definition, to the more general endeavour of community- 
based care5:
’The people we deal with have enormous social difficulties. We can respond to a certain 
extent, but housing and work - we can’t help them with that. It’s essentially psychological 
help that we can offer - moral support - it’s quite a lot, but it’s not enough, of course.’ (F22)
I: How do you see the future of community care?
B23: I think a lot depends on resources. I also think if you want people to live in the 
community, the community has to be receptive to those people. Nobody wants it next door 
to them do they? And if that’s going to be the attitude then I don’t suppose we’re going to 
get very far. ... I think we’ll just muddle along as we do now really. It’ll be a slow process 
of trying some improvements here, and suddenly noticing there’s a huge hole there.
For British professionals, a common prediction is of a return in the future to more 
reliance on hospital based facilities:
5 It is worth noting that all the respondents in this research work in areas of Paris and London where 
social problems such as housing, unemployment, racism and poverty are relatively high, and they are 
therefore likely to be particularly aware of the limitations the social environment places on their work.
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I: How do you see the future of community care in general?
B21: One of my worries is that it may take a complete U-turn, in the sense that with the 
enthusiasm at the moment to push more and more for clients in the community, I think a 
breaking point may be reached when everything will have gone too far and there will be some 
kind of immediate response to start looking at things backwards, and start bringing people 
back in again.
Many professionals consider that greater reliance on hospital based facilities would 
provide a more ’balanced’ response to mental health problems than the radical shifts into 
the community currently being implemented. But others fear that this may be motivated 
by a public backlash against large numbers of mentally ill people in the community in a 
context of insufficient community-based facilities6.
French professionals’ views of mental health services in the future are more variable - 
some paint a bleak view of the future, others are more hopeful. Primarily, they 
anticipate that the move towards community care will gradually become more widespread 
in France, as the ’slower’ secteurs catch up with those that have already implemented 
significant changes. They also anticipate greater integration with general medical services 
as psychiatric services are moved into general hospitals. How this integration will be 
managed in practice, given that mental health professionals define themselves and their 
work as distinctly different from medicine, remains to be seen.
2 W orking  W ithin Changing Systems
In their lived experiences of the changes that community care policies entail, a central 
concern within professional communities in both Britain and France is with the impact 
of these on professional inter-relationships. Although interviews were not designed 
specifically to investigate multi-disciplinary team working, changes in working 
relationships emerge from interview narratives as a universal challenge within worlds of 
mental health care, but one which affects the various professional groups in rather 
different ways.
6 Interestingly, three years on, there are signs that this prediction is being lived out in the increasing pre­
occupation of the British media with the failure of community care, typically objectified in stories of tragic and 
violent episodes involving mentally ill people living in the community. This is accompanied by growing public 
debate around the need for tighter community supervision of ’high risk’ (ie dangerous) patients and public calls 
for more secure facilities for mentally ill offenders.
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2.1 The Challenges of Multi-disciplinary Team W ork
In both Britain and France, the provision of mental health care by an integrated multi­
disciplinary team of professionals is central to recent community care legislation. This 
very fact of multi-disciplinarity reinforces many aspects of professional ’common sense’ 
which have already been elaborated. For example, eclecticism and teamwork embody 
the assumed impossibility of any single ’right’ way of understanding or reacting to mental 
illness, aiding professionals in their construction of multi-perspective understandings and 
reactions to mental ill health. Similarly, the inclusion in these teams of a wide range of 
non-medical ’caring professions’ and practitioners who work in a range of welfare, 
educational and personal development arenas perpetuates a representation of mental health 
work as a broad and essentially social endeavour, of which medical interventions are only 
a part.
However, tensions between the powerful legacy of the past and the impetus for change 
raise several fundamental issues regarding the status and remit of various professional 
groups. Perhaps most significantly, multidisciplinary teamwork challenges the 
historically established dominance of medicine in the world of mental health. Although 
this century has seen the rise of many professionally autonomous mental health workers, 
psychiatry has generally retained its position of power7. This is most obvious in two 
contexts. Firstly, the power of psychiatry is evident in hospital teams on both sides of 
the Channel, where care strategies and daily routines have changed little with the 
implementation of community care policies, and there is more reliance on medical 
treatments than in community services. Secondly, across most services in France, power 
is retained in the managerial roles of psychiatrists in planning and running local services. 
It is primarily in community-based settings where more egalitarian multi-disciplinary 
teams can be found8.
n
The fact that psychiatrists remain the only profession who can prescribe medication, and as such, carry 
much greater legal responsibility than other professional groups helps this situation to endure.
8 For example, in Britain the day centre in West Lambeth is run by a team of nurses, social workers 
and occupational therapists, with only sessional input from a psychiatrist. In France, the 24 hour drop-in 
centre in Secteur 1, Paris represents a radical departure from traditionally organised services in that 
psychiatric nurses are entirely responsible for the evaluation and referral of all new cases.
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Other difficulties in multi-disciplinary team working appear to revolve around two main 
issues. Firstly, tensions between diversity of opinion and a need for minimal levels of 
consensus, and secondly role ambiguities. The first of these is illustrated below:
’What is difficult at the day centre is that we are a team of practitioners who don’t all have 
the same orientation. It can be very enriching, but sometimes it’s difficult because you want 
things to be done in a certain way according to your own personal orientation, whereas other 
people may want something else, and it’s not always easy to find a compromise.’ (F30)
The different theoretical and practical perspectives on mental illness that diverse 
professionals bring to a multidisciplinary team can be a double-edged sword. Just as a 
lexicon of shared terminology allows professionals to collectively anchor a client’s mental 
health problems (Chapter 6, section 3.2), so a minimal level of consensus between team 
members is required if they are to communicate and make practical decisions.
A second area of difficulty concerns role blurring. Having spent much of the twentieth 
century carving out distinct areas of specialism and professionally unique theories and 
bodies of knowledge (see Appendix 3), mental health practitioners are now required to 
pool their understandings and work much more closely with each other than ever before. 
Given this history, overlap is likely to provoke the defense of unique professional 
’territories’:
’I’m happy when each person sticks to their role. ... To a certain extent I find it difficult to 
work as a team. If several people are involved with one patient I find it easier when each 
person does his own thing, giving others the elements they need to do their own work, but 
without interfering. I can’t tolerate things getting diluted very well.’ (F16)
Similar areas of difficulty in multi-disciplinary team work have been identified by several 
other studies of mental health teams. For example, Ramon (1992 p94-5) notes that 
’interdisciplinary work is often presented by workers as a major source of conflict and 
strife, of consistent discontent’. This author attributes the difficulties to unrealistic 
expectations, inter-disciplinary competition and collective myths about the incompatibility 
of other professions’ models. In the context of services for people with learning 
difficulties, Dockrell, Gaskell & Rehman (1990) note that both horizontal integration 
(between team members) and vertical integration (between practitioners and managers) 
are crucial to the successful development of community services. And in a recent study
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of community mental health teams in Britain, Onyett, Pillinger & Muijen (1995) report 
that role ambiguity is a particular problem of multi-disciplinary approaches to community 
care, associated with stress and job dissatisfaction. Practitioners are now members of 
two professional groups (their discipline and their team) and this research predicts that 
the ideal conditions for team working would be those in which each discipline has a clear 
and valued role within the team, allowing team membership to coexist with rather than 
challenge professional identities.
Faced with these various difficulties there is sometimes a tendency to fall back on more 
traditional professional relationships and established role definitions. Kirk & Kutchins 
(1992) conceptualise the standardised divisions of labour within mental health 
organisations as a way of dealing with the ambiguities and uncertainties which permeate 
this professional world. In times of rapid change, in which multi-disciplinary teams are 
the site of power struggles between professionals and redefinitions of professional 
identities, the clarity of historically established roles (even if these are unequal) may 
provide a valuable sense of stability and orientation. Traditional hierarchies may be 
implicitly retained as a way of providing the reassurance of clarity of leadership.
’There’s still a very obvious hierarchy there. It’s less rigid - people don’t assume that the 
higher up the hierarchy you get, the righter you get. You certainly have more experience and 
you have more theoretical knowledge to go on, but ultimately I think a junior nurse and a 
consultant can often shed the same light on a problem. ... People have different things to 
offer and they’re equally valuable, although ultimately somebody has to bear responsibility 
and make decisions and that is invariably going to be a hierarchical thing. ’ (B8)
2.2 Struggling with the Changes: Social Workers and Clinical Psychologists
Given the historical positionings of the various professional groups, it is evident that 
different practitioners come to this situation from very different perspectives. The 
current research identifies two professional groups whose perspectives on 
multidisciplinary teamwork are unique: The experiences of social workers and clinical 
psychologists are worthy of comment not only because they are described as particularly 
difficult, but because these difficulties are manifestations of more general shifts and 
contemporary dynamics in the world of mental health. In particular, the concerns of 
social workers reflect current questions regarding the boundaries of mental health work, 
and how it relates to other social agencies, whilst the difficulties experienced by clinical
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psychologists reflect current challenges to the traditional dominance of a medical 
perspective.
Although differences between professional groups are generally minimal, the experiences 
of social workers in the implementation of community-based care are highly distinctive. 
On both sides of the Channel, social work respondents in particular talk about acute 
difficulties and dissatisfactions with the current nature of their work. Recent and on­
going policy changes appear to be placing particularly heavy strains on mental health 
social workers, particularly in France, where unanimous feelings of discontent are 
expressed by all the social workers interviewed. French social workers feel undervalued 
by psychiatrists and other colleagues in the mental health team, scape-goated, 
marginalised and tom between the often conflicting agendas of mental health teams and 
social services:
’I’m ordered about by the patients, the doctors, and the social workers at the town council, 
and sometimes that makes me feel very uncomfortable. Sometimes the psychiatric team 
doesn’t understand, or doesn’t want to understand. They think it’s important to have links 
with other services, but more in terms of just getting allowances or services for people than 
really working together. I find it quite disturbing - 1 think the psychiatric team is quite put 
out by the social services, which are also extremely powerful, and sometimes the social 
worker becomes everybody’s scapegoat. Sometimes I’m the target of aggression and 
incomprehension from the psychiatric team about what is happening in the outside world, 
because I represent that outside world. I think it’s also a form of self protection for 
psychiatrists in relation to the outside world. Psychiatry has its limits of course, and when 
it comes up against those limits it tries to see if another response can be found elsewhere. 
And because they are not specialists in social issues they’ll say "I can’t do that for this 
patient, so it’s down to the social worker to do it". But sometimes reality means that we 
can’t offer what the doctors would like us to offer. Sometimes there’s a lot of 
misunderstanding, with each person stuck in their own world. (FI8)
Social workers in France have become the victims of current debates highlighted in 
section 1.1 surrounding the boundaries between psychiatry and social services. As 
professionals involved in welfare and health services struggle to redefine new roles and 
relationships, and the remit of mental health widens and becomes less clearly defined than 
in the era of institutional care, tensions are felt most acutely by practitioners who work 
at the interface between health and social services. Mental health social workers are 
doubly marginalised, regarded as only token members of both mental health teams and 
social services. Their experiences reflect the challenges of community care for mental 
health services in reacting to the mentally ill as social beings, while nevertheless 
maintaining a distinctive mental health approach. Social workers become the messengers
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in the continuous ’buck passing’ which occurs between various social agencies faced with 
the enduring nature of mental health problems and social inequalities.
Whilst many of the experiences of British social workers parallel those of their French 
colleagues, their difficulties are slightly less acute, and reflect somewhat different 
structural issues. For British social workers, perhaps more than for any other profession, 
the implementation of community care policies is equated with significant increases in 
work-load, responsibilities, and a shift in the nature of work towards greater concern with 
finances and the targeting of scarce resources:
’What I think it (community care) has meant is that there is more work for us to do.
Whereas before if someone needed a day centre with nothing else, a nurse could refer or the 
person could refer them self, now everybody who needs any service has to come via a social 
worker. So it increases our paperwork. It’s also increased the amount and the categories of 
people we are supposed to see and assess on wards. With the turn over of the number of 
people on the ward, and all the other work we’ve got, you can’t, with the best will in the 
world, keep up with that. You just can’t do it unfortunately. So the general thing that I feel, 
and probably the rest of us feel, is that it has increased paperwork and increased the 
expectations of our work. ’ (B25)
Recent changes in the funding of British mental health services means that social workers 
are now implicated in all referrals of mentally ill clients to any community or social 
services facility. One respondent describes this shift as social work ’becoming simply 
a means tester’ (B12). Social workers in Britain bear much of the brunt of the budgetary 
limitations imposed on the development of community care, as well as taking on 
increasing responsibilities in their legal role in compulsory hospital detentions on the 
grounds of serious mental illness. These findings parallel those of the recent Onyett, 
Pillinger & Muijen (1995) study, which reports that compared to other professional 
groups, social workers show the least overall job satisfaction, lowest levels of satisfaction 
with work relationships, high levels of emotional exhaustion and depersonalization, and 
a low sense of personal accomplishment. On a more positive note, all the British social 
workers in the current study report receiving professional support and training to help 
them negotiate these changes.
The second professional group whose common experiences of multidisciplinary teamwork 
mark them out from other professional groups are clinical psychologists. In both Britain 
and France, clinical psychologists in this study express difficulties establishing their 
position within multidisciplinary teams, and report a continual struggle to carve out a
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valid and valued perspective against the dominance of psychiatry:
’The unique position of the clinical psychologist shouldn’t be considered a superficial 
position, but as fundamental to the team. The problem is that at the moment we inhabit a 
rather marginal position, which is often seen as something rather superfluous. People don’t 
quite know what the psychologist is doing there, whereas for me it’s a fundamental role.
(F25)
’I see psychology as being quite different from other mental health professions. I think 
traditionally mental health or mental ill health has been diagnosed by medical people. ... As 
psychologists we are less interested in diagnoses and names and labels and more interested 
in making psychological formulations - tying up all the information about that person with a 
view to trying to understand them. ... I think psychology’s about making individual 
formulations for each person’s problems, and the treatment very much depends on that 
formulation, rather than what label you’ve given their difficulty.... I think there’s a place for 
both medicine and psychology to work hand in hand. I think we should be working together.
So I don’t think one is better than the other, but I wouldn’t be a psychologist if I didn’t 
believe that was the preferred or more fruitful way to work with people’s psychological 
difficulties. (B17)
Recent professionalisation of the discipline, together with the significant contribution of 
psychological theories and therapies to expert understandings and treatments of mental 
ill health (for example, social learning theories, and cognitive perspectives) mean that, 
of all the mental health professions, clinical psychology represents the most significant 
challenge to the dominance of psychiatry. Yet there is currently an imbalance between 
the influence of psychology on a theoretical level and the status accorded to psychology 
practitioners. Struggles with the implicit power of the medical profession, and difficulties 
of presenting other perspectives are amongst the most important current concerns of the 
clinical psychology profession in Britain (Johnstone, 1993). Together with 
psychotherapists, clinical psychologists are the profession who claim to make most use 
of theory in their practical work, a strategy which may well be related to the desire to 
enhance their professional status. What seems most likely is that the experiences of 
clinical psychologists represent not only the struggles of a single profession, but are 
indicative of current erosions of the medical power base in the world of mental health.
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3 Community Care and Professional Social Representations
The themes presented in sections 1 and 2 of this chapter represent a snap-shot of 
professionals’ opinions and experiences of the implementation of mental health policies 
taken at a particular historical moment within a longer and more general process of 
change in public mental health care strategies. But can a more general understanding of 
the impact of community-based care policies be developed? Extrapolating from this 
historically and geographically situated data, this section conceptualises the impact of 
these change processes on professional social representations, highlighting three 
overlapping aspects. Firstly, the novelties, ambiguities and lack of knowledge associated 
with community care policies augment the uncertainties which are already a defining 
feature of professional representations of mental illness. Secondly, current mental health 
policies constitute significant challenges to many aspects of these representations. And 
thirdly, community care policies highlight the conflicting agendas of various social 
worlds, bringing into sharp focus the position of professionals at the interface between 
these agendas and the consequent difficulties with which their daily work is imbued.
3.1 Augmenting Representational Uncertainties
’We’re working in a structure where there isn’t really any precedent. It’s a new type of 
structure which has only been around in psychiatry for the last ten years. So we haven’t 
really come to any conclusions regarding savoir faire. We’re breaking new ground. 
Situations develop and we innovate. ... There are some general reference points, but they’re 
less easy to pick out than at the hospital because the whole project and the type of responses 
are more personal. So it’s more difficult to pass them on to other people because you’re 
faced with a new situation every time. At the hospital you can fall back on a classification 
system - you know there are certain signs and a standard treatment, and you follow a 
protocol. Here we have certain lines of conduct, but no protocol.’ (F2)
’I’ve been working here for a bit more than ten years, and I’ve seen psychiatry evolve from 
being very hospital based to wanting to get out of the hospital and pull down the walls of the 
asylum. From eighty hospital beds we went down to eighteen or twenty, and we’ve now 
gone up again to twenty five. ... I feel that at the moment we’re going through a period of 
a kind of apprenticeship, and that we’re not managing to move beyond this difficult period 
too well.’ (F18)
It is clear from interview narratives that the implementation of community care policies 
equates with change and uncertainty in daily working practices. In disentangling the 
origins and semantics of this uncertainty, several sources can be identified. First and 
foremost, novelty is a prime cause of uncertainty. Professional communities are in the
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midst of radically rethinking and reworking the established daily practices upon which 
their historically grounded representations of mental illness rest. Particularly for the 
older generation of mental health professionals, working with the mentally ill as social 
beings integrated (more or less) into society is a radical departure from the more 
institutional work they were trained for, and one which requires new styles of relating, 
new aims and goals. There are clear parallels here with Kuhn’s (1963, 1970) notion of 
shifting ’paradigms’, in which challenges to the basic assumptions and practices of an 
expert community initiate crisis and revolution. In this case however, old 
representational anchors may have been firmly rejected, but new ones are not yet in 
place. The professional community may be sure of what it has rejected, but it is still in 
the midst of deciding what to replace this with. Furthermore, this process is hindered 
by generally low levels of knowledge and understanding of current and recent policy 
changes within the professional community. Professionals regard themselves as 
uninvolved and under-informed about current policy changes (section 1.2), and there is 
currently a striking lack of consensual understandings of what the notion of ’community 
care’ actually means. The ’top-down’ ways in which policy changes have been 
introduced (especially in Britain) engender uncertainty in professionals regarding the 
political and organisational frameworks underpinning their practice.
Individualised care strategies, which are enshrined in contemporary mental health policies 
in both countries, are another source of professional uncertainty. The deliberate attempt 
to provide packages of treatment appropriate to the needs of specific individuals means 
that mental health work necessarily becomes less standardized. As analysis in Chapter 
6 shows, the work of mental health professionals becomes an active, constructive process 
of integrating multiple strategies, characterised by high levels of uncertainty and minimal 
reliance on theory and standard protocols.
A final reason why community care augments representational uncertainty relates to the 
ambiguities inherent in the complex social semantics of the notion of ’community’. 
Whilst any organisational change or disruption of the status quo is liable to produce some 
degree of anxiety and concern in its replacement of what is known with what is unknown, 
ambiguities surrounding the relationships between mental illness and the social 
environment evoke many more questions and uncertainties than can be attributed to 
organisational change per se. The world of mental health is replete with assorted
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understandings of how mental illness relates to notions of ’the community’. For example, 
while the community has been implicated in the aetiology of mental health problems (as 
a source of stress, or due to social deprivations and inequalities), it has also been 
construed as a potential source of support and therapeutic value. Similarly, in its journey 
towards becoming a social reality, the notion of ’community care’ has been associated 
paradoxically with both left-wing and right-wing political ideologies (the former through 
the anti-psychiatry and human rights movements of the 1960s, the latter more recently, 
through promotion of the values of independence and individualism, and reductions in 
state welfare provision). These ambiguities map onto broader social concerns in which 
the concept of ’community’ in post-modern society is an area of much current debate 
(Berger et al 1974; Giddens 1991).
Organisational change is simultaneously a chance for innovation, initiative and creativity, 
and a potential source of stress and tensions. In the case of professionals living through 
the introduction of community-based care for the mentally ill, the combination of novelty, 
semantic ambiguities, and lack of control render this primarily a source of struggles with 
uncertainty. As the analysis in preceding chapters highlights, uncertainty and agnosticism 
are already defining features of professional representations of mental illness. Current 
changes and instabilities at the level of policy may unsettle professional communities by 
adding yet more uncertainty to their practice-based representations of mental illness.
3.2 Community Care as a Social Representational Challenge
It was proposed at the beginning of this chapter that community care represents the most 
dramatic shift in societal reactions to mental illness since the beginnings of confinement. 
As such, it constitutes a dramatic challenge to how mental illness is socially represented 
in requiring that society integrates those it has traditionally defined as threatening, 
different and worthy of a marginalised or excluded social position. A significant part of 
the work of mental health practitioners becomes that of challenging these common sense 
understandings of mental illness, and suggesting to society that new ways of reacting 
mental ill health are possible and preferable. New practices enacted by professionals 
challenge the historically established anchor of ’otherness’ which society has traditionally 
used to make sense of mental illness.
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The theoretical implications of these representational ambiguities are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 8 (section 2.1), which attempts to conceptualise the complexities of 
current societal understandings of mental illness. Keeping the focus on professional 
representations for the time being, there are several knock-on effects of community care 
which constitute specific challenges to professional representations. For example, as well 
as requiring professionals to challenge societal assumptions about mental illness, 
implementing community care may also challenge professionals’ own tacit beliefs about 
mental illness (remembering that lay representations can be considered as integral 
elements of professional social representations). As Jacques (1955) and Menzies (1960) 
highlight, organisational change may be resisted because it undermines the use of 
established working structures and routines as collective defenses against anxiety. 
Community care also entails a challenge in the domain of professional identities 
requiring, as we have seen, radical changes in professional roles and relations such that 
previous areas of specialism, hierarchies and professional distinctions are broken down. 
It also challenges the world of mental health in provoking questions regarding the social 
role and positioning of mental health services. Where are the boundaries of mental health 
services’ remit, and how do they interrelate with other social agents, namely social 
services and medicine? The representations emerging from this research suggest that the 
world of mental health is increasingly defining itself as distinct from medicine. But this 
shift away from general medicine, and the prevailing view of mental health work as a 
social endeavour brings with it challenges to the boundaries and respective roles of 
mental health workers and social services.
3.3 Highlighting Conflicting Agendas
In increasing uncertainties and provoking representational challenges, the recent policy 
changes highlight tensions and incompatibilities between the agendas of the various social 
worlds involved in the construction of social knowledge. As such, they bring into sharp 
focus the unique and difficult ’cross-roads’ position of mental health professionals who 
act as translators, vectors and integrators of various belief systems and demands (Chapter 
3, section 2.6). Professionals are faced with the task of developing strategies of care for 
the mentally ill which are simultaneously consonant with policy directives, legitimate in 
the eyes of the lay public, and acceptable to clients themselves. Awareness of these
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multiple agendas forces professionals to recognise that the success of the strategies they 
implement is, to a large extent, out of their hands:
I :  H o w  d o  y o u  s e e  t h e  f u t u r e  o f  t h e  m e n t a l  h e a l t h  s y s t e m  i n  F r a n c e ?
F 2 :  I t ’ s  c o m p l i c a t e d  b e c a u s e  I  t h i n k  e s s e n t i a l l y  i t ’ s  l i n k e d  t o  t w o  v a r i a b l e s  w h i c h  w e  c a n ’ t  
c o n t r o l .  T h e y  a r e  t h e  e c o n o m i c  s i t u a t i o n ,  b e c a u s e  n o t h i n g  c a n  b e  d o n e  w i t h o u t  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
r e s o u r c e s ,  a n d  a l s o  w h a t  s o c i e t y  w a n t s .  I s  s o c i e t y  a w a r e  o f  m e n t a l  h e a l t h ,  a n d  i f  i t  i s  w h a t  
s o r t  o f  s o l u t i o n s  d o e s  i t  w a n t  t o  g i v e ?  S o  w e  a r e  a t  t h e  c o n j u n c t i o n  o f  s e v e r a l  e l e m e n t s .
In implementing community care, there is a confrontation of old and new, an antagonistic 
meeting of what is historically established as a given (the mentally ill as different and 
dangerous) with innovation and change. Research reviewed in Chapter 2 shows how 
members of the lay public prefers to distance and differentiate themselves individually 
and collectively from those defined as mentally ill. They may accept general arguments 
about tolerance, civil rights, and the horrors of large scale institutionalisation, but the 
’not-in-my-back-yard’ syndrome is alive and kicking. And as Jodelet’s (1991) study so 
powerfully illustrates, there is a big difference between integration into the community 
in terms of shared physical space, and true psychosocial integration. Professionals are 
likely to face scepticism and resistance from the public in their attempts to support 
mentally ill people as equal and valid members of society.
As well as these substantial tensions with the desires and representations of the lay 
public, community care also enhances agenda conflict with the world of politics and 
policy making. As analysis in section 1 illustrates, professionals are deeply concerned 
about government funding of community care policies and suspect that policy makers may 
be primarily motivated to cut costs. This sits uneasily with professionals’ representations 
of their work as a long term endeavour, requiring multiple interventions, and 
comprehensive networks of community based and hospital facilities. Especially in 
Britain, where change has been imposed rapidly with little consultation with practitioners, 
professionals feel they are being asked to enact political agendas which neither they, the 
public, or mental health ’experts’ are entirely in agreement with. However, although 
professionals are highly critical of many aspects of current policy, they are generally in 
agreement with the broad principles of community based care. Thus, a more complex 
picture emerges of major conflicts between professional and political worlds in the area 
of mental health, but also of professional ambivalence. Relations between policy makers 
and professionals are clearly more complex than universal antagonism.
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To conclude this chapter, the professionals in this study are vital actors in the on-going 
process of carving out how society makes sense of and constructs the notion of 
’community care’, and in shaping mental health strategies which will take us into the 
twenty-first century. Whilst the practitioners investigated in this study are united both 
nationally and internationally in their belief that community-based care for the mentally 
ill is generally a desirable ideal, the discrepancies between this and their perceptions of 
the realities of community care are striking. Cross national variations in concerns over 
implementation reflect structural and organisational differences between Britain and 
France: There is general concern in both countries over limited financial resources, but 
in France this is perceived primarily as hindering the speed of change, whereas in Britain 
financial constraints are judged to effect the amount of community facilities. The over­
riding sense amongst British professionals of living through a period of rapid and 
dramatic change in working practices, over which they have little control, understanding 
or general knowledge, risks creating not only disorientation, but also disillusionment.
Current changes disrupt the fragile status quo in the social position of mental health 
professionals and the internal workings of their representations. Both within the mental 
health services and in interaction with other social agencies, practitioners are struggling 
to renegotiate new working relationships. The impact of these changes on professional 
social representations can be conceptualised as three interrelated effects: Community care 
adds further uncertainty to professional representations already characterised by much 
uncertainty; as a paradigmatic shift, it poses challenges to several aspects of these 
representations, such as professional identities and the remit of mental health services; 
and it highlights and enhances tensions between mental health professionals and other 
social spheres, particularly the lay public and the world of politics. Within this climate 
of change, professional representations of mental illness are currently the site of much 
debate, negotiation and power struggles. The result of this rhetorical and practical 
activity is the construction of practical strategies in the on-going endeavour of mental 
health care, which constitute insecure compromises rather than fixed solutions. This 
theme of professional social representations as compromise will be taken up and discussed 
in more detail in the following chapter.
226
CHAPTER 8
EMPIRICAL INTEGRATION. THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS
AND IMPLICATIONS
This final chapter draws together the principle empirical findings of the thesis, and uses 
these as the basis for reflections on both theoretical and substantive issues. As a 
conclusion to the thesis it has four aims:
Firstly, (in section 1) it summarises what this research shows about the social 
representations of mental illness which circulate amongst mental health practitioners in 
France and Britain, contextualising these findings in relation to other domains of social 
knowledge. Whilst the uncertainty found in these representations is also a feature of 
professional knowledge in general medicine, it is argued that the area of mental health 
is characterised by particularly high levels of doubt and speculation. In comparison to 
common sense, professional representations of mental illness are more complex and less 
definitive, with otherness themes existing as one of several areas of debate rather than 
as an unquestioned defining feature. Similarities between British and French professional 
representations generally outweigh differences, and professionals of all disciplines are 
united by broadly similar representations. The most consistent cross cultural difference 
centres around the influence of psychodynamic ideas which hold more sway in 
professionals causal models and in daily working practice in France.
Secondly, the chapter aims to explore the functional aspects of professional social 
representations. Section 2 proposes that professional social representations serve 
important compromise functions helping practitioners to reconcile tensions and 
ambiguities which they confront in their daily work. Areas in which reconciliation and 
compromise are required are classified into those relating specifically to professional 
representations of mental illness, those which may occur in all professional social 
representations, and those pertaining to more generic social representational processes.
The third aim of the chapter is to use the empirical analysis of the thesis to address 
current lacunae in the theory of social representations. Accordingly, section 3 speculates
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on the theoretical consequences of otherness, multiplicity, ambiguity, notions of 
unfamiliarity, and several other themes which have emerged from this research, 
suggesting ways in which the theory could be fruitfully modified and refined to account 
for these characteristics of our social world.
The forth and final aim of the chapter is to speculate on the implications of this research, 
both in respect of future social psychological research that this study suggests and in 
terms of the issues it raises for contemporary mental health care. Some suggestions for 
professional training and strategies which could facilitate the implementation of 
community based care are made. The thesis concludes with a reminder of the social 
relevance of this form of research.
1 R evisiting  ’Professional Social Representations’
1.1 Representing Mental Illness: Social understandings and professional uncertainties
Rather than attempting to summarise the findings of the previous three empirical 
chapters, Figure 8.1 presents a graphical illustration of the professional representations 
of mental illness which have emerged from this investigation. Building on the proposed 
structure of professional representations developed in Chapter 3 (and illustrated in Figure
3.3), the principle findings are grouped according to five components of professional 
representations: theory, practice, professional identities, organisational factors and lay 
representations. Some of the clearest inter-relationships between aspects of these 
knowledge spheres are illustrated using arrows (although doubtless other connections 
could also be added).
Following the detailed expositions in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the contents of each of the five 
domains in the main section of Figure 8.1 should be self-evident. Rather than reiterating 
these details, this review aims to take a broader perspective, contextualising these 
empirical findings within the broader tapestry of social knowledge of which they form 
a part. Representations of mental illness must overlap with understandings of other forms 
of deviance such as physical illness, and rest upon implicit collective representations of 
life, human nature, and relationship of individuals and society. The delineation of a
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Figure 8.1: Professional Social Representations of Mental Illness 
A Graphical Summary
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specific area of social knowledge for the purpose of research is, to some extent, a false 
boundary, which carries with it risks of decontextualisation. In order to appreciate the 
full social meaning of any branch of knowledge, we must look beyond the limits of a 
single study, to position its findings within the broader web of inter-connecting social and 
collective representations. Accordingly, this section focuses on the ’bed-rock’ themes in 
the lower part of the figure, which constitute the defining characteristics of these 
representations. The inter-related representational features of ’social’ and relational 
understandings, multiplicity, and uncertainty, and their linkages to other spheres of social 
knowledge will be considered in turn. (A forth characteristic, namely internal tensions 
and inconsistencies, is the focus of section 2 which considers functional aspects of 
professional representations.)
First and foremost, the representations of mental illness which emerge from this research 
constitute an essentially ’social’ model of mental illness. In other words, the mental 
health or illness of an individual is judged by professionals not in isolation, but relation 
to the norms of the social world in which they live. To be defined as mentally ill, an 
individual must be judged to be not only distressed, but also different from other people 
in a way that disrupts normative ways of being and relating. This concern with social 
functioning reflects a broad shift in the nature of professional practice, away from its 
historical roots of treating individuals in isolation from mainstream society. Not only in 
mental health, but in areas of general medicine, learning disabilities and so on, a concern 
with ’social functioning’ rather than symptomatology is now central to the work of 
practitioners from doctors to social workers, nurses, educationalists and care assistants. 
Socially oriented care policies force society to question its consensual notions of 
normality, deviance and difference, and bring these issues to the forefront of 
contemporary social representations. Whilst understandings of physical and mental health 
and illness have always been bolted onto notions of normality and abnormality1, 
professional concern surrounding the type of difference that mental ill health is 
(temporary or permanent, quantitative or qualitative) is indicative of how community- 
based care for social deviants forces society to contemplate the bounds of its tolerance 
and its criteria for acceptability.
1 That health is the default status or background condition from which various states of illness deviate and 
are marked as ’abnormal’ is illustrated simply, but powerfully, by the fact that people are referred to as 
’unhealthy’ (ie deviating from the norm), but never as ’un-ill’.
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The implication of inter-personal relationships is central to professionals’ ’social’ 
understandings of mental illness are manifested. For example, interpersonal relationships 
(especially familial relationships in childhood) are seen as important causal factors in 
mental health problems, which may be manifested in ways that disrupt current 
relationships or make the establishment of relational links (empathy and understanding) 
more difficult. Relational aspects of the work of mental health professionals are seen as 
vital building blocks which underpin all treatment strategies, compensating for other 
relationship difficulties or deprivations, and enabling trust and knowledge to be 
established. Many of the treatment interventions enacted by professionals (especially 
those taking a psychodynamic perspective or involving group activities) aim to encourage 
change in current relationships and ways of relating, and enabling the mentally ill to form 
and continue ’normal’ relationships in everyday life is one of the principle aims of 
contemporary mental health work. Although these relational themes can be traced in 
several spheres of expert knowledge (for example, psychodynamic, humanistic and social 
learning perspectives), their ubiquity, even amongst professionals who do not subscribe 
to these theoretical perspectives, betrays a more basic aspect of mental illness 
representation. Namely, it indicates that mental illness is not cast as an ’absolute other’, 
detached completely from social participation, but more as a problem of otherness and 
difference which must be tackled within the course of daily social intercourse. (This 
theme is addressed in more detail in section 3.1).
Two other defining features of professional representations of mental illness are 
multiplicity and uncertainty. Professional representations are multiple both in terms of 
conceptualising mental ill health as a polymorphous phenomenon (split primarily into 
’neuroses’ and ’psychoses’), and in their integration of various expert schools of thought. 
Chapter 6 suggests that it is because of their agnostic stance and their uncertainties 
regarding treatment selection and outcome, that professional generally choose to adopt 
multiple and eclectic strategies in daily practice. This is confirmed by observations of 
ward rounds and team meetings (a secondary data source) in which it is not unusual for 
debate about a particular individual’s mental health problems their treatment to last for 
thirty minutes or more2. A sense of ’going round in circles’ and failing to reach any
2 This is within the context of services which may have between fifty and one hundred clients on their 
books at any one time.
231
definitive understanding is common in these team discussions. In the face of this 
acknowledged collective uncertainty, mental health teams invariably resort to multiple 
treatment strategies in the hope that something they do might make a degree of difference 
to the person’s quality of life. Perhaps the only relative certainty amongst these 
professionals is that they are not involved in the business of cure, but are practitioners 
who work within the parameters set by the enduring nature of most mental health 
problems.
Throughout the twentieth century and further back into the history of mental health care, 
’expert opinion’ has provided various ways of approaching mental distress (medically, 
behaviourally, psychodynamically and socially, for example). Although each of these has 
had its heyday and received its share of criticisms, none of them have been entirely 
discredited. Their contemporary coexistence offers mental health professionals, whose 
working remit is now extremely wide, a heterogenous pool of expert knowledge from 
which they can select and combine elements in their daily practice and their continual 
struggles to make sense of the elusive phenomenon of mental illness. Interestingly, 
although the basic principles of these various perspectives may be logically inconsistent, 
professionals rarely regard theoretical inconsistencies as a problem. The compatibility 
of their practical derivatives is assumed in eclectic daily practice. This situation 
highlights two important features of professional common sense in the world of mental 
health. Firstly, it suggests that links between theory and practice are tenuous. Secondly, 
such multiplicity debunks the myth perpetuated by simplistic research designs, that 
professionals can be categorised according to subscription to single models of mental 
illness (for example, Rabkin 1972, Strauss et al 1964, Thommen et al 1992). Instead, 
it is the relative weight or importance given to each perspective that is the differentiating 
factor between mental health workers.
As noted in Chapter 3, multiplicity and uncertainty are features of professional knowledge 
uncovered by other studies of the world of mental health (for example, Kirk & Kutchins 
1992, Prior 1993, Strauss et al 1964, Zani 1987, 1993). However, research conducted 
in similar professional spheres suggests this is not unique to the mental health 
professions. The work of the medical sociologist Fox (1988) highlights how the 
professional world of physical illness is also imbued with high levels of uncertainty. Fox 
conceptualises medical training as ’training in uncertainty’ which derives from medical
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students’ incomplete mastery of available knowledge, the limitations of medical 
knowledge, and the difficulties of distinguishing between these two. She suggests that 
medical students and doctors develop collective coping mechanisms to deal with this 
professional uncertainty, such as strong group identities, and attempts to achieve as much 
cognitive command of the situation as possible through acquisition of medical knowledge 
and technical skills (’learning to conjure possibilities and probabilities’ as one of her 
medical student interviewees puts it). Compared to general medicine, expert 
understandings of mental distress are general regarded as ’less advanced’. For medically 
trained psychiatrists (as well as some nurses) who experience the transition between these 
two worlds, treatment decisions in mental health work are made harder and more 
uncertain by the current transition to community based care, and by the more ethically 
loaded nature of the work. More than in general medicine, there is a need to take 
account of patients’ opinions and wishes, not only for moral reasons, but also because 
information about mental health problems can often only be obtained through self-report, 
rather than through independent, ’objective’ measures such as blood tests, X-rays or urine 
samples.
Finally, how do professional representations of mental illness compare to their counter­
parts in the world of lay thinking and common sense? As argued in Chapter 3, 
professional representations should be regarded as emerging from, and forming part of 
a socio-historically specific web of constructed social knowledge, such that elements of 
common sense are contained within professional representations. Beyond the general 
structural features which differentiate professional representations from lay understandings 
(inclusion of ’expert knowledge’, the enactment of professional competencies, and so on), 
this analysis suggests that professional understandings of mental illness depart from 
common sense in two inter-related ways. Firstly they are more differentiated and 
complex, and secondly, they are less definitively set in stone as unquestioned social 
realities.
Whilst polymorphism and the coexistence of multiple forms of knowledge have been 
identified as characteristics of lay understandings of both mental and physical illness in 
studies conducted across Europe and North America in the last two decades (for example, 
Bastounis 1996, De Rosa 1987, Herzlich 1973, Glasgow University Media Group 1994a, 
Raty 1990, Stainton-Rogers 1991, Zani 1995), this complexity seems to be particularly
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exaggerated in professional knowledge systems. More than lay people, professionals 
understand mental ill health as a range of problems rather than a single entity. The most 
important distinction for professionals is between ’neuroses’ and ’psychoses’. Their 
representations of ’psychotic’ problems as permanent, fundamental and incomprehensible 
difference or ’otherness’ shows the clearest parallels with common sensical notions of 
mental illness. But the coexistence of views of neurosis as a less permanent and 
fundamental form of difference, and their unanswered questions regarding the types 
difference, disruption and distress that can be attributed to mental illness, undermine any 
fixed, constant and definitive understanding within the professional community. 
Somewhat paradoxically, as society’s ’practical experts’, mental health professionals may 
be more agnostic about mental illness than lay people. Their daily interactions with the 
mentally ill alert them to the arbitrary and partial nature of their understandings (a 
challenge which may be less common amongst lay people), such that professionals are 
less willing than the lay public to accept their social representations as fixed and 
ontologically real (Markova 1992).
Compared to lay people, professionals represent mental illness less definitively as a 
fearful and dangerous ’other’. Whilst danger, violence and ’risky’ behaviour are part of 
their representations, these are not such strongly defining and ubiquitous themes. 
’Otherness’ coexists with themes of the similarity of mental illness to more common or 
’normal’ experiences, and professionals recognise subjective distress as a key feature of 
mental ill health. They appear more willing to construct links through empathy and 
parallels between themselves and the mentally ill than lay people, who prefer to keep 
’psycho-social clear water’ between themselves and people defined as mentally ill. This 
suggests that professionals may be more at ease with integrationist policies than lay 
people, a relatively unremarkable finding, given that practitioners were at least partially 
responsible for this historical shift3.
3 Similar findings are reported by Zani (1987) who finds that in comparison to lay people, Italian mental 
health professionals tend to stress the diverse manifestations of mental health problems, and place more emphasis 
on social and environmental causes. Professionals in Italy have more complex views of treatment than lay 
people, emphasising the benefits of a range of strategies, and seeing the community as a more appropriate 
location for treatment than lay people do.
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1.2 Representational Variations
The analytic strategy adopted in this thesis has been open to both variation and consensus 
in the data corpus, with a priori segmentations of interview data according to nationality, 
professional groupings and location of work (hospital or community based settings) built 
into the qualitative investigations conducted using QSR-NUDIST (see Chapter 4, section
3.3). However, in reviewing the empirical findings in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, 
commonalities between interview respondents generally outweigh divergences. This is 
not to say that complete consensus is found. The intersection of a diverse range of 
beliefs and knowledge systems in professional representations generates continuous debate 
and questioning. Whether this diversity ever did, or will in the future distil into distinct 
representational positions is a matter of debate, but at the time of flux and transformation 
when this research was conducted, no such neat divisions could be made. In other words 
it has not been possible to identify coherent groups of respondents, either aligned to 
professional groupings, nationality or place of work, or clustered in some other way, who 
subscribe to obviously distinct and different representations of mental illness. The 
variations which are detected are more a matter of subtle differences in weight or 
emphasis.
In an attempt to rule out the possibility that qualitative analysis may have over-looked 
pattemings which might form the basis of several distinct representations, some multi­
variate quantitative analyses were also conducted. The details of the cluster analysis of 
respondents using data from twenty three of the principle variables developed in analysis 
are reported in Appendix 7. The results of this analysis show that, essentially, no 
meaningful clusters of respondents can be detected, and support findings from the 
thematic qualitative approach which suggest that professional understandings of mental 
illness consist of one representational field containing diverse and debated themes rather 
than several different and distinct representational positions. Given this, the purpose of 
this section is to draw together what representational variations have been found, by 
summarising comparisons made according to the three a priori divisions of the data 
corpus.
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i) Variations between France and Britain
The differences between British and French representations which emerge from this study 
illustrate the disjunctions between theory and practice which characterise professional 
representations. Essentially, whilst there are substantial differences in the types of expert 
theoretical knowledge which professionals in each country believe in and draw upon in 
making sense of mental illness, these differences diminish at the level of actual daily 
practice. It is as if French and British professionals anchor and make sense of their work 
with the mentally ill by drawing upon theories whose status has varied historically in the 
two countries, but they nevertheless do very similar things regardless of which country 
they work in and which theories they subscribe to. So, for example, accounts of 
essentially similar interactions with clients may be couched in terms of counselling (in 
Britain) or psychotherapy (in France).
Although cross-national differences are generally diminished by the eclecticism which is 
common in both countries, psychodynamic theories generally hold more sway in France, 
compared to a relatively greater influence of medical and social perspectives in Britain. 
This is clearly detected in professionals’ accounts of the genesis of mental illness 
(Chapter 5, section 3.2) and, to a lesser extent, in their practice (Chapter 6, section 2.1) 
in which pure forms of long-term psychotherapy are more common in France. Although 
medical interventions are equally as common in both countries, the historical dominance 
of the medical paradigm is very much still a part of current professional representations 
in Britain. This has been challenged in France by the rise of psychodynamic perspectives 
as a major ideology which has shaped both common sense and spheres of expert 
knowledge in the post war decades.
Not only are psychodynamic perspectives generally more influential amongst French 
practitioners, but historical divergences in the development of psychodynamic thinking 
in France and the Anglo-American world are detectable. Section 2.2 of Chapter 6 details 
how professionals describe their work with clients in terms of ’listening’ (in France) and 
’coping’ (in Britain). One could speculate that such divergences may rest in turn upon 
deeper cultural and religious differences between Britain and France. French styles of 
psychodynamic theorising centre around Jacques Lacan’s reinterpretations of Freud’s 
early work on dream interpretation, and focus on interpreting the language of the
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unconscious. In comparison, Anglo-American versions of psychodynamic thought, based 
on Freud’s later works and the conceptual development of ego defense mechanisms 
provided by Anna Freud, focus on the restoration of social and inter-personal functioning. 
It might be argued that ’coping’ and ’functioning’ are more congruent with the Protestant 
work ethic and a culture in which people are judged by their output and mechanical 
analogies are encouraged. To lead a ’normal’ life within this cultural context is to 
’function’ socially and inter-personally, and deviations such as mental ill health are 
construed as failures to ’function’ in a socially acceptable way. (In support of this 
speculation, references to ’coping’, ’functioning’ and ’managing’ in relation to mental 
illness are detected in 57% of British interview narratives, compared to only 17% of 
French interviews.)
ii) Variations between different professional groups
Generally speaking, analysis highlights very few cross-profession differences, a situation 
which, arguably, reflects the nature of modern professional practice in mental health: 
With the move away from hospital based care, not only is there a wider array of 
professional groups involved in care of the mentally ill than ever before, but the 
boundaries between these groups in daily practice are becoming increasingly blurred. All 
professionals, regardless of their status are now involved in the type of social and 
supportive work traditionally associated with the roles of nurses, social workers and 
occupational therapists.
The difficulties of this role ambiguity in multi-disciplinary teams are currently one of the 
most important areas of concern amongst professionals. Faced with challenges to 
traditional professional roles and hierarchies, the various professional groups hold onto 
some degree of professional distinctiveness through their respective professional bodies, 
training processes, and roles in carrying out certain specific tasks. For example, 
psychiatrists have legal responsibility for the prescription of medication; nurses are 
trained to deal with general medical complaints; clinical psychologists retain a monopoly 
over psychometric testing; social workers have unique knowledge of and relations with 
social services; and (in Britain) there is a mandatory requirement for psychiatrists and 
social workers to sanction the enforcement of legal restrictions and compulsory treatment.
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The two professional groups who stand out most in this research are clinical psychologists 
and social workers. However, this distinctiveness centres more around inter-professional 
issues than on general notions of mental illness and its treatment. Social workers are 
distinctive in their position on the inter-face between mental health and social services, 
and (particularly in France) experience difficulties in their working lives associated with 
this. Clinical psychologists stand out in three ways. Firstly, they occupy a distinctive 
position within multi-disciplinary mental health teams in which they are currently 
struggling to raise their status and define themselves in relation to psychiatry. Secondly 
they report a greater reliance on theory than other professions4. Third, the discipline of 
psychology is where differences between France and Britain are most clearly manifested. 
British clinical psychologists typically use eclectic practices, integrating cognitive- 
behavioural therapy, counselling and psychodynamic practices and ways of thinking. In 
comparison, their French counter-parts are more likely to conduct purer forms of long­
term psychotherapy.
iii) Variations between professionals working in different services
Given the diversity of working locations from which interview respondents were selected, 
surprisingly few representational differences between professionals working in acute 
hospital wards, inner city drop-in centres or suburban day centres emerge. This suggests 
that a common basic understanding of mental illness and the general endeavour of mental 
health work over-rides the very different daily tasks with which individual practitioners 
engage. However, the possibility can not be ruled out that the semantically based 
analysis conducted in this research may mask more other practice-based variations. 
Compared to research conducted recently by Prior (1993), which finds that in Northern 
Ireland representations amongst psychiatric hospital staff are dominated by a medical 
ideology, the current research suggests that the more social and relational understandings 
of mental illness which Prior detects amongst community based staff are a feature of all 
professionals’ social representations, regardless of where they work.
4 These two features may well be related, in that the citation of theory and the appropriation of bodies 
of ’expert’ psychological knowledge may serve to raise the status of clinical psychologists against the historical 
dominance of medicine.
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2 Functional Considerations; Professional Social Representations as 
Psycho-social Compromise
Chapter 3 describes ’professional social representations’ as spheres of collective 
knowledge held by practitioners such as teachers, doctors, psychiatrists and social 
workers through which these professional groups put their competencies into practice, and 
make sense of the aspects of human social life with which they are charged. Section 2.6 
of Chapter 3 conceptualises professionals as ’integrators, translators and vectors’ between 
the various agendas and sources of social knowledge derived from common sense, politics 
and ’experts’ which converge in their practical work. Following the empirical analysis 
of this thesis, this section returns to these functional considerations, elaborating a 
conceptualisation of professional social representations as practice-based belief systems 
which serve to reconcile several areas of tension and ambiguity that arise in professional 
practice. Many of these tensions are associated specifically with the work of caring for 
the mentally ill (section 2.1), but there are also paradoxes which apply more generally 
to the social position of a wide number of professionals (section 2.2), as well as tensions 
to be reconciled in the broader process of social representation per se (section 2.3). 
Table 8.1 summarises the specific tensions which arise within these three overlapping 
areas. It is argued in section 2.4 that whilst all representation necessarily involves some 
degree of compromise, the social position of professionals and the moral, social and 
inter-personal issues which are raised in contemporary mental health care imbue 
professional social representations of mental illness with a central purpose in helping 
practitioners to manage these dynamics, such that they are able to practice and retain a 
sense of professional competence and legitimacy in daily working life.
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Table 8.1: Tensions and Paradoxes within
Professional Social Representations of Mental Illness
Areas of Ambiguity Specific Paradoxes
MENTAL HEALTH 
WORK
- Respect of individuals and their wishes versus social 
norms of acceptability
- Requirements to react practically to mental illness 
versus professional uncertainty, inability to predict 
treatment outcome, and potential negative side effects
- Mental illness as incomprehensible and dangerous 
versus goals of understanding and proximity
THE SOCIAL POSITION 
OF PROFESSIONAL 
PRACTITIONERS
- Paradoxes inherent in the notion of ’professional 
carer’
- Professionals as self regulating, autonomous 
’experts’ versus the constraints of social institutional 
structures
- Professionals as implementors of change:- the power 
of established practices versus the impetus for 
innovation
- Convergence of the agendas of various social actors 
in professional practice (politicians, ’experts’, the 
public, service users)
SOCIAL
REPRESENTATIONAL
PROCESSES
- Tensions between familiarity and unfamiliarity; 
between pre-existence and novelty; between individual 
/ collective fantasies and needs, and the interactive 
demands of social life
2.1 The social ethics of mental health work
The work of mental health professionals is an essentially moral endeavour in its focus on 
people and attempts to change aspects of their lives and experiences. The analysis in 
Chapter 6 highlights how contemporary mental health work involves practitioners in an 
ever widening gamut of medical, intra-psychic, inter-personal and social aspects of their 
clients’ lives. Clients’ eating and sleeping habits, their family and marital relationships, 
the state of their home, their dreams, their use of public transport, even the clothes they
wear are all potentially open to the scrutiny and evaluation of mental health 
professionals5. Under the broad remit of ’enhancing life quality’, mental health work 
may involve encouraging change in virtually any area of the minutiae of daily life. Such 
decisions cannot be made without recourse to socially constructed norms which dictate 
what is considered ’normal’, ’desirable’ and ’appropriate’. Located within the 
community, mental health work is imbued with social ethics revolving around tolerance, 
difference and diversity. If mental ill health is understood socially as some form of 
relatively enduring difference, distress and social psychological disruption, then the work 
of mental health professionals is essentially to fmd a mutually acceptable space for 
difference in society, and to contain and manage distress and disruption within the bounds 
of society’s collective norms.
So, whilst interview discourses focus on how mental health work benefits mentally ill 
individuals, we cannot escape from the fact that much of the remit of these practices is 
to satisfy broader social agendas. If the mentally ill are to be cared for within the 
community, professionals must reassure the public and society at large that they are able 
to adequately contain and manage this fearful aspect of humanity, that the mentally ill 
can, with their help, live in society and behave in ways that are acceptable, that conform 
to social norms, and that are not disturbing to individuals, communities and the broader 
social status quo. Thus, the first tension which arises in mental health work is between 
the demands and needs of the mentally ill client and those of society in general, which 
may not necessarily be in accord. Evidence of this tension is detectable in several aspects 
of the empirical findings. For example, Chapter 5 highlights the unresolved issue of 
whether the mentally ill are people who are themselves distressed, or whether the key 
criteria is the evocation of distress in others (in other words the tension between 
distressed or distressing individuals). Although professionals define themselves as 
practitioners who possess specialist skills in listening, forming relationships and trying 
to understand the experiences of mental ill health (Chapter 6), they must also listen to the 
concerns of friends or family who may consider their behaviour to be intolerable,
5 Even within the confines of the psychiatric hospital, Goffman (1961, p 358) makes a similar point: ’All 
of the patient’s actions, feelings, and thoughts - past, present and predicted - are officially usable by the therapist 
in diagnosis and prescription. ... None of a patient’s business, then, is none of the psychiatrist’s business; 
nothing ought to be held back from the psychiatrist as irrelevant to his job. ... Almost any of the living 
arrangements through which the patient is strapped into his daily round can be modified at will by the 
psychiatrist, provided a psychiatric explanation is given. ’
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inappropriate or unsafe. Tolerance, openness and respect are frequently cited as personal 
qualities required to work in mental health, but professionals also have a social duty to 
respect the norms and expectations of society.
Invariably, when the wishes of an individual conflict with the demands and expectations 
of society at large, the later carry more weight. In such cases, it becomes untenable to 
include ’clients’ as willing partners in treatment, and professionals may find themselves 
dealing with people who regard themselves to be mentally healthy, calling upon legal 
statutes to curtail their freedom, or administering medicating against their will. Mental 
health practitioners grapple with these power inequalities daily in their work, and must 
ultimately decide upon ’the best’ course of action, whilst recognising that this may 
involve going against the wishes of some parties. (Similar ambivalences are reported 
amongst professionals charged with occupational of the mentally ill in France (Jodelet, 
1996).)
A second area of tension revolves around the fact that ’ideal’ solutions and treatment 
strategies are impossible to achieve in the world of mental health. Professionals’ agnostic 
stance means that they can never be more than tentative about the potential outcomes of 
any strategy. Their daily work is set against a background of assumed limitations in what 
they can hope to achieve, and collective knowledge that many mental health problems 
endure or reoccur, and that treatment strategies may produce unpleasant side effects6. 
Professionals must somehow reconcile their sense of uncertainty and limited 
understanding regarding mental ill health, its causes and its treatment with the 
expectations of clients and of society in general, that they will be able to offer some sort 
of definitive solution to the problems associated with mental illness.
Finally, tensions abound between mental health practice as aiming to understand and 
recognise the experiences of mentally ill clients, and collective professional 
understandings of some mental health problems (especially ’psychoses’) as fundamentally 
different forms of experience or being which renders full understanding or empathy
6 For example, asked about how satisfied he is with the outcomes of his work, a British psychiatrist makes 
the following comment: ’It’s very mixed. There are no panaceas. ... It’s always a compromise. And 
sometimes it’s horrific to realise that to get someone well, to keep them well, we are giving them medication 
that may be harmful, and they know it. I see plenty of people in out-patients who say the medication is awful, 
but they know that if they stop it they get unwell. But that’s the best we can offer.’ (B15)
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impossible. Working with the mentally ill requires physical proximity, and a degree of 
psychological closeness with phenomena to which common reactions are fear and the 
maintenance of clear psycho-social distance7. The establishment of professional 
identities, the use of theories as mediators, and the maintenance of symbolic differences 
in the organisation of most mental health services are illustrative of how professional 
representations help mental health practitioners overcome these ambiguities, allowing 
them to work with the mentally ill whilst positioning themselves as psycho-socially 
different and distant from them. The high levels of stress that professionals report are 
a testament to the difficulties of achieving this balance.
2.2 Paradoxes of ’the professional’
Whilst mental health professionals clearly face ambiguities and conflicts of interest in 
their daily work, many of these are not confined to the world of mental health, but are 
features which also characterise other people-based professions, and relate to the social 
role and positioning of expert practitioners8. Mental health professionals, medical 
practitioners, nurses and those who work with the elderly, the disabled or the socially 
disadvantaged are often referred to collectively as ’caring professions’. The notion of 
being a ’professional carer’ is deeply imbued with paradoxes and contradictions. To be 
a professional is to behave in a balanced and neutral way, according to collectively 
agreed standards of practice based on ’expert’ knowledge and theories, to make rational 
and unprejudiced decisions, to keep personal involvement to a minimum, and to establish 
clear and unambiguous relationships with clients. In contrast, the notion of ’care’ implies 
a degree of personal involvement sufficient for inter-personal empathy, support and the 
development of a unique and genuine relationship. The modem notion of ’professional 
carer’ renders ’care’ a technical and expert enterprise in which economic considerations
7 Rosenhan (1973, p 254) comments that ’most mental health professionals would insist that they are 
sympathetic towards the mentally ill, that they are neither avoidant nor hostile. But it is more likely that an 
exquisite ambivalence characterises their relations with psychiatric patients, such that their avowed impulses are 
only part of their entire attitude.’ This observation highlights the difficulties of detecting taken-for-granted or 
taboo collective semantics, an issue which is discussed in section 4 in relation to the use of individual interviews.
8 The reader is reminded that the model of ’professional social representations’ proposed in Chapter 3 
limits itself to ’people-based’ professions, such as teaching, medicine, and occupational groups associated with 
social welfare and ’caring’.
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meet existential needs. These challenges have been highlighted by several authors. For 
example, Menzies (1960) describes various aspects of ward practice as institutional 
defenses against the anxieties which the intimate nature of nursing work evokes. The 
requirements for medical students to attain a balance between empathy and objectivity are 
described by Fox (1988) as learning to develop ’detached concern’, and Goffman (1961, 
p 339) describes professionals’ ’cultivation of trustworthy disinterestedness’. There is 
recognition of similar paradoxes amongst the professionals in this research. For example, 
one respondent, talking of the centrality of the professional-client relationship, comments 
that ’that’s not pretending to be best mates or friends - it means being quite clear that as 
a professional, you are there to help and support.’ (B29)
Another set of paradoxes which unite professionals across a range of spheres concerns 
their membership of organisational structures. Larson (1977) describes the privilege of 
self regulation and the power to practice according to distinctive ’expert’ theories, 
knowledge and self generated ideologies as defining features of what it means to be ’a 
professional’. Yet professionals are also part of organisational structures such as schools, 
hospitals and the broader education and health systems these form part of, which are 
shaped invariably by economic and political agendas. As such, professionals’ freedom 
to act autonomously is curtailed by these structures, and they maintain an uneasy and 
ambiguous relationship with the social institutions they work within. The organisation 
is often experienced as having agendas which conflict with the interests of patients and 
the goals that professionals aim to achieve (Hasenfeld, 1992)9. Simultaneously, 
however, practitioners are also fundamentally reliant on these structures for their very 
existence and social integrity. Paradoxically, institutions both constrain and enable the 
professional groups who work within them.
Within the modem social context in which economic considerations are high on the social 
and political agendas and paramount in debates about the provision of health and social 
services, financial limitations are one of the most frequently cited ways that professionals 
experience organisational constraints. As health services are increasingly required to
9 For example, a British clinical psychologist comments, ’(my work) involves juggling the needs of the 
client with the needs of the system, the needs of the organisation. And although the organisation’s main aims 
would be to meet clients’ needs, often in my therapeutic work, I’m faced with questions of who am I doing this 
for. Is this to reduce waiting time and to make my numbers up, or make it look as if I’m seeing people, or is 
it actually for the need of my client?’ (B17)
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justify their effectiveness on the basis of the economic logic of ’clinical audit’, this issue 
is likely to become increasingly significant in the future. It is detectable in the current 
study in professionals’ perceptions of financial constraints as one of the most important 
factors in the current shape of community-based care. Similarly, practitioners who work 
psychodynamically often report being forced by financial constraints to reduce the number 
of sessions they offer a client, compared to the more long term work they would ideally 
like to do.
Professionals working in the field of mental health are faced with particular ambiguities 
which surround collective understandings of mental health institutions. Historically, 
various aspects of psychiatric systems have received attention by researchers, social 
theorists and practitioners alike, who have charted both the positive, ’therapeutic’ 
potential of these systems (for example, Rapoport 1960), as well as the negative aspects 
of mental health organisations (Goffman 1961, Rosenhan 1973 and many others). The 
coexistence of diverse and sometimes oppositional themes in interviewee’s accounts of 
the systems they work within reflects these paradoxes. Accounts of organisational 
structures as factors which limit or conflict with the work of caring for the mentally ill 
coexist with views of these organisations as therapeutic to the mentally ill and beneficial 
to the work of professionals. In order to be able to practice on a daily basis, 
professionals must be able to reconcile negative representations of psychiatric institutions 
with their own position as agents of these organisations. Professionals’ representations 
facilitate this process such that, three decades after the publication of Goffman’s 
’Asylums’ and the development of anti-psychiatry, and with increasing experience of care 
in the community, they recognise both the dangers and the positive aspects of hospital 
based care. They argue, typically, that hospitals can provide genuine asylum from the 
outside world, reassurance for intensely distressed people, and structures which helps 
’contain’ the disruption of mental illness.
A third area of potential difficulty and need for compromise concerns the role of 
professionals as implementors of change. As social and political thinking changes 
regarding the ’best’ ways to maintain the population’s health, to educate children, and to 
deal with society’s deviants, professionals are the social agents charged with introducing 
new policies and practices. As integrative, community based policies become the norm 
in many areas of health care and social provision, many different professional groups are
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currently facing the task of challenging established social representations and introducing 
new ways of reacting to social problems which may seem alien or bizarre. The current 
generation of mental health professionals, for example, are the first to grapple with 
implementing community-based care for the mentally ill and, as such, must reconcile the 
power of established and familiar working practices with the political and professional 
impetus for change. Chapter 7 illustrates how this water-shed in the history of mental 
health care engenders uncertainty and collective anxieties within the professional 
community.
Finally, the social position of professionals as integrators, translators and vectors between 
the various social spheres involved in the production of social knowledge brings with it 
the need to reconcile potentially incompatible demands and agendas. Professional 
practice involves the construction of compromise solutions between the demands of 
service users (people with mental or physical health problems, those in need of various 
forms of social care, and so on), the expectations of the general public, the political and 
ideological agendas of policy makers, and the current thinking and recommendations of 
experts in the field. The diversity of these social worlds is reflected in the internal 
components of professional representations (theory, practice, lay representations and so 
on), and it is through the convergence of these knowledge spheres that professional 
representations help practitioners steer a path through the thicket of various individual and 
collective demands which they face in their daily work.
2.3 Tensions in processes of social representation
The third area in which tensions and paradoxes can be identified concerns more general 
and fundamental dynamics of social representation formation. The process of 
representing a social object in a collectively meaningful way requires individuals and 
groups to confront tensions between what is known and familiar and what is novel, 
unfamiliar or strange. Anchoring processes, for example, constitute finding a balance 
between adapting an unfamiliar concept to pre-existent representational systems and 
recognising its unique or novel characteristics. (The vicissitudes of ’unfamiliarity’ and 
the difficulties of anchoring processes are addressed in sections 3.2 and 3.3 below.) The 
involvement of social representations in innovation and social change necessarily means
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that they are characterised by these dynamic tensions.
Further, when the object to be represented is one which inspires fear and suspicion, 
tensions also arise between social representation as a reflection of collective fear, desires 
and fantasies, and the requirements of everyday social interaction. For example, while 
it may be possible in art or the media to represent the mentally ill, gays or people from 
other cultures as radically different, inhuman or totally ’other’, processes of social 
representation which occur during the course of everyday social interaction are more 
complicated. Collective fears of insanity, contagion or loss of identity must be reconciled 
with cultural assumptions of some degree of commonality, respect and equality between 
human beings. Building on ideas proposed by Gilman (1988) and Kaes (1984), which 
highlight the emotionally loaded nature of representation, social representation can be 
understood as the reconciliation of collective motivations, imagination and defenses 
against anxiety (for example, maintenance of the social status quo, defense of positive 
social identities, guarding against loss of control or order), and the more ambiguous and 
less absolute nature of social interaction. As Giami (1987, p 178, my translation) puts 
it ’(social) representation is not a construction according to the wishes of the subject, but 
a solution of compromise with the demands of reality which is transferred to different 
levels of social organisation. ’
2.4 Reconciling Tensions and Ambivalences
The preceding three sections have detailed several areas of social representation in which 
tensions and inconsistencies arise. Beyond the compromises which characterise generic 
social representational processes, many of these pertain to features of professional 
representations and the practical work of mental health professionals in particular. Faced 
with this list of psycho-social and moral dilemmas, mental health professionals 
nevertheless manage to conduct their daily work. If social representations mediate and 
construct collective interactions with and understandings of aspects of the social world, 
then a central function of professional social representations is to construct compromises 
which enable practitioners to conduct their daily work. Specific strategies such as the use 
of multiple treatment strategies in the face of uncertainty illustrate how professional 
representations aid reconciliation and facilitate the management of paradoxes through
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which a collective sense of professional competence and legitimacy can be maintained. 
Professional social representations help practitioners to take one course of action rather 
than another, and to develop a position within this web of dilemmas and unresolved 
questions which can provide personal and social justification for their daily work10.
Often, smooth and complete reconciliation of the dilemmas of mental health work is 
simply not possible. This is evidenced by the various disjunctions detected in the 
research, between for example, theory and practice, and the principles and realities of 
community-based care. Faced with the impossibility of harmonising various incompatible 
agendas, professional representations allow collective recognition of these difficulties, and 
airing of unresolved points of contention through the on-going debate and uncertainty 
which permeate even the most basic aspects of professional representations of mental ill 
health.
3 The  Theory  of  Social Representations: Addressing lacunae
A case was made in the initial stages of this thesis that the theory of social 
representations provides a valuable theoretical framework from which to embark on a 
study of how mental health practitioners are involved in the construction of contemporary 
societal understandings of mental ill health. To reiterate briefly, Chapter 2 presented the 
theory as a truly social form of social psychology which allows the researcher to 
conceptualise both the agency of individuals and the power of society, culture and history 
in shaping and constructing social knowledge in its broadest sense. Perhaps most 
importantly, the theory has proved itself through this research, as a perspective able to 
handle complexity. As such, it serves to debunk the myth - perpetuated by research 
whose theoretical starting point assumes that belief systems are homogenous, unitary and
10 There are parallels between this argument and those proposed by discursive psychology which highlight 
how individuals and groups draw upon collective discourses to construct ’positions’ in relation to context specific 
combinations of arguments, counter-arguments and ideologies (Billig 1987, Edwards & Potter 1992). As an 
illustration, a French interview respondent justifies her work in the following way: ’I think to be a carer is 
basically to try and do some good. ... it’s to give back a sense of relating to other people. But you see some 
patients who are happy with their solitude, and for them, that intrusion is absolutely unbearable. So you’re a 
sort of intrusion which must have a purpose - the term intrusion is quite pejorative - but the goal of that 
intrusion must be to try to establish a relationship, try to make sure the person isn’t entirely alone in his illness.’ 
(F17)
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individual-based - that individuals or social practices can be categorised as expressing 
single models of mental illness (for example, ’psychodynamic’, ’medical’ or ’social’ 
models of mental illness). Instead, it enables conceptualisation of the tensions, 
consistencies and negotiations of diverse spheres of knowledge and social practices which 
coalesce in the field of mental ill health.
Beyond this, however, the researcher has an intellectual obligation to go further than 
theoretical self-congratulation. By taking a more constructively critical stance, empirical 
findings can be used to actively engage in debate at a theoretical level11. Furthermore, 
the contribution of a specific empirical study is enhanced by the value social 
representational theory places on content as well as process. The choice of mental illness 
as a topic of in-depth empirical investigation provides rich investigative ground, tapping 
directly into a range of social and cultural belief systems surrounding themes of deviance, 
abnormality, person-hood, and the nature of society.
Perhaps the theoretical premise most central to this study is the distinction made by social 
representations theory between the reified and the consensual universes. The arguments 
presented in Chapter 3 highlight how, on several accounts, this conceptualisation is 
problematic. As an initial exploration of a social world which incorporates aspects of 
both the reified and the consensual universes, this thesis shows the utility of developing 
a more complex model of the social circulation of knowledge which recognises the 
interactions of various social spheres (politics, the media, professional practitioners and 
so on). Beyond this, several other aspects of the theory of social representations have 
been called into question by the empirical research conducted within this thesis. The 
sections which follow capitalise on the current openness of the social representational 
approach to address some of these lacunae. Firstly, section 2.1 asks how mental illness 
as otherness can be reconciled with the multiplicity of representation detected in this 
research. It considers how uncertainty and fear are exacerbated by the ambiguous and 
insecure nature of these multiple representations of mental illness. Extrapolating from 
this debate, section 2.2 considers implications for the notion of unfamiliarity within the 
social representations theory. It speculates that different forms of unfamiliarity could be
1 1  T h i s  i s  e n c o u r a g e d  b y  t h e  o p e n n e s s  a n d  r e s i s t a n c e  o f  c l e a r  d e f i n i t i o n s  w h i c h  c h a r a c t e r i s e  t h e  t h e o r y  o f  
s o c i a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  ( a l t h o u g h  t h i s  v e r y  v e r s a t i l i t y  h a s  a l s o  l e d  t o  p r o b l e m s  o f  m i s u s e  o f  t h e  t h e o r y  ( A l l a n s d o t t i r  
e t  a l  1 9 9 3 )  a n d  a c c u s a t i o n s  o f  v a g u e n e s s  ( J a h o d a  1 9 8 8 ) ) .
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used to develop a typology with which to compare representations of various social 
objects. Finally, section 2.3 addresses some other conceptual issues raised by this 
research, which whilst they have not been taken up as topics of detailed consideration by 
this thesis, are nevertheless worthy of comment.
3.1 Otherness and Multiplicity: Conceptualising the ambiguous representation of 
mental illness
The literature review in Chapter 2 suggests that the concept of otherness provides a useful 
way of integrating a disparate range of sociological, historical and psychological research 
on mental illness. Themes of difference, abnormality, strangeness and danger are the 
defining features of common sense knowledge about mental illness which is invariably 
associated with strong emotional reactions of suspicion, fear and rejection. In the current 
research there is ample evidence for similar constructions of mental illness as ’other’ 
within the professional community. Particularly in relation to mental health problems 
termed ’psychotic’, mental illness is represented as other in two ways: Firstly, in the 
sense of being a radically or qualitatively different type of experience, and secondly, as 
a fundamental and enduring trait-like difference compared to ’normal’ people.
Yet this is not a definitive and un-problematic understanding of mental illness: the 
uncertainty which pervades professionals’ representations and the multiplicity of their 
understandings and practices are common threads through-out the analysis. Chapter 5, 
for example, highlights how otherness competes within professional representations with 
notions of similarity and sameness. ’Expert’ literature provides professionals with a 
diversity of models of mental ill health, each of which is no more than provisional and 
partial. Given that no single theory appears, on its own, to account adequately for the 
complexities and diversities of mental illness, professionals develop multi-factorial causal 
models and eclectic strategies of care which are matched by multiple but indefinite 
understandings of mental health problems in the lay community.
This raises two conceptual problems in our struggle to theorise both professional and 
public understandings and reactions to mental illness. Firstly, how can we account for 
the coexistence of otherness themes and multiplicity within a social representational
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framework? And secondly, what are the social psychological correlates and consequences 
of this complex combination of otherness, multiplicity and ambiguity which converge in 
representations of mental illness?
The first of these issues can be addressed in a relatively straight forward way by 
conceptualising otherness as one element in the multiple representation of mental illness 
in contemporary society. Historical analyses suggest that mental illness as otherness may 
be the most historically rooted representation, but in today’s world of integrationist 
policies, understandings of mental illness have diversified. If mental illness is multiply 
represented, then one of these coexistent representations (whose historical dominance may 
confer power and status which less well established representations cannot match) is of 
the mentally ill person as a dangerous and / or fragile other12.
The second issue of the semantic and representational consequences of multiple 
representation is more complex, and requires more detailed elaboration, especially when 
we consider the ambiguous, insecure and speculative nature of this representation. The 
initial model of the social representation of mental illness presented in section 2.5 of 
Chapter 2 proposes that representing mental illness as other allows individuals and 
collectivities to making sense of a phenomenon which is socially and individually 
challenging. Construing mental illness as otherness serves to localise, contain, distance 
and marginalise a social object which threatens both person-hood and society. From this 
perspective, the other is a familiar social category which unites various social groups 
such as Jews, blacks, homosexuals and the mentally ill who for various reasons have 
challenged the basic values of society, arousing mixed and intense emotional responses 
of fear, fascination and anxiety (Gilman, 1988).
But what happens when the category of other cannot be un-problematically brought into 
play to make sense of mental illness? Take the person living apparently successfully in 
the community, but with a past history of psychiatric hospital admissions; the colleague 
whose life-long existential doubts are defined by a clinical psychologist as ’clinical
1 2  A l t h o u g h  t h i s  i s  t h e  c o n c e p t u a l i s a t i o n  f a v o u r e d  b y  t h e  a u t h o r ,  i t  i s  n o t  t h e  o n l y  w a y  o f  r e l a t i n g  t h e  
n o t i o n  o f  o t h e r n e s s  w i t h  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l  f e a t u r e s  o f  m u l t i p l i c i t y  a n d  a m b i g u i t y .  A n  a l t e r n a t i v e  
c o n c e p t u a l i s a t i o n  w o u l d  b e  t o  s e e  o t h e r n e s s  a s  s o m e t h i n g  w h i c h  f u n d a m e n t a l l y  d i s r u p t s  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l  
p r o c e s s  a n d  p r o d u c e s  a  s u r f e i t  o f  m u l t i p l e  a n d  u n c e r t a i n  m e a n i n g s  ( s e e  M o r a n t  &  R o s e ,  1 9 9 6 ) .
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depression’; the stranger whose erratic and bizarre public behaviour could be interpreted 
as drunkenness or signs of mental illness. All of these illustrate the overlaps between 
behaviours defined as ’sane’ and those taken to be signs of mental ill health. ’However 
much we may be personally convinced that we can tell the normal from the abnormal, 
the evidence is simply not compelling’ (Rosenhan, 1973, p 250). Representations of the 
mentally ill as definitively other are almost always open to question, and community- 
based care which seeks to reduce the physical and social dislocation and marginalisation 
of the mentally ill serves to exacerbate this questioning and uncertainty.
For each of the examples above, the world of mental health ’experts’ cannot provide 
clear, definitive understandings and predictions. Despite the best efforts of the 
professional community to make sense of mental illness unequivocally (for example 
through the use of theories as anchors, or through detailed and multi-faceted assessment 
procedures), they are unable to reach clear, consensual understandings of why a person 
is showing signs of mental distress at a particular point in time, when this distress 
becomes acute enough to be called a mental illness, or whether a person’s mental health 
problems are likely to reoccur later in life. This unsuccessful search for clear ways of 
identifying the mentally ill has been pursued throughout history. Changing with 
developments in medical science, its manifestation has shifted from a focus on facial 
expression and craniology in the eighteenth century, through interest in physiology and 
behaviour, to current research on the genetics of mental illness (Gilman, 1988). But 
compared to medical science, which can increasingly provide clear, unambiguous 
indicators of the presence or future manifestation of various physical health problems, 
mental health experts are still unable to furnish the public with definitive knowledge and 
predictions.
If the category of other cannot be un-problematically applied, because its nature is 
ambiguous, because mental illness cannot be clearly identified or tied down to something 
we can definitively explain and understand, because those defined as mentally ill now live 
within the community, then we must accept the potential and unidentifiable presence of 
this fear-provoking phenomenon within the social world in which we participate. The 
definitive separation between self and madness is challenged by this competition between 
’otherness’ and other ways of representing mental illness. If mental illness can be 
understood as an exaggeration of ’normal’ experiences, as a state rather than a trait, or
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as something which is not limited to certain ’different’ people but can affect any one of 
us, and can appear (or disappear) at any stage of a person’s life, the reassuring 
assumption of our own immunity to mental health problems which ’otherness’ 
representations provide, is shattered.
The combination of ’otherness’ themes with the multiple and ambiguous nature of mental 
illness representations produces a potent combination of formal and substantive 
uncertainties13. Mental illness is unpredictable and fear-provoking both because, as a 
socially constructed other, it represents chaos, loss of control and the inapplicability of 
’normal’, rational folk theories of mind or notions of the ’generalised other’, and because 
it simultaneously resists this, or any other single classification. Such ambiguities of 
people and their status are socially dangerous and threatening in their challenge to the 
underlying structures and consensual orderings of society (Douglas 1966, Kelvin 
1969)14. Despite societal expectations of their ability to disambiguating sanity and 
madness, professionals’ representational uncertainties do little to reduce these ambiguities. 
Douglas (1966) describes how traditional societies often define ambiguous people or 
practices which transgress established social categories as unclean or polluting. Slippage 
from established social groupings, especially when it constitutes a challenge or break­
down of categories containing deviants or socially feared groups, may arouse collective 
fears of contagion15.
Modem integrationist care policies arouse such fears by exacerbating the ambiguities 
surrounding mental illness. Mental illness is a psycho-socially feared phenomenon, but 
one which may now be part of daily life, and can no longer be definitively identified as 
separate and marginalised from ’normal’ mainstream society. It invades the social 
grouping in which we participate and with which we identify. In the contemporary 
world, the social practices of removing and permanently marginalising the mentally ill
1 3  W h i l e  t h e  t h e o r y  o f  s o c i a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  s e e k s  t o  a v o i d  s u c h  s p l i t s  b e t w e e n  f o r m  a n d  c o n t e n t ,  t h i s  
a r t i f i c i a l  s e p a r a t i o n  i s  n e v e r t h e l e s s  u s e f u l  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e s  o f  t h e  c u r r e n t  a r g u m e n t .
1 4  T h e  c o g n i t i v e  e q u i v a l e n t  o f  t h i s  a m b i g u i t y  w o u l d  b e  t h e  d i s r u p t i o n  o f  e s t a b l i s h e d  s y s t e m s  o f  
c a t e g o r i s a t i o n  a n d  u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,  w h i c h  s o c i a l  c o g n i t i o n  r e s e a r c h  s u g g e s t s  i s  a  f u n d a m e n t a l  b a s i s  f o r  o u r  a b i l i t y  
t o  m a k e  s e n s e  o f  t h e  d i v e r s i t y  o f  o u r  s o c i a l  w o r l d  ( e g  R o s c h  &  L l o y d  1 9 7 8 ) .
1 5  T h i s  m a y  t a k e  t h e  f o r m  o f  p r e - m e d i c a l  b e l i e f s  i n  m a g i c a l  c o n t a g i o n  s u c h  a s  t h o s e  d e t e c t e d  b y  J o d e l e t  
( 1 9 9 1 ,  s e e  s e c t i o n  2 . 1  o f  C h a p t e r  2 ) .
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in psychiatric institutions no longer exist as ways of ’containing’ mental illness and the 
anxieties it evokes. Collective fears of this seepage are expressed in the growth of a 
discourse of risk surrounding mental health care: ’Risk assessment’ and ’risk 
management’ are increasingly part of the social definition of ’community care’ (for 
example, McGovern 1996, Monahan & Steadman 1994). In short, psycho-social 
correlates of the convergence of otherness, multiplicity and ambiguity in the 
contemporary social representation of mental illness are the exacerbation of collective 
anxieties, uncertainties and fearful responses.
3.2 Reflections on Unfamiliaritv: Towards a Typology of Representations
Moving beyond the substantive topic of mental illness, this conceptualisation of how 
mental illness is represented in contemporary society has broader implications for the 
theory of social representations. Specifically, it challenges the theory to recognise firstly, 
that representation does not banish unfamiliarity, and secondly, that the notion of 
unfamiliarity is complex and merits more serious consideration than it has so far received 
by social representations researchers.
Returning to the basic premises of social representations theory, we can recall the 
assumption that social representations function to familiarise the unfamiliar. It is stated 
that:
’ t h e  a c t  o f  r e - p r e s e n t a t i o n  t r a n s f e r s  w h a t  i s  d i s t u r b i n g  a n d  t h r e a t e n i n g  i n  o u r  u n i v e r s e  f r o m
t h e  o u t s i d e  t o  t h e  i n s i d e ,  f r o m  a  r e m o t e  t o  a  n e a r b y  s p a c e . ’ ( M o s c o v i c i  1 9 8 1 ,  p  1 8 9 ) .
The implication here is that representational processes necessarily involve drawing 
unfamiliar objects psychically and socially closer, and reducing their threat. From the 
evidence of this and other research, neither of these assumptions appear to hold true in 
the representation of mental illness. While it is undisputed that representation involves 
the construction of social meaning, in some cases it is through this very construction 
process that unfamiliarity is perpetuated. If, as is argued above, the Other is a familiar 
social category, then one of the most common ways of making sense of mental ill health 
is to familiarise it as unfamiliar. Through its very representation as other, mental illness 
is constructed as unfamiliar, as something which constitutes fundamentally different
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experiences and falls beyond the bounds of consensual rationality-based theories of mind. 
This perceived gap of experience (which for professionals is most commonly applied to 
’psychosis’) perpetuates an assumption that some forms of mental distress remain 
fundamentally unknowable. The sense of threat and fear that mental illness commonly 
inspires; the associated tendency to keep contact with the mentally ill to a minimum; the 
historical social marginalisation and taboo of mental illness; and the provisional and 
speculative nature of mental illness representations all combine to perpetuate this sense 
of strangeness and unfamiliarity which remain at the heart of contemporary mental illness 
representations.
It is clear that there is space for unfamiliarity and threat within a social representation, 
and that neither of these are simply banished when a social representation is created as 
the theory implies16. Throughout history, social representations have functioned to give 
mental distress some sort of tangible social meaning, but one which is centred around 
unfamiliarity. Comparing this situation with other social objects whose unfamiliarity 
derives from their novelty (for example, biotechnology, AIDS, psychoanalysis), we begin 
to see how different sources of unfamiliarity, associated with either novelty or the 
capacity to arouse collective and individual fears and anxieties might be distinguished. 
Novelty and ’threat’ could be conceived as two independent sources of unfamiliarity 
within a representation. Novel social objects are unfamiliar in the sense of being ’not 
known about’, and although there will always be some level of resistance and scepticism 
towards what is new, those objects which are relatively benign will eventually come to 
be more-or-less un-problematic features of our everyday social world (science or 
information technology would be illustrations). Other more enduring social objects are 
continually constructed as unfamiliar and their retention of unfamiliarity highlights their 
capacity to arouse collective and individual fears and anxieties. Still others (for example, 
AIDS) combine novelty and profound social anxiety evoked by associations with 
historical illnesses and social taboos (Joffe 1996, Sontag 1990)
Figure 8.2 shows how a speculative typology of representations could be developed on 
the basis on two independent variables: a time dimension and a threatening - benign
1 6  A  s i m i l a r  a r g u m e n t  i s  p u t  f o r w a r d  b y  P u r k h a r d t  ( 1 9 9 3  p  1 1 4 )  w h o  c o m m e n t s  t h a t  ’ t h e  t h e o r y  m u s t  
e m b r a c e  t h e  u n f a m i l i a r  w i t h i n  i t s  h i s t o r i c a l  a n d  e v o l u t i o n a r y  f r a m e w o r k  s u c h  t h a t  i t  i n c o r p o r a t e s  t h e  s o c i a l  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  u n f a m i l i a r  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  p e r p e t u a t i o n  o f  t h e  f a m i l i a r ’ .
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Figure 8.2: A Typology of Social Representations 
based on two sources of unfamiliarity
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Mental Illness
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Biotechnology
Novel
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continuum17. The positioning of social objects within this schema is necessarily linked 
to the social context in which representations develop18, but consideration of both a time 
dimension and an object’s link to social semantics of fear and threat may prove a useful 
way to conduct comparative explorations between various social objects. Embarking on 
a meta-analysis of this kind counter-balances the tendency within social representations 
research to focus on single objects, and tackles the associated dangers of fragmentation 
without sacrificing the rich and in-depth understanding generated by individual studies.
3.3 Other Theoretical Considerations 
Power
The problem of power was initially raised in Chapter 3 which suggests that social 
representations theory has not provided an adequate conceptualisation of the workings of 
power in modem society. Moscovici’s (1988) categorisation of hegemonic, polemic and 
emancipatory representations fails to adequately account for how any single representation 
develops through social processes made up of complex power relations involving 
persuasion, imposition and resistance. Within the social sciences, the notion of power 
is complex, and there is not space in the confines of this thesis to enter into this debate. 
However, as a step towards reiterating the role of ideological power stmggles in the 
development and negotiation of common sense and social practices, several aspects of the 
professional social representations investigated in this research can be highlighted. The 
social role of professionals as integrators of the agendas of politics, ’experts’, ’patients’ 
and the lay public, and the associated compromise functions which section 2 proposes as 
a key feature of professional social representations constitutes the most immediate 
example of power stmggles. From a Foucauldian perspective, for example, the work of
17 Against this two dimensional conceptualisation, Joffe (1996) argues that there are no social 
representations which are benign or non-threatening, since it is the very novelty of a concept which renders it 
threatening. However, Joffe’s argument fails to take account of the varying history of different social objects.
18 For example, in Moscovici’s (1976) study of psychoanalysis as a novel social object, social 
representations in the world of French Catholicism might be located in the top right hand quadrant due to 
controversial associations between psychoanalysis and sexuality. In comparison, representations which 
developed in the world of Marxism, where psychoanalysis was more readily accepted, might be better placed 
in the lower right hand quadrant.
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professionals in ’managing’ mental health problems within the remit of community care 
policies represents social processes through which ideological power and implicit forms 
of social control over what is ’normal’ and acceptable in contemporary society are 
perpetuated (Foucault, 1980). In daily decisions about treatment and care, the voices of 
the patient, the professional and the policy maker are far from equal, and professionals 
are not blind to the value-laden nature of their work19.
A key determinant of power balances in contemporary society is money. Economic 
considerations are an increasingly important factor in shaping societal reactions to mental 
illness, and the recent shifts towards community care for the mentally ill which are being 
implemented across Europe are intertwined with public and political debates about the 
changing role of The State and the financing of health and social services. As financial 
considerations move into the foreground of practical care strategies, ’cost-effectiveness’ 
becomes an increasingly powerful bench-mark for assessing social value and legitimacy.
Another area of professional social representations in which power imbalances can be 
detected is in the historical dominance of medicine and the models of mental distress 
which emanate from this. Especially in Britain, the historical dominance of the medical 
perspective over-shadows the world of mental health, existing as a constant reference 
point which cannot be ignored, even by those who reject it. This sets the scene for the 
unequal influence of the various professions in shaping professional representations (for 
example, the struggles of clinical psychologists to position themselves against the 
dominance of psychiatry). The dominance of medicine as one of the most influential 
social institutions in western society, whose power infiltrates common sense, public life 
and many of the most profound aspects of human existence is highlighted by medical 
sociology (Foucault 1967, 1973; Zola 1972 for example). It is against this background, 
in which mental distress has traditionally been dealt with as a medical phenomenon, that
19 For example, a British interview respondents makes the following comment: ’A lot of social workers 
would say what you are trying to do is to help people develop insight. Obviously there is such a thing, but it’s 
not a term I use a lot, because it’s been my experience that when people say a client has insight, what they 
actually mean is that the client accepts their definition of their problems. Obviously a lot of mental health work, 
because of the power relationship and the access to services, is about renegotiating people’s reality.’ (B29). 
This professional awareness of the moral and ideological nature of their work adds weight to criticisms of the 
anti-psychiatry and labelling approaches made in Chapter 2 (section 2.2). These perspectives tend to offer an 
over-simplified gloss on social psychological processes, and to assume, incorrectly, that professionals are either 
willing agents of social control or simply oblivious to their role in perpetuating societal power relations.
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the enactment of changing professional representations is played out.
Whether it is manifested in the dominance of medical interventions, in the determining 
role of financial resources, or in the value-laden decisions professionals face every day 
in their practical work, there is ample evidence in this research for the existence of power 
struggles and inequalities in social representational processes. The theory of social 
representations could only be enriched by attempts to integrate notions of power into its 
understandings of social knowledge construction.
Anchoring as an active and problematic process
Another theoretical issue raised by this research relates to the fundamental process of 
anchoring. It is clear that in the case of mental illness, the process of collective sense- 
making is far from smooth and un-problematic. This can be interpreted theoretically as 
problems of anchoring - mental illness resists classification and definitive anchoring 
through its imperfect fit into any single belief system. Neither experts or lay people can 
decide what is the most appropriate system of beliefs for mental illness to be anchored 
into, and as a consequence, they ’buy into’ several different models simultaneously. 
These findings add weight to the argument put forward by Billig (1988, 1993) (discussed 
initially in Chapter 2) that anchoring is not as smooth a process as the theory of social 
representations implies. Rather, it is one which always involves controversy and debate 
surrounding choices between several possible but imperfect spheres of knowledge into 
which a concept could be anchored. The consequences of problematic and ambiguous 
anchoring are the simultaneous circulation of multiple representational themes, often (as 
we saw in Chapter 5) organised in terms of binary oppositions which are debated rather 
than fixed. The coexistence of these oppositional themes (difference - similarity, 
temporary - permanent, distressed - distressing, for example) enhances a sense of 
unpredictability and ambivalence, and guarantees that, despite its enduring nature, mental 
illness remains an object of controversy.
Levels of consensus and representational fields
This leads directly to a final theoretical issue surrounding how the structure of a 
representation is conceptualised. Rather than the highly structured, two dimensional
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model of representations consisting of core and periphery elements adopted by the ’Aix 
School’ of social representational researchers (Abric, 1984), the argument proposed in 
Chapter 5 for a three-dimensional conceptualisation of a social representation is 
reiterated. This allows us to differentiate between the implicit representational themes 
which form the ’bed-rock’ of a representation, and the on-going daily debate and 
dissension which occurs within the ’representational field’ whose parameters are defined 
by more fundamental levels of consensus (Rose et al, 1995). (This distinction is 
illustrated in Figure 8.1.) Again, this conceptualisation shows parallels with the 
rhetorical perspective of Billig who argues that:
’(c)ommon sense would appear to possess two contrary aspects in its relations with 
argumentation. On the one hand, common sense seems to close off arguments: certain 
matters will appear to be commonly sensible within a community, and consequently these
matters will be accepted without argument On the other hand, common sense seems to
open up arguments: the common-places, which constitute important components of common 
sense, provide the seeds of rhetorical arguments.’ (Billig, 1987, p 208)
The notion of a ’representational field’ allows us to capture the dynamic and fluid 
relationships between diverse and contradictory themes which characterise representations 
of mental illness. The term ’mental illness’ is used to account for experiences and 
behaviours as diverse as hallucinations, social withdrawal, eating or sleeping problems, 
intense grief, and anxiety. Subsumed within the same broad social category, these 
diverse aspects of human experience are defined in relation to each other and become 
ambiguously related. ’Representational fields’ also allow us to recognise the possibility 
of both consistencies and inconsistencies between different components of the 
representation (for example, the weak links between theory and practice identified in 
Chapter 6). If, as has been argued, professional social representations function as 
psycho-social compromises, then inconsistencies between their elements can be expected. 
This view is supported by Horenczyk & Bekerman (1995), who argue that inconsistency 
and internal conflict are common features of all social representations, and point out that 
common assumptions amongst psychologists of cognitive consistency may have 
misleading consequences for social psychological research. The notion of 
representational fields also acknowledges that the boundaries of any representation are 
fuzzy, that they overlap with other representational areas (for example, deviance, illness 
and other ’disability’ states in the case of mental illness), and that these may rest upon 
common culturally shared belief systems about person-hood, ’normality’ and society.
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4 Concluding  Com m ents: Future D irections and Implications
4.1 Avenues for Future Research
The theoretical issues raised by this research which are discussed in section 3 point to 
several conceptual areas which could feasibly be investigated empirically in the future. 
But what specific areas of further inquiry does this initial attempt to apply a social 
representational approach to the world of professional knowledge point to? A critical 
evaluation of the focus and methodology of this research highlights some fruitful 
strategies of future inquiry and methodological modifications which would build upon and 
extend the investigations conducted in this thesis.
The model of ’professional social representations’ as ’professional common sense’ or 
practitioners’ collective understandings of the object of their work has proved a useful 
theoretical tool to guide the research. This is a clear demonstration that the theory of 
social representations can be fruitfully applied to spheres of social knowledge beyond 
common sense. The validity of this model has been up-held and at least initially 
supported by the empirical findings, but many unanswered questions remain. 
Specifically, I would identify the need for investigations of other professional groups, for 
research which explores the interaction of professional representations with other spheres 
of social knowledge, and for studies designed to address processes of change as 
particularly pertinent avenues of future inquiry.
The first of these - the need to apply this model to other professional groups - arises 
inevitably from research focusing specifically on one particular professional world. 
Whilst the strengths of this ’case study’ approach lie in its ability to provide in-depth 
understandings of substantive content, these are countered by associated difficulties of 
disentangling unique aspects of mental health work from more generic features of all 
people-based professionals. Although the comparisons made in section 1.1 highlight 
several parallels with professionals in general medicine, studies applying the same 
theoretical model to other professional worlds (teaching, for example), or to more than 
one professional sphere simultaneously, would provide a clearer mechanism for 
identifying areas of similarity and points of difference.
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Secondly, the theoretical model on which this research is based proposes that several 
inter-related but relatively distinct social spheres are involved in the contemporary 
development and circulation of social knowledge (see Figure 3.2). Research which 
compares the representations of a particular social object circulating in the media, 
amongst lay people, and in ’expert’, professional and political worlds, uncovering how 
interactions between these social spheres serve to modify, perpetuate or diffuse collective 
understandings, would extend our understandings of interactive, transformative and 
power-imbued processes in the development of social knowledge. This relates to a third 
recommendation, namely that future research should be process-oriented. Like much 
social representational research, the current study constitutes a snap-shot taken at a 
particular historical moment. Because this moment is one of rapid change in societal 
reactions to mental illness, it points implicitly to many dynamic process, but is unable 
to tap into these change and diffusion processes directly. Although the theory of social 
representations places much weight on the dynamic nature of social knowledge and the 
processes involved in its genesis and development, empirical research rarely employs 
longitudinal methods which are explicitly designed to investigate process20. Process- 
oriented methods would allow researchers to address issues such as how lay notions of 
’community care’ have changed in the years since its introduction, and how cycles of 
policy proposals, media and public reactions, and governmental and professional 
responses develop.
Methodologically, probably the most significant weakness of this study is its over-reliance 
on verbal methods, with concomitant risks of obtaining data shaped by self-presentation 
and rationalisation processes. Although methodological triangulation has been partially 
adopted (using secondary sources of documentary evidence, observations and ’key 
informant’ interviews to inform the analysis of primary interview data), a more full-scale
20 Some notable exceptions are work conducted recently by Bangerter (1996) attempting to model 
processes of knowledge diffusion between individuals, and research in Sweden on interactions between macro­
social policy changes and the shared beliefs of communities cohering around young people with mild learning 
disabilities living in the community (Gustavsson, 1996). This research shows how, within this sub-community, 
consensuality and consistency with the integration ideology of policies contribute to a gradual solidification of 
representations of these people as legitimate members of society. However, these processes are set against a 
broader background of more widely held socially representations of people with learning disabilities as stupid, 
dangerous and sinful.
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triangulation of methods involving non-language based techniques would be preferable21. 
For example, individual interviews could be fruitfully complemented with group 
discussions, observations of practice, or analysis of professional training procedures (in 
which the implicit values of professional practice may be more explicitly communicated). 
The difficulties of cross-cultural investigations, in which the researcher’s relationships 
with the area of study, the research participants, and the semantics of linguistic data are 
not functionally equivalent in foreign and native countries, could be overcome by the 
collaboration of researchers based in different counties (what Banister et al (1994) term 
’investigator triangulation’).
Finally, the analytic strategy of this research has been fruitfully shaped by the use of 
QSR-NUDIST, which not only allows the practical management of a large data set, but 
also encourages transparency and innovation in interacting with, linking and 
conceptualising data. The principle technical weakness of this computer package, in its 
current form, is its inability to capture narrative structure and temporal relationships 
between text segments. However, the sophistication of ’CAQDAS’ (Computer-aided 
qualitative analysis) programmes is increasing rapidly, and substantial developments are 
to be expected in the next few years. The latest version of Atlas-ti already provides ways 
of specifying the nature of relationships between text segments and researcher-generated 
concepts which have the potential to capture temporality and narrative structure. It is 
hoped that this demonstration of how the credibility and analytic power of qualitative 
research can be enhanced by CAQDAS packages whose epistemological foundations are 
compatible with the theory of social representations will encourage other social 
representations researchers to explore their use in the future, and contribute to on-going 
methodological innovation.
4.2 Drawing Practical Implications
A potential danger of research conducted from a social constructionist perspective is that 
in focusing on how social reality is historically and culturally constructed and
21 As discussed in Chapter 4 (section 2.1), the current study was limited by issues of client confidentiality 
which precluded the observation of many specific professional-client interactions.
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deconstructing our common currency of value judgements, it may fail to offer any value 
judgements of its own. Unless such research takes a critical stand on what social 
psychological states of affairs it rates as more or less preferable, relativist nihilism or 
apathy may result. The aims of this concluding section, therefore, are to consider what 
the ’real world’ implications of this research are, and how it could be used practically to 
’make a difference’. To do this, it is necessary to re-state the value judgements on which 
this research is based, namely that care of the mentally ill is currently an important but 
problematic social issue, and that research which strives to understand the prejudices and 
social psychological difficulties which it raises may ultimately contribute to improving 
the lot of people suffering from mental health problems.
Much of the previous research reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3 presents negative and 
pessimistic messages of pervasive prejudice and social intolerance of mental illness. It 
both explains and anticipates problems in the successful implementation of community- 
based care in terms of the deeply-rooted and powerful nature of social representations. 
Mental ill health is collectively understood as a dangerous pollutant whose re-entry into 
the community is an invasion that threatens established identities and boundaries between 
normality and abnormality. How can a community accept into its ranks people who are 
assumed to be unpredictable and un-understandable in terms of its conventional folk 
theories of mind? Research cautions that we should not underestimate the power of 
historically established belief systems to generate substantial public resistance to this 
endeavour, and points to an urgent need for public education programs to ease the burden 
on mental health professionals faced with the task of implementing integrationist policies. 
Rather than focusing exclusively on setting up community-based support structures and 
preparing long-term hospital residents for life in the community, more energy (and 
resources) should be invested in the other side of the equation, namely social changes 
which will facilitate the success of community care. Public education and mental health 
awareness campaigns in schools, the media, local community centres and so on may not 
reverse public prejudice over-night, but done well, they may at least contribute to 
creating a social climate in which mental ill health is less stigmatized and feared than in 
the past22.
22 A recent good example of campaigns to raise public awareness of mental ill health in Britain was the 
’States of Mind’ series of programmes on BBC 2 television and BBC Radio 4 in 1995.
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Turning more specifically to the role of professionals in this process, the contribution of 
the current research is two-fold: Firstly, it furthers understanding of the practical and 
semantic vicissitudes of contemporary mental health work in two European countries, and 
secondly, in highlighting problematic areas, it is suggestive of several practical strategies 
which could ease the implementation of community-based care into the twenty-first 
century.
The thesis’ contribution to knowledge and understanding lies in its in-depth description 
and conceptualisation of the work of mental health professionals in France and Britain. 
As a snap-shot of these worlds taken in the early 1990s, it is hoped that this analysis 
enriches the understandings of the social scientific community and other interested 
outsiders of modem mental health work and its relationship to broader aspects of society. 
For readers who are already acquainted with the contemporary world of mental health 
care, or are mental health practitioners themselves, the thesis serves to conceptualise their 
own lived experiences from a social psychological perspective, contextualising them 
within a broader historical, cultural and social psychological tapestry. This may help 
practitioners to reflect upon and make sense of their current practice in new and 
informative ways, providing a ’tool to think with’ or suggestions for change.
In terms of its practical implications for practitioners, perhaps the most concerning aspect 
of this study’s findings, in terms of the potential for professional prejudgments which 
may be detrimental to the care and life chances of particular clients, lies in the semantics 
of the term ’psychosis’ which is primarily represented as fundamental and permanent 
difference at the level of the person (and possibly, their genetic make-up). Construing 
psychotic experiences as entirely distinct from ’normal’ experiences renders professionals 
less likely to believe that empathy and understanding are achievable goals with this client 
group23. The result may be that people who are already stigmatized and alienated from 
mainstream society (typically people with diagnoses of schizophrenia, manic-depression 
or other non-specific ’psychotic’ problems, who constitute approximately 4 per 1,000 
people in the British population (OPCS, 1994)) remain marginalised and misunderstood
23 As R D Laing (1982, p 38) puts it, ’(t)he way we construe a difference may serve to narrow or widen 
it. Both what you say and how I listen contribute to how close or far apart we are. A psychiatrist has been 
trained to believe that, if he were to think that he thought and felt much the same as those people he diagnoses 
as psychotic, this would not mean that they would not be psychotic, it would mean that he was psychotic.’
265
within the very services which are set up to care for them.
This issue is currently being tackled by mental health service users’ and campaign 
groups, whose recent growth across Europe is described by Rogers & Pilgrim (1991) and 
Van Hoorn (1992). In Britain, for example, groups such as MIND, Survivors Speak Out 
and Hearing Voices work to promote a message of ’meaning in madness’24. Essentially, 
these campaign strategies encourage understandings of mental illness in terms of 
consensual models of behaviour based on rational intentionality. In other words, they 
aim to anchor social representations of mental illness into folk theories of mind, or more 
general social representations of person-hood. Although these notions are not 
incompatible with professional social representations (whose openness and uncertainty 
leaves space for debate surrounding issues of difference), they are currently a minority 
position. By suggesting new ways of making sense of ’bizarre’ behaviour, these and 
similar awareness campaigns targeted at both professionals and lay people could help 
break the cycle of perpetuation of ’otherness’ representations which hinders tolerance and 
empathy.
A second area in which suggestions for practice can be extrapolated concerns strategies 
for the implementation of community-based care. If community care constitutes a 
paradigmatic shift in the Kuhnian sense, this research has captured the struggles and 
uncertainties which are aroused by the process of change. While many aspects of 
contemporary professional representations are congruent with the integration ideology of 
community care policies (for example, involvement with the mentally ill as social beings, 
encouraging and supporting independent living), other features (for example, notions of 
irreconcilable difference) sit less easily with this new ethos. Although professionals’ 
consensual desire to reject ’the old’ (institutionalisation) is taken for granted, as yet there 
is little consensus about what ’the new’ could or should be. The cultural revolution in 
mental health care is under way, but community care is still in the process of becoming, 
and the current cost of its implementation is measurable in professional uncertainty and
24 For example, at a recent conference for mental health practitioners and service users (’Meanings and 
Madness: Psychotherapy and Psychosis’ organised by The Psychotherapy Section of The British Psychological 
Society, Bristol, 29-30 June 1995), members of ’Hearing Voices’ ran practical workshops demonstrating how 
many of the secondary symptoms of schizophrenia (delusions, mood swings, paranoia and so on) can be 
attributed to the experience of hearing voices. By reconceptualising what are traditionally seen as ’symptoms’ 
as ’coping strategies’, the aim is to promote empathy and understanding of these experiences.
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scepticism about the future, a sense of collective powerlessness, and tensions between 
professional disciplines.
Although many of these dynamics are features of any organisational change process, 
some specific issues highlighted in Chapter 7 suggest strategies of introducing change 
which may be more manageable for professionals and could harness the innovative 
energies of mental health teams more effectively. For example, the endemic sense of 
powerlessness and frustration amongst many practitioners (especially in Britain) indicates 
a need to involve professionals in the organisational decisions now in the hands of 
’managers’ (who often have little or no direct experience of mental health practice). It 
suggests a need for greater recognition of the toll that rapid and multi-level change 
accompanied by resource restrictions takes on practitioners struggling to understand and 
adapt to new demands and expectations. Whilst new generations of mental health 
practitioners may benefit from training which responds to recent policy changes, older 
generations, many of whom were trained in institutional working styles, struggle to get 
to grips with new integrationist policies. Professional development and training could 
usefully address this mis-match, as well as tackling the difficulties of role ambiguities, 
shifting relationships between professions, and renegotiations of boundaries between 
health and social service agencies. Spaces for debate regarding the ambiguities contained 
in notions of ’community’, ’care in the community’ and ’professional carers’ should be 
encouraged both within the world of mental health and in the broader public sphere. 
Although this is unlikely to generate neat solutions, and may do little to reduce the basic 
uncertainties which professionals experience regarding the concept of mental illness per 
se, it may allow greater public recognition of the social ethics of mental health work in 
late twentieth century society. And as community care unfolds into its second decade and 
gradually solidifies into a social reality, new codes of practice, reference points and 
representational anchors may emerge, diminishing the uncertainties which currently 
characterise these professional representations.
This progress of mental health care into the twenty-first century must be accompanied by 
continual study of the spheres of practice-based knowledge which circulate in professional 
communities. For it is the powerful social reality of these professional social 
representations in shaping social practices as diverse as legal decisions, childrens’ 
understandings of states of deviance, and the lives of thousands of people who pass
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through the mental health services that imbues them with such significance in the on­
going production of social knowledge and construction of society.
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APPENDIX 1
DESCRIPTIONS OF THE MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES STUDIED IN
BRITAIN AND FRANCE1
The current research is based on data collected in mental health services in urban and 
suburban areas of Paris and London. While there was a deliberate attempt to research 
’typical’ services, their location in capital cities implies several unique features: Services 
located close to academic institutions and teaching hospitals tend to be at the forefront of 
innovation and change, and may implement policy changes more quickly than provincial 
counterparts. Difficulties of staffing and recruitment (a chronic problem in mental health) 
are less acute than in rural areas. And the social environment of large cities implies 
social problems and issues which differ from rural areas.
1 France
Research was conducted in three psychiatric ’secteurs’ in the Paris area. One of these 
is located in the centre of Paris, the other two in the north east suburbs of Paris, in the 
departement of Seine-St-Denis. This is a relatively deprived area of suburban Paris, 
similar in social terms to the localities in London where research was conducted. It is 
characterised by high rise architecture dating from the 1960s, and has a reputation for 
serious social problems including unemployment, racial tensions, drug abuse, and youth 
alienation.
1 This review describes mental health services in the study areas as they were during the data 
collection period of this research (1992 in France, 1993 in Britain). As well as the sources listed, this is 
based on information obtained from interview respondents and discussions with several ’key informants’ 
(service managers, mental health researchers and professionals involved in service planning - see Chapter 
4, section 2.2 for details.)
293
1.1 Secteur 15. Seine-St-Denis2
The fifteenth secteur of Seine-St-Denis provides mental health services in the areas north 
of Neuilly-sur-Mame including Clichy-sous-Bois, Gagny, Montfermeil and Coubron (an 
area containing a population of 100,000). The network of mental health services in this 
secteur consists of one psychiatric hospital ward, a ’centre medico-psychologique’, a day 
centre, a team of social workers, a team working with AIDS victims, and a small amount 
of sheltered accommodation. Overall, the secteur employs around 80 mental health 
professionals, around half of whom are psychiatric nurses. Over the last fifteen years the 
secteur has lived through a period of radical change, implemented by a ’chef de service’ 
determined to develop a community based network of services. The time when research 
was conducted was described as a period of ’letting the dust settle’ and of gradual 
stability following these shake ups. Amongst the professionals and key respondents I 
talked to, the fifteenth secteur is regarded as slightly ’above average’ in that it has 
succeeded in reducing numbers of in-patient beds, developed an adequate network of 
extra-hospital services, and is run by a dynamic and reasonably satisfied team. However 
it is far from being a model secteur, perceived problems being centred around the 
functioning of the hospital service. Research was conducted in three services in this 
secteur:- the in-patient ward at Ville-Evrard Hospital, the Day Centre at Clichy-sous- 
Bois, and the ’Centre Medico-Psychologique’ (CMP) at Montfermeil. These are 
described in turn below:
Champagne Ward. Ville-Evrard Hospital
Ville-Evrard psychiatric hospital is a large hospital situated 15km to the east of central 
Paris, in the suburban district of Neuilly-sur-Mame. Its history can be traced back to the 
fourteenth century although its current architecture bears witness to the nineteenth century 
institution. It is set in large walled grounds, and is organised around a tree lined avenue 
leading to the central administration block, containing administrative departments, a shop, 
a chapel and a cafeteria. Spreading out into the grounds are the various wards, housed
2 During my time in France, this was the secteur in which I spent most time, and which I came 
to know the best, using it to familiarise myself with the French mental health system. The detailed 
descriptions of this secteur provided here serve to illustrate how mental health services are generally 
organised in France.
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mainly in the renovated nineteenth century ’pavilions’, built in the style of large stone 
houses, with three floors and large shuttered windows. The hospital provides in-patient 
psychiatric facilities for adults and children in the fifteen ’secteurs’ of Seine-St-Denis 
departement, and contains a total of about 1,000 patients.
Champagne ward is typical of most wards in the hospital, and its general ambience is 
very similar to wards studied in Britain. Day rooms, a kitchen and dining room and staff 
offices are located on the ground floor, communal bathrooms and bedrooms with two or 
three beds on the first floor, and large meeting rooms used for group activities and staff 
meetings on the second floor. It has an institutional feel and there has been little attempt 
to soften the environment with pictures, plants or other decoration. The ward’s 25 beds 
tend to be fully occupied most of the time. Most patients pass through in a number of 
days or weeks, but there are a few elderly and physically disabled patients whose stays 
are longer term and are well known by all staff. Despite many references by informants 
to improvements in recent years, there are few signs of attempts to animate hospital life. 
Patients can often be seen hanging around in the corridors or day rooms, while staff busy 
themselves with practical tasks or chat to each other in the staff office. In line with the 
majority of nursing staff in the hospital, most nurses on the ward wear white medical 
coats (In my experience, this is highly unusual in British psychiatric wards.) The team 
of ward staff consists entirely of psychiatrists and psychiatric nurses (social workers 
attend the ward for some sessions, but other professionals are located full-time at the 
various community centres). Thus, there is a clear sense of a working environment 
modeled on general medicine.
Clichv-sous-Bois Dav Centre
The ’Centre de Jour’ at Clichy aims to provide flexible daytime support specifically for 
people with long-term mental health problems living in the local community, most of 
whom also attend the CMP for formal psychotherapy or administration of medication. 
The centre has been created in an apartment in one of the rather run down 1960s tower- 
blocks which characterise the local area (a deliberate attempt to shift mental health 
services into the heart of an extremely deprived area). It consists of three large 
communal rooms, a kitchen and a staff office and is open three days a week for four to 
six hours. There is a generally relaxed atmosphere, and activities are not fixed, but
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decided between by staff and clients. They may include cooking a midday meal together, 
having a picnic in the nearby woods (an activity in which I participated), visiting 
museums, parks, and other places of interest, or evening outings to the cinema or theatre. 
The team of professionals (all of whom appear to be highly motivated) consists of three 
psychiatrist and a clinical psychologist who work at the centre part time, and three full­
time psychiatric nurses. During opening hours four or five staff are in attendance, with 
patient numbers varying from less than five to around fifteen.
Montfermeil ’Centre Medico-Psvchologiaue, (CMP)
The CMP is located in a large three storey house just off the main street of Monfermeil. 
A central reception room staffed by two secretaries, a small medical room used for 
injections, a kitchen and a waiting room are housed on the ground floor. Rooms in the 
upper two floors are used for formal one-to-one consultations. The centre is open from 
nine to six on weekdays and on Saturday mornings. Typical of most CMPs, which exist 
now in the majority of psychiatric secteurs in France, its aims are to provide support for 
people with mental health problems living in the community, to prevent hospital 
admissions, and to reintegrate and support patients following discharge from hospital. 
Patients are referred to the CMP mainly by general practitioners, mental health 
practitioners at Ville-Evrard, or by the local general hospital. It is also open to the 
public to ’drop-in’ informally to receive advice about mental health issues (although this 
service remains relatively under-used). Formal one-to-one consultations and domiciliary 
visits form the bulk of the daily work of a multi-disciplinary team of consisting of nurses, 
psychiatrists, a clinical psychologist, and a movement therapist. Psychotherapy is 
conducted by the psychologist and the psychiatrists (several of whom work part time), 
while nurses are involved in a variety of tasks including administering long-acting 
medication and monitoring clients’ mental states and living conditions.
1.2 Secteur 4. Seine-St-Denis
The forth psychiatric secteur of Seine-St-Denis covers an area of the northern suburbs of 
Paris including Dugny, La Coumeuve and Stains. In-patient facilities are provided at 
Ville-Evrard hospital (located about 25km away from the secteur), and there are two
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CMPs and two day centres in the secteur. These operate along similar lines to those 
described above, although with more emphasis on group activities at the CMPs. The 
secteur has a small amount of sheltered accommodation, and also makes use of a family 
placement scheme in which local families house clients for a period of months following 
discharge from hospital. Secteur 4 has generally been more conservative than many 
others in moves to reduce its hospital capacity. Until recently it made use of three 
hospital wards, each with a capacity of 25 beds, although one of these was closed during 
the data collection period. Interviews were conducted with professionals working at the 
CMP in Stains and in the hospital ward (which was broadly similar to the ward describe 
in section 2.1).
1.3 Secteur 1. Paris
The first psychiatric secteur of Paris is responsible for the population of the first and 
second arrondissements of Paris, a central area north of the river. This location brings 
with it specific considerations - an extremely heterogenous and unstable population, and 
problems of homelessness associated with city centres. Hospital facilities (about 130 
beds) are provided at a large psychiatric hospital in Perray-Vaucluse, 30km south of 
Paris. Interviews were conducted with staff working in a community centre in central 
Paris, housed within a large modem building, and containing a CMP / day centre and a 
24 hour drop in centre as well as child / adolescent mental health services. The drop in 
centre aims to be the first port of call for new or existing clients, aiming to assess mental 
health and refer to other services if necessary. It is staffed by a team of 16 psychiatric 
nurses, who have unusually high levels of autonomy and responsibility. The CMP / day 
centre occupies two floors of the centre and aims to provide daily support for chronic 
patients living in the secteur as well as those recently discharged from hospital. A 
canteen provides a mid-day meal and various group activities are organised for long term 
clients by a multi-disciplinary team. More formal one-to-one consultations also take 
place, including various types of psychotherapy and prescription of medication.
2 9 7
2 Britain
Research was conducted in two District Health Authorities in south east London3. These 
areas are racially mixed and fairly deprived, with high levels of unemployment and large 
proportions of council owned housing. Literature produced by the regional health 
authority (SETRHA) suggests that mental health services in this region are generally 
typical of national service provision, and have followed trends similar to those occurring 
throughout the country. In both the districts studied, the data collection period (May to 
December 1993) coincided with major organisational changes involving new managerial 
structures and changing relationships with social service providers.
2.1 West Lambeth
The West Lambeth district covers areas of Brixton, Stockwell and Streatham, and its 
mental health services are under the control of the West Lambeth Community Care NHS 
Trust. The district contains St Thomas’ Hospital, although most of its psychiatric in­
patient beds are located at the South Western Hospital and Tooting Bee psychiatric 
hospital (a large Victorian institution which is being gradually closed down). Several key 
informants regarded the network of community mental health services in West Lambeth 
as poorly developed and failing to meet the specific needs of the local ethnic population.
Interviews in West Lambeth were conducted with staff working at a psychiatric day 
centre located in the grounds of the South Western Hospital in Stockwell. This is a 
small, Victorian hospital containing four adult psychiatric in-patient wards. The Day 
Unit represents a good example of the implementation of community care as envisaged 
by government policies. It is situated in single storey building and consists of a large day 
room containing easy chairs and table-tennis tables, other large rooms used for specific 
group activities, a woodwork and pottery workshop, several smaller rooms for one-to-one 
work, and staff offices. The walls and corridors are decorated with paintings done by 
clients and displays of woodwork and pottery. The overall aims of the Day Unit are to
3 DHAs usually serve a population of between 250,00 and 330,000, an area significantly larger 
than the equivalent ’secteurs’ in France (which cover a population of around 70,000).
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provide day support and treatment-oriented activities to a variety of mentally ill clients 
(staff here always use the term ’client’ rather than ’patient’, and seem generally very 
aware of power issues associated with terminology). A proportion of the clients are long 
term service users, but the majority are relatively short term cases, many of whom are 
referred from the hospital’s acute wards both prior to and following discharge. The 
average length of stay is around six months, following which clients may be referred to 
other community based support services such as community psychiatric nurse teams 
(CPNs) or sheltered workshops. There is an emphasis on helping clients to manage real 
world issue in preparation for more independent life, and there are close links with local 
social services involved in housing and benefits, and with sheltered work agencies. 
Around 60 clients are registered at the Day Unit at any one time. Most clients attend two 
or three days a week, so that around 20 people are present each day.
The daily activities of the Day Unit are very much group based. One-to-one work is 
limited to meetings between clients and key workers, and consultations with the 
psychiatrist to review medication. All the activities are designed to have a therapeutic 
focus rather than being simply time-filing exercises. They include ’work skills groups’ 
using activities such as pottery and woodwork to develop skills needed in a work setting 
(time management, organisation, self discipline etc), informal discussion groups aiming 
to improve social and interactive skills and build self confidence, and psychodynamic 
groups focusing on trust building, self expression and disclosure through discussion and 
creative writing. At the time of interviewing the Day Unit was staffed by a team 
consisting of five full time professionals (three psychiatric nurses and two occupational 
therapists) plus sessional input from a psychiatrist at senior house officer level, a 
registrar, a consultant psychiatrist and a social worker.
2.2 Lewisham and North Southwark
The district of Lewisham and North Southwark covers some of the most deprived areas 
of south London, encompassing an area from Lewisham and New Cross north to the 
river, and as far east as Rotherhithe. Mental health services are provided by Guy’s and 
Lewisham NHS Trust and The Optimum Health Services NHS Trust. Psychiatric in­
patient facilities are located at Guy’s, Hither Green and Bexley hospitals. At the time
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of research, this was complemented by a network of services consisting of social work, 
psychology, psychotherapy and out-patients departments at Guy’s Hospital, several day 
centres, teams of CPNs and case managers, teams focusing on problems of homelessness, 
and alcohol and drug abuse, and a small amount of sheltered accommodation provided 
in conjunction with housing associations. A major reorganisation of community services 
was being planned for the following year (causing much concern amongst staff members). 
Interviews were conducted with professionals working in three locations in this area:- an 
acute admissions ward at the York Clinic at Guy’s Hospital, the Chaucer Day Hospital 
in Rotherhithe, and the Blackfriars Road Resource Centre.
The York Clinic
The York Clinic, a four storey building situated in the grounds of Guy’s Hospital, 
contains two acute adult psychiatric in-patient wards and a ward run according to 
therapeutic community principles. The ward selected for study (one of the two acute 
admissions wards) has 11 beds, in single, two or three bed rooms. The lay out of the 
ward is reminiscent of a medical ward - a nurses station, a day room with easy chairs and 
a television, several rooms for one-to-one work and staff meetings, a treatment room and 
a laundry room. Meals cooked in the main hospital kitchen are eaten in one of the larger 
rooms. Although it is not particularly run down, neither is it a particularly friendly or 
inspiring environment. The ward caters for people suffering from acute episodes of 
confusion or instability, and frequently institutes sections of the Mental Health Act to 
detain people considered to be dangerous to themselves or others. Many patients are 
long-term service users who periodically have short stays in hospital at times of crisis. 
The average length of stay is a few weeks, although this can vary from a few hours 
(when a person is brought in against their will and immediately discharges them self) to 
several months. The catchment area is such that a large proportion of people seen in the 
ward have problems associated with alcohol or drug abuse, homelessness and 
unemployment. This means that staff work closely with local shelters for the homeless, 
social services and the police.
Typical of many psychiatric hospital wards, patients spend much of their time sitting in 
the day room and there is constant close surveillance by staff. Staff try to encourage 
patients to attend occupational therapy work-shops in the main hospital, but there are very
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few group activities organised on the ward. There is relatively high use of medication 
in this context, although attendance at weekly ward rounds confirmed an eclectic 
approach amongst ward staff. At the time of interviewing, the staff team on the ward 
consisted of two psychiatrists and eight nurses. An occupational therapist, a 
psychotherapist, a CPN and a social worker are attached to the team part time while 
working in other community services. My impressions gained from observations of ward 
rounds and time spent on the ward suggest that the staff team is relatively cohesive. 
Weekly meetings to review patients had a relaxed, open and discursive atmosphere, 
informally led by the consultant psychiatrist but with input from all team members and 
much discussion regarding possible formulations of patients’ problems.
Chaucer Dav Hospital
The Chaucer Day Hospital is located in an old single storey building on the site of the 
former St Olave’s Hospital in Rotherhithe, south-east London. It caters for acute and 
long term mental health service users, many of whom have moved on from in-patient 
wards at the York Clinic. Around 90 to 100 clients are on the books at any one time, 
although around 20 usually attend on any one day. Lengths of contact range from a few 
months to several years. The lay out and aims of Chaucer day hospital are similar to the 
Day Centre studied in West Lambeth. The centre is open weekdays 9am to 5pm and 
provides a variety of services with a hot midday meal provided. The main focus is on 
group work, with three or four groups running each day. At the time of interviews the 
groups being run included a small psychotherapy group, art therapy, a creative / drama 
group, anger management, anxiety management, gardening, pottery, media and discussion 
groups and a movement group. Clients are also seen for individual work. For some 
clients, medication is administered by nurses in the form of long-acting ’depot’ injections. 
The staff team is multidisciplinary, including four psychiatric nurses, four occupational 
therapists, a clinical psychologist, an administrator and a secretary. Two psychiatrists 
are attached to the team. Integration with other services is high - most of the staff spend 
at least one day a week working at other services, and clients may be referred to social 
workers at Guy’s hospital, CPNs or case management teams either during or following 
their time at Chaucer.
3 0 1
Blackfriars Road Resource Centre
This is the base for two teams of mental health professionals working with clients living 
in the community. A team of CPNs and a ’Case Management Team4’ provide support 
and monitoring of clients whose mental health problems are mainly long term. The 
centre differs from others studied in that very little direct mental health work occurs at 
the centre. Professionals spend the majority of their time conducting home visits and use 
the centre primarily for team meeting and administration. Domiciliary visits may be 
conducted daily, weekly or less frequently, and involve a range of activities from 
administering long acting psychotropic medication, to checking on state of a person’s flat 
or helping them with benefit claims.
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APPENDIX 2
THE MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONS
9
Psychiatry
Psychiatry is the oldest of the mental health professions and the one that has had the most 
impact on public mental health systems throughout the world. From the earliest ’mad 
doctors’ or ’alienists’ of the seventeenth century to the present day, the medical 
profession has shaped the treatment of the mentally ill, and placed mental distress firmly 
within the domain of ’illness’ and medicine. It is only in the second part of the twentieth 
century, with the professionalisation of other mental health practitioners, that the 
dominance of psychiatry in mental health care has been seriously questioned. Despite 
this, psychiatry still remains the most powerful of all the mental health professions, its 
alliance with medicine giving it considerable social status.
Against a background of significant developments in medical knowledge and 
conceptualisations of the psyche, the history of psychiatry has seen several shifts of 
focus, from a relatively limited view of the body and observable behaviour in the early 
nineteenth century, to a wider focus on the neurological system, the mind and social 
relations during the twentieth century (Prior 1993). Contemporary psychiatry takes the 
principles and practices of general medicine as its starting point (ie a focus on diagnosis 
and classification of specific mental illnesses, and an assumption of distinct and universal 
disease entities which can be treated using interventions impacting on the person’s 
physiology or biochemical systems). However, while a medical model of mental ill 
health has dominated psychiatry historically and remains its closest conceptual ally, 
contemporary psychiatric training schools practitioners in a range of other perspectives 
in which the mentally ill person is seen as a bio-psycho-social entity.
In both France and Britain, psychiatric training can only be begun once a full medical 
training is completed. Psychiatrists are therefore first and foremost doctors whose 
medical training has socialised them as medical practitioners responsible for the 
prescription of medication. This medical responsibility places psychiatrists in a different
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position from all other mental health professionals both legally and socially. Although 
psychiatric nurses are qualified to administer medication, psychiatrists are the only 
professional group who have the power to prescribe medication or other medical 
interventions such as ECT or psychosurgery. Psychiatry in Britain and France is broadly 
similar, the most notable difference being the greater up-take of psychodynamic ideas and 
practices amongst French psychiatrists. Although classic medical approaches to 
psychiatry still dominate, since the late 1960s a significant proportion of French 
psychiatrists have incorporated psychoanalysis into their daily work, either in private 
practice or within the public mental health system.
Clinical Psychology
Clinical psychology developed originally in the first part of the twentieth century to 
provide psychometric support for psychiatry (Prior, 1993). The discipline has 
traditionally been concerned with measurement, observable behaviour and tests of 
intelligence and personality. It is probably the most theoretically oriented profession in 
mental health, attempting to apply psychological theories and principles to the evaluation 
and treatment of mental ill health, and adopting a ’scientific practitioner’ model of work. 
In so doing, clinical psychology has undergone several transformations in recent decades. 
Pilgrim & Treacher (1992) describe these shifts in British clinical psychology as 
constituting four stages:- a concern with psychometrics in the 1950s, a shift towards 
behaviour therapy during the 1960s, therapeutic eclecticism in the 1970s and 
’managerialism’ in the 1980s. These shifts have been accompanied by an increasing 
professionalisation of clinical psychology over the last two decades. Psychologists in 
both France and Britain have fought hard to enhance their status and to institute state- 
endorsed registration and chartered status for the profession. (In both countries, training 
to become a clinical psychologist must be preceded by a degree in psychology and 
involves a minimum of three years further training.)
Although the theoretical contributions of clinical psychology represent a significant 
challenge to the dominance of medical conceptualisations of mental ill health, there has 
always been an imbalance between the conceptual contributions of psychology to expert 
understandings and treatment strategies, and the relatively limited role of clinical
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psychologists in mental health services. In both countries clinical psychology is a 
relatively ’small* profession and there is usually only one psychologist in a multi­
disciplinary mental health team of between ten and thirty other professionals. While the 
status of clinical psychologists in the world of mental health is similar in Britain and 
France, divergences exist in the theoretical approaches adopted on each side of The 
Channel. Contemporary British psychology is dominated by cognitive-behavioural 
interventions. These strategies are virtually unknown in France where clinical 
psychologists usually adopt a psychodynamic approach. Like psychiatrists, the contact 
that clinical psychologists have with mentally clients tends to be time-limited and 
structured around pre-arranged consultations or activities.
Psychiatric Nursing
Historically, the position of psychiatric nurses in institutional mental health settings was 
been as ’guardians* responsible for the administration of medication and the basic 
physical needs of inmates, and employed essentially in a surveillance role. In the 1950s 
a more therapeutic role for psychiatric nurses was first envisaged, but it has only been 
in the last two decades, aided by the gradual shift of mental health services beyond the 
confines of the hospital, that significant professionalisation and changes in the role of 
psychiatric nurses have actually occurred. In France the shift towards a more social and 
therapeutic role for nurses was aided by the socio-political changes of the late 1960s. 
Training in both countries now takes a minimum of three years, with increasing numbers 
of nurses entering the profession at post-graduate level. The last two decades have seen 
the development of a large body of psychiatric nursing theory and literature which has 
borrowed from psychological, psychodynamic and humanist perspectives to develop 
eclectic models of nursing care. Psychiatric nurses have increasingly attempted to 
dissociate themselves from the medical paradigm and to emphasise a psychosocial 
approach to their work (Reynolds & Cormack 1990). Although they share a proportion 
of their training with nurses in general medicine, psychiatric nurses in both France and 
Britain generally consider themselves as a distinct discipline.
Psychiatric nursing constitutes the largest single profession in mental health, although the 
existence of specialisms and professional hierarchies makes for a relatively heterogenous
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professional group. More senior charge nurses or ’infirmiers surveillants’ often have 
considerable managerial responsibilities and power over the day-to-day running of 
services, especially those based in the community. Although psychiatric nurses are 
qualified to administer medication, they rely on psychiatrists for decisions about dosage. 
Compared to other professionals, nurses are the practitioners who spend most time in 
direct contact with mentally ill clients, especially in hospital ward settings.
Psychiatric Social Work
Psychiatric social work first appeared in the first half of the twentieth century as a 
profession concerned with aftercare following hospital admission. The gradual 
integration of social work into mental health services during the 1930s, 40s and 50s is 
accounted for by Prior (1993) in terms of growing beliefs in social factors in the 
aetiology of mental illness, a recognition that mental health problems were widespread 
in the community, and an expansion of the number and types of symptoms that were 
considered within the remit of psychiatry. The development of psychiatric social work 
theory and practice in Britain and France over the last few decades owes much to the 
theoretical perspectives of psychoanalysis, psychology and sociology. The profession has 
not developed its own distinct body of theory, but claims distinctiveness from both 
general social work and other mental health professions on the basis of its knowledge of 
the social welfare system and its specialised practice focused on the social situation of 
mentally ill clients. However, with the growing importance of community based 
professions such as case management and community psychiatric nursing these 
distinctions are becoming increasingly blurred.
The social position of social workers in both France and Britain has traditionally been as 
a profession which is undervalued and frequently the focus of public scrutiny and 
scepticism. Recent shifts towards community based care for the elderly, the mentally ill 
and the disabled have added to this, and have entailed significant increases in social 
workers’ responsibilities for long-term social welfare. Since 1983 in Britain psychiatric 
social work involvement in mental illness has been enshrined in law, with both a 
psychiatrist and a registered social worker being required to agree to compulsory 
detention on the grounds of mental ill health. Social workers in both countries are now
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principally involved in the coordination of services between health and social services 
departments. Their work is diverse and may include, for example, helping mentally 
clients claim sickness benefits, liaising with housing departments, or participating in 
group or therapeutic activities in community services.
Community Psychiatric Nursing
Community psychiatric nurses (CPNs) are psychiatric nurses who have undergone further 
training which qualifies them to take primary responsibility for the long-term monitoring 
of mentally ill people living in the community. CPNs may be responsible for a large 
number of clients in a local area, and typically arrange meetings on a weekly or less 
frequent basis, either in clients’ homes or at a community or hospital based psychiatric 
centre. CPNs work mainly with people with long-term mental illnesses, and the 
profession defines itself as involved in four areas:- assessment and therapeutic input to 
clients and relatives; consultation with other professionals; monitoring the effects of 
psychotropic drugs; and (most definitively) administration of long-acting psychoactive 
injections (White 1993).
Recent shifts towards community based care have meant that superficially at least, the 
roles of CPNs and social workers have appeared to converge. Overlaps in the work of 
social workers and community psychiatric nurses in Britain have been noted by Wooff 
et al (1988) and Sheppard (1990), but both these authors also highlight differences 
between the two professions. Sheppard (1990) notes differences in the knowledge bases 
associated with the two professions: Social workers are more influenced by the social 
sciences, whereas CPNs have a stronger focus on mental illness, with a background tied 
more to medical knowledge. In their daily practice, social workers are more concerned 
with clients’ social relations and work closely with other mental health staff. In 
comparison CPNs focus on symptoms and medication, and work more independently of 
the mental health team, liaising more frequently with general practitioners (Wooff et al, 
1988).
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Occupational Therapy
Since its beginnings in the 1930s, occupational therapy (OT) has always been a periphery 
component of the mental health team. Prior (1993) notes the moral undertones that have 
always been associated with OT, suggesting an implicit belief in the value of work, 
personal discipline and structured, goal-oriented activity, and the dangers of idleness. 
In asylum based mental health services, occupational therapy initially took the form of 
large workshops in which patients were put work on repetitive, unskilled tasks. From 
this shared historical base, OT has moved in different directions in France and Britain. 
In France, occupational therapy never really progressed beyond this non-therapeutic 
production basis. Despite the existence in some psychiatric hospitals of creative OT 
workshops (providing opportunities for pottery, woodwork or painting for example), OT 
in France has never recovered from its negative image as a component of coercive 
institutionalisation (Machto 1989), and has effectively died out as an integral component 
of multi-disciplinary mental health teams. In contrast, OT in Britain has moved through 
several transformations, shifting from a focus on work to the provision of time-filling, 
creative or expressive activities, and in recent years, to a more pragmatic social skills 
orientation. However, in the absence of theoretical specialisation, OT has been unable 
to assert a truly autonomous identity, and has borrowed theoretical principles from 
psychology, in particular behavioural and social skills training models. In contemporary 
mental health services in Britain, occupational therapists work in both hospital and 
community settings. They are typically concerned with two types of activity: Practical 
assessments and improvement of daily living activities (cooking skills, self-care, work 
and social skills for example); and creative / expressive activities. In its focus on social 
and practical skills, occupational therapy is concerned ultimately with individual 
’functioning’ and conforming to social norms.
Case Management
The idea of case management originates in the United States, where it was developed in 
the 1970s as an attempt to overcome the fragmentation of services that accompanied 
community based care. In Britain case management has only become a widely recognised 
profession in the last few years, identified in government policy literature as central to
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community care policies1. In France the profession of case management does not exist.
Case management can be conceived either as a set of tasks performed by practitioners 
from various professional origins, or as an independent profession. In the services in 
Britain used for the current research the second approach is taken. Thus the case 
managers interviewed define themselves as specific professional discipline, although they 
originate from backgrounds in occupational therapy and social work. Case managers are 
principally concerned with the co-ordination of services rather than with their actual 
implementation. Onyett (1992) defines case management as ’a way of tailoring help to 
meet individual need through placing the responsibility for assessment and service 
coordination with one individual worker or team’ (p 3). He identifies five parallel tasks 
of case management:- assessment of an individuals need and strengths; planning; 
implementation of a care strategy by a range of agencies; monitoring; and reviewing the 
outcomes of planned interventions. Case managers typically work with people with long­
term mental health problems living in the community and fulfil the important role of 
ensuring that long-term service users do not ’disappear’, but remain supported and in 
contact with mental health services. Although liaising with mental health teams, social 
services and medical practitioners, case managers tend to work in a relatively autonomous 
fashion. Given the novelty of this profession in the rapidly changing context of 
community care policy implementation, the overlaps and relative roles of case managers, 
CPNs and social workers are variable and unclear, and have yet to be established 
definitively.
Other Professions
Although the seven professional groupings described above form the core of multi­
disciplinary mental health teams in France and Britain, these teams may also include a 
range of other professionals who offer specific individual or group therapies and 
activities. Movement therapists, art therapists, music therapists, and various other types 
of psychotherapists and adult education specialists may be linked to mental health services
1 Department of Health (1990) Caring for People: Community Care in the Next Decade and Beyond. 
HMSO: London.
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(often on a part-time basis), providing specialised interventions in both hospital and 
community locations.
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APPENDIX 3
THEORIES OF MENTAL ILLNESS
1) Medical Perspectives
Medical models draw parallels between mental health problems and somatic illness. 
Mental illness is seen as a consequence of physical or chemical changes in the brain or 
of genetic make up. This perspective makes sense of mental distress by anchoring it 
firmly into medical models developed to understand physical ill health. It suggests an 
approach to mental illness similar to that in general medicine; mental illnesses are 
diagnosed according to established systems of symptomatology, and treated with physical 
interventions, most commonly drugs, but also psychosurgery and electro-convulsive 
therapy (ECT). Medical models have traditionally dominated the psychiatric profession 
internationally, and general acceptance of the term ’mental illness’ betrays the dominance 
of this approach historically in western societies. The discovery of pharmacological 
treatments in the 1950s provided strong support for a medical view of mental illness. 
Although this declined in the 60s and 70s, recent developments in bio-technology have 
rekindled interest in the search for genetic components of mental illnesses.
The traditional medical or psychiatric approach to mental ill health relies heavily on the 
process of differential diagnosis in which manifest signs and symptoms are used as the 
basis for categorising mental distress into specific mental illnesses. Since the 1950s the 
American Psychiatric Association and The World Health Organisation have been 
publishing successively updated versions of diagnostic manuals which are used 
internationally by the psychiatric profession1. DSM-IV (Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders) and ICD-10 (International Classification of Diseases) 
published in 1994 and 1992 respectively are the most recent editions of these manuals. 
These psychiatric systems provide the basis for psychiatric training and the terminology 
of a common language between professionals in the world of mental health. They offer
1 Despite attempts to standardise these diagnostic systems internationally, some of the diagnostic 
categories used in French psychiatry are significantly different from their counterparts in Anglo-American 
psychiatry (Pichot, 1982).
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psychiatrists clear guiding principles in their daily dealings with the mentally ill in 
suggesting, for example, the administration of specific types of medication for specific 
problems). In their contemporary forms, they conceptualise mental illness as a set of 
distinct disorders or abnormalities associated with a theme of loss of self control, and 
offer an essentially individualistic and biological model of the origins and treatment of 
mental distress (Gaines 1992, Light 1982).
Medical approaches to mental illness have come under attack from a variety of 
perspectives, most vigorously from the anti-psychiatry movement, and others critical of 
the dominance of medicine and the social status quo (see Chapter 2, section 2.2). 
Sedgwick (1982a), for example, notes that medical models are based on the assumption 
that illness constitutes abnormality in the sense of statistical deviation from the norm, and 
that this deviation is undesirable and worthy of treatment. He goes on to argue that 
neither of these assumptions stand up to scrutiny. Many commentators (eg Boyle, 1990; 
Gilman, 1988) criticise the lack of attention to cultural and contextual factors in medical 
perspectives, with the consequence that mental health problems are represented as bizarre 
and incomprehensible. They also suggest that medical models are attractive to the public 
and professionals alike, as a way of coping with the threat and fear implicit in 
representations of mental illness. In postulating the origins of mental health problems in 
biology and genetic make-up, they serve to absolve the victim, their family and society 
in general from responsibility; they suggest clear differences between the mentally ill and 
other people, thus serving to enhance a sense of distance from the threat of mental 
illness; and they suggest that the source of this threat can be specifically located and 
contained.
2) Psvchodvnamic2 Perspectives
The writings and theories of Freud provide the basis for this approach. However, the 
multitude of theoretical and therapeutic developments since the appearance of Freud’s 
original work at the beginning of the century, mean that it is more correct to refer to a
2 Although the terms ’psychodynamic’ and ’psychoanalytic’ tend to be used interchangeably, I 
choose to use the term ’psychodynamic’ as it has broader connotations associated with a school of thought 
rather than a specific therapeutic technique.
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’family’ of psychodynamic perspectives. What unites these approaches is an 
understanding of mental illness as a phenomenon involving psychic and unconscious 
processes resulting from emotional traumas or experiences during early development, 
particularly in family or parental relationships. Psychodynamic practice aims to help the 
person become aware of and come to terms with their past experiences and the impact 
these have had on later relationships and experiences, through the reliving of childhood 
emotions during therapy. This can take a variety of forms within an ever expanding 
gamut of techniques which includes long term one-to-one psychoanalysis, short and 
medium term ’talking therapies’, group therapy, therapeutic communities, art therapy, 
drama therapy, movement therapy and so on.
In the context of the current research, it is important to note that there have been 
significant divergences in psychodynamic developments in the English speaking world and 
in France (see for example, Laplanche & Pontalis 1973, Stevens 1983, Turkle 1979). 
The British ’object relations’ school of thought developed through the work of Melanie 
Klein and, later, Winnicot. Essentially, this perspective focuses on the impact of 
emotional experiences infancy, in particular anxiety, aggression and frustration in the 
new-born child. American neo-Freudians including Erich Fromm, Karen Homey and 
Erik Erikson developed perspectives which stressed the impact of cultural context and 
down-played the role of biological determinants. Focusing on the ego and conscious 
experience more than the id and the unconscious, American psychoanalysts developed 
’ego psychology’, a more optimistic and individualistic perspective than European 
approaches, emphasizing the possibilities for individual change and adaptation to social 
reality.
In France psychodynamic developments followed a rather different line, which has tended 
to remain independent of developments in the English speaking world. The core of this 
approach is Jacques Lacan’s significant reinterpretation of Freudian theory in the light 
of structuralist linguistics and semiotics, and as a critique of individualistic American 
approaches. Language is central to Lacanian theory, and it is through language and the 
spoken word of the patient that Lacanian psychotherapists aim to understand non-rational 
aspects of the unconscious, of humanity and of society. Lacan’s suggestions that 
psychoanalysis could be used as a tool to understand not only individual problems, but 
wider societal issues, together with his anti-establishment approach mean that since the
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late 1960s psychodynamic thinking in France has been closely associated with left-wing 
politics and social criticism. As a consequence, there has been a huge proliferation of 
psychodynamic ideas in France, compared to their relatively marginal position in Britain.
3) Social Theories of Mental Illness
Social models of mental illness see the social environment as a crucial aetiological factor 
in mental health problems. Research such as Brown & Harris’ (1978) study into the 
epidemiology of depression among women living in the community suggests that factors 
including unemployment, poverty and lack of social support may act as stressors, 
increasing a person’s vulnerability to mental illness. Attempts to improve a person’s 
social situation, development of strategies to help people cope with social stressors, and 
the provision of a supportive environment are seen as crucial care strategies. Social 
models of mental illness developed in association with left-wing sociological perspectives 
in the 1960s. The theories of the anti-psychiatry movement which fall broadly within this 
perspective, conceptualising mental illness as labelling of deviance or a myth and 
criticising asylum based care, can also be categorised as social theories of mental illness. 
These have been discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.
4) Cognitive-Behavioural Perspectives
Cognitive and behavioural theories of mental illness developed out of psychological 
theories of the 1950s and 1960s. Generally they see mental illness as ways of behaving 
or thinking which have been learned through experiences and relationships in childhood 
and later life. Following this argument, mental illness can be treated by therapy which 
involves modification of behaviour and / or thoughts. Behavioural theories and therapy 
preceded cognitive approaches, drawing on learning theories and behaviourism which 
were dominant in 1950s psychology (eg Eysenck & Rachman, 1964). Shifts toward 
cognitivism in psychology in the 1960s and 1970s produced more cognitive perspectives 
on mental illness. Cognitive therapy (eg Beck, 1967), which attempts to modify thought 
processes and beliefs is a technique commonly used by clinical psychologists in Britain 
in the treatment of depression, phobias and anxiety. The impact of cognitive-behavioural
315
perspectives on mental illness has been much more marginal in France, although there 
are currently signs that this approach is gaining in popularity.
5) Systemic Perspectives
Systemic perspectives on mental health and illness have developed in the last three 
decades and are the youngest of the perspectives presented in this review. Although they 
draw on psychodynamic and psychological approaches, they represent a significant 
departure from the four previous models in their shift of emphasis to an inter-personal 
rather than individual level of explanation. Mental illness is seen as a consequence of 
dysfunctional patterns of communication, especially among family members. Gregory 
Bateson (eg 1972) is usually credited for the original ideas on which this perspective is 
based. Treatment is similarly inter-personal, using family therapy to change dynamics 
between family members (eg Haley, 1967). Although systemic ideas carry increasing 
weight in the field of mental health in both Britain and France, their application to family 
therapy, is a relatively new, but expanding treatment strategy.
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APPENDIX 4
LIST OF INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS
For each respondent their profession and the location of their work are shown. B denotes 
British respondents, F denotes French respondents.
Interviewee Profession 
number
Location 
of work
Geographical
district
B1 psychiatric nurse day centre West Lambeth
B2 occupational therapist day centre West Lambeth
B3 psychiatric charge nurse day centre West Lambeth
B4 psychiatrist hospital & community West Lambeth
B5 clinical psychologist community West Lambeth
B6 psychiatric nurse in-patient ward Lewisham & N Southwark
B7 program worker community West Lambeth
B8 psychiatrist in-patient ward Lewisham & N Southwark
B9 occupational therapist hospital & day centre Lewisham & N Southwark
BIO psychotherapist in-patient ward Lewisham & N Southwark
B ll psychiatric nurse in-patient ward Lewisham & N Southwark
B12 social worker hospital & community Lewisham & N Southwark
B13 social worker hospital & community West Lambeth
B14 psychiatric charge nurse in-patient ward Lewisham & N Southwark
B15 consultant psychiatrist hospital & community Lewisham & N Southwark
B16 community psychiatric nurse community Lewisham & N Southwark
B17 clinical psychologist day centre Lewisham & N Southwark
B18 psychiatric nurse day centre West Lambeth
B19 occupational therapist hospital & day centre Lewisham & N Southwark
B20 movement therapist day centre Lewisham & N Southwark
B21 psychiatrist hospital & community Lewisham & N Southwark
B22 community psychiatric nurse community resource centre Lewisham & N Southwark
B23 clinical psychologist day centre Lewisham & N Southwark
B24 psychiatrist hospital & community West Lambeth
B25 social worker hospital & community Lewisham & Southwark
B26 psychiatric nurse day centre Lewisham & N Southwark
B27 art therapist hospital & day centre Lewisham & N Southwark
B28 psychiatric charge nurse day centre Lewisham & N Southwark
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B29 case manager community resource centre Lewisham & N Southwark
B30 case manager community resource centre Lewisham & N Southwark
FI psychiatric charge nurse 24 hour community centre Secteur 1, Paris
F2 psychiatric nurse 24 hour community centre Secteur 1, Paris
F3 consultant psychiatrist hospital & community Secteur 1, Paris
F4 psychiatric nurse 24 hour community centre Secteur 1, Paris
F5 clinical psychologist 24 hour community centre Secteur 1, Paris
F6 social worker hospital & community Secteur 1, Paris
F7 social worker hospital & community Secteur 1, Paris
F8 psychiatrist hospital & community Sectuer 1, Paris
F9 movement therapist hospital & day centre Secteur 15, Seine-St-Denis
F10 psychiatrist 24 hour community centre Secteur 1, Paris
F l l psychiatric charge nurse day centre Secteur 15, Seine-St-Denis
F12 psychiatric nurse in-patient ward Secteur 15, Seine-St-Denis
F13 psychiatrist in-patient ward Secteur 15, Seine-St-Denis
F14 psychiatric nurse in-patient ward Secteur 15, Seine-St-Denis
F15 psychiatric charge nurse in-patient ward Secteur 4, Seine-St-Denis
F16 social worker hospital & community Secteur 15, Seine-St-Denis
F17 psychiatric nurse day centre Secteur 15, Seine-St-Denis
F18 social worker hospital & community Secteur 15, Seine-St-Denis
F19 nurses union official (former psychiatric nurse) Seine-St-Denis
F20 psychiatrist day centre Secteur 15, Seine-St- Denis
F21 psychiatric nurse day centre Secteur 15, Seine-St-Denis
F22 psychiatric nurse day centre Secteur 15, Seine-St-Denis
F23 clinical psychologist day centre Secteur 15, Seine-St-Denis
F24 psychiatrist in-patient ward Secteur 4, Seine-St-Denis
F25 clinical psychologist hospital & community Secteur 4, Seine-St-Denis
F26 receptionist day centre Secteur 15, Seine-St-Denis
F27 social worker hospital & community Secteur 4, Seine-St-Denis
F28 psychiatric nurse in-patient ward Secteur 4, Seine-St-Denis
F29 psychiatric nurse day centre Secteur 4, Seine-St-Denis
F30 clinical psychologist day centre Secteur 15, Seine-St-Denis
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APPENDIX 5 
INTERVIEW TOPIC GUIDE
(Specific probes generated by main questions not included)
A: Daily Practice
- Can you describe to me what your day-to-day work with patients/clients consists of?
- What is your aim in the work you do with patients/clients? What are you trying to 
achieve?
- Is your work based on certain theoretical models?
- What other factors to you think it is important to consider beyond theory in your 
practical day-to-day work?
- In general how happy would you say you are with the outcomes of your work for 
clients / patients?
- What do you think is the best way to care for and treat those with mental illness? (in 
an ideal world)
- What personal qualities do you think are needed to be a good professional in mental 
health?
B: Mental Illness
- For you personally, what is mental illness? / How would you describe mental ill health?
- What do you think could be the causes of mental illnesses?
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- What do you think of the concept of cure in relation to mental illnesses?
C: The Service
- In general how happy are you with care and treatment strategies which are used in this 
service?
- If it was up to you, what changes would you like to make?
D; Community Care (British respondents only)
- How has the introduction of community care influenced your work over the last few 
years?
- Where does your knowledge of community care come from?
- What do you see as the theoretical and historical origins of community care policies?
- How do you see the state of community care at the moment?
- How do you see the future of community care?
- Do you think that community care could work successfully in an ideal world?
- What changes would have to occur for community care to work successfully?
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APPENDIX 6
LIST OF NODES CREATED IN OSR-NUDIST 
DURING DATA ANALYSIS
(1) Background (demographic data for respondents)
(11) /background/profession
( 11 1 ) /background/profession/psychiatrist
( 1 1 2 ) /background/profession/psychologist
(1 1 3) /background/profession/nurse
(1 14) /background/profession/social worker
(1 1 5) /background/profession/other
( 11 6 ) /background/profession/charge nurse
(1 17) /background/profession/OT
(1 1 8) /background/profession/ CPN
(1 19) /background/profession/case manager
(1 2) /background/place
(12  1) /background/place/france
(12  11) /background/place/france/secteurl
(12  12) /background/place/france/secteurl5
(12  13) /background/place/france/secteur4
(1 2 2) /background/place/britain
(12  2 1) /background/place/britain/lambeth
(1 2 2 2) /background/place/britain/southwark
(1 3) /background/location
(13 1) /background/location/hospital
(13  2) /background/location/community
(13  3) /background/location/both
(2) Daily Practice
(3) Treatments
(3 1) /treatments/medication
(3 1 1) /treatments/medication/cited
(3 12) /treatments/medication/used
(3 1 3) /treatments/medication/comments
(3 2) /treatments/psychotherapy
(3 2 1) /treatments/psychotherapy/cited
(3 2 2) /treatments/psychotherapy/used
(3 2 3) /treatments/psychotherapy/comments
(3 3) /treatments/relationship
(3 3 1) /treatments/relationship/cited
(3 3 2) /treatments/relationship/used
(3 3 3) /treatments/relationship/comments
(3 4) /treatments/cognitive and behaviour therapy
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(3 4 1) /treatments/cognitive and behaviour therapy/cited
(3 4 2) /treatments/cognitive and behaviour therapy /used
(3 4 3) /treatments/cognitive and behaviour therapy/comments
(3 5) /treatments/family therapy
(3 5 1) /treatments/family therapy/cited
(3 5 2) /treatments/family therapy/used
(3 5 3) /treatments/family therapy/comments
(3 6) /treatments/groups
(3 6 1) /treatments/groups/cited
(3 6 2) /treatments/groups/used
(3 6 3) /treatments/groups/comments
(3 7) /treatments/counselling
(3 7 1) /treatments/counselling/cited
(3 7 2) /treatments/counselling/used
(3 7 3)
(4) Models
/treatments/counselling/comments
(5) Assessment
(5 1) /assessment/mental illness
(5 2) /assessment/social situation
(5 3) / assessment/treatment
(5 4) /assessment/need
(5 5) /assessment/diagnosis
16) Aims
(6 1) /aims/help cope
(6 2) /aims/understanding
(6 2 1) /aims/understanding/professional
(6 2 2) /aims/understanding/patient
(6 3) /aims/assessment
(6 4) /aims/support
(6 5) /aims/accept or manage illness
(6 6) /aims/reduce distress
(6 7) /aims/cure
(6 7 1) /aims/cure/no
(6 7 2) /aims/cure/yes
(6 8) /aims/life quality
(6 9) /aims/change
(6 10) /aims/others
(6 10 1) /aims/others/social circumstances
(6 10 2) /aims/others/psychic structure
(6 10 3) /aims/others/resolve problems
(6 10 4) /aims/others/listen
(6 10 5) /aims/others/social acceptance
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(6 10 6) /aims/others/crisis management
(7) Outcomes
(8) Role
(8 1) /role/psychiatrists
(8 2) /role/psychologists
(8 3) /role/nurses
(8 4) /role/social worker
(8 5) /role/charge nurse
(8 6) /role/occupational therapist
(8 7) /role/CPN
(8 8) /role/case manager
(8 9) /role/other
(8 10) /key worker
(9) Personal
(9 1) /personal /qualities
(9 1 1) /personal /qualities/respect
(9 12) /personal /qualities/openness
(9 1 3) /personal /qualities/listening
(9 14) /personal /qualities/empathy
(9 15) /personal /qualities/interpersonal
(9 16) /personal /qualities/patience
(9 17) /personal /qualities/stability
(9 2) /personal /stressors
(9 2 1) /personal /stressors/uncertainty
(9 2 2) /personal /stressors/mental illness
(10) Professionals
(10 1) /professionals/psychiatrists
(10 2) /professionals/nurses
(10 3) /professionals/psychologists
(10 4) /professionals/charge nurses
(10 5) /professionals/social workers
(10 6) /professionals/case managers
(10 7) /professionals/occupational therapist
(10 8) /professionals/CPN
(10 9) /professionals/others
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(11) System
(11 1) /system/community care
(11 1 1) /system/community care/Britain
(11 1 1 1) /system/community care/Britain/present
(11 1 1 2) /system/community care/Britain/future
(11 1 1 3) /system/community care/Britain/resources
(11 1 1 4) /system/community care/Britain/knowledge
(11 1 2) /system/community care/france
(11 1 2 1) /system/community care/france/present
(11 1 2 2) /system/community care/france/future
(11 1 2 3) /system/community care/france/resources
(112) /system/teams
(11 3) /system/wider system
(11 3 1) /system/wider system/constraint
(11 3 2) /system/wider system/conflict
(11 3 3) /system/wider system/therapeutic
(12) Mental illness
(12 1) /mental illness/fragility
(12 1 1) /mental illness/fragility/mentally ill
(12 1 2) /mental illness/fragility/everyone
(12 2) /mental illness/difference
(12 2 1) /mental illness/difference/no
(12 2 2) /mental illness/difference/yes
(12 3) /mental illness/unclear definition
(12 4) /mental illness/functioning
(12 4 1) /mental illness/functioning/type of coping
(12 4 2) /mental illness/functioning/not coping
(12 5) /mental illness/neuroses
(12 6) /mental illness/psychoses
(12 7) /mental illness/distress
(12 8) /mental illness/understanding
(12 9) /mental illness/medical model
(12 10) /mental illness/comments
(12 10 1) /mental illness/comments/lay views
(12 10 2) /mental illness/comments/on question
(12 10 3) /mental illness/comments/joking
(12 10 4) /mental illness/comments/on the term
(12 11) /mental illness/loss of control
(12 12) /mental illness/others
(12 13) /mental illness/unpredictability
(12 14) /mental illness/insight
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(13) Causes
(13 1) /causes/multiple
(13 2) /causes/don’t know
(13 3) /causes/depends
(13 3 1) /causes/depends/on person
(13 3 2) /causes/depends/on illness
(13 4) /causes/childhood Rs
(13 5) /causes/biological
(13 5 1) /causes/biological/not biology
(13 6) /causes/social
(13 7) /causes/others
(13 7 1) /causes/others/psychoanalysis
(13 7 2) /causes/others/susceptibility
(13 7 3) /causes/others/stress
(13 7 3 8) /causes/others/stress/life events
(13 7 7) /causes/others/drugs alcohol
(14) Cure
(14 1) /cure/yes
(14 1 1) /cure/yes/types of illness
(14 1 2) /cure/yes/how
(14 1 2 1) /cure/yes/how/management
(14 1 2 2) /cure/yes/how/understanding
(14 1 2 3) /cure/yes/how/psychotherapy
(14 1 2 4) /cure/yes/how/motivation
(14 2) /cure/no
(14 2 1) /cure/no/if not, what
(14 2 1 1) /cure/no/if not, what/functioning
(14 2 1 2) /cure/no/if not, what/understanding
(14 2 1 3) /cure/no/if not, what/stability
(14 2 1 4) /cure/no/if not, what/others
(14 2 1 5) /cure/no/if not, what/support
(14 2 1 6) /cure/no/if not, what/work towards
(14 2 1 7) /cure/no/if not, what/recover
(14 2 1 8) /cure/no/if not, what/remission
(14 2 1 9) /cure/no/if not, what/reduce suffering
(14 2 1 10) /cure/no/if not, what/change
(14 2 1 11) /cure/no/if not, what/managing
(14 2 1 12) /cure/no/if not, what/ care for
(14 2 1 13) /cure/no/if not, what/feel better
(14 2 2) /cure/no/types of illness
(14 2 3) /cure/no/why not
(14 2 3 1) /cure/no/why not/mental illness
(14 2 3 2) /cure/no/why not/seriousness
(14 2 3 3) /cure/no/why not/fragility
(14 2 3 4) /cure/no/why not/lack knowledge
(14 2 3 5) /cure/no/why not/not in experience
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(14 3) /cure/definition
(14 3 1) /cure/definition/uncertain
(14 3 2) /cure/definition/functional
(14 3 3) /cure/definition/symptom reduction
(14 3 3 1) /cure/definition/symptom reduction/yes
(14 3 3 2) /cure/definition/symptom reduction/no
(14 3 4) /cure/definition/relation to other definitions
(14 3 4 1) /cure/definition/relation to other definitions/of causes
(14 3 4 2) /cure/definition/relation to other definitions/of normality
(14 3 4 3) /cure/definition/relation to other definitions/mental illness
(14 3 5) /cure/definition/conflict resolution
(14 3 6) /cure/definition/restructuring
(14 3 7) /cure/definition/reduce suffering
(14 3 8) /cure/definition/live with others
(14 3 9) /cure/definition/stability
(14 3 10) /cure/definition/change
(14 3 11) /cure/definition/defined by patient
(14 3 12) /cure/definition/acceptance
(14 4) /cure/use of term
(14 4 1) /cure/use of term/medical
(14 4 2) /cure/use of term/impact on patient
(14 4 3) /cure/use of term/professionals
(14 5) /cure/of interest
(14 5 1) /cure/of interest/joking
(14 5 3) /cure/of interest/not the aim
(14 6) /cure/depends on illness
(99) Strings (text searches for specific words)
(99 1) /strings/therapies
(99 1 1) /strings/therapies/psychoanalysis
(99 1 1 1) /strings/therapies/psychoanalysis/freud
(99 1 1 2) /strings/therapies/psychoanalysis/psychoanalysis
(99 1 1 3) /strings/therapies/psychoanalysis/lacan
(99 1 2) /strings/therapies/medication
(99 1 2 1) /strings/therapies/medication/medicament
(99 1 2 2) /strings/therapies/medication/chimeotherapie
(99 1 3) /strings/therapies/cognitive
(99 1 3 1) /strings/therapies/cognitive/cognitif
(99 1 3 2) /strings/therapies/cognitive/comportment
(99 2) /strings/illnesses
(99 2 1) /strings/illnesses/depression
(99 2 2) /strings/illnesses/schizophrenia
(99 2 3) /strings/illnesses/mania
(99 2 4) /strings/illnesses/phobia
(99 2 5) /strings/illnesses/anxiety
(99 2 6) /strings/illnesses/obsession
(99 2 7) /strings/illnesses/psychosis
(99 2 8) /strings/illnesses/neurosis
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(99 4) /strings/coping
(99 4 1) /strings/coping/french
(99 4 2) /strings/coping/british
(99 5) / strings/vulnerability
(99 6) /strings/listening
(99 6 1) /strings/listening/french
(99 6 2) /strings/listening/british
(99 7) /strings/stability
(99 8) /strings/relationship
(101) Not coded
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APPENDIX 7
CLUSTER ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES
The multivariate quantitative analyses employed in this thesis are based on the 
recommendations of two commonly used texts on multivariate analysis (Everitt & Dunn 
1991, and Manly 1986) and were conducted using SPSS. The technique of hierarchical 
cluster analysis was chosen as an appropriate way to identify relatively homogenous and 
distinct groups of variables (Chapter 6) or cases (Chapter 8) on the basis of variations 
on multiple quantitative measures. The analyses reported in these two chapters are 
based on the same quantitative data set derived from codes developed in QSR-NUDIST. 
Binary variables corresponding to the presence or absence of a code in each 
respondents' interview transcript were created for twenty three variables relating to four 
key aspects of professional representations:- conceptual understandings of mental ill 
health; causal models; perceived goals of mental health work; and practical treatment 
strategies. The table below lists these variables and the names used in the cluster 
analytic techniques which follow.
There are a number of different techniques for conducting cluster analysis, and as there 
is no one generally accepted 'best method' (Manly, 1986), a common strategy is to 
employ several methods to ensure that results are not an artefact of the specific 
algorithms employed. Accordingly, the analyses reported below were repeated using 
three of the most commonly used techniques (within-group linkage method, between- 
groups linkage method, and Ward's methods) calculated using Euclidean distance 
measures (recommended by Manly, 1986).
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Names and definitions of twenty-three key variables used in cluster analyses
THEMATIC AREA VARIABLE
NAME
DEFINITION
Conceptual 
Understandings 
of mental illness
DIFFQUAL
DIFFQANT
DISRUPTN
DISTRESS
Mental illness as:
- Qualitative difference
- Quantitative difference
- Disruption
- Distress
Causal Models of 
mental illness
BIOLOGY
CHILDRS
STRESS
SOCIAL
FRAGILE
- Biological / genetic
- Childhood experiences or early 
relationships
- Stress
- Social Causes
- ‘Fragility’
Perceived goals of 
mental health work
ASSESS
UNDPROF
SUPPORT
REDDISTR
LIVEWITH
LIFEQUAL
CHANGE
UNDPATNT
- Assessment
- Understanding by the 
professional
- Provision of support
- Reduction of distress
- Helping clients to live with 
mental health problems
- Improving quality of life
- Bringing about change
- Helping person to understand 
their problems
Treatment
Strategies
MEDICATE
RELATE
GROUPS
PSYCHOTH
COUNSEL
COGBEHAV
- Medication
- Developing relationships
- Group work
- Psychotherapies
- Counselling
- Cognitive-behavioural therapy
Cluster Analysis on Variables (Chapter 6)
This analysis is based on co-occurrences of variables within the whole interview 
transcript for each respondent, and as such, is a somewhat crude analysis which cannot 
pick up how variable are positioned in relation to each other within each interview 
narrative. However, as I have argued in Chapter 4, through its ability to systematically 
investigate a large data corpus, quantitative analysis such as this can provide useful 
indications of patterns and inter-relationships to supplement qualitative analysis.
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Dendograms produced by clustering the twenty three variables using three different 
methods (Ward’s method, between group linkage method, and within group linkage 
method) are presented below (these are taken from SPSS output). In these graphical 
representations of the cluster analysis process, the larger the rescaled distance (right 
hand side of the horizontal axis) the more distinct is any given cluster. Conversely, 
linear links between variables or groups of variables which occur close to the left-hand 
side of these diagrams indicate similarities between variables. Cluster analysis works 
by successively dividing the set of variables into two groups, then three groups and so 
on until no more divisions can be made. The first (and most distinct) divisions are 
indicated in dendograms by separations on the right hand side of the diagrams 
(corresponding to the highest distance scores).
For all three analytic methods, three relatively consistent clusters of variables are 
produced. The most robust and distinct cluster (in term of the fact that its components 
do not vary between methods and it emerges as distinct from other variables relatively 
‘early’ in the analytic process) is a cluster consisting of the use of professional client 
relationships as a treatment strategy (RELATE) and causal models of mental illness 
combining the impact of childhood experiences (CHILDRS) and biological or genetic 
factors (BIOLOGY). For all three techniques, this cluster is the first to separate from 
the rest of the other variables. Qualitative analysis and various quantitative indicators 
including the relatively frequent co-occurrence of these variables across all interviews, 
and the statistical significance of correlations with the other two models of care (see 
below, and footnote 9 of Chapter 6), suggest that this cluster can be interpreted as a 
‘generic’ model of professional practice.
The other two clusters which emerge later in the analytic process are most clearly 
represented in the dendogram produced using Ward’s method. The ‘long-term care’ 
cluster consists of 15 variables including the use of various ‘talking therapies’ 
(PSYCHOTH, COUNSEL, COGBEHAV) and practical aims associated with living 
with the enduring existence of mental health problems (LIVEWITH, LIFEQUAL, 
UNDPATNT for example). Conceptualisations of mental illness as disruption and as an 
exaggeration of ‘normal’ experiences are also included in this cluster (DISRUPTN, 
DIFFQANT). The majority of these variables (13) are present as a stable ‘core’ within
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* * * * * * h i e r a r c h i c a l  c l u s t e r  a n a l y s i s * * * * * *
Dendrogram using Average Linkage (Within Group)
Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
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The third cluster is made up o f five variables which appear to relate to ‘crisis 
intervention’ strategies. The use o f medication (MEDICATE), the reduction o f distress 
and provision o f support (REDDISTR, SUPPORT), and a model of mental illness as 
distress and qualitative difference (DISTRESS, DIFFQUAL) are included in this 
cluster.
Following this identification o f three clusters o f variables and their interpretation as 
three models of professional practice, further analysis focused on answering two 
specific questions:
i) How are the three models o f professional practice related
In order to answer this question, at least in part, using quantitative analyses, new 
variables were created for each model of practice by summing the variables contained 
within each cluster. As this analysis is based on binary data representing the presence or 
absence of a variable in a given interview transcript, it would then be possible for 
individuals to score between 0 and 15 on Tong term care’ (which consists of 15 
variables), between 0 and 5 for ‘crisis intervention’ and so on. Spearmans rank
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within each cluster. As this analysis is based on binary data representing the presence or 
absence of a variable in a given interview transcript, it would then be possible for 
individuals to score between 0 and 15 on ‘long term care’ (which consists of 15 
variables), between 0 and 5 for ‘crisis intervention’ and so on. Spearmans rank 
correlations were then calculated for pairs of variables using these new scores for all 60 
interview respondents. The results of this were statistically significant correlations 
between the ‘generic’ model and the two other models (p<0.05), but not between ‘long­
term care’ and ‘crisis intervention’ models. This adds further support to the suggestion 
that the first cluster represents a ‘generic’ model of care which underpins both other 
working strategies.
iif Are models of practice associated with professional status, nationality or location of 
work?
In order to answer this question, the derived scores described in i) for each of the three 
models of practice were ranked for all 60 respondents. ‘Low scoring’ and ‘high scoring’ 
groups of respondents for each model were identified as the lowest and highest quartiles 
of the distribution (in other words, the top and bottom 25% of the sample of 60 
respondents, corresponding to 15 respondents in each group). The make-up of each of 
these high and low scoring groups was then investigated. If models of practice were 
associated with specific professional disciplines, locations of work or nationality, one 
would expect these high and low scoring groups to differ from each other in their make­
up and / or to be made up of particular groups of respondents. Essentially, the results of 
these investigations did not reveal any significant patterns or associations between 
derived quantitative scores relating to models of care and ‘demographic’ variations 
within the interview sample (nationality, professional discipline and location of work).
Cluster Analysis on Cases (Chapter 8^
Cluster analysis on cases was done using the twenty three key variables listed and 
defined in the table above. As with the analysis above clustering by variables, three 
different analytic methods of clustering (Ward’s method, between group linkage and 
within group linkage) were conducted and compared. The dendograms which represent
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the results of these are presented below (see above for an explanation of how these 
diagrams should be interpreted). Cases 1 to 30 refer to British respondents, and 31 to 
60 are French respondents (corresponding to the labels of FI to F30 in the rest of the 
thesis). Details of professional disciplines and locations of work can be found in 
Appendix 4.
Essentially, as these dendograms show, no consistent clusters of cases emerge from 
these analyses. The solutions generated by each analytic method are so different as to 
suggest that these are simply an artefact of each method rather than the detection of any 
'real' groupings within the sample of respondent. As Everitt & Dunn (1991, pl23) 
note, 'clustering techniques will generate a set of clusters even when applied to random, 
un-clustered data'. No meaningful and reliable way of clustering interview respondents 
emerges from this quantitative analysis.
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* * * * * * H I E R A R C H I C A L  c l u s t e r  a n a l y s i s * * * * *
Dendrogram using Average Linkage (Between Groups)
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* * * * * * h i e r a r c h i c a l  c l u s t e r  a n a l y s i s * * * * * *
Dendrogram using Average Linkage (Within Group)
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